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Abstract 
 The conventional wisdom on the evolution of copyright and what has shaped it 
has come under increasing strain in recent years. As technical innovation pushes for 
reforms, the results are increasingly subject to political debate and tension. Examining 
how copyright has evolved and what has driven the process is of key importance 
because of the economic importance of copyright to individual countries. In the light of 
this and to contribute to possible solutions, it is necessary to examine what or who has 
driven the process. To do this, the evolution of copyright polices has to be mapped in a 
comparative way. 
 This thesis examines the evolution of copyright in Germany, the US, the UK and 
at an international level between 1880 and 2010. The analysis itself is split between 
the culture and stringency of policies. Culture refers to the overall approach to 
copyright while stringency covers the scope of protection. This approach is original 
because it allows for a comparison of copyright systems as neutrally as possible. The 
results are clearly quantifiable and more importantly the extent of evolutions is 
directly comparable. Furthermore, the nature of the data ensures that causal forces 
behind the pattern can be examined.  
 This methodology will be applied to a number of propositions commonly found 
in the copyright literature. The focal point here will be on arguments of rising 
stringency levels over time and the cultural convergence between case studies. For 
these, the commonly argued causal forces, in particular technological innovation and 
the influence exercised by individual actors will be examined. The results show that 
neither the cultural or stringency evolutionary pattern nor the causal factors fully 
matches previous studies. First, the evolution of stringency levels has been more 
complex than previously argued. In addition, although there has been some degree of 
cultural convergence, this has not been caused by technology and even the influence 
of particular actors has been limited. In both cases, it is clear that the role of copyright 
exemptions has been under-theorised.  
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Part 1: Introduction 
1. Introduction 
In 2004, the world of copyright owners, users and scholars was shaken by the 
actions of Google. Google started to digitise complete books to make them at least 
partially available online.1  The scanning affected books in and out of copyright and 
was carried out without the explicit consent of the copyright holders. It was clear that 
the project has significant merit for the public because books are fully search-able and 
those out of copyright accessible. However, it also presented the copyright owners 
with a significant loss of control. Although Google acted in the US, the debate crossed 
national boundaries and inspired debate across the world.2  
Copyright has been subject to vivid debates over recent years. The Google Book 
Project illustrates all of the major debates surrounding the development of copyright 
in recent years. First and foremost, the project is a reflection of the challenges that 
new technologies bring to copyright. Copyright is designed to benefit authors by giving 
them control over some of the economic uses of the works (G. Davies 2002: 14- 15). 
New technology places a demand on it because it enables a use not envisaged in the 
legislation or case law before this point. As a result, copyright owners feel they are 
loosing out economically as others free-ride on their work and react by demanding 
more protection (B. Kernfeld 2011). It has been argued extensively in the literature 
that copyright protection has been significantly expanded over time as a result (J. 
Ginsburg 1990a; J. Ginsburg 2001; L. Lessig 2004; J. Campbell 2006; C. Seville 2006; I. 
Alexander 2007) .  
This argumentation also illustrates a wider copyright debate: the unauthorised 
use of works. Google Books has scanned the books without the explicit permission of 
                                                          
1
 Books which are in copyright are only accessible online in snippets (three lines long extracts) while 
those out of copyright are fully accessibly.  
2
 The issue affects all countries, not least because works are held in libraries with which Google 
cooperates. For a fairly large selection of international press coverage on the issue, please see: (Google 
2013b). For an influential German view on the issue: (Die Zeit 2013). Discussions have also occurred at 
EU level (Union European 2009; E. Miller 2009). Finally, it should noted that there has is a high-profile 
cooperation with between the British Library and Google’s project (British Library 2011). 
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the authors. From the copyright owners’ point of view, Google is a pirate and therefore 
similar to those who illegally download songs or movies online. Copyright owners have 
argued that piracy, especially online piracy, has had a major detrimental impact on 
their business. For example, the motion picture alone claimed a lose in 1998 of $1.42 
billion (S. Wang 2003: 26). The response has been a coordinated lobbying effort for 
stronger protection nationally and internationally (J. Barnes 1974: 115; W. Cornish 
1993: 47; J. Braithwaite et al. 2000: 44; S. Ricketson et al. 2006: 20). These pressures in 
turn again pushed towards a strengthening of copyright.  
 Despite these pushes for stronger protection worldwide, the responses across 
countries to Google’s actions have varied significantly. International multilateral 
coordination in the field of copyright has a long standing tradition, starting with the 
1886 Berne Convention. In response, it has been argued that copyright systems have 
converged: their approach to the issue of what should be protected and how has 
become more similar over time (F. Grosheide 1994: 204; J. Sterling 2003: 17; H. 
MacQueen et al. 2008: 41; S. von Lewinski 2008: 63). However, Google Books is one 
but not the only example of how new technology has been met with a different 
response. In the EU, Google’s actions were deemed inappropriate (European 
Commission 2009; M. Barnier 2012). At the same time though, the benefit to the 
public is too clear to be ignored. The EU’s response was its own digitisation project 
(Europeana). Copyright has proven to be a hurdle here. Progress is slow and uneven 
and in practice, only those works out of copyright are scanned (European Commission 
2008; European Commission 2009). In sum, Google Books shows how copyright still 
varies. 
These variations in response occur despite similar levels of protection. The US, 
EU and Japan have all an interest in strong intellectual property protection (J. 
Braithwaite et al. 2000: 66). They advocated stronger protection for intellectual 
property rights internationally, including copyright. For example, they ensured that 
detailed copyright provisions, especially on enforcement, were included in the TRIPs 
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agreement (World Trade Organisation 1994: Part III). These provisions reflect the 
scope of copyright protection: the particular uses and sanctions applicable to copyright. 
However, as the different response to Google has demonstrated, this is not the same 
as the underlying understanding of what copyright should be doing and how. If they 
were, then the different responses should not have been observable. Instead, the 
approach to copyright is reflected not in the presence of particular provisions but how 
they link with each other. Therefore, it is necessary to treat the scope of protection 
independently from how they link.  
 Google Books also shows the other side of copyright protection. Copyright is 
not a goal in itself but also aims at the dissemination of works. The public benefit is 
served because the more works are available, the more the public benefits (J. Ginsburg 
1990b: : 933). By digitising works and making those out of copyright freely accessible, 
the range of books usable in practice is extended significantly (Electrontic Frontier 
Foundation 2009). Therefore, the Google Book Project also illustrates the public good 
side of copyright: the potential of more accessible works. This concern with access has 
significant economic implications in practice. Europe for example is consciously trying 
to facilitate its transformation to a Knowledge Society. This is in recognition that the 
innovation based on existing works has a significant economic value and therefore 
have a real impact on the competitiveness of the EU and its member states (European 
Commission 2008) However, these benefits come at a cost to copyright owners. 
Innovation is stifled by giving copyright owners too much control (R. Anderson 1998: 
660). 
 This limiting influence of copyright has increasingly gained attention at the 
national and international level. The public benefit in the Google Books project is clear, 
as is the hindering of the copyright system.3 There is an increasingly vocal group of 
users and copyright specialists who argue that copyright protection today is too 
extensive (L. Lessig 2004; J. Gantz et al. 2005). As a result, it is not supporting 
                                                          
3
 This is especially visible in the limited progress made in Europe. See for example: (European 
Commission 2008; European Commission 2009). 
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innovation but rather preventing it (L. Bently et al. 2009: 35). In response, user groups 
have increasingly started to oppose the strengthening of copyright (J. Borland 2003; 
Research Institute of Public Policy 2006; A. Moore 2012; Hamburger 
Verbraucherschutzzentrale 2012). However, some have gone even further. In some 
circles, copyright is rejected as a principle (M. Svensson et al. 2012: 3). There were 
even widespread street protests over the ACTA agreement (D. Lee 2012). Overall, 
growing resistance to copyright as a principle and the particular form it takes has 
increased the political salience of the issue.  
In conclusion, copyright has evolved over time. Much of the change has been in 
response to technological change and resistance by copyright owners to unauthorised 
uses. Authors agree that copyright protection has expanded but they differ on the 
degree of this change. Not everybody agrees that the balance between users and 
copyright owners has tilted. In addition, despite the long history of international 
coordination and the convergence arguably resulting from it, the responses to 
technological challenges still vary significantly. In sum, Google Books is one instance 
when the major contemporary questions about copyright have come to the forefront. 
First, who benefits from copyright and has this changed over time? Secondly, is there 
one understanding of copyright or do they vary across countries? 
 
1.1 Importance 
 These questions about how copyright has evolved are especially pressing now. 
First, governments have an inherent interest in protecting their copyright-reliant 
industries. These are a major pillar of Western economies. In the US, copyright 
industries contribute 7.75% ($791.2billion) of the GDP in 2001 and their growth has 
been twice as fast as the rest of the economy (S. Wang 2003: 24).  In this light, it is 
argued that strong copyright protection is essential to economic development and 
growth (S. Wang 2003; Copyright Review Committee 2012). Therefore, instances of 
piracy need to be tackled as efficiently as possible because they affect the economic 
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prospects of a country. As a result, the preferences of copyright owners have 
significant political clout: protecting the economic value and exploitability of works has 
been considered paramount (L. Lessig 2004; B. Kernfeld 2011). Given the importance 
of the internet, this mind-set also has repercussions for other countries and the 
international coordination. For example, the US has increasingly resorted to bilateral 
action both via its own trade processes but also in instances such as the Megaupload 
case4 (J. Braithwaite et al. 2000; M. Brown 2012). In sum, the copyright issue is 
important because the economic value attributed to it affects the behaviour of states.  
Secondly, copyright has a significant economic value for the future. Western 
countries perceive themselves as Knowledge Societies where economic value is the 
result of innovation and intellectual creation (European Commission 1990; European 
Commission 2008). However, both new creations and especially technological 
innovation often challenge existing copyright provisions and the benefit the public and 
owners can derive from these innovations crucially depends on how the policy-makers 
and courts react to them (L. Lessig 2004: 77). These kinds of responses however 
depend on the larger purpose and approach to copyright within a particular 
jurisdiction. In conclusion, copyright is important for the economic structure of the 
future. 
 Thirdly, the copyright issue has become increasingly politicised. Copyright 
owners and increasingly vocal users have entered the political arena. While the first 
group pushes for more protection, the consumer groups have increasingly advocated 
reforms to account for their needs.5 The support for copyright among users has fallen 
in response to increasingly invasive copyright provisions (J. Borland 2003; L. Lessig 
2004: 200; J. Gantz et al. 2005: 83, 205; B. Kernfeld 2011: 211). Mobilisation has not 
been limited to the shape of copyright but also the concept as such. High profile 
                                                          
4
 In this series of events, the US took action in cooperation against the online file storage Megaupload 
and its owner. The owner lived in new Zealand at the time and although it cooperated with the New 
Zealand police, it was the FBI and therefore the US which was the main driving force (G. Sandoval 2012). 
5
 The 1998 Digital Millennium Act is a good example: its exemption provisions reflect the specific needs 
of narrow user groups, for example libraries and encryption researchers (US 1998). 
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opposition by groups such as Anonymous and their glorification in parts of the internet 
community shows a similar trend (BBC 2011; A. Moore 2012; Hamburger 
Verbraucherschutzzentrale 2012). The result has been and is significant political 
conflict. This was reinforced by the media. The copyright issue and the importance of 
reforms have entered the main stream media in the wake of the ACTA protests. In sum, 
copyright is a major political issue.  
 Finally, the pressure to investigate the evolution is especially rising because 
major copyright reforms are in the pipeline. For example, the US is currently holding 
hearings on the issue. Similarly, Germany’s copyright act is 48 years old (1965) and 
even the UK has not seen a major reform since 1988. All of these predate the digital 
age and were therefore written in a different context from today’s world.  
 In conclusion, examining how copyright has evolved in the past is especially 
important now because reform debates are in the political space. In addition, 
economic interests are increasingly split between traditional copyright industries and 
the needs of new businesses relying on innovation under the Knowledge Society. This 
is in the context of increasing user opposition. To contribute to this important debate, 
it is essential to understand the impact of past reforms. This is also a prerequisite for 
an evidence-based policy.  
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1.2 Problem 
 This thesis targets three distinct areas in the literature. First, it will 
reconceptualise copyright law as a policy by drawing on the literature in political 
science. Traditionally, authors examined the setting of particular legal provisions and 
then applied their findings to the copyrights systems, especially if they have converged. 
In this approach, the policy space and the strength of provisions are intrinsically linked. 
The literature on policy convergence however clarifies that the overall policy space and 
the precise setting of instruments are conceptually distinct (K. Holzinger et al. 2005). 
Treating the approach to copyright and its scope as separate issues allows for a more 
structured comparison. 
 Secondly, this thesis will address the problem of extent. The general agreement 
is that the scope of protection has expanded over time, benefitting mainly copyright 
owners, especially corporate ones (J. Ginsburg 2001; J. Campbell 2006: 1646). Similarly, 
the overall approach to copyright has also been discussed. Again, authors agree that 
the different copyright traditions, reflected in the distinction between common law 
and civil law systems, have become more similar over time (F. Grosheide 1994: 204; J. 
Sterling 2003: 17; H. MacQueen et al. 2008: 41; S. von Lewinski 2008: 63). However, 
there is a pronounced lack of consensus about the extent of the evolutions. 
 Thirdly, this thesis seeks to contribute on the debates on the causal forces 
behind the evolution of copyright over time. To do so, it will use the empirical evidence 
generated here to examine if the contributing factors commonly identified in the 
literature did impact on the evolution of copyright in the way and to the extent 
previously argued. First it will investigate the role played by technological innovation 
on the scope of protection and the approach to copyright (J. Ginsburg 2001; L. Lessig 
2004; J. Campbell 2006; I. Alexander 2007; L. Bently et al. 2009; B. Kernfeld 2011). It 
will also examine the influence of particular actors (W. Kingston 2002; C. Seville 2006; 
H. MacQueen et al. 2008: 43; S. von Lewinski 2008: 34; P. Goldstein et al. 2010). 
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1.3 Selection of Case Studies 
This study seeks to explain the evolution of copyright policies. The chosen case 
studies are for Europe: the UK and Germany. This provides for a common law country 
and a civil law country. France tends to feature high in comparative studies because it 
is perceived as the ideal author rights (AR) system, especially in relation to the moral 
rights. However, this thesis relies on idealized models for the AR and common law 
copyright system (CL) for comparison benchmarks because France has never fully 
matched the description of the ideal AR system. The same is true for the US in relation 
to the CL ideal. (J. Ginsburg 1990b) Furthermore, the full codification of moral rights in 
France (1957) and Germany (1965) occurred after their inclusion in the Berne 
Convention during the Rome revision (1927). As a result, there is not an added benefit 
of including France at the expense of the economically stronger Germany. In addition 
to the European case studies, the US is also included. On one hand, this is necessary 
because of the US' importance in the world economy. On the other hand, it provides a 
control variable to European developments.  
The chosen timeframe is 1880-2010 for a number of reasons. First, to identify 
the importance of the international dimension, any comparison has to start before the 
multilateral international dimension became significant. In the case of copyright law, it 
therefore has to be before 1886 and the Berne Convention. In addition, any earlier 
date would have entailed substituting Prussia for Germany, as Germany was only 
unified in 1871.  
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1.4 Thesis Outline 
 This thesis is divided into parts and chapters. Chapter two will outline how 
copyright can be analysed as a policy and how this is reflected in the existing literature. 
It concludes by summarising the main weaknesses in the existing literature and how 
the methodology used here will contribute to remedying these.  
  In the second part then, the focus shifts to methodology. This is divided into 
five distinct areas. The third chapter provides a short summary of the methodology as 
a whole. The aim is to outline how the methodology works and emphasise the links 
between the different components. Chapter four to seven then discuss the individual 
methodological steps in detail. Chapters fourth and five focus on making the 
information available on copyright systems directly comparable. It discusses the coding 
and processing of the data. Chapter six then moves on to the scope of protection. It 
will demonstrate how the concept defined in the literature can be operationalized in 
practice. Chapter seven is the final methodological chapter. It describes how the data 
is used in an effort to trace the overall approach to copyright.  
 Part 3 moves away from the methodology to the empirical evidence generated 
by it. Chapter eight presents the empirical results. It will first focus on the individual 
trends and therefore how the case studies have developed, both for copyright culture 
and the scope of protection. Particular attention is made to the role of major reforms 
on the stringency, culture and coherence of copyright systems. It then investigates 
how the case studies relate to each to other, especially if they have become more 
similar over time. Chapter nine shifts away from the empirical evidence and towards 
the factors shaping the evolutionary patterns. These include the impact of technology, 
the presence of a digital impact and the particular role played by individual actors. The 
chapter concludes with a summary of which influences explain which the cultural and 
stringency developments. It will also identify those instances not adequately explained.   
 Chapter ten moves the focus away from stringency towards culture, in 
particular how the individual case studies relate their respective ideal types. Special 
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attention will be paid to the importance of legal origin in 1880; over time and as a 
standard of comparison. Chapter eleven then will examine the extent of convergence 
between the case studies as well as the driving forces behind it.  
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2. Literature Review 
 This literature review will establish the link between copyright and policy and 
how this is reflected in the existing literature of the topic. It will first link copyright and 
policy as a prerequisite to drawn on the literature of policy evolution in describing 
copyright evolution. This then allows for treating the scope of copyright and the overall 
approach as distinct areas. It will then provide an overview of the state of art in these 
two areas. Finally, it will identify the weaknesses in the existing literature and outline 
how the thesis will contribute to remedying them.  
 
2.1 Copyright Law as a Policy 
 This section identifies what copyright policies are. To use the work on policies, 
it first has to be established that copyright law can actually be treated as a policy in 
methodological terms. To do this, the term ‘policy’ will first be defined by defining its 
three core characteristics. In a second step then, copyright will be examined in the 
light of these requirements.  
 Most commonly, a policy describes a group of decisions, actions and inactions 
and how these change over time (H. Heclo 1972: 85; R. Hague et al. 2004: 309). 
Although definitions vary, a policy has three basic characteristics. The term firstly 
implies order, meaning system and consistency. The action is not arbitrary-it follows 
intent. This does not mean that unintended consequences of policies are excluded but 
rather that positive action follows some kind of objective. Secondly, policy refers to 
authority, and therefore requires legitimacy. This can be based on the policy outcomes 
(the aim of the policy) or the way the policy is made (input legitimacy). Finally, policy is 
intrinsically linked to expertise. A policy essentially claims both knowledge of the issue 
area and proposes solutions to problems (W. Parsons 1995: 15; H. Colebatch 2009: 8-
9). This claimed rationality provides another basis for legitimacy in addition to pure 
authority (W. Parsons 1995: 14; M. Hill 2005: 6). In summary, to treat something as a 
policy, these basic features have to be covered: it has to be intentional; it has to be 
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legitimized by either outputs or inputs; and it has to be based on some kind of 
expertise. To establish if copyright law can be considered a policy, it will now be 
compared to these requirements. Each of the characteristic is examined in the light of 
copyright policy. 
 The requirement of intent emphasises the importance of targeted action. 
Copyright is statute-based and enforced mainly by private individuals in the courts. 
Both of these actions show intent. The statutes are the reflection of the will to balance 
author/ copyright owner protection with that of users (G. Davies 2002: 7). The aims 
vary but include for example creating an incentive to publish works or protecting the 
personality of the author (J. Ginsburg 1990b: 993; M. Rose 1993; G. Davies 2002: 14-15; 
S. von Lewinski 2008: 38). They are therefore showing clear intent although the gap 
between stated aims and practice can vary.  
 The case law also exhibits intent. First of all, private individuals make a choice 
in persecuting infringement. Especially corporations or interest representations will 
actively select cases which they deem worthy. For example, the Recording Industry 
Association of America’s (RIAA) decision to pursuit comparatively minor cases of 
infringement aimed more at other infringers rather than the actual damages done by 
the particular individual (B. Kernfeld 2011: 211). Secondly, copyright owners may 
select cases in the light of the broader policy, seeking to expand existing rights. One 
key example here is the introduction of the broadcasting right in Germany 1926 (1926). 
Similarly, users may use the court system to challenge particular rights. In the US 
Eldred case, the term extensions have been challenged as unconstitutional (Eldred v 
Ashcroft  1999). In sum, copyright policies have an aim, even though it may not 
actually achieve it.  
The second requirement is authority in the form of legitimacy. In copyright 
policy, this is a mixture of input and output legitimacy. On one hand, government 
action involves consultations and therefore the input of different sectors of society. 
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There is extensive literature on how influential different types of interests are.6 But 
nonetheless the process itself is considered legitimate reflecting on the policy that is 
created by it (R. Baldwin et al. 1999: 18). Copyright policy is also deriving legitimacy 
from the output. By providing protection to authors, it is argued to create a justified 
return for authors because they deserve to profit from their work (M. Rose 1993; G. 
Davies 2002: : 14-15; R. Deazley 2004).7 Other justifications are for example linked to 
the economic benefit of a copyright work. Copyright polices are therefore based on 
authority, derived from the both the policy-making process as such and the aims it 
seeks to fulfil.  
 The third characteristic of a policy is expertise. This is also clearly identifiable in 
copyright policy. On one hand, the legislator identifies problems with the system and 
then adopts a solution to it based on claims that it is the most appropriate one. For 
example, to combat rampant online piracy, the US Congress adopted the Digital 
Millennium Act which contained protection for Digital Rights Management. It was 
argued that by making the circumvention itself illegal, the efficiency of copying 
protection could be maintained (J. Ginsburg 2001: 1618). This in turn means that if 
works cannot be copied and therefore digitalised, they will not be subjected to online 
piracy. This shows a clearly identified issue (online piracy) and a solution (preventing 
the circumvention of copying control).  
 On the other hand, those enforcing the law also claim expertise. Individual right 
owners/users take legal action to enforce breaches on the basis that a particular kind 
of behaviour is problematic and the statute can remedy it. The courts are tasked to 
investigate narrow issues and apply the statute on the basis of their expertise. In 
conclusion, all areas of copyright policy involve the identification of problems and 
solutions portrayed as the most appropriate. It therefore exhibits expertise as required 
by the definition of a policy. 
                                                          
6
 For influential theories in relation to copyright politics, see for example pluralism (R. Dahl 2005); 
regulatory capture theory (G. Stigler 1971) and collective action theory: (M. Olsen 1969). 
7
 The extent is contested but it forms part of the discourse. 
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 In summary, copyright can be considered a policy because it has the essential 
features of one.  Copyright shows intent in that a particular course of action is taken, 
both by the legislator and individuals. It also exhibits legitimacy which is based on the 
legislative process and on the particular aims which copyright is designed to 
implement. Finally, copyright policy is based on claims to expertise as problems are 
identified and responses are portrayed as viable solutions to them. It is therefore clear 
that copyright can be examined using the policy lens.  
 Looking at copyright from a policy angle poses the question of what is part of it. 
Clarifying what components are considered part of copyright is necessary before an 
investigation of its evolution can begin.  
 
2.2 The Constituent Parts of Copyright 
 Copyright is the ‘right to determine who can have a copy’ (J. Gantz et al. 2005: 
5). The policies across the world vary in their scope as it incorporates different things. 
However, it is essential to be clear about what the core components of copyright are. 
Today, there are three types of works which are protected by copyright. The first one is 
copyrighted works understood as the works of authors. This is the oldest and most 
traditional category of works. It includes for example literature and art works. These 
works are protected because a minimum threshold of originality is successfully crossed. 
The second group are the neighbouring rights. These are mechanical works, here 
especially broadcasts and sound recordings (phonograms). These works are by 
definition not original. However, they are of significant economic importance to the 
exploitation of the underlying original works.  The third category of works is the 
performers. Protection here is not granted to the work but the performance of it-fixed 
in tangible form.  
 Copyright covers two areas: the protection of the work and the protection of 
the author. The protection of the work emphasises the economic value which is 
associated with exploiting a copyrightable work. It focuses on what constitutes a work 
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and the protection it has from unauthorised uses. The first aspects to consider are the 
prerequisites for protection. First, does the work in question fall within the specified 
categories which are considered copyrightable? Secondly, does the work cross the 
required level of originality? Copyright works need to cross a minimum threshold, 
although the level varies across countries. Neighbouring rights and performers are not 
subject to this requirement though. Thirdly, there can be formalities which need to be 
complied with, for example registration or the © symbols. The kinds of works 
protected, originality and formalities together determine if a work benefits from 
copyright. 
 Once it has been established that a work is ‘copyrightable’, the focus moves to 
the extent of protection. The emphasis in this area is the economic exploitation of the 
work. As a result, the key demarcation line in terms of interest is between the 
copyright owners and the users of works. Protection is shaped by a number of features, 
some benefitting the copyright owners and others the users. The important aspects to 
consider here are the kinds of uses which are controlled; the term that they are 
protected for and the available sanctions to remedy infringements. In addition, it is 
also necessary to consider the exemptions to protection and the conditions which 
apply to them. All of these areas together shape the scope of protection. They indicate 
who can prevent whom from copying a work in which situations. It should be noticed 
that protection varies between works. Therefore, each of these features have to be 
examined separately for every category and every kind of work protected.  
 The second area is the protection that the author as opposed to the copyright 
owner benefits from. The author has a number of prerogatives which limit the normal 
economic exploitation of the work. For example, they can affect the extent to which 
rights can be ceded by the author when he assigns his rights to a third party.8 They 
therefore protect his interests against both the copyright owners and the users. The 
actual shape of this protection depends on the kinds of prerogatives the author 
                                                          
8
 For example, the resale right in Germany cannot be waived by the artist under the 1965 
Urheberrechtsgesetz (Germany 1965: §26). 
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benefits from (moral rights); the term during which they are enforceable; the 
exemptions which apply to them and finally the sanctions available to remedy 
infringement.  
 In conclusion, the content of copyright includes the provisions which shape the 
existence of copyright, its economic exploitability and the protection of the author. It 
should be noted thought that copyright acts tend to cover more than just copyright, 
with significant cross-country variations. As a result, the question arises of which parts 
to exclude from the process. The only parts included here are those discussed above. 
This means that all aspects shaping the extent of protection for copyright work, 
neighbouring rights, performer’s rights and moral rights are included. However, areas 
such as semi-conductor chips and administrative aspects, for example the organization 
of the deposit scheme, tribunals and others are excluded.  
 
2.3 Policy Evolutions 
 In the previous section, it has been established that copyright can be 
understood as a policy and its constituent parts have been defined. This opens up the 
possibility to rely on the literature on policy evolution and its empirical methodologies 
to examine how copyright policy has evolved over time.  
 Policy evolutions are understood as the result of two individual components: 
the overall shape of the policy and the direction of change. Knill and Holzinger argue 
that analysing policies requires an examination of two distinct areas. First, the 
convergence of the policy as a whole has to be analysed. This refers to the 
combination of policy instruments and therefore the policy space as a whole. Secondly, 
the particular scope of protection is relevant. Here, the precise setting of policy 
instruments needs to be considered. These determine the mean of the regulation (K. 
Holzinger et al. 2005). These two areas will now be discussed in turn, starting with the 
scope of the overall policy.  
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2.3.1 Defining Convergence 
In general, policies develop over time but they do so in different ways. Seeliger 
identifies and clarifies three possible developments a policy can take over time. He 
compares the similarity between two policies at two different points in time (t1 and t2). 
The first possible outcome is convergence where the differences measured at t1 are 
larger than those measured at t2. In these cases, the similarity has increased. The 
second possibility is divergence. The differences at t2 are larger than at t1. This is 
therefore a decrease in similarity or rise in variation. However, it is also possible that 
the differences observed at t1 and t2 are the same. This is either the case because the 
case studies did not move or because they developed in parallel (R. Seeliger 1996: 289- 
293).  
 Of the three possible outcomes, much of the evolution literature focuses on 
convergence between regulatory systems and there is significant consensus on what 
that term means. It describes a process as much as an end result. Holzinger and Knill 
define convergence as 'the growing similarity of policies over time' which implies a 
reduction in the standard variation between t1 and t2. (K. Holzinger et al. 2005: 776) 
Bennett defines convergence 'as the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to 
develop similarities in structures, processes and performances' (C. Bennett 1991: 215) 
This definition is commonly used, for example Knill uses exactly the same one. (C. Knill 
2005: 765) In summary, convergence is essentially a relative concept: it describes 
developments in reference to some kind of referencing point (R. Seeliger 1996). 
Within the category of convergence, a further distinction is necessary. Knill 
argues that there are different types of convergence which influence how the results 
are interpreted. This is important because it impacts on the comparability of different 
studies. He draws on the types of convergence defined by Heichel et al (S. Heichel et al. 
2005). Heichel et al conceptualize convergence in terms of how convergence occurs, 
using a number of non-mutually exclusive types. They argue that convergence can 
occur in terms of several policy systems growing together (sigma convergence), 
becoming more alike overall. The second category is beta convergence which entails a 
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laggard catching up to a leader. The third category sees convergence as mobility 
(gamma convergence). It is essentially based on country rankings for a relevant 
indicator: if the different rankings vary significantly, the mobility of a country is high 
and therefore its policies have developed in comparison to the other countries. This 
measure is more sensitive to movement and change than the other categories. Finally, 
convergence can also occur as several policy systems converge around an exemplar 
(delta-convergence) (S. Heichel et al. 2005). In sum, convergence means that the 
difference between two policies has been reduced. How exactly this has come about, 
and therefore the relationship between these two policies, can vary though.  
The relative nature of convergence means that the policy space has to be 
clearly defined. It is necessary to establish one coherent understanding of the policy 
options. For example, to examine sigma convergence all instruments need to be 
defined. If the country A moved from policy instrument X to Y and country B from Z to 
Y, all instruments X, Y and Z need to be clearly defined. Otherwise, the movement 
would not be identifiable. Similarly, in delta convergence, the comparative standard 
(model) has to be described in detail first. This is the only way to see if case studies 
have closer to it. Therefore, the emphasis is here on the clarity about what is 
compared, what constitutes variation and the requirements in defining the policy 
space this entails. 
In summary, to analyse the convergence of a policy, a number of considerations 
are necessary. Convergence describes how a policy evolves over time across a defined 
policy space. Therefore, both the temporal and the spatial dimension need to be 
incorporated (C. Bennett 1991; S. Heichel et al. 2005). It is essential that the time 
points are the same for all case studies. In addition, the precise policy has to be 
defined in some kind of standardised manner. How this is done depends on the 
particular type of convergence under examination. One way to map the policy space is 
to rely on the literature of legal origins.  
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2.3.2 Conceptualising Copyright Culture 
 The focus in the literature is on convergence and therefore the growing 
similarity between copyright policies. This overall approach is analysed in studies 
working on the legal origins of copyright policy. This literature links the individual 
components which make up copyright to each other in such a way as to provide an 
image of the copyright culture, the overall understanding and approach of copyright, 
as a whole. As such, it moves beyond the individual components and compares the 
relationship between them. This means it aims to establish the similarity between 
copyright approaches and not only particular substantive provisions. This body of 
literature is based on the difference between different legal traditions, especially the 
Common Law and Civil Law ones.9  
  The assertion that copyright systems vary according to legal traditions forms 
part of a larger body of works focusing on the systematic differences between them. 
Understanding the copyright assumptions in turn also necessitates some 
understanding of the difference sat large. This section will provide this general 
overview.  
 
  
                                                          
9
 See for example: (R. Monta 1958; J. Ginsburg 1990b; G. Dworkin 1994; G. Davies 1995; G. Davies 2002; 
P. Goldstein 2003; A. Littoz-Monnet 2006; H. MacQueen et al. 2008; S. von Lewinski 2008). 
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Legal Tradition: the Difference between Common Law and Civil Law Countries 
 The distinctions of copyright between AR and CL are part of a larger body of 
literature on the importance of legal tradition. They describe more differences 
between the systems concerning how law is made and understood. French law, an 
archetype and influence on all continental law, sought to eliminate the role of the 
judiciary (perceived as corrupt); strengthen state power and prevent the courts from 
interfering with the exercise of power by the state (Thorsten Beck et al. 2003). In this 
respect, it has been highlighted hat continental law relies on abstract rules and a 
codified legal code in which there are not any gaps (at least theoretically). As a result, 
the answer to any particular problem can always be found by examining the solution a 
rule provides (K. Zweigert et al. 1987: 70). This also means that precedent does not 
have a role to play, given that the statutes are complete (J. Merryman 1985: 24).  
 Common Law is seen as fundamentally different. The law here is the result of 
defending property against the Crown (Thorsten Beck et al. 2003). The legislation is 
perceived as incomplete which means that the rules do not always provide the answer, 
although they follow a formalist approach in that they are highly specific (K. Zweigert 
et al. 1987: 71). As a result, the law has developed gradually and represents a mix of 
legislation and case law. Subject to previous decisions (precedent), judges have some 
freedom of interpretation of the law (K. Zweigert et al. 1987: 70- 71). 
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The Features of Author Rights and Common Law Copyright Systems  
 The literature on the differences between common and civil law systems has 
also influenced copyright. In particular, it is argued that the understanding of what 
copyright is and should do varies between the two legal traditions. These differences 
have been summarised under the labels author rights system for civil law countries (AR) 
and common law system for common law countries (CL).  
 The AR and CL systems represent a coherent set of positions on those issues 
affecting copyright protection. They reflect how copyright is understood in general 
terms and how this translations into particular solutions, especially for new problems. 
As such, they reflect two different cultural approaches to copyright. In essence, the AR 
and the CL vary on their underlying justification for introducing a copyright system in 
the first place (policy goals). These differences are described to have a domino-like 
effect on the actual shape of the copyright systems and therefore the policy content 
and the outcome. The discussion will first outline the different justifications since they 
form the underlying theme. Following from this, the key differences between the ideal 
types are described. 
 
Justifications 
 The AR and CL systems vary on the underlying rationale for establishing a 
copyright system. There are a number of different justifications outlined in the 
literature.  First, there is the utilitarianism-based reasoning that copyright is vital to the 
creation and dissemination of new works by securing an income for the authors or 
those making the relevant investment. It is therefore in the public interest to give 
protection to works to ensure that new works are not only created but also made 
available to the public (J. Ginsburg 1990b: 933).  
 The other group of justifications is natural rights-based. However, it is 
important to distinguish the basic reasoning here. In one group, the right to benefit 
from copyright is based on labour and the expenditure of resources. The author/ 
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investor has spent his resources and efforts to create a work and therefore owns it, 
along the lines of Locke's theory on mixing labour with the commons creating property 
(M. Rose 1993; G. Davies 2002: 14-15; R. Deazley 2004). The other natural right 
reasoning, and third rationale, however is not linked to labour but to personality. Here, 
the author's personality is reflected in his work and this gives him control over it. This 
kind of justification lends itself to justify the protection of both economic and moral 
rights (S. von Lewinski 2008: 38). It should be noted though, these justifications are not 
mutually exclusive and a system can rely on a mix of these. It is their relative 
importance compared to each other which distinguishes the ideal AR from the ideal CL. 
Labour-based natural right and utilitarian justifications are on the CL side of the 
spectrum while the personality-based theories point towards an AR system. 
 The justifications inspire the actual shape of the ideal systems (policy content). 
The first key difference is the originality threshold of copyright systems. Any copyright 
system has a threshold at which it starts to grant copyright protection to a work. 
However, the actual level varies significantly. In a CL system, the access to works is the 
driving force and natural right assumptions, if present, are based on labour rather than 
personality. As a result, the originality threshold is very low, requiring only the 
expenditure of skill and labour ('sweat of the brow') (G. Davies 2002: 329; H. 
MacQueen et al. 2008: 42). Not even any sense of judgement is considered mandatory. 
In practice, this means any fixed expression is protected. On the other end of the 
spectrum, in AR systems, a work has to reflect the author’s personality and therefore a 
high degree of originality is necessary to qualify for copyright protection (G. Davies 
2002: 239; H. MacQueen et al. 2008: 42; C. Seville 2010). Judgement alone is not 
enough, the criterion is actual creativity.  
 The justifications also impact on the existence of formalities and the protection 
granted to foreign works. If protection is based on authorship as an activity, then all 
authors irrespective of their nationality or their adherence to administrative 
procedures are worthy of protection. Therefore, in AR systems, formalities are absent 
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and foreigners receive national treatment, regardless of their nationality or any other 
similar provision. (J. Ginsburg 1990b: 994; G. Davies 1995: 4; S. von Lewinski 2008: 43) 
In CL systems on the other hand, copyright is not automatic but a privilege. In order to 
maximise the gain received by the public from granting these rights, extensive 
formalities are in place. One example are deposit requirements which facilitate public 
access to a work. These also limit the scope of copyright in practice as some works will 
fail to comply with the formalities. Similarly, foreign works are not protected or subject 
to very extensive formalities to facilitate free-riding and therefore provide benefits to 
the own public without making them bear the cost (R. Monta 1958: 178; J. Ginsburg 
1990b: 994; S. von Lewinski 2008: 44). 
 Similarly, AR systems emphasize the importance of the creator whose 
personality is reflected in his work. He is the first owner of the rights whereby moral 
rights will be stronger than the economic ones. By the same token, only a natural 
person can be an author. Similarly, performing a work does not itself justify a 
copyright-like protection (R. Monta 1958: 179- 180; G. Davies 1995: 4; P. Goldstein 
2003: 159).  On the other hand, a CL system focuses on the economic exploitation of a 
work. As a result, it excludes moral rights because of their potentially damaging impact 
in terms of using the work. Rather, it aims to ensure the dissemination and access to 
the work by providing a financial return to the author or investor. This means in 
practice that ownership will be given to the person having born the investment which 
includes the author but also more significantly the employer or investor, for example 
the producer of phonograms (R. Monta 1958: 178; G. Davies 1995; G. Davies 2002; S. 
von Lewinski 2008: 49, 59). As for the scope of the rights, an AR system is expected to 
provide more protection and new forms of exploitation are assumed to be included 
while these rights have to be specifically granted in a CL system (R. Monta 1958: 177; J. 
Ginsburg 1990b: 993; P. Goldstein 2003: 138).  
Outside of the content of the law, the systems also differ in their legal habits: 
the actual structure of their copyright acts. Von Lewinski argues that the order reflects 
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the significance of the different sections whereby the earlier they appear in an act, the 
more important they are. In an AR system, the importance of the author is reflected in 
his rights being covered first, especially his moral rights. They start with general 
provisions which will be followed by provisions on the work itself; the author or works 
protected under neighbouring rights (NR) owner; economic rights; exemptions and 
then the duration of protection. The following sections will cover contracts, collective 
management organizations and finally, the enforcement of the provisions (S. von 
Lewinski 2008: 41, 51, 62-63). 
 In a copyright act under common law, the economic importance of the works is 
assumed to have inspired the layout. Rather than starting with the moral rights of 
authors, CL systems commence with definitions. This is generally followed by the 
section covering the protection of the works whereby CR works are dealt in advance of 
the separate but equal NR. The next sections cover authorship and first ownership, 
again without substantive distinctions in principle. Afterwards, the duration of 
protection, the economic rights conferred and secondary (commercial) infringement is 
covered. CL system finish with provisions on exemptions and finally, if present, moral 
rights. Performers are treated separately (S. von Lewinski 2008: 41, 54, 62- 63). In 
summary, the key differences here focus on what is covered; how CR and NR are 
handled in relation to each other; the location of moral rights and when the term of 
protection is defined.  
 In conclusion, the difference in purpose or justification for the copyright system 
determines its actual shape. The ideal AR is based on the protection of the author’s 
personality in the work. As a result, the author owns the work, the originality threshold 
is high, formalities do not apply and foreign works are automatically protected. On the 
other hand, the CL system seeks to make works accessible to the public and sometimes 
considers the investment of resources as the key issue. Therefore, the employer owns 
the work, the originality threshold is very low, extensive formalities apply and foreign 
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works do not receive protection. For both systems, the act structure is assumed to 
reflect these characteristics.  
 
2.3.3 Factors Contributing to Convergence 
As the previous section has illustrated, copyright systems can be distinguished 
according to their legal traditions. Although copyright laws address the same problem, 
they adapt different solutions (S. Ricketson et al. 2006: 10). The legal literature has 
examined the question of copyright culture before. There is consensus that some 
degree of convergence has occurred (F. Grosheide 1994: 204; J. Sterling 2003: 17; H. 
MacQueen et al. 2008: 41; S. von Lewinski 2008: 63). The literature identifies a number 
of different processes which have triggered this evolution. These include: the 
international dimension (meaning the harmonizing effect of international agreements), 
the influence of actors such as the EU and the US as well as more general facilitating 
forces, especially technology.  
 
International Level 
 The first actor attributed with influence over other case studies is the 
International Level. Multilateral agreements bridge the gap between CL and AR 
because their member states come from both groups. They therefore have to offer a 
compromise which represents a middle ground acceptable to all member states (G. 
Davies 2002: 335; P. Goldstein 2003: 152; H. MacQueen et al. 2008: 43; S. von Lewinski 
2008: 34; P. Goldstein et al. 2010: 14).  
 The International Level’s converging effect is the result of two interlinked 
forces: required amendments for compliance and a moral impact. The US illustrates 
the need to amend its existing policies to comply with requirements. It had to abolish 
its constitutive formalities for foreigners when it joined the Berne Convention (G. 
Davies 1995: 4; G. Davies 2002: 336). In addition, the Berne Convention’s advocacy of 
no formalities developed an indirect influence because member states went further 
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than they needed to in this respect. Rather than only abolishing them for foreigners, it 
became unacceptable in the US and UK to keep them for nationals (US 1988; C. Seville 
2006: 9). Similar influences are also attributed to model laws (J. Braithwaite et al. 2000: 
63). 
 The actual potential of particular agreements to trigger convergence however 
varies. The stronger the international agreement in question, the more influential it 
will be (S. von Lewinski 2008: 63). The Berne Convention is commonly seen as the most 
influential multilateral agreement (L. Bently et al. 2009: 40). The actual need for 
reform varies though depending on the issue. As already mentioned, the Berne 
Convention has required explicit amendments, especially for the US and its approach 
to formalities (G. Davies 1995: 4; G. Davies 2002: 336). However, it is argued that 
common law member states only allowed for the inclusion of moral rights because 
they were vague. They already indirectly provided some protection in their systems (G. 
Davies 2002: 336). As a result, the reforms did not require amendments to their laws 
(G. Dworkin 1994: 231- 232). Nonetheless, the Berne Convention also created indirect 
convergence pressure. Moral rights have spread over time because the idea has spread 
(G. Davies 2002: 336).  
 Other multilateral agreements are also attributed with of an influence on 
convergence. The Rome Convention triggered more similarities in the spread of 
neighbouring rights because hardly any signatory country protected all three 
neighbouring rights categories included in the agreement at the time (G. Davies 2002: 
338). For example, Germany signed the treaty in 1961 but could only ratify it in 1966 
(WIPO 2013b) after the 1965 Urheberrechtsgesetz had introduced neighbouring rights 
(Germany 1965: Teil II: Verwandte Schutzrechte). However, at the same time, the 
Rome Convention also had a divergent influence because it established the distinction 
between copyright right and neighbouring rights at the international level.  
 TRIPs is also attributed with significant influence on substantive provisions but 
the impact on convergence is disputed. Although minimum standard were established 
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in TRIPs, it did not lead to convergence-not least because the US ensured that moral 
right would not be included (G. Davies 2002: 339- 341).10 However, MacQueen et al. 
pointed out that TRIPs and the WIPO treaties have both enhanced the converging 
influence of the Berne Convention (H. MacQueen et al. 2008: 43). In sum, the influence 
of multilateral agreements on convergence varies.  
 In conclusion, the International Level is expected to have a converging 
influence on its member states. Growing similarity is the result of a mixture of direct 
amendments and the spread of ideas. However, the actual strength of agreements in 
this respect varies. It is expected to be strongest for the Berne Convention and weaker 
for later agreements.  
 
Influence of the US 
 The second major actor identified in the literature is the US. The US became 
concerned by the scale of international piracy and therefore used a mixture of Berne, 
TRIPs and its own trade legislation to impose copyright protection on other countries 
(W. Cornish et al. 2007: 390). By the 1980s, it became the single most influential in 
determining and enforcing the intellectual property regime (J. Braithwaite et al. 2000: 
66).  
 The US acted bilaterally by enforcing intellectual property by using trade, 
especially pressuring individual countries via the 301 process.11 In addition, the US 
started to take an active role at the multilateral level. On one hand, its influence was 
enhanced when it joined the Berne Convention in 1989 (G. Davies 1995: 1). On the 
other hand, the US started to actively shape the international level. Since the 1980s, it 
has pushed intellectual property protection multilaterally as part of its trade policy and 
required trading partners to provide what it considered adequate protection. (J. 
                                                          
10
 This would have made it actually enforceable at the international level. This gives rise to a whole 
range of speculation on the US' implementation of the Berne Convention. 
11
 In this process, the US uses trade sanctions against those countries refusing to provide adequate 
intellectual property protection. 
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Braithwaite et al. 2000: 66). Those who had given in to this bilateral process were 
more likely to accept strong TRIPs provisions in the Uruguay negotiations (J. 
Braithwaite et al. 2000: 62). It essentially shifted forum by linking intellectual property 
to trade (P. Drahos 1999; J. Braithwaite et al. 2000: 66). This provided particular 
benefits to the US: intellectual property could be linked to trade benefits, for example 
giving concessions in textiles and similar sectors in return for stronger intellectual 
property protection (J. Braithwaite et al. 2000: 83). The trade regime also provided 
stronger enforcement mechanisms that any intellectual property treaty and sanctions 
are more effective (WTO dispute settlement) (P. Goldstein 2001: 48). In sum, the US 
influences other case studies by both uni-and multilaterally by linking copyright to 
trade.  
 
EU 
A more recent converging influence is attributed to the EU. The EU system is 
seen as a mixture of AR and CL characteristics (L. Bently et al. 2004: 46). As such, it 
allowed for harmonization despite the philosophical differences among its member 
states. The first converging pressure is the result of the courts. In the joined Phil Collins 
cases12  for example, the court has argued that copyright is designed to protect both 
the economic and moral interests of authors which essentially bridges a key gap 
between AR and CL (S. Stokes 2003: 22). The other converging influence is the 
directives (H. MacQueen et al. 2008: 43). The UK has moved closer to the AR approach 
as a result of Europeanization. For example, it made the principal director in addition 
to the producer the joint author of a films (T. Aplin 2011: 558). Other illustrations 
include the work for hire doctrine for computer programs and the authorship of legal 
entities. 
  
                                                          
12
 Phil Collins v Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft mbh and Patrica Im-und Export Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH 
and Leif Emanuel Kraul v EMI Electrola GmbH (1993) Case-C92/92. 
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Technology  
 Finally convergence is also the result of technological innovations. First, 
copyright systems draw on a range of different rationales. This means for example that 
different rationales are relevant in case studies from the beginning although one might 
have exerted more influence than the others (J. Ginsburg 1990a; S. von Lewinski 2008: 
39; P. Goldstein et al. 2010: 21). In addition countries have been subjected to similar 
social, economic and political structures (P. Goldstein et al. 2010: 14) The economic 
importance of particular new technologies means that countries have protected them 
under copyright law and by doing so, moved away from their principled stances (J. 
Drexl 1994: 103; P. Goldstein et al. 2010: 21). As a result, they moved towards each 
other. In summary, similarities in circumstances in combination with different 
rationales for protection have contributed to similarities in policy. 
 
2.3.4 The Convergence of Copyright Culture 
Convergence is proven using specific examples. Two very common examples of 
this approach are the convergence of moral right provisions and the originality 
threshold. In terms of moral rights, it is argued that approximation has clearly occurred 
because moral rights have been gradually introduced in CL countries. Moral rights are 
explicitly protected in the Berne Convention and this has been accepted by the 155 
Berne member states (WIPO 2012). As a result, they are not considered an AR-only 
phenomenon anymore. In addition, the WPPT has spread the recognition of moral 
rights for performers (WIPO 1996: art. 5). Finally, they are seen to vary as much within 
the specific groups as between them (G. Davies et al. 2010: 1033- 1034; P. Goldstein et 
al. 2010: 15). This means that the difference between particular AR countries can be 
larger than the difference to a CL country. Therefore, differences between moral right 
provisions remain but they are not linked anymore to the legal origin.  
Another often cited example for convergence is the level of originality required 
to qualify for protection. Here, the efforts of the EU are often highlighted where the 
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computer directive introduced a medium level of originality. This required Germany to 
lower its previously very high standards while forcing the CL member states13 to raise 
theirs. (G. Davies 2002: 345- 346) In addition, Germany also lowered its originality level 
in response to the nature of works it wanted to protect. This was the result of general 
pressures and technological development (J. Drexl 1994: 103). A similar move is 
illustrated by the EU and its member states which provide for a sui generis right for 
databases (P. Goldstein et al. 2010: 21). These works are not original but of significant 
economic value. They have created an ad hoc work category in order to accommodate 
these kinds of works without changing the existing copyright law provisions. The areas 
of originality and moral rights show that certain identifying characteristics have spread. 
In essence, it is the presence of particular policy instruments which indicates that the 
policies have converged.  
 Convergence is not absolute because significant national variations remain (F. 
Grosheide 1994: 204; H. MacQueen et al. 2008: 41; S. von Lewinski 2008: 63). Values 
are embedded in the law and they tend to survive over time (S. Larsson 2011: 10). The 
remaining differences are seen as cultural, making debates about them rather fierce in 
nature (S. von Lewinski 2008: 34). This leads to Davies arguing that full convergence is 
not actually possible (G. Davies 2002: 351). However, values are not necessarily set in 
stone. Sudden social development can facilitate change and legal values do evolve 
when the social and legal spheres start to conflict each other (S. Larsson 2011: 10). 
 To illustrate this tension, the UK provides a good example. The UK actively 
protects long standing features of its CL copyright system. It did not introduce a private 
use exemption and remains strictly opposed levies (T. Aplin 2011: 577). However, it is 
interesting to see that the reasoning is not reliant on cultural language. The UK (and 
also the US) did not introduce levies for a number of reasons which include 1) 
unreliable documentation about the harm suffered; 2) questionable plans for the 
                                                          
13
 These member states are: the UK, Ireland and since 2004 Cyprus and Malta. 
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proceeds to both performers and record companies and 3) inability to determine in 
advance for what purpose a type will be used (B. Kernfeld 2011: 161).  
 Even if differences remain, their importance is debated because copyright 
systems can have functionally converged. First differences on paper do not necessarily 
have a real effect. Different approaches can nonetheless lead to the same outcome (J. 
Sterling 2003: 17). For example, there are variations in terminology across countries. 
The US control reproduction on the internet as part of its general right to control the 
reproduction of works. However, the EU has explicitly introduced an additional right 
for this. The same applies to its member (Germany 1965: §19a; UK 1988: 20; EU 2001: 
art. 3).  In addition, the differences are seen as minor and not as significant as is usually 
assumed. They are of degree rather than kind (G. Davies et al. 2010: 2; P. Goldstein et 
al. 2010: 15). Therefore, copyright policies are not identical on paper. However, their 
functionality, the way they work in practice, can be. The remaining differences in this 
sense are not important for the copyright culture.  
 In conclusion, the literature refers to a process of significant convergence in 
copyright policy since the 19th century. The driving forces behind it are the 
harmonizing power of multilateral agreements, the power of individual actors such as 
the EU and the US on domestic and international policy in other (member) states as 
well as the general circumstances. At the same time, the literature also points out that 
the differences between the systems remain and are unlikely to disappear. However, 
their practical importance is limited as the actual protection is largely the same 
irrespective of the group. Therefore, the degree of convergence is debated.  
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2.3.5 Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the overall policy space in copyright has been described before in 
terms of legal origin, termed here copyright culture. Overall, the literature agrees that 
there has been some degree of convergence. However, the extent is not clear.  
Although some authors argue that there has been at least a functional convergence, 
the example of technological challenges show that there is still some significant 
variation. This means that is the actual extent of convergence, if there has been any, 
needs to be investigated systematically. 
 
2.4 Stringency: The Scope of Protection 
In addition to policy convergence, the literature on policy evolution also 
emphasises the importance of the regulatory mean. Holzinger and Knill argue that the 
mean of the regulation, the average level of regulation within a given sample, can 
move upward or downward over time. This is commonly termed stringency (D. Vogel 
1997; M. Kahler 1998; A. Ogus 1999; D. Murphy 2004; D. Konisky 2007). However, they 
also emphasise that defining top and bottom is essentially a normative judgement. 
Common practice is to define interventionist policies with the top and laissez-faire 
with the bottom (K. Holzinger et al. 2005). It is therefore necessary to establish how 
stringency can be described.   
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2.4.1 Defining Stringency 
 In the existing literature, the scope of protection in copyright is linked to the 
balance of rights between copyright owners and users. An expansion in scope reflects 
strengthening the rights of copyright owners. Reducing the scope would strengthen 
the users because it limits the applicability of copyright protection. This assumption is 
not always made explicit but it is the underlying assumption in most writing on the 
issue. 
 In the traditional legal scholarship, for example, writings on the Berne 
Convention refer to minimum standards by protecting essential author rights (S. 
Ricketson 1987; S. Ricketson et al. 2006). The same understanding is also visible in 
more mixed studies, such as law and economics. Stricter levels here are associated 
with more control over the use of the work by the copyright owner (W. Landes et al. 
2003). This understanding is also very explicit in works that criticise the existing 
protection as too extensive. Lessig argues that copyright owners have gained more 
control over works. This has shifted the balance in their favour and away from the 
users or the public good (L. Lessig 2004). Finally, the main stream media also links 
more protection with benefits for the authors (BBC 2011; A. Moore 2012; Hamburger 
Verbraucherschutzzentrale 2012; A. Meister 2013). In conclusion, the common 
approach to the scope of protection is to link the strength of protection with 
ownership control.  
 Some clarification is necessary though how this stringency concept applies to 
copyright. In other policies and regulation, government intervention and therefore 
more stringency translates into more consumer protection and additional costs for the 
regulated, usually business. For example, in the seminal work Trading Up, Vogel refers 
to stricter laws as meaning more environmentally friendly legislation which is pushed 
by a mixture of environmental and consumer groups (D. Vogel 1997: 5-6; 21). However, 
copyright polices have a more differentiated impact. On one hand, the cost of 
regulation is imposed on the users of protected works and therefore the consumer. On 
the other hand, many copyright owners are also users of protected works, standing on 
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both sides of the divide. Taking a look at the major stakeholders involved clarifies this 
problem.   
 Copyright policy does not feature a clear division of interests. The interests of 
the different groups involved in copyright has started to fragment (C. Seville 2006: 10). 
Rather, a wide range of interested parties exist. For example, the copyright review in 
Ireland distinguishes between copyright owners, those representing them, 
entrepreneurs, users and those concerned with heritage. All of these have overlapping 
interests (Ireland consultation paper p. 9-10). As a result, the stringency standard is not 
as straight forward as it seems on the surface.  
The solution here is to focus on the level of state intervention which is implicitly 
used in the traditional classifications as well. In traditional regulatory areas, for 
example environmental regulation, the state intervenes to protect consumers. As a 
result, more consumer protection is directly related to more state intervention and 
more stringency.14 Similarly, less stringent regulation entails a withdrawal of the state: 
it intervenes less. This logic can be applied to copyright policy although the benefiting 
group is different. State intervention here translates into more stringent regulation, 
however, the beneficiaries here are intellectual property right owners and authors. By 
the same token, less stringent regulation is characterized by less state intervention 
which in turn benefits the users of protected works. 
In practice, stringency therefore refers to the extent that works can benefit 
from protection. This is by definition exactly what legal analysis has focused on 
extensively. For example, the first edition of Copinger’s commentary on copyright law 
sets out in detail which kind of work benefits from what particular provisions. It does 
not only list what is not permitted, but also emphasises where protection ends. Later 
editions highlight the impact of reforms in the extent of protection, for example if an 
additional use of a work is now restricted or an exemption has been confirmed in the 
                                                          
14
 Consumer groups push for more regulation. See for example Vogel for an account of consumer groups 
in environmental regulation (D. Vogel 1997).  
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courts. It therefore highlights if this balance between copyright owners and users has 
shifted. In summary, stringency is defined by those aspects which make up legal 
analysis: the positive protection and exemptions which affect particular work types or 
authors, the prerequisites they have to meet; as well as their enforcement.  
In conclusion, stringency is understood as the intervention of government to 
protect copyright owners and authors. This intervention is visible in how the legislation 
and the case law provide for the protection of particular works at the expense of the 
uncontrolled use by third parties. It therefore is a reflection of the balance between 
copyright owners and users as struck by the government and its courts. It is the scope 
of protection that copyright owners enjoy.  
 
2.4.2 The Evolution of Copyright Stringency in the Literature 
 The literature agrees that the scope of protection has expanded over time (P. 
Drahos 1999). This trend is the result of different factors. There are forces which push 
for stronger protection and therefore rising stringency levels. However, the same ones 
can also restrict the increases in protection because they bring opposing actors into 
action. This section will first discuss why stringency levels rise. It will then change focus 
and describe how the same force also limit rising stringency levels.  
 
Factors Contributing To Rising Stringency Levels 
 The evolution of copyright is shaped by a number of different factors. The first 
one is piracy. Its impact varies depending on the specific kind of piracy in questions. On 
one hand, piracy can be the result of ignoring existing law. In these cases, the activity 
harming the copyright owner is already deemed infringement. However, for one 
reason or another, they cannot enforce it effectively. As a result, the pressure is to 
ensure that enforcement gets more efficient. One example for this type is the large 
scale infringement of works online, for example the illegal downloading of songs. The 
policy-makers reacted by making the Internet Service providers part of the 
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enforcement effort.15 They now have to take down infringing material if they are 
notified about it by the copyright owner.16 In sum, existing copyright can suffer from 
enforcement issues. These in turn facilitate stronger copyright protection. 
 The second kind of piracy is international piracy which operates across borders. 
However, copyright protection is essentially territorial in nature. This means that 
protection only applies domestically but not to another state (W. Cornish 1993: 47; J. 
Braithwaite et al. 2000: 44).17 For example, in the 19th century it was common for 
books to be copies without permission in other countries and these unauthorised 
copies would often be re-imported into the country. This pattern had a double impact 
on the rights owners. They lost the foreign market and it harmed the domestic sales (S. 
Ricketson et al. 2006: 20). To resolve the issue, international minimum harmonisation 
was pursued. For example, the UK was aware that only international protection could 
prevent unlicensed prints from entering its domestic market (J. Barnes 1974: 115). The 
same issues still apply today and international protection is still seen as the solution (J. 
Braithwaite et al. 2000; P. Yu 2009). In sum, international piracy triggers a response 
towards stronger protection using the international route to protection. Specific 
measures are required by international agreements and therefore spread across 
countries. National copyright systems are therefore strengthened because compliance 
with multilateral agreements requires it.  
 The second cause for rising stringency levels is the spread of ideas across 
countries. International coordination also has a more indirect influence on the 
domestic sphere. It disseminates a particular view of copyright protection and 
therefore contributes to the norms in the field. This norm-setting on intellectual 
                                                          
15
 ISP enforcement has been added to the copyright acts, for example the UK’s Copyright, Patens and 
Designs Act (s.97A) and the US Copyright Act (s. 512 1 e)). 
16
 Some data on this available. For example, Google publishes statistics on the takedown requests it gets: 
(Google 2013a). 
17 In general, states cannot take action again measures of another state However, under the ‘effects 
doctrine’, when activities abroad have an effect domestically which contradict domestic legislation, then 
action can be taken. Both the EU and the US have such an effects doctrine although enforcement 
limitations exist (I. Brownlie 2008: 309- 311). 
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property issues is done largely by shaping model laws. Model laws are designed by 
international organisations, national law reform bodies but also business NGOs (P. 
Drahos 1999). The EU for example strongly supported the drawing up of model laws 
for the Berne states as a way of having their copyright interpretation spread (European 
Commission 1990: 5) Similarly, the WIPO arena is of little importance to the US 
compared to TRIPs. Nonetheless, it offered the US a way to adapt the international 
system to the challenges of digitalization (J. Braithwaite et al. 2000: 64, 68). 
Stringency levels have also been expanded in response to technological 
challenges. New technology has increased the possibility for market-place imitation as 
copying is cheaper than creating new works. Kernfeld has described this pattern in 
detail. Unauthorized use has always been a feature of copyright protection and most of 
it was the result of technological developments. These create a new way of using or 
exploiting a copyrighted work which had not been anticipated by the copyright owners. 
It therefore alters the balance between the owners and users of copyrighted material 
in favor of the user-the new use is not yet protected by copyright. Copyright owners 
react by labeling the new form of exploitation 'piracy' and lobby for enhanced 
protection. This in turn leads to legal change as copyright owners seek to benefit from 
the new uses (B. Kernfeld 2011: 218).  
Since the advent of digital technology, the issue got a new sense of urgency. 
Infringement by individuals took on a new magnitude of threat to copyright owners. 
Copies can be made faster, cheaper, in better quality and can be distributed more 
widely (E. Fleischmann 1988: 6). For example, the music industry was not too 
concerned as long as copies were made for personal use and in small numbers (J. Gantz 
et al. 2005: 14). However, online infringement was met with coordinated strict 
enforcement and lobbying (L. Lessig 2004; J. Gantz et al. 2005; I. Alexander 2007; B. 
Kernfeld 2011). In sum, new technology often allows for new uses of works. These are 
not subject to copyright, making copyright owners argue that more protection is 
necessary to limit this free-riding. The pattern has accelerated in the digital age. 
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 Another factor facilitating stronger protection for copyrighted works is the 
author-based discourse. In the political debate, the harm of piracy is attributed to the 
authors and creators rather than the corporate copyright owners. It is the vision which 
Campbell and Rose describe this image as the romantic author: the lone poor writer 
(M. Rose 1993; J. Campbell 2006). Expansions in the scope of protection are commonly 
justified by the harm it has on the author (S. Sterk 1996: 1199). This way of justifying 
copyright expansions is not new but rather has always shaped the evolution.18 In this 
respect, expansions are necessary to ensure that the author gets the benefits he 
deserves in return for his work.  
 The author-based rhetoric is reinforced by the choice of language. Using the 
term piracy includes a claim to moral high ground because it includes moral 
condemnation (S. Ricketson et al. 2006: 21). Therefore, using the term to some extent 
already divides the good and the bad, separates worthy from unworthy unauthorised 
uses of a work. The moral impact has been significant enough to influence the 
perception of countries. As Seville points out, international protection became linked 
with national identity and moral standing (C. Seville 2010: 20). In essence, not 
providing protection became unacceptable. It negatively influenced a country’s 
international reputation (C. Seville 2010: 42). In sum, a mixture of the author’s plight 
and the moral judgment implicit in the term piracy has served to facilitate expansions 
in the scope of copyright. 
 Another factor facilitating the extension of protection has been the weakness 
of consumer groups, especially at the international level. Consumer groups failed to 
recognise the trends for a long time. One major factor is the lobbying influence of 
business interest groups on policy. For example, by the time consumer groups 
understood the importance of TRIPs, it was too late (J. Braithwaite et al. 2000: 72). The 
1990s WIPO negotiations was the first time that consumer protection groups actively 
lobbied against too strict laws (J. Braithwaite et al. 2000: 64). Therefore, given the 
                                                          
18
 Rose, for example, shows how the booksellers pushed for copyright protection under the umbrella of 
authors’ rights (M. Rose 1993). 
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strength of business interests and the weakness of the opposing consumer ones in the 
policy process, the scope of protection has expanded at the international level.  
 In sum, there are a number of factors which have facilitated stronger copyright 
protection. On one hand, there is national and international piracy. These situations 
trigger a call for more protection because the rights already guaranteed are not having 
the desired impact on the ground. A similar pattern develops when technological 
innovation creates new uses for works which are not already subject to copyright 
control.  This is further strengthened by the spread of ideas across countries, especially 
via the international level. Essentially, the view that copyright owners should benefit 
from a particular way their work is used gains currency over time. The effect of these 
arguments are especially pronounced if the damage is linked to authors rather than 
corporate owners and morally charged language such as piracy is used. It is further 
enhanced by the weakness of consumer groups.  
 
Factors Contributing to Lower Stringency Levels 
 The previous section has outlined the factors facilitating rising stringency levels. 
However, this is only part of the story because these forces can also develop a limiting 
influence. The economic impact of piracy is disputed (S. Ricketson et al. 2006: 21; B. 
Kernfeld 2011: 193). These claims are part of enhanced protection campaigns. As a 
result, they are biased towards higher damage levels. Authors and publishers seek to 
make the situation more pressing (J. Barnes 1974: 96- 97). In addition there is not any 
that copyright is beneficial. Some authors concluded that there is no evidence that 
copyright protection has fulfilled its aims in either the number of books sold, author 
income or amount of new works (E. Höffner 2010: 385). Furthermore, a lack of 
protection is not necessarily the same as not getting an economic return. For example, 
in the absence of official protection for foreigners, unofficial foreign copyright was still 
possible in the US (S. Ricketson et al. 2006: 21). These arrangements would naturally 
limit the impact because the economic impact would be softened. Overestimating the 
impact of piracy has led to resistance to reforms benefitting copyright owners.  
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 In addition, open source projects prove that there are other factors involved 
outside of pure economic benefit (J. Campbell 2006: 8- 9).This argument emphasises 
the success of the open access movements, for example the Creative Commons or 
Open Source Software. For example, the Creative Commons permits access to the 
work. The scope of commercial use however depends on the particular license in 
question (Creative Commons 2013b). In these models, the copyright stays with the 
author and is not assigned to an intermediary. A similar approach is followed by the 
Open Source Software movement. The different Linux distributions all operate under 
an open access umbrella.19 
The way the damage is attributed to the author has also triggered significant 
opposition. First of all, the reality does not comply with the romantic image of the 
author that the industry invokes (J. Gantz et al. 2005: 1; J. Campbell 2006: 12). The 
majority of works today are not created by the independent author. Instead, they are 
made for hire and therefore owned by the employers (J. Campbell 2006: 12). Therefore, 
it is not surprising that extensions are pushed by corporations (L. Lessig 2004: 233). 
Even if this is not the case, exploiting the work economically usually requires the 
author to cede their copyright. They therefore do not benefit directly from the 
extensions either (J. Ginsburg 2001: 1646). For example, the US copyright term 
extension under the Sonny Bono Act is vested in the corporate owner rather than the 
authors' heirs (J. Ginsburg 2002: 6). And even if authors actually get an increased 
economic return, extensions benefits mainly bestsellers (E. Höffner 2010: 388) and not 
the smaller, unknown authors.  
 Similarly, the term piracy is selectively used. Lessig points out that many of 
today’s copyright protecting industries have first started out as pirates, relying on 
formerly unauthorised uses. Examples include the record industry or the cable 
networks (L. Lessig 2004: 77). After a phase of prohibiting the particular practice, the 
industry aims to contain it. It then assimilates it into its business practices (B. Kernfeld 
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 This does not mean that there is no commercial component. For example, OpenSuse will charge for 
support services. 
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2011: 218). Therefore, activities termed piracy are often exploited by the copyright 
owners themselves.  
 In sum, the particular forces pushing for stronger protection also create 
resistance to it. The impact of piracy is and has been for a long time overstated by 
copyright owners to elicit a political response. In addition, although attributing harm to 
the ‘poor author’ makes the public more sympathetic, the growing awareness about 
work for hire and corporate ownership create disillusionment based resistance. This is 
reinforced by the use of the emotive term piracy for uses which are unauthorised but 
not actually infringing. Finally, there are models which work without relying on 
copyright to generate income.  
 
Summary 
 Criticism of existing protection has detrimentally affected the legitimacy of 
copyright. A new voice on copyright has emerged which is anti-protection in nature 
and was triggered by the handling of the digital media (K. Bowrey 1996: 327). 
Essentially, there is no proof that copyright really acts as an incentive to create 
although there is some evidence that the opposite may be true. As the expansion in 
scope became clearer, opposition developed in the form of consumer interest groups 
which have started to challenge to perceived capture of government by business.  A 
number of distinct factor have contributed to the rising stringency levels. On one hand, 
the economic harm caused by unauthorised uses, whether they were openly infringing 
or ones not covered by copyright policies, have pushed towards more protection. This 
was enhanced by attributing the harm to authors rather than corporations. Finally, the 
weakness of consumer groups meant that the opposition to expansions was limited in 
its political effectiveness. 
 However, as the protection expanded the same factors facilitating it also 
inspire resistance. It became increasingly clear that the impact of piracy has been 
exaggerated and action may therefore not be needed. In addition, works today are 
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often owned by corporations concerned with profit. They shape the legislation to 
reflect their needs rather than that of the individual author.  
 
2.4.3 The Scope of Protection 
 The diverse impact of the factors shaping the scope of protection is reflected in 
the literature. Although scholars agree that authors have benefitted from more rising 
stringency levels over time, they disagree on whether this has tilted the balance 
between copyright owners and users. 
 
Rising Stringency 
There is general agreement that the scope of copyright has expanded over 
time. This is clear from the individual provisions and what types of work they cover. 
Looking at what the acts protect in 2010 compared to 1880 already shows the scope 
has expanded significantly. By 2010, all of the case studies protect neighbouring rights, 
for example broadcasts and sound recordings. These are inventions of the 20th century 
and therefore necessarily represent new additions. In addition, the particular terms 
have also expanded, for example the term of protection which has been extended from 
56 years in the US to 70 years after the author’s death. However, stringency has not 
only increased because provisions have expanded. In addition, the focus of protection 
has moved away  from direct copying to control in derivative works and therefore away 
from the physical copy of a work to the work itself. (J. Ginsburg 1990a: 1885- 1887). 
Copyright laws include a number of controlled uses which do not require actual 
copying, for example the control over adaptions.  
 Rising stringency is also reflected in the incorporation technology provisions 
into the laws, especially the protection of digital rights management facilities. Although 
digital technology makes copying easier, it also allows for more control than analog 
technology (J. Campbell 2006: 2). In all case studies examined here, the circumvention 
of technical measures designed to protect copyrighted material is today considered a 
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breach of the law. By prohibiting the circumvention, copyright owners now have the 
ability to restrict the use of their work significantly more than they have been able 
before. For example, they can determine how often a book can be read or a song 
listened to. This represents a fundamental shift from regulating the use of technology 
through law to regulating use by the design of the technology (T. Gillespie in Kernfeld  
(J. Ginsburg 2001: 1632; B. Kernfeld 2011: 183). This ability to control the actual use of 
a work rather than only its copying represents a strong move towards more stringency. 
 Expanding protection is visible in how the copyright is enforced. The third 
approach taken by copyright owners was to enhance enforcement on the ground. The 
copyright owners, led by the music and film industry, have brought a large number of 
court cases aimed at limiting infringement by individuals. On one hand, these targeted 
the supply and distribution networks through which infringement occurred (UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v MP3.com, Inc.  2000; A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc  2001; I. 
Alexander 2007: 847- 848). On the other hand and different than before, individual 
users have been targeted. P2P networks essentially decrease the commercial 
importance of intermediaries, therefore the only real aim for copyright owners are the 
individuals (B. Depoorter et al. 2005: 361). In summary, in addition to an overall 
increase in stringency in terms of substantive law, enforcement has been stepped up by 
attacking both the distribution level as well as individuals. 
 These observations however do not necessarily imply that the balance of 
power has actually shifted between users and copyright owners. Expanding the 
protection for owners does not automatically imply that the users lose out. 
Exemptions for example can act as a balancing factor as they limit the application of 
the law. Copyright policy has to meet two opposing targets. It needs to provide 
economic return for the copyright owners and ensure the creation and dissemination 
of new works. For this reason, limitations to copyright protection are the valve 
ensuring continued innovation, especially when advances are in the form of 
continuous improvements (R. Anderson 1998: 660). In this respect, the alternatives to 
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the official copyright approach can be seen as evidence of the stifling impact copyright 
can have today. 
 
Tilting Balance 
The arguments about balance however have changed in recent years. With the 
advent of digital technology, infringement by individuals took on a new magnitude of 
threat to copyright owners. The rights owners view, they are faced with a large number 
of potential pirates who cannot only make high quality copies but also share them 
efficiently among each other (E. Fleischmann 1988: 6; L. Lessig 2002: 7; B. Kernfeld 
2011: 182). Their response was the same as before: calling for more stringency. 
However, the response by the legislator was qualitatively different.  
 Shifting balances are reflected in the particular criticism of copyright protection. 
First, copyright is criticised for the kinds of works it protects: not all of them are seen as 
inherently copyrightable (L. Bently et al. 2009: 35). There have been restrictions on the 
kind of works copyright protects. One core example here is the on-going debate about 
databases. In the US Feist case, a database was denied protection on the basis it lacks 
the necessary originality to qualify as a copyrightable work (Feist Publications, Inc. v 
Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc.  1991). However, the same work can get 
protection in the EU, even though a less extensive one than other kinds of works (EU 
1996: chapter III). The EU is criticised for protecting databases because these do not fit 
the traditional categories, especially unoriginal ones. Creating a separate category for 
them recognises this.  
 The second set of criticisms focuses on the substantive protection available. 
Lessig argues that the copyright owners have gained more protection over the years. 
The balance of power has shifted in their favour and away from the users or the public 
good (L. Lessig 2004). He illustrates his argument with the term expansion of the Sonny 
Bono Act (L. Lessig 2004: 233). The impact of the extensive protection is especially 
keenly felt in the digital environment. It has started to limit the public domain to such 
an extent that it makes innovation using the internet difficult (L. Bently et al. 2009: 35). 
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Essentially, the same behaviour which was legal before and/ or seen as no real issue, 
now constitutes serious and punishable offenses (J. Gantz et al. 2005: 54). In this sense, 
copyright rather than piracy has become part of the problem rather than the solution 
to it. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, copyright has undoubtedly increased in stringency. The individual 
provisions have expanded in scope and more uses are controlled today. They have 
moved away from direct to copying towards a broader concept of what copyrighted 
works are. In addition, more effective enforcement and DRM have contributed to this 
trend. As a result, some argue that the balance of protection has tilted over time, 
benefitting mainly copyright owners, especially the corporate ones.  
 
2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
 Existing legal studies have established that copyright policies have evolved over 
time, both in terms of culture and the scope of protection. It has been established that 
the approach to the copyright problem has become more similar over time. This has 
been identified in relation to two the AR and CL systems which are identified as loosing 
importance. Similarly, it has been consistently argued in the literature that the 
stringency of protection has increased over time. The conclusion is based on the 
spread of particular provisions across countries. Nonetheless, the end result is more 
debated, especially if the balance has shifted towards the copyright owners. There are 
a number of weaknesses in the literature.  
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2.5.1 Weakness in the literature 
 The first issue is the idiosyncratic nature of copyright analyses. The most 
important weakness refers of comparability. This issue is created by a number of 
individual factors. First, there is the problem of terminology. National legislations and 
international agreements do not use the same terms to describe the same phenomena. 
As a result, there is significant variation in the content of any particular terms. It is 
difficult to use commentaries because the terms are particular to the specific system it 
discusses. If more than one case study is used, terms may be defined indirectly but it is 
not standardised. Every author conducts their investigations in their own way. The 
result is variation in the understanding of phenomena despite the same terms being 
used.  
 For example, it is possible that an author compares country X to country Y, 
using Y as the reference point. In this case, the terminology would most likely align 
closely with Y. However, if countries X, Y and Z are compared and X is the reference 
point, then terminology would be closer to X. Because X and Y differ in their 
understanding, the conclusions of the two studies cannot be combined without 
additional effort. As a result, the findings between studies cannot be easily combined. 
 Another issue is the temporal dimensions, especially in studies of convergence. 
Most of the studies are not clear about the date of comparison. However, this is a 
major issue because the developments over time cannot be aggregated or averaged (R. 
Seeliger 1996: 298). As a result, findings drawn from early in a year do not necessarily 
match those for later in the same year. The legislation can have been amended or an 
important case has been decided.  Therefore, combining findings is problematic 
because the time points of the analyses are not clear.  
 The second is the scope of studies: they are very narrow. The idiosyncratic 
nature of the literature is best illustrated in the dominance of small n studies. Legal 
analysis is often doctrinal and therefore requires significant qualitative input. This 
naturally limits the number of case studies which can be compared in any one study, 
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given that resources are limited. Many studies focus on a single case or very few case 
studies. Legal commentaries for example provide a great amount of detail but trace 
the evolution over time for this one particular case study. 
 Even if studies include more than case study, they do not examine all relevant 
areas at once. Instead, they focus on particular issues, for example moral rights (E. 
Adeney 2006). Even if they are concerned with the overall scope of protection (W. 
Landes et al. 2003), they do not define it. Similarly, studies focusing on convergence 
investigate particular areas when they investigate the importance of legal traditions. 
They trace the spread of particular features over time which in turn are interpreted as 
representative for either AR or CL (J. Drexl 1994: 103; G. Davies 2002: 345- 346; P. 
Goldstein et al. 2010: 15, 21). However, they only examine a selection of indicators and 
not all of them together. As a result, each individual study only provides insight on one 
area, neglecting all others.  This would not be a problem if the results of different 
studies could be combined. 
 The result of these inconsistencies across studies and the difficulty in 
combining them is a lack of clarity about the outcome of the developments. It is not 
clear to what extent countries have converged in terms of culture or the stringency 
levels have risen. The following 11 distinct assumptions and arguments which will 
serve as the research questions in practice and which will be examined here (Table 1). 
The original contributions that this thesis makes focus on these issues.  
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 Proposition Explanation 
1 Stringency levels have increased over 
time. 
The level of overall stringency has risen 
between 1880 and 2010. 
2 Technological innovation has caused 
the rising levels of stringency. 
The rise in stringency levels has been a 
response to the development of new 
technologies and how these were 
incorporated into copyright policies. 
3 The effect of stringency on the 
individual has been particular 
pronounced in the digital age.  
The digital age has had a particular 
effect on stringency, accelerating the 
trend of rising levels of protection.  
4 Corporations have over-proportionally 
benefited from rising stringency levels 
in comparison to users. 
Corporations and not users have 
benefitted from copyright reforms. 
5 Corporations have over-proportionally 
benefited from rising stringency levels 
in comparison to authors. 
Corporations and not authors have 
benefited from copyright reforms.  
6 Copyright systems have converged 
over time. 
Copyright systems have become more 
similar over time. 
7 Older copyright policies will show the 
strongest link to the traditional cultural 
approach. 
Legal traditions and therefore the 
closeness between a policy and the 
respective traditional approach are 
most pronounced in earlier stages of 
the policy. 
8 Copyright policies have moved way 
from their respective ideal types over 
time. 
Copyright policies have become 
hybrids over time, moving away from 
their traditional approaches to 
copyright.  
9 Copyright policies have become 
increasingly settled over time in how 
they perceive the purpose of copyright 
time. 
Copyright policies have become more 
coherent over time and therefore 
across the different policy areas. 
10 The cultural convergence of copyright 
has been caused by technological 
innovation. 
The convergence of copyright policies 
on a similar approach has been in 
response to technological challenges. 
11 The cultural convergence of copyright 
has been caused by individual actors. 
The convergence of copyright policies 
on a similar approach has been in 
response to the influence of a 
particular actor on another one. 
Table 1: List of propositions that have been made in the literature. 
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2.6 Original Contributions 
 This thesis seeks to make original contributions to different areas. The main 
contributions here are conceptual, methodological and empirical.  
 The first major contribution is conceptual: linking copyright evolution to the 
literature on policy evolution. By linking copyright developments to policy studies and 
drawing on insights about how policies converge, the methodological original 
contribution is to provide a complete methodological toolkit to turn copyright policies 
and case law into directly comparable data. By being explicit about how the analysis is 
conducted, it is not only possible to compare the findings to other studies but also 
across time. The approach is also fully reproducible and can be applied to new case 
studies as well. This in turn will help to remedy the lack of comparability across 
copyright studies. 
  The toolkit relies on a number of smaller methodological contributions. First, it 
provides the basis for coherent coding and interpretation of the law. The detailed 
coding schedules can be applied to code any copyright system because they are 
consistent and cover the relevant areas of the law. Secondly, the stringency of 
protection of copyright systems is defined as a concept and made measurable.20 
Instead of focusing on one narrow area of copyright systems, the features affecting the 
overall strength of protection are grouped by what they affect and how they link to the 
strength of protection. They are made measurable and comparable across time and 
case studies by expressing the values in terms of a base year. Overall, this means that 
the scope of protection is turned into one coherent concept and operationalized in 
such a way as to give numerical expression to the developments over time.  
 The third methodological contribution affects culture. Based on the notion of 
legal tradition, the different copyright systems are formalised. It uses the common law 
and civil law systems as epitomised polar opposites and defines the gradual 
                                                          
20
 For a detailed explanation, please see 6. Copyright Stringency. 
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differences between the two in eleven distinct areas.21 As a result, the policy space is 
conceptualised coherently. The variation between copyright systems is not only 
conceptually clarified but also operationalized. This means in sum that the policy space 
in copyright has been systematically identified in such a way as to make changes 
directly comparable over time and across case studies. In summary, this thesis 
provides a methodological toolkit to make the evolution of copyright systems directly 
comparable. As such, it can also be applied to additional case studies with no or very 
little adaptation of the framework.  
 By making copyright measurable and comparable across case studies and time, 
the evidence will contribute the existing literature. First, it will map the cultural and 
stringency trends over time. It therefore provides clarity on the extent of particular 
evolutionary shifts. However, the evidence is not limited to the trends. It can also be 
used to draw conclusions on the distributional effects over time, for example if 
corporate owners have benefitted more than authors. Secondly, because the data is 
directly comparable, the impact of factors arguably having shaped copyright systems 
can be examined. It is for example possible to analyse how the introduction of 
neighbouring rights has impacted on a particular system and if this has varied across 
case studies.  
 In addition to the literature on copyright, this thesis also contributes to the 
existing body of work on policy convergence. First, it provides a complete data set for 
the analysis of convergence. There are similar studies in relation to tax policies and 
environmental policies, among others. In addition, it also provides detailed 
information on the change in the regulatory mean. The combined results can be used 
to test general convergence hypothesis, for example the importance of international 
coordination or regulatory competition.  
Finally, the empirical evidence will also be important for the on-going debate 
on copyright reform. In the light of pressures to reform existing protection and major 
                                                          
21
 For a detailed explanation, please see 7. Copyright Culture.  
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reform projects for example in the US, empirical evidence on how past reforms have 
affected the shape and scope of the policy are of added importance. For example, the 
evidence generated here shows who has benefited from reforms and to what extent. 
In addition, knowing how reforms have affected copyright in the past also means that 
the evidence can be used to evaluate the impact of new proposals more precisely. As 
such, it can therefore contribute to evidence-based policy making.  
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Part 2: Methodology for Copyright Stringency and Culture 
 
 This section provides an overview of the methodology used to determine 
culture and stringency in copyright policies. It is made up of a number of consecutive 
stages. To facilitate the discussion, it is beneficial to outline the overall process first 
before the individual components are discussed. The detailed discussion of the 
individual components is provided later in the relevant chapters.  
An overview of the methodology is provided in Figure 1.22 The summary will 
first outline the coding and data processing stages which aim to make the data drawn 
from the case studies directly comparable. The second part focuses on stringency and 
how the data was used to arrive at a single stringency index score.  It then moves on to 
the cultural dimension of copyright, based on the systematic differences between 
Author Rights and Common Law copyright systems.  
 
  
                                                          
22
 It is recommended to use this graphic (a removable version is provided) when reading this thesis. 
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3. Introduction 
3.1.1 Making Copyright Systems Comparable 
 
Encoding the Law 
 The process starts with coding the legislation and case law. Copyright 
terminology varies across countries. For example, the right to perform a work can 
include performances in front of an audience but also by using technical equipment. 
The exact content varies not only across countries but also over time as technology 
develops. To ensure comparability, it is therefore necessary to apply a consistent 
terminology. For this purpose, a complete set of definitions for the relevant copyright 
aspects was designed (coding schedule). These definitions are characterised by their 
narrow scope: they do not overlap.23 Their second characteristic is precision. When 
they are compared to any copyright law, the possible answer is either ‘yes, this feature 
is present’ or ’no, it is not present’. Therefore, all the data at this stage is binary: 
provisions exist or do not.  At the end of this stage, a complete list of available features 
has been created for each case study at each point in time. The data at this stage is 
therefore directly comparable very detailed, reflecting the underlying qualitative 
information. Each feature is a standalone data point. 
                                                          
23
 The coding schedule was based on the detailed study of primary sources. It was also dynamic in that 
formerly unaccounted for aspects of the law could be added and then applied to all case studies. 
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Figure 1: Overview of the methodology used to move copyright policies to the stringency index and culture scores. 
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Processing the Data 
 The presence of legal provisions by itself has only limited meaning. As a result, 
the individual data points need to be grouped (recoded) into variables: components 
which reflect substantive policy areas. This is done in a number of different ways. Most 
aspects of the policy can be counted, for example the number of rights the policy 
provides to the copyright owners (economic rights). Here, the individual data points, 
each representing one particular existing right, would be counted under the heading 
‘economic rights’. The second group are those variables which convey a numerical 
value. In practice, this only affects the term of protection for economic and moral 
rights. The important information here is the number of years that a work benefits 
from protection, therefore, no additional processing is necessary.  
 The third data type is ordinal/ interval variables. There are two of these 
variables overall: the impact of formalities and the level of originality. They share that 
their provisions are not countable or even numerical by default but instead values are 
assigned based on a set of definitions. These definitions can be ranked and provide 
equally distanced categories: 3 point for impact and 5 point for originality. These sets 
distinguish between five possible configurations in the case of originality. The second 
ordinal scale at this stage is the impact of formalities.  
 Some of the essential information cannot be grouped but is nonetheless 
essential, for example the ownership rules. Here, this kind of data remains binary. At 
the end of this stage, all of the policies have been transformed into directly 
comparable values, each form one of four possible data types: count; value; 3 or 5 
point equidistance ordinal-interval scale. In addition to this, some information remains 
binary.  
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Summary 
In sum, the first part of the methodology focuses on making the copyright 
policies of the individual case studies directly comparable. To do this, a common 
terminology is applied to the provisions, turning the qualitative information into binary 
data. In addition and in the second step then, these provisions are recoded according 
to their underlying purpose. The binary data is turned into variables of copyright policy 
as the values become numerical. In conclusion, the data now has two levels. The first 
one is the general numerical values which reflect the substantive protection by 
copyright area. The second one is the binary data which represents the detailed 
substantive provisions in a comparable manner.  
 
3.1.2 Copyright Stringency  
Stringency is the degree of government intervention to provide protection to 
copyright owners. As a result, legislation which benefits copyright owners increases 
the level of stringency while those benefitting the users decrease it.  
 
Designing the Stringency Index 
There is no independent measure of copyright stringency. As a result, this 
thesis relies on a composite index of stringency which combines the core features into 
a single measure. The index is based on six individual areas. For each of these, 
provisions strengthening protection were weighted against those weakening it. For 
example, economic rights benefit copyright owns and therefore raise the level of 
protection. Exemptions on the other hand reduce it because they benefit users at the 
expense of the owners.  
The first area is the threshold of protection which summarises the 
preconditions a work has to meet to benefit from protection. The next three areas 
cover particular work types: copyrighted works, neighbouring right works and the 
Performers. For each of these, the scope of protection is assessed. The fifth area is 
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moral rights and therefore the scope of the author's protection as distinct from the 
copyright owners. Finally, the sixth area focuses on the overall enforcement 
capabilities. In sum, at the end of this stage, the different areas of stringency have 
been conceptualised and the particular variables have been selected. 
 
Normalisation 
 The variables from the second stage by themselves do indicate stringency. For 
example, protecting four kinds of works is more stringent than protecting only two. A 
wider range of works can benefit from protection and therefore more copyright 
owners are the result. However, the different areas of protection cannot be combined 
because the units and nature of the individual variables differs. They have to be 
normalised first: transformed into the same unit. Normalisation here is on the basis of 
the base year 1880. This base year value reflects the average provisions for each 
variable in Germany, the US and the UK at this point in time. Therefore, each variable, 
for each point in time is divided by this year and provision. This provides a normalised 
index value which can then be combined in the calculations.  
 
 Calculation 
 In this stage, the normalised variables are aggregated according to the areas of 
stringency (Designing the Stringency Index). The results for these individual areas are 
then also added up to arrive at an overall score for the level of stringency a case study 
has in comparison to the average provisions that Germany, the US and the UK had in 
1880.  
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Summary 
In conclusion, to determine the level of stringency of particular copyright 
systems, its core components have to be combined. Copyright systems are broken 
down into six distinct areas, each with a different focus in what kind it protects. For 
each of these, the relevant variables are combined once they have been normalised to 
the base year 1880. The individual area values are then combined to arrive at an 
overall index score for stringency.   
 
3.1.3 The Culture of Copyright Systems 
Independently of stringency, this thesis also examines the approach to the 
copyright issue: its copyright culture. At this stage, the data on the case studies is 
available in a directly comparable form (Processing the Data). However, to determine 
how the provisions link to the copyright approach, here termed copyright culture, they 
have to be linked to theory. The literature identifies two approaches in the Western 
World to how copyright is protected. The first one is the Common Law approach (CL) 
where the emphasis is on the public benefit of copyright in the form of the incentive to 
create. The second way is the (continental) civil law understanding termed the Author 
Rights approach (AR) in which the personality of the author is paramount. These two 
systems are assumed to show marked differences, occupying opposite positions on a 
range of issues. Although they do not exist in their ideal forms, they are used here to 
define the possible range of cultural positions that a copyright policy can take. They 
serve as external benchmarks to which policies can be systematically compared.  
The following section will demonstrate how the binary data and the variables 
based on it from the different case studies are turned into a cultural score. The process 
has three stages. First, the ideal types are specified and 11 individual dimensions on 
which they differ are identified. For each of these, the distance between the ideal 
types is divided into five intervals. In addition, the appropriate variables which reflect 
the dimensions’ content are selected. Secondly then, all the required variables are 
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placed on the same scale. Then, the calculations are carried out by combining the 
variables according to the ideal type outline. The individual areas are combined to 
determine the overall cultural position of the copyright policy. 
 
 Designing the Ideal Types 
The AR and CL systems in their ideal type form show strong and clearly 
identifiable differences in 11 separate dimensions. These range from how they handle 
neighbouring rights to the role of formalities. To assess these dimensions, the 
provisions which can shed light on particular areas need to be identified. For example, 
the role of formalities is determined by two aspects: the number of formalities there 
are and what kind of impact they have. Combining these two components will show 
the overall role formalities play. The actual number of variables used to calculate the 
dimensions varies from one to 13. At the end of this it is clear what provisions are 
necessary for each dimension and how these link to AR and CL.  
 
 Classification 
The variables and binary data from the Processing the Data stage represent the 
substance of the policies. However, they are not representative of its cultural approach 
on their own. The cultural differences between AR and CL systems are expressed here 
in a 5 point discrete scale where 1 represents the ideal CL copyright system and 5 the 
ideal type AR system. The mid-point 3 represents neutrality and is used if a feature is 
tilting neither towards CL nor AR. To link the cultural predictions of the ideal types to 
the individual variables, each one of them has to be classified in this respect. For 
example, strong moral rights protection is seen as a sign of AR systems. Therefore 
strong provisions would be classified as a 5 here. On the other hand, strong 
exemptions are predicted as typical for CL. Extensive provisions in this area would 
therefore be classified as 1 (the CL ideal type). The meaning of strong and weak is 
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determined in relation to the overall sample. For every variable established at stage 
two, the values are now classified.  
In addition to classifying already existing variables, the qualitative information 
represented in the binary data set is used to create additional culture variables. For 
example, one expected difference between AR and CL systems is the transferability of 
the copyright. In an ideal AR system, strong protection for the author in form of 
assignable rights and guaranteed extensive remunerations exist. On the other hand, CL 
systems would not provide any limits to ensure that works are as economically 
exploitable as possible. The variable here would therefore be based on the qualitative 
information: if there are limits; if rights are guaranteed and the presence of 
unwaivable remuneration rights among others. Each distinction of the spectrum is 
outlined by a clear definition, dividing the scale into 5 equidistance intervals. The result 
is that all the variable level data is placed on the discrete 5 point spectrum. At the end 
of this stage, all variables are 5 point ordinal interval variables. 
 
 Calculation 
In the final (fifth stage) then, the classified variables and the substantive binary 
data necessary to determine the 11 individual dimensions are combined and final 
score is calculated. This final score represents the position of a particular copyright 
system at a particular point in time. Due to the calculations, continuous five point 
scales.  
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 Summary 
 In summary, to determine how a copyright system approaches copyright 
protection, it is compared to ideal CL and AR types. These ideal types are external 
benchmarks for comparison and vary on 11 separate points. Each of these in turn is 
subdivided into five distinguishable and clearly defined categories. The systematic 
differences are reflected in the individual variables which are classified on the 5 point 
spectrum accordingly. To determine how a particular policy compares to each of these 
areas, the relevant variables are combined. The final position is the result of combining 
the individual dimension scores. The outcome represents the relative position of a 
copyright policy compared to the ideal AR and CL type and is independent of its 
evolution in terms of the level of protection  
 
3.1.4 Summary 
 This section has provided a short overview of the complete methodology from 
coding the data, to processing it into variables and then using the data to calculate 
stringency and culture. The next parts will now outline the individual stages in detail. 
The first part will focus on making the data comparable. The second section then 
focuses on stringency. The final part then is culture. Each of these parts concludes with 
a demonstration to provide an illustration of how the methodology works in practice. 
A useful example has to be comprehensive enough to show how the technique works. 
Nonetheless, it also has to be limited in scope to prevent unnecessary complexity 
which would limit the clarity of explanation. The chosen example here is the Statute of 
Anne because it is comprehensive enough to be considered a copyright policy while 
also short enough to allow for a clear explanation of the methodology. Therefore, all 
three sections will be applied to the Statute of Anne. 
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4. Making Copyright Systems Comparable 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 To trace the evolution of copyright polices across time and countries, it is vital 
to ensure the comparability of provisions. This section outlines how the copyright 
policies of the individual case studies were transposed into directly comparable data. 
The discussion will first emphasise the scope of the investigation: the components of 
copyright, the kinds of sources used, the case studies as well as the timeframe 
examined. It will then provide a detailed discussion of the coding schedule, clearly 
outlining the definitions used for the different areas under consideration. The second 
part then focuses on how this data was transformed into numerical variables, 
providing quantitative information on the different policy areas. The discussion will be 
illustrated using a simple example: the Statute of Anne. 
 
4.1.1 Establishing the Scope of the Data Set 
 A number of prerequisites have to be discussed to ensure the comparability of 
the outcome. First, the kinds of sources which are to be included in the coding process 
have to be clarified. As mentioned above, copyright protection is largely statute based 
and therefore these constitute one source. However, they are not the only the 
relevant policy source. The case law also needs to be examined for changes, for 
example the granting of the rights or exemptions. Finally, the letter of the law and its 
interpretation in practice may vary. It is therefore essential to refer back to secondary 
sources, especially legal commentaries when the substance of the policy is determined.  
 Secondly, the selection of case studies needs to be reiterated. This study seeks 
to explain the evolution of copyright policies. The chosen case studies are for Europe: 
the UK, Germany and the EU. In addition, the US is included as a non-EU country with 
significant political clout. This provides for a common law country, a civil law country 
and the regional level. The timeframe ranges from 1880 until 2010 whereby the state 
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of the copyright policy is assessed every 10 years (cut-off point is the 31 December of 
the relevant year) for all case studies to make the results comparable. However, it 
should be noted that this also means that some developments appear later in the data 
than they actually were. For example, the 1911 UK Copyright Act is only going to 
feature in the analysis from 1920 onwards.  
 At this stage, the boundaries of what is examined have been established. It is 
now necessary to look at the individual components of the dataset. 
 
4.2 The Data Set 
 It is clear from the primary and secondary sources that terminology is a major 
issue for comparing copyright policies across the case studies. The names given to 
features vary across countries not only in terminology but also content. This means 
that the terms used in the legislation cannot be used one-to-one in coding the laws. 
Rather, the coding schedule had to be based on independent definitions. The solution 
adopted here was to break down the existing terms into their smallest distinguishable 
unit. This means that all the information could be recorded as precisely as possible and 
in a comparable manner. These do not necessarily overlap with the terms used in the 
countries-otherwise comparability could not be ensured. As a result, the coding 
schedule ensured that the coding was done entirely for content rather than label. 
 
4.2.1 The Different Areas of Copyright and Their Coding Definitions  
 To assess copyright, a wide range of aspects have to be considered and 
therefore coded for. The following section will discuss these in detail. These will now 
be outlined in detail, presenting the individual components of the coding schedule. The 
first part will focus on general provisions. The second section then moves on to 
substantive rights granted to copyright owners and authors. The third area then 
outlines the exemptions and their conditions. The fifth part centres on enforcement 
and finally, the protection of foreigners is examined.  
75 
 
4.2.2 General provisions 
In this part, general considerations are considered. These are mainly the order 
of provisions in the particular legislation, the justifications stated for providing 
copyright protection as well as the prerequisites (formalities, originality levels) which 
have to be met. 
 
Act Structure 
 The general outline of the particular act can be relevant in the analysis. It is 
assumed that the order of sections is a reflection of the importance attributed to them 
(S. von Lewinski 2008: 41, 51, 62-63). The sections were recorded in their order, with ‘1’ 
assigned to the one appearing first; ‘2’ for the second one and so on. The following 
section are distinguished24 
Section Content 
Definitions  List of definitions 
Economic Rights  Section providing information on 
what particular uses are restricted 
Exemptions  Section providing information on 
situations where copyright cannot 
be enforced 
Foreign Works  Provisions covering foreign authors 
and their works 
Formalities  Section providing information on 
existing formalities and their 
impact 
Moral Rights  Section providing information on 
what author interests are protected 
vis-à-vis the copyright owner 
Neighbouring Rights  Section providing information on 
the protection of neighbouring 
rights (broadcasts and sound 
recordings) 
Table 2: Coding schedule for sections which can be present in an act. 
  
                                                          
24
 Based on the AR-CL differences, see 7.2.1 Act Structure.  
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Performers  Section providing information on 
the protection of Performers 
Sanctions  Section providing information on 
the enforcement provisions 
Term  Terms of Protection 
Transfer  Transfer Provisions 
 For example limits on assignability 
Table 2: Coding schedule for sections which can be present in an act. 
 
The Justifications 
 The first substantive area under consideration is the stated justifications for 
legislating. To this end, the particular justifications named in the legislations were 
coded. These vary significantly and include international pressures, economic benefits 
but also specific reasons such as implementing EU legislation. It should be noted that 
this section only includes those justifications explicitly stated in the legal provisions.25  
Justification Content 
Codification  Legislation aims to codify existing law, especially to 
streamlining it 
Competition  Legislation will enhance the competitiveness of the 
country 
Constitution  Legislation is a constitutional requirement 
 For example: effect of rulings by a constitutional 
court 
Economic Benefit  Legislation is designed to improve the economic 
benefit derived from copyright policy 
 Can be aimed at any interested party 
EU Obligation  Legislation is required by EU Law 
International Obligations  Implementation/ transposition of an international 
(non-EU) agreement 
Table 3: Coding schedule for explicitly stated justifications. 
 
  
                                                          
25 
This is not the same as cultural justifications which forms part of the culture dimensions, see The 
Justifications. 
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International 
Importance 
 Target of reform has been gaining in international 
recognition and spread as a result 
 Catching up with a (perceived) international 
consensus 
Legal Certainty  Legislation aims to ensure that the principle of legal 
certainty is met 
Labour  Author has used his labour to create the work and 
therefore deserves to benefit from it 
Member States  Legislation is designed to appeal to a wider range of 
potential member states 
 Only applicable to international agreements, 
conventions or unions 
National Interest  Legislation aims to further the national interest 
National Reputation  Legislation is required to enhance/ protect the 
international reputation of a country 
Needs of the Author  Legislation  will ensure that the particular needs of 
the author are met 
 Needs can have economic and moral rights 
dimension 
Personality  The work reflects the personality of the author 
which gives him the right to control it 
Piracy  Harm caused by domestic and international piracy 
requires legislation 
Preparatory Work for 
Boarder Protection 
 Partial reform intended to establish the 
prerequisites for further reform 
Technical Changes  Update existing legislation to new technological 
reality 
Single European Market 
(SEM) 
 Legislation will implement the SEM in particular 
 Only relevant for EU member states 
Trade  Legislation will increase the potential for trade 
Utilitarianism  Legislation is designed to provide an incentive to 
create and disseminate works for the public benefit 
Table 3: Coding schedule for explicitly stated justifications. 
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Copyright Requirements 
To benefit from copyright protection, a work has to comply with two sets of 
formalities. The first one is the minimum level of originality required to qualify for 
copyright protection. This only applies to copyright works. NR are by definition 
mechanical works and therefore not original. The literature on copyright policy uses 
three terms to describe originality thresholds. The first one is the ‘sweat of the brow’ 
(based on Locke) which is understood to mean that labour alone is sufficient and no 
explicit originality is required to gain protection. This in line with the UK’s early 
approach as exemplified in Walter v Lane (Walter v Lane  1900). In the US, the Bleistein 
decision reflects this kind of approach: it refers to a requirement that the work is not 
copied (D. Zimmerman 2006).  
The second term is judgement. This refers to a requirement of some although 
rather limited originality. The author must put in some effort which cannot be 
described as pure labour.26 For this reason, German law distinguished between 
different kinds of photographs and films. It provided a higher level of protection if 
these were considered to be original rather than just the result of a technological 
process.27 Harke refers to non-industrial and average which makes it difficult for 
example to gain protection for very short texts (D. Harke 2001: 14- 17).  
Finally, especially continental systems, the term used is ‘creativity’ which refers 
to a high level of originality in the sense that the author’s personality is reflected in the 
work (J. Wiefels 1962: 122). A German case in 1898 did explicitly state that even letters 
may not be of sufficiently creative to justify protection, especially if the content only 
referred to news and similar items (1898: 49).  Similarly, by 1908 it was decided that 
individual creative works, here also referring to letters, were protected (1908: 404). 
                                                          
26
 Examples here are the Feist decision in the US (Feist Publications, Inc. v Rural Telephone Service 
Company, Inc.  1991). 
27
 For example, the 1965 Urheberrechtsgesetz still distinguished between original photographs which 
are protected under §2 and mechanical ones under §72, despite in essence providing the same level of 
protection for both. 
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The German courts have also highlighted that judgement alone is not sufficient (1928: 
358). 
These categories are blurred in practice and so intermediate steps were also 
considered. Each category shows an increase in the level of originality required and is 
based on an equal distance between them. In the coding process, these categories 
were not treated as mutually exclusive but rather if a source referred to the originality 
level, all of these statements were recorded to not overly rely on a potential minority 
opinion.28  
Originality level Content 
None  'Sweat of the Brow' 
 Requires that the work is not 
copied 
Low  Largely relies on skill and labour 
 Some minor judgement/ 
individuality is necessary when the 
work is made 
Some individuality  Judgement needs to be identifiable 
in the work 
 skill and labour are not enough but 
creativity is not needed 
Reflect part of the author's personality  The work has to show judgement 
combined with some limited 
creativity 
 some author personality is 
necessary 
Reflect the author's personality (creativity)  Protection only granted if 
creativity, reflecting the personality 
of the author, is identifiable in the 
work 
Table 4: Coding schedule for the level of originality. 
                                                          
28 In cases where no agreement could be identified, all alternatives were recorded and then 
included in alternative calculations (see Appendix 2). 
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 The second kind of formalities is administrative. Administrative formalities 
were coded for by listing all the formalities which have been included in the legislation 
during the relevant timeframe.  
Formality type Content 
Registry  A work has to be registered in a 
central register  
Deposit  Copies of the work have to be 
deposited with specified libraries/ 
institutions 
Tangible medium  The work has to be expressed in a 
tangible medium 
Name  Name of copyright owner and/ or 
rights reserved appear on the title 
page 
Manufacturing clause  The work has to be manufactured 
in a certain place 
 refers here to the US 
Continued adherence to Berne  Protection is only granted if the 
state continues to adhere to the 
Berne convention 
 refers to the special clause in the 
UCC 
Table 5: Coding schedule for administrative formalities. 
 In addition, the effect the formalities have on the subsistence and enforcement 
was also recorded. It distinguishes between formalities as a precondition; formalities 
as relevant for enforcement only; and formalities have no effect in practice. It is very 
important at this point to be clear which formality had which impact. It is possible that 
the registration of the work is necessary to achieve copyright while the deposit has no  
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impact at all despite giving rise to a fine only.29 To assess the importance of formalities, 
distinctions like these need to be included.  
Provision Definition 
1  formalities are constitutive 
2  formalities are always affecting enforcement 
 no constitutive effect 
3  No effect of formalities 
Table 6: Coding schedule for the impact of formalities. 
 
4.2.3 Protection of Authors and Copyright Owners 
In the second part, the focus moves to the substantive protection of work types. 
This includes which types are protected and who benefits from their protection 
(ownership rules), depending on the circumstances in which they are created. It then 
describes the economic rights which can be provided for as and to what extent these 
can be assigned to other parties. In addition to the economic rights, the moral rights 
which protect the authors’ interest against any other interested party are considered.   
 
Work Types 
 The information of the legislation was coded according to work type. To make 
the comparison as accurate as possible, every significant distinction drawn between 
works from 1880 to 2010 is reflected within it. A few things have to be noted though. 
Firstly, the terms literature work and art work have always been broad and 
subcategories exist. In order to keep the comparisons meaningful and not get lost in 
complexity, it was decided that representative work types will be used: those having 
gained protection first. As a result, literature works are represented by books (meaning 
texts) and art works by paintings. Having said this, controversial later additions which 
                                                          
29
 One example is the difference between the UK and the US. In the US, the formalities were a 
precondition for copyright to exist in the first place. In the UK after 1880, however, compliance with 
formalities had no impact on the existence of copyright as such although it did affect its enforcement. 
By 1920, compliance with formalities had no actual impact at all. 
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happened in the period studied were added as separate work types such as computer 
programs and original databases.  
In summary, the following categories were established:  
Copyright works Literature work: text  Any expression 
which takes the 
shape of a text 
 traditionally referred 
to as a book 
Literature work: computer 
program 
 The source code of a 
computer program 
Literature work: original 
database 
 A databases which is 
able to cross the 
minimum originality 
threshold. 
Dramatic work  A drama in any 
form. 
Musical compositions  A musical 
composition a in any 
form 
 Traditionally 
considered to be 
sheet music 
Art works: painting  The protection 
granted to an artistic 
work 
 exemplified here by 
a painting 
Film  Protection given to a 
film as such rather 
than the underlying 
work expressed in it 
Photographs: high 
originality 
 Photographs which 
fulfil the minimum 
originality 
requirement 
Table 7: Coding schedule for work types.  
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 Photograph: low originality  Photograph which 
does not reflect 
originality 
Neighbouring rights/ rights 
related to copyright 
Sound recording  The protection 
granted to the 
producer of a sound 
recording for the 
recording itself 
Broadcast  The protection 
granted to the 
producer of a 
broadcast for the 
broadcast itself 
Rights akin to copyright Database: sui generis  Protection granted 
to unoriginal 
databases on the 
basis of investment 
Performers  Protection granted 
to a Performer in 
relation to his 
performances of a 
work 
Table 7: Coding schedule for work types. 
 Secondly, it is important to distinguish between the work type protected and 
the right to control a use of this work. Although this might sound obvious, overlapping 
terms can cause significant confusion here. For example, authors can have the right to 
control the broadcasting of a work. The protected item remains the underlying work 
and protection is granted against the activity of broadcasting. However, the work type 
broadcast refers to the broadcast as the item of protection and the ownership lies with 
the (legal) person being in charge of making the broadcast. Here, the broadcasting 
activity is protected in addition. This is important because the dates at which the 
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broadcasting activity gained protection compared to the broadcast as an item tends to 
be significantly earlier.30 
 For each of the work types, the first ownership was included. These refer to 
who owns the copyright by default, especially if it lies automatically with the author or 
not. The distinction is between the author and employer. The situation in which a work 
is created is important: it determines the relationship between the author and the 
work and therefore also the employer. This information is relevant later on in the 
analysis.  
Creation situation Content 
Joint work  The work was created by more 
than one author and their 
contributions cannot be 
distinguished from each other 
Collective work  Refers to a work which was 
created by more than one 
author and the contributions 
can be distinguished 
Contributions to collective works  Refers to the copyright in the 
specific contribution which was 
created with the intent of 
forming part of a collective 
work 
Anonymous/ pseudonymous works  (Real) name of the author of 
the work is not known 
Table 8: Coding schedule for the relationship between a work and the author. 
 
The Rights  
The next area under consideration is the particular uses of a work which are 
protected by copyright policy. These economic rights have been broken down into 
their smallest possible components and listed separately.  
                                                          
30
 The right to control broadcasting was established in the Germany in by the court ((1926) RGZ 113 p. 
413). However, broadcasts themselves only gained protection in the 1965 Urheberrechtsgesetz.  
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 This chapter aims to track the development of copyright and therefore, the 
rights will be treated as separate even though they might not be listed as such any 
more in the law or the relevant commentaries. It is the substance which counts, not 
the label. As a result, although adaptation right includes the translation of a work in 
modern copyright law, it will be treated as separate here due to the historical 
dimension. Similarly, although Internet access to a work is conceptually part of the 
communication to the public, not all countries necessarily have it automatically 
included. Therefore, the making accessible on the Internet is listed independently as 
well. The same applies to the splitting of the performance right into 1) performance as 
such, meaning by a person or group in front of the audience; 2) performance using a 
technical instrument in front of an audience, especially a sound recording and 3) 
performance via technical equipment and transmitted live to a (limited) distant 
audience, for example with a screen and loudspeakers to the outside of the room 
where the performance occurs.31 On the other hand, not all rights are logically 
available to all kind of works. For example, there is little copyright relevant meaning in 
exhibiting a literature work because the copyright relevant essence of the work is the 
expression and therefore the wording rather than the material object as such. Finally, 
the right to extract and re-utilize data only applies to databases which are protected 
based on their investment value rather than creative merit (sui generis databases32).  
  
                                                          
31
 The third right is different from broadcasting in that the transmission distance is limited: it refers to 
the broadening of the audience for a live performance by other means than broadcasts. 
32
 Sui generis databases differ from other databases protected under copyright that they are not 
considered original but still beneficial to the public. So, to ensure a return in investment, they get a 
special kind of protection which is shorter in term and less expansive in scope than databases qualifying 
for normal copyright protection. 
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Economic right Content 
Reproduction  Right to reproduce a work in a tangible 
form, both analogue and digital 
 irrespective how these are made or in 
what shape the reproduction takes 
Distribution right  Right to make a work publicly available by 
the sale or transfer of ownership of a 
tangible copy or the original 
Fixation right  Reproduce oral work or performance in a 
tangible medium 
Exhibition right  Right to exhibit a tangible copy of a work 
in public 
Rental/ Lending right  Right to borrow a tangible copy of a work 
 Renting refers to commercial nature 
 Lending is non-commercial 
Adaptation right  Right to prevent the alteration of a work’s 
expression  
 For example: dramatization of a novel 
Translation right  Right to control the translation of a work 
into other languages. 
Performance/ Recitation right  Right to control the performance of a work 
in public by a natural person 
 The audience is present during the 
performance 
Performance via a technical 
instrument 
 Right to control the performance of a work 
in public 
 The audience is present but the 
performance is done by a technical 
instrument, especially a sound recording 
Performance via technical 
equipment 
 Right to control a performance in public 
 Uses technical equipment to transmit the 
performance live to a (limited) distant 
audience 
 For example with a screen and 
loudspeakers to the outside of the room 
where the performance takes place 
Table 9: Coding schedule for economic rights. 
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Communication to the public right  Right to control the transmission of a work 
to a distant place 
 Excludes broadcasting 
Broadcasting right  Right to broadcast a work by the means of 
wireless transmission 
Retransmission right  Right to control the retransmission of a 
broadcast by both wired and wireless 
means 
Making accessible  Right to control if a work is made 
accessible on the Internet. 
Extract and reutilization right  Describes the use of a database 
 Only applies to sui generis databases 
Table 9: Coding schedule for economic rights. 
 The term of protection was also recorded. Special attention was paid to the 
circumstances of creation. For example, the term can vary depending on if it made for 
hire or not. In this area, there was a specific issue related to the US legislative style. 
The US statute uses broad terms for the rights and these are expanded by the courts to 
include new meanings. The points of these inclusions are largely clear except for the 
'Making Accessible' right. It is very hard to pinpoint the introduction of this right as it is 
an expansion of the reproduction right. My solution here was to include it from 2000 
onwards for a number of reasons. Firstly, dating it back to the actual introduction of 
the broad term (reproduction) right would date it back to 1976 and therefore before 
the Internet was thought of in a modern way. Secondly, court cases affecting the 
infringement of copyright on the Internet first appear in the 1990s. Thirdly, the WCT 
which includes the right explicitly was transposed into US law with the 1998 Digital 
Millennium Act. The conclusion was therefore that it was introduced at some points in 
the 1990s. 
 In addition to the existing rights, it was also recorded to what extent they are 
transferable. In some cases, limitations applied when particular assignments were 
explicitly prohibited. The provisions here covered the followed non-exclusive 
distinctions:  
88 
 
Transferability Content 
Fully Transferable  There are no limitations on the 
what the owner can assign 
Only by Will  The right can only be passed on 
after the death of the author as 
part of the estate 
Expropriation  The copyright can be expropriated, 
for example in cases of debt 
State Ownership  The right will be inherited by the 
state if no heir can be found 
Table 10: Coding schedule for the transferability of rights. 
 
Moral Rights 
 Outside of economic rights, moral rights were also coded for. The term author 
here reflects the creator of the protected work as distinct from the copyright owner. It 
can therefore be an author, artist or a performer, depending on the specific work in 
question. However, it cannot be a corporation or similar entity. Like with the economic 
rights, the terms used in the particular policies were broken down into their smallest 
components.  
Moral right Content 
Positive paternity  The right of the author to be 
named as such. 
Negative paternity  The right to not have a work 
attributed to an author. 
Integrity  The right of the author to prevent 
actions which compromise the 
integrity of the work 
 For example alterations 
First Publication  The right of the author to control 
the first publication of the work  
 Publication refers to making it 
available to the public in whatever 
way 
Table 11: Coding schedule for moral rights. 
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Remuneration  The right of the author to be 
adequately compensated when his 
work is used 
Resale  The right of the author to benefit 
from increases in a work's value if 
it is resold 
 Mainly applies to art work 
Access  The right of the author to have 
access to a work after the transfer 
of ownership of the physical copy 
Participation  The right of the author to demand 
more remuneration if the original 
contract does not reflect a rise in 
value of the work. 
Withdrawal based on a change in attitude  The right of the author to withdraw 
a work because it does not reflect 
his attitudes anymore 
Withdrawal based on non-exercise of the 
rights assigned 
 The right of the author to withdraw 
the copyright on the basis that the 
assignee has not exercised the 
right 
Fixation  The right of the author to not have 
his work fixed in a tangible form 
without his consent 
Privacy/ Portrait  The right of the person pictured in 
a portrait or being reflected in a 
work to prevent certain actions on 
the basis that this is relevant to his 
privacy 
Table 11: Coding schedule for moral rights. 
 In addition to the moral rights, the term of protection for these was also 
recorded. 
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4.2.4 Protection of Users 
 
The Exemptions 
In the third part, the focus moves away from the protection of the owners/ 
authors to the users. The possible exemptions as well as the particular conditions 
which can apply to them are coded. Like with the rights themselves, the distinction is 
between exemptions for economic rights (CR, NR and Performer) but also additional 
ones for Performers and for moral rights. 
 
Exemptions for Economic Rights 
 Of all areas in copyright policy, determining the exact shape of an exemption 
affecting economic rights has been the most complex task. Not only does terminology 
vary across countries, their applicability and conditions vary according to work types. 
As a result, the main aim of the coding was to reduce this complexity and make them 
comparable across case studies. To this end, exemptions were recorded according to 
their specific purposes. The act sections especially often provide for several separate 
occasions in which an exemption can be claimed for different reasons. One example 
are the library exemptions which range from copying an unpublished manuscript, to 
copying and distributing a scientific article to lending a work. These activities are 
exempt for different reasons and have different conditions attached to them. As a 
result, they are treated separately here but as similar as possible across the different 
case studies. This also means that a section in the specific act can be congruent with an 
exemption listed here but not necessarily so. 
When coding for exemptions, it is essential to also compare the infringement 
side with the rights to identify where hidden exemptions exist. For example, even 
though a right to perform exists, it is possible that only public performances constitute 
infringement. Therefore, non-commercial (private) performances are exempt from 
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copyright.33 The list of exemptions is therefore a mixture of listed exemptions, case law 
and infringement considerations. 
 The following table summarises all of the exemptions (in alphabetical order):  
 Exemption Purpose Content 
3 Step Test  Explicit reproduction of the Berne 3 step 
test 
 Conditions are listed under General 
Limits/ Conditions in the conditions part 
of the coding schedule 
Abstract  Making an abstract of a work 
Archiving  Making complete copies for the purpose 
of including them in an archive 
Back up  Allows to make a backup copy 
Catalogue  Use of a work by including it in a 
catalogue 
Circumvention  Break the anti-copying mechanism 
Coin-Operated Machines  Using a work in relation to coin-operated 
machines 
Coin-Operated Machines (Games)  Using of a work in coin-operated gaming 
machines 
Compilations/ Collective Work  Purpose of creating a compilation which 
includes a variety of different works 
Compliance with Berne  Include exemptions by reference to Berne 
Compliance with Rome  Include exemptions by reference to Rome 
Table 12: Coding schedule for economic right exemptions. 
 
  
                                                          
33
 This has been the case for example in the US for the performance of musical works in the 1909 and 
1947 Copyright Acts. 
92 
 
Copyright Equivalent/ General 
Exemption 
 Same scope of exemptions apply to these 
works as they do for standard copyright 
protected works 
 Used for NR and Performers 
Correct Errors  Correct errors in a computer program 
Criticism/ Review  Purpose of criticizing or reviewing a work 
De-Compilation  Reversing high-level code into machine 
accessible code 
De Minimis  Some minor use is allowed 
Derogation from Grant  Use copyright in such a way that it 
amounts to abuse 
 For example refusal to publish by heirs 
Developing Countries  Use of a work only available to countries 
with developing country status 
Digital Audio Transmission  Using a work in connection with digital 
audio transmission 
Disability  Make works accessible in special formats 
to enable disabled people to have access 
to them 
Encryption Research  Purpose of understanding any encryption 
mechanisms 
Ephemeral Recordings  Allows a broadcaster to make copies in 
relation to the broadcasting activity 
EU  Limits on copyright due to EU 
requirements 
Exemptions Manufacturing Clause  Exemptions to the requirement that 
copies need to be manufactured within a 
country 
Exhaustion of the Right  After a work is sold, certain rights granted 
do not apply anymore 
Table 12: Coding schedule for economic right exemptions. 
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Expiry Assumption  Defines time periods were it is reasonable 
to assume that copyright has expired 
 Relevant when copyright owners 
unexpectedly appear 
Fair Use/ Creating an Independent 
Work 
 Create a new work which qualifies for 
copyright itself 
 Transformative use 
Folk Song  Use a work is possible because it is a 
folksong 
Foreign Language/ Foreign Country  Works written in a foreign language are 
not subject to all copyright provisions 
Government/ Public Institutions or 
Charity Use 
 Exemptions granted for actions by these 
kind of institutions because these are 
understood to serve the broader public 
good 
Incidental Inclusion  Incidental inclusion of work within 
another kind of work 
Inclusion in Scientific Article  Inclusion of a work in a scientific article 
Interim Copyright  Grant of copyright to a work for a set 
period to allow for the compliance with 
formalities 
Lawful Use  Lawful use of the work does not cause 
infringement 
Legal Requirement  Statutory duty necessitates the infringing 
action 
Library: Back-up Copy  Copy a complete work to replace another 
one 
Library: Copy a Work  Allows the library to copy a work for a 
third person 
Library: Copy an Digital Work  Allows library to make digital copies of a 
work 
Library: Copy from Internet  Allows libraries to copy works available 
on the Internet 
Table 12: Coding schedule for economic right exemptions. 
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Library: Copy Unpublished 
Manuscript 
 Library can make a copy of an 
unpublished manuscript 
Library: Exhibition Catalogue  Allows libraries to copy works for the 
purpose of using them in exhibition 
catalogues 
Library: Export  Make complete copy of a work before the 
original is exported 
Library: Final Years  Library activities permissible during the 
final years of copyright protection 
Library: Import  Allows for the import of copyrighted 
works by and for the use of libraries 
Library: Interlibrary Exchange  Copy a work to distribute the copy to 
another library 
Library: Make Work Accessible 
Digitally 
 Allows library to copy a work and make 
the copy accessible digitally 
Library: Rent/ Lend  Exemption covering the rental and 
lending rights 
Manufacture Sound Recording/ 
Compulsory License 
 Manufacturers of sound recordings can 
make copies of a work in return for a fee 
Minor Import  Exemption to import restrictions based 
on the small quantity of works imported 
News  Use works in news reporting 
Non-commercial Broadcasting  Use works in certain types of public 
broadcasting 
Out of Print  Copy a work if it is out of print 
Paper Reproduction  Reproducing a work on paper rather than 
digitally 
Parody  Allows to use a work in a parody 
Political Speeches  Use of the work is permitted because it is 
a political speeches 
Table 12: Coding schedule for economic right exemptions. 
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Privacy/ Personal Information  Works cannot be used if privacy or 
personal information issues are affected 
Private Study  Purpose of private study 
Private Use  Private use of a work 
Public Place  The work copied is situated in a public 
place 
Public Recitation  Public recitation of a work 
Public Safety/ Judicial Proceedings  Use a work in relation to judicial 
enforcement or other security related 
activities 
Quote  Quote parts of a work in another work 
Religion  Use of a work by a church or in the course 
of worship 
Rental  Uses in the course of a rental activity 
Rental Right Transferal Assumption/ 
Compulsory License for Rental 
 Rental right is assumed to have been 
transferred in certain cases 
Repair  Use the work in the repair of technical 
equipment 
Research  Use a work in the course of research 
activities 
Restricted Term/ Right  Certain rights have not the standard term 
of protection 
Retransmission  Exemptions to retransmission rights 
Reverse Engineering   Copy a work in an attempt to understand 
its workings with the goal of creating an 
independent work 
Right Assertion Requirement  Right is not in effect unless it has been 
asserted 
Table 12: Coding schedule for economic right exemptions.  
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Sale  Use of a work with the aim of selling it 
Special Broadcasting  Broadcasting by certain types of 
institutions and for limited (not public) 
uses only 
Subsequent Work  Use a work to create related works 
Teaching Performance  Performance of a work in the course of a 
teaching 
Teaching: Classroom Instruction  Use works in the course of teaching 
activities 
Teaching: Classroom Instruction-
Make Accessible Online 
 Use works in the course of teaching 
activities by giving students access to the 
works online 
Teaching: Exam  Use a work for the purpose of 
examinations 
Teaching: Import  Import a work by and for the use of 
educational establishments 
Teaching: Make Broadcast/ 
Transmission 
 Use a work in a school broadcast or 
transmission 
Teaching: Make Photocopy  Make photocopies of works for use in 
teaching activities 
Teaching: Performance  Perform a work (including via mechanical 
instruments or technical equipment) 
Teaching: Record Broadcast/ 
Transmission 
 Copy a broadcast/ transmission to use in 
teaching activities 
Teaching: Rental/ Lending  Exemption for educational 
establishments to the lending and rental 
rights 
Teaching: Textbook  Use works in textbooks 
Table 12: Coding schedule for economic right exemptions. 
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Technical Necessity  Works are copied in the course of a 
technical process which is necessary to 
the lawful use of the work 
Temporary Reproduction  Making a temporary copy of a work 
Unpublished Manuscript  Make complete copies of unpublished 
manuscripts  
Table 12: Coding schedule for economic right exemptions. 
 For each of the exemptions, a number of different characteristics were 
recorded. Not all work types are subject to the same rights and exemptions. Therefore, 
the type of work subject to the exemption is also recorded. Secondly, the economic 
rights which are affected by it. However, not every exemption explicitly lists the right it 
affects. So, it can be necessary to deduce the rights affected by the purpose of the 
exemption or the specific conditions which apply.  
 
Exemption Conditions 
Another issue with exemptions relates to the conditions which apply to them. 
They tend to be very detailed and complex. To allow for comparison across case 
studies, the conditions applicable to the different exemptions have been standardized 
and generalized according to their nature. For example, if a work can only be accessed 
in electronic form in a certain building, for two years and only at 5 computer 
simultaneously, the actual restrictions are: time (two years), territorial (only in the 
building) and in the number of copies (5 at any time). In addition, conditions have been 
recoded according to their underlying motive.  
To determine the focus of the exemption, the emphasis has to be on the 
impact any conditions has in practice. The first group includes those conditions which 
protect the author's interest as an author. These are essentially non-economic 
conditions. Secondly, conditions can limit the extent to which a work is distributed, 
limiting the circulation of copies made under an exemption. Thirdly, the copying of the 
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work itself can be restricted, termed here 'limited scope'. Fourthly, some exemptions 
have conditions attached which are designed to ensure the compensation of the rights 
owner (remuneration). In the next group, conditions are summarized which limit the 
uses of a work under a specific exemption. Conditions can also be grouped by the 
actor/ procedural limits. Here, how an exemption is exploited and by whom is 
important. Finally, there are conditions which describe general limits. The following 
table illustrates the meaning of these categories in addition to defining the content of 
the specific conditions as they apply to economic rights. 
 
Group Condition Content 
Author interest Name and source  The name of the author 
and/or the source from 
where the extract was taken 
has to be indicated 
Consent required  Author has to be asked and 
actively agree to the use 
No recall for changed 
attitudes 
 Work cannot have been 
recalled from circulation on 
the basis that the author's 
attitudes have changed 
Limited 
distribution 
Limited public  The circle of people that 
benefit from the use of the 
work is limited by specific 
criteria 
 not public use 
Number of copies  Number of copies which can 
be made is restricted 
©-note (prevent further 
spread) 
 Every copy made under the 
exemption has to carry the 
©-note to make sure that 
further use can infringe 
Territorial limit  Exemption carries specific 
territorial restrictions 
Table 13: Coding schedule for exemption conditions. 
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Limited scope Nature of the work  Exemption only applies if the 
copyrighted work matches 
certain criteria 
 For example a school 
textbook 
Time limit  Exemption applies only 
within or after a specific time 
period 
No assertion  Exemption only applies if the 
attacked rights owner has 
not asserted the affected 
right 
 Right not exercised  Exemption only applies if the 
right is not actively exercised 
Information/ format not 
available 
 The information/ format 
sought under the exemption 
cannot be available prior to 
the exemption being used 
Only necessary parts  The copying/ use itself is 
restricted to those parts of 
the work which can be 
justified directly by the 
exemption 
Incidental/ part of the 
technical process 
 Infringement is a by-product 
of another (lawful) activity 
Published  The work must have been 
published before the 
exemption is invoked 
License prevails  Exemption does not apply if 
a license agreement exists 
and prohibits the activity 
Compensation Remuneration  The right owner has to be 
compensated for the exempt 
use 
No commercial advantage  The use cannot be 
commercial 
Table 13: Coding schedule for exemption conditions. 
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 Compulsory license  Exemption allows for 
commercial use of a work in 
return for compensation 
Declare intent  The intent to use an 
exemption has to be 
declared beforehand 
 Either to author or a central 
organization 
Collection society only  Compensation claims can 
only be exercised by a 
collecting society 
 Arbitration  If no agreement on the terms 
of use can be found, 
arbitration is required 
Use No modification  The work cannot be altered 
Very limited/ highly specific 
use only 
 Exemption only applies for a 
very specific use 
Lawful use/ copy  Exemption only applies if a 
lawful copy is used and/or 
the general activity is lawful 
Create independent work  Transformative use is 
required 
Several authors  Works from several authors 
have to be used 
Own copy  The person relying on the 
exemption has to own the 
copy used 
Actor/ procedure Doing it yourself  Only the person relying on 
the exemption can carry out 
the activities it entails 
Lawful user  The user has to be allowed to 
use a work 
By one person  Exemption only applies if it is 
carried out by only one 
person 
Table 13: Coding schedule for exemption conditions. 
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 Reproduction method  Exemption only applies if 
certain reproduction 
methods are used 
Circumvention measure  Exemption includes 
removing the DRM 
Nature of the institutions  The nature of the institution 
relying on the exemption has 
to match certain criteria 
General limit Special cases  Exemption only applies in 
special cases 
 Berne criterion 1 
Normal exploitation 
guaranteed 
 Exemption does not interfere 
with the regular market of a 
work 
 Berne criterion 2 
No unreasonable prejudice  The impact created by the 
exemption is not overly 
costly for the rights owner 
 Berne criterion 3 
Comply with Rome 
obligations 
 All exemptions have to be 
permissible under the Rome 
agreement 
Table 13:  Coding schedule for exemption conditions. 
 
  
102 
 
Exemptions for Performer 
 In addition, some exemptions to Performer rights were separately coded 
because their nature is significantly different from the exemptions which apply to 
other types of works. They exist in addition to the standard copyright exemptions. 
Therefore, when assessing copyright exemptions as applicable to Performers, both sets 
need to be included. It is clearly noticeable that the additional limitations are designed 
to facilitate economic exploitation rather than a public good reasoning. In addition, 
these exemptions tend to be quite absolute in that they contain no further conditions 
outside of the purpose to determine when they apply.  
Additional Performer's Rights Exemptions Content 
Remuneration  The right cannot be exercised if 
adequate compensation is paid. 
Integrity  The performer has no rights 
concerning the integrity of the 
work if the work is a film. 
Compulsory consent  The performer is assumed to have 
consented to the use and therefore 
rights to do not apply. 
Audio-visual work  The performer cannot exercise his 
rights if the work in question is an 
audio-visual work. 
Broadcast performance  The performer cannot exercise his 
rights if the performance in 
question has been broadcast. 
Fixation  Fixation can be made as long as it is 
for private use. 
Employment  Rights cannot be exercised if the 
performance was made in the 
course of employment 
Authorized fixation  An authorized fixation does permit 
further uses of the this specific 
fixation 
Table 14: Coding schedule for performer exemptions. 
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Same use as authorized fixation  Rights cannot be exercised if the 
use in question is essentially the 
same as the one for which the 
original permission was granted 
Public performance/ exhibition on spot 
reference 
 Exemption if the work is made 
available for  public performance 
or on the spot reference 
Nature of the institution  Certain institutions are always 
permitted to make changes to the 
material 
 For example: exclusion of 
disturbing material by the 
broadcaster 
Reasonable exercise  The rights can only be exercised to 
the extent that is reasonable and 
prevents an unduly impact on the 
rights holder.  
Table 14: Coding schedule for performer exemptions. 
 
Exemptions for Moral Rights 
Exemptions for moral rights were also coded separately because their purposes 
are fundamentally different from those applying to different sets of rights. Again the 
coding was done according the purpose of the exemption, describing situations where 
moral rights are limited. The coding included the type of work and which specific moral 
right is affected by what exemption. The particular conditions did not have to be 
recorded because the exemptions here are already so narrow that the purpose and 
conditions are practically identical. It should also be noted that the exemptions tend to 
be highly country specific and cross-country overlap is very limited in practice.  
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Exemption 
to Moral 
Rights Content 
Advertiseme
nt  Performance made for the purpose of an advertisement 
Assertion 
Requirement 
 The moral right can only be exercised if it has been asserted 
beforehand 
Audio-Visual 
Work 
 Moral rights cannot be exercised in relation to an audio-
visual work 
Collective 
Managemen
t 
 The moral right can only be exercised by a collection society; 
Usually refers to remuneration 
Collective 
work 
 The moral rights cannot be exercised if the underlying work 
is a collective work 
Competition 
Consideratio
ns 
 Any activity which would have significant implications for 
competition is not subject to moral rights 
Computer 
Programs 
 The moral rights do not apply if the underlying work is a 
computer program 
Conservation 
Efforts 
 Any changes to the work which are the result of 
conservation efforts are not be subject to moral rights 
Contract 
 Any action allowed under a contract are not subject to 
moral rights 
Copyright 
Exemptions 
 The moral rights cannot be used to limit uses permitted 
under the copyright exemptions 
Destruction 
 Any activity which destroys the work is not subject to moral 
rights 
Disclaimer 
 The moral rights cannot be exercised if the adapted work 
has a disclaimer on it which distances the author from the 
changed work 
Expiration 
 Any activity after the moral rights have expired are not 
subject to moral rights 
Get Name 
Removed 
 Exercising the moral right is limited to have author's name 
removed 
Incorporatio
n into 
Building 
 Any activity affecting the work if the work is part of a 
building are not subject to moral rights 
Minimum 
Time Limit 
 The right applies for a minimum term; Relevant if the right 
usually expires with the owner's death 
Monetary 
Limit 
 The exercise of the right is limited in value; especially 
relevant to the resale right 
Table 15: Coding schedule for moral rights exemptions. 
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Nature of 
Materials 
 Any changes to the work which are the result of the 
materials used and their specific characteristics are not 
subject to moral rights 
Passing of 
Time 
 Any changes to the work which are created by the passing 
of time itself cannot be subject to moral rights 
Prejudice of 
Honour 
 Any activity has to be at least prejudicial to the honour of 
the author to fall within the moral right remit 
Prejudice 
Reputation 
 Any activity has to be at least prejudicial to the reputation of 
the author to be subject to moral rights 
Public 
Presentation 
 Any changes to the work which are the result of presenting 
the work to the public are not subject to moral rights 
Public 
Safety/ 
Judicial 
Proceedings 
 Any activity which is linked to public safety or judicial 
proceedings is not subject to moral rights 
Reasonable 
Exercise  The moral right has to be exercised in a reasonable manner 
Requires a 
Declaration 
of Intent 
 Exercising the moral right is only possible after the intent to 
do so has been declared beforehand 
Requires 
Compensatio
n of Owner 
 Exercising the moral right requires the owner of the work to 
be compensated 
Unreasonabl
e Effect on 
Owner 
 Any exercise of the right which would have an unreasonable 
effect on the owner of the work  is not subject to moral 
rights 
Work for 
Hire 
 The moral rights do not apply if the underlying work was 
created in the course of employment 
Table 15: Coding schedule for moral rights exemptions. 
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4.2.5 The Enforcement 
In the fourth part, the centre of attention shifts to the enforcement of 
copyright. This section outlines the available sanctions as well as the kinds of 
infringement they are applicable to. Finally, the last part examines the protection of 
foreigners in comparison to nationals. The key considerations are both the extent of 
protection and the role of formalities.  
Sanctions 
 The final dimension included was the sanctions which refer to particular 
remedies available to tackle infringement. The decision was made against coding for 
the actual stringency of the offense, for example the maximum amount of a fine. The 
timeframe is so long that the legal systems have changed in how they punish. It would 
be nearly impossible to compare prison sentences with hard labour (UK, 1911 
Copyright Act) to pure fines or modern prison sentences. Similarly, monetary values 
are difficult to compare over time and across countries. In addition to inflation and 
varying conversion rates, Germany especially switched its currency several times in the 
examined period. Finally, a rarely used very punitive sanction may be less relevant in 
practice in practice than a more lenient but regularly used one. In sum, only the type 
of sanction is recorded.  
 The following sanctions were identified in copyright policies across the 
timeframe examined:  
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Sanction Content 
Injunction  Injunction against an individual with 
the aim to stop the infringing activity 
Seizure/ deliver up  Infringing material can be seized or 
has to be delivered up to the court/ 
copyright owner 
Profits  Infringer can be order to pay the 
profits he made from the infringing 
activity 
Fines  Payment of a fine by the infringer 
Prison  Prison sentences to be served by the 
infringer 
Duty to Provide Information  Duty to provide information on the 
infringing activity, its organization and 
other infringers 
 can apply to the infringer and those 
linked to him 
Search Warrants  Search warrants can be issued with 
the aim of securing evidence on the 
infringing activity 
Private Searches/ Investigations  Possibility for private persons to 
conduct a search or investigation 
 usually only available in very specific 
circumstances 
Legal Cost  Requirement to pay for the legal cost 
of the opponent in addition to one's 
own 
Destruction   Infringing articles are to be destructed 
Lose Copyright Protection  Lose the benefits which follow from 
copyright protection 
 de-validates copyright 
Injunction Against the Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) 
 Injunction against the ISP to stop an 
infringing activity on the Internet 
 usually entails the removal of 
infringing material from the ISP's 
servers or blocking access to a side 
Import Restrictions  Certain copyright protected materials 
cannot be imported into the 
jurisdiction in question 
Table 16: Coding schedule for enforcement. 
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Types of Infringement 
As for what was punished, copyright right works, neighbouring works and 
Performer have to be considered separately. For each of these, the distinction 
between commercial-scale infringement, normal infringement and innocent 
infringement was added. Furthermore, moral rights were split into moral rights 
relating to copyright works and Performers. Finally, specific offences such as tempering 
with the digital rights management34, knowing of infringement, intended infringement, 
attaching a false ©-note and the failure to deposit were also included. 
For the international level, a distinction was drawn between the optional and 
the mandatory provision of an offense as well as the aim to facilitate. This departs 
from the national case studies but helps to distinguish between the enforcement 
capabilities of international agreements. Separate coding was not used because 
modern agreements such as TRIPs have stronger enforcement capabilities which 
mirror the national level. Also, not having these specific provisions makes a statement 
about its available capabilities on its own. The categories of referral to international 
mediation and provide technical cooperation were added. Both of them are remedies 
but also reflect the special nature of international agreements compared to national 
systems. 
 
4.2.6 Protection of Foreigners 
 The last area of coding concerned the protection works got whose authors are 
not nationals of the country in question. The coding contains two distinct aspects. The 
first one is the scope of protection in relation to national authors as well as the country 
of origin. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The second part is formalities 
and how extensive these are.  
  
                                                          
34
 Technology to control copying or copyright information. 
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Extent of Protection Content 
No Protection  Foreigners do not benefit from any 
protection under copyright policy 
Limited guaranteed protection  Every foreign author benefits from 
some protection 
 The scope of protection is more 
narrow than that of national 
authors 
Reciprocity  The protection available to foreign 
authors cannot be more extensive 
than in the country of origin 
Most-favoured Nation Clause  Copyright is subject to the WTO 
style Most-Favoured Nation clause 
(most favourable terms for any 
partner apply to all of them) 
National Treatment  Foreign authors benefit from the 
same scope of protection as 
national authors 
No Formalities  There are no additional formalities 
to be complied with by foreign 
authors 
Some Formalities  Some formalities apply 
 Refers exclusively to a requirement 
to publish in the country of 
question within a set time 
Extensive Formalities  Foreign authors have to comply 
with formalities which are 
potentially more extensive than 
those national authors have to 
comply with  
Table 17: Coding schedule for the protection of foreigners. 
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4.2.7 Summary 
 In summary, the data is drawn from the UK, US, Germany and an aggregated 
International Level and their respective policies between 1880/ 1890 and 2010. The 
data is based on statute, case law as well as the interpretation of contemporary 
sources. The resulting data is binary in that provisions are recorded as present or not 
present. The investigation only focuses on the core components of protection, namely 
copyright works, neighbouring works, Performers and moral rights. For each of these, 
the recorded data centres on what is protection, to what extend in which situation and 
how is it enforced. For all of these areas, the coding schedule relies on narrow and 
precise definitions which do not overlap. 
 
4.3 Comments on Coding 
 This thesis applies uses the coding to general empirical evidence. It is therefore 
necessary to elaborate on what are considered sources: which sources are relevant 
and how these are combined. This part will first outline the selection process, 
highlighting how sources were identified, retrieved and sorted. Afterwards, the focus 
will move to the. It will describe how three different areas were investigated: 
legislation, case law and secondary sources. Finally, the third part will clarify how the 
large amount of information was turned into data.  
 
4.3.1 Selecting the Sources 
 The selection process was started with general reading on the development of 
copyright. At this point, the case studies were treated as separate, meaning that the 
first one was completed before a second one was started. The research went further 
back than the original timeframe to understand the history of the law in addition to 
tracing the broad developments. For example, for the UK, it started with the Statute of 
Anne and early case law. Based on this, a preliminary list of all relevant laws and key 
court cases was compiled for the timeframe of 1880-2010. 
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 The interest now shifted to 1880. The aim was to establish the starting point for 
the analysis, namely all the documents which affected the state of the law in 1880. To 
do this, the list of documents was compared to the laws and court cases named in the 
historical sections of modern commentaries on copyright law and general histories of 
the time. This worked well for Germany and the US which had largely consolidated 
copyright acts in 1880.35 However, it was very complicated for the UK because its 
copyright law at this stage was not in one but a whole array of parliamentary acts.36 
Therefore, it was necessary to use additional, UK-specific primary sources to complete 
the list, especially the 1878 Copyright Commission Report and Copinger's Law on 
Copyright (1870)(W. Copinger 1870; Report of the Royal Commission  1878).  
It should be noted that although the data set covers 1880 until today, not all 
case studies are relevant at all times. In 1880, only the UK, US and Germany actually 
provided a copyright regime. So only those three provide for continuous data from 
1880 until 2010. The International Level is incorporated from 1890 because the Berne 
Convention was concluded in 1886.  
 The historical accounts on the evolution of copyright law in the different case 
studies were then used to build a skeleton outline. It includes which acts were in force 
when and which court cases are important. In a second step, the timeline was 
complemented by using contemporary legal textbooks on copyright law37, amendment 
histories, legal databases as well as commentaries on specific acts, court cases or other 
events. The result was a nearly complete picture of which documents needed to be 
examined to assess the state of the law for the chosen point in time. The result was a 
list of amendments which had taken place between 1880 and 2010 as well as the 
complete list of relevant documents for 1880. The next step now was to collect the 
sources. 
                                                          
35
 These acts were (Germany 1870; US 1870; US 1874; Germany 1876; Post Office Amendment Act 1879). 
36
 Laws include 1842 Copyright Act; 1852 International Copyright Act and the 1862 Fine Arts Copyright 
Act. For a complete list, see the attached amendment history. 
37
 For example, several editions of Copinger on Copyright Law were used to track down important acts 
and court cases for the UK as well as the US. 
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 Different strategies were employed to retrieve the sources. For the early stages, 
most of acts were available in the on-line archive Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-
1900) (L. Bently et al. 2008). However, for later periods, especially 1900 to roughly 
1970, many original acts are not accessible on-line. In these cases, I relied on the 
collections of libraries in both Britain and Germany, including the British Library and 
the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. As with the laws, most of the pre-1900 commentaries 
were available on-line whereas later ones could only be accessed via library collections. 
The Internet became important again for modern laws, especially those after 1990. 
Legal databases such as Westlaw, Westlaw International and HeinOnline proved most 
valuable for both the retrieval of original acts and to trace the relevant amendments, 
especially for the US and the UK. As for Germany, the most important resource was 
the amendment history by Fuchs (T. Fuchs 2008). It provided codified versions of all 
copyright articles since 1965. In sum, by this point, a list of amendments and the 
relevant acts and case law had been collected. The next step now was to determine 
the actual state of the law for each point in time.   
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4.3.2 State of Law 
 The state of the substantive law was then determined by reference to the 
collected acts, court cases and contemporary as well as modern secondary sources. 
Any additional relevant primary sources identified in this process were also collected 
and included in the study. In the first step, the laws were retrieved and analysed. If any 
aspect was unclear, contemporary commentaries on copyright law were used to 
resolve the issue. The choice was made to only rely on contemporary sources at this 
stage to limit a modern style bias in the interpretation of the law. Afterwards, modern 
secondary sources, including histories, articles and commentaries, were consulted for 
additional information which was not apparent from the laws themselves. For example, 
commentaries would highlight the most important court cases and how they impacted 
on the legislation. Similarly, they contain lists of amending laws which can then be 
traced. Thirdly, the court case references and minor amending laws which had 
appeared in the commentaries or secondary sources were followed up, assessed if 
they were relevant to the study of copyright as conducted here and if so, analysed. The 
notes from the three individual steps were kept separate unless it became clear that a 
legal provision had been misinterpreted.  
 The same process was repeated for every decade for each case study examined, 
except for one minor change. Unless there was a general revision or codification of the 
law, the notes from the earlier decade were used and only adapted to reflect the 
amendments. All these changes were done in cursive to make them easily identifiable 
later on. Therefore, at the end of this note-taking stage, three sets of notes existed: 
the legislation; relevant case law and the opinions by authors.  
 For each case study, one or more secondary sources proved especially useful. 
For the early stages of copyright law, the on-line archive Primary Sources on Copyright 
(1450-1900) (L. Bently et al. 2008) was a valuable starting point because the historical 
comments written to accompany the acts provided insights into both the context and 
the meaning of the specific act. However, the quality of these comments was generally 
lower for the US and even more so for German laws. For the international dimension, I 
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relied heavily on Ricketson and Ginsberg's The Berne Convention and beyond, 
Goldstein's International Copyright and von Lewinski's International Copyright Law and 
Policy (P. Goldstein 2001; S. Ricketson et al. 2006; S. von Lewinski 2008). These provide 
detailed explanations of the provisions of all relevant international agreements, 
including their contexts. In addition, for the EU, the core commentary proved to be 
Walter and von Lewinski's European Copyright Law (M. Walter et al. 2010). 
 The UK's copyright provisions have been very complex from the beginning. This 
made Copinger's Law on Copyright so useful because it has been revised continuously 
since 1870 (W. Copinger 1870; W. Copinger et al. 1915; J. Skone James 1948; F. Skone 
James et al. 1958; J. Skone James 1980; J. Skone James 1991; W. Copinger et al. 1998; 
K. Garnett et al. 2004; K. Garnett et al. 2010). Differences in substantive law were 
easily identified because the structure stayed largely constant. On the other hand, the 
copyright provisions and the case law got more complex as time went on in Germany 
and the US. It is therefore not surprising that most of the key sources here are rather 
modern. In the case of the US, the most important sources were the annotated 
versions of the United States Code. In addition, the special nature of the fair use-
doctrine required heavy reliance on academic articles.38 For Germany, the copyright 
commentaries by Nordemann et al as well as the explanations provided by Rehbinder 
(and their respective revisions) proved to be very useful (H. Hubman et al. 1991; F. 
Fromm et al. 1998; M. Rehbinder 2001; M. Rehbinder 2002; F. Fromm et al. 2008; M. 
Rehbinder 2010). 
  
  
                                                          
38
 For example: (L. Yankwich 1954; A. Latman 1958; W. Fisher III 1988; J. Hughes 2003; B. Beebe 2008). 
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4.3.3 Comparable Data 
 Once all of the information was collected, it could be coded.39 The aim of the 
coding was to trace amendments to the state of the law. For every point in time, 
several different sources were coded for separately. The first round of coding focused 
on the legislative acts themselves. In a second step then, the information drawn from 
court trials and secondary sources was added. Discrepancies between the different 
sets were investigated by referring back to the relevant sources. Most of the issues 
were resolved this way as the coding concerned mainly general points rather than 
specific issues of legal debate. Finally, once the whole timeframe had been covered, 
the data was re-arranged according to work/ exemption type and chronology as the 
second sorting principle. Any jumps in protection which appeared by putting the actual 
items together were investigated and if necessary corrected. This way, many 
transposition issues were successfully identified and resolved. 
 It needs to be emphasised here that the state of the law was recorded for 
exactly the same point in time. The state of the law was assessed every 10 years. This 
also means that some developments appear later than they actually were. For example, 
the 1911 UK Copyright Act is only going to feature in the analysis from 1920 onwards. 
To keep the approach consistent, the cut-off date is the 31/12 of the respective year 
and only sections in effect are included. This is especially important when acts are very 
close to this date. For example, the CDPA was not fully in force by 31/12/1990.  
It should also be noted that changes were only included if they had been stated, 
either by law or by a court or any other similar way. For example, when the parody 
exemption was introduced in Germany in 1971 by the Bundesgerichtshof (Disney 
Parodie  1970), this was not back dated to 1965 when the Act was first introduced. It 
could be argued that the substantive relevant provision has been the same and 
therefore the right has existed before even if it was never explicitly pronounced. 
However, this could potentially mask changing attitudes. The one exemption here is 
                                                          
39
 For the detailed coding schedule, please see section 4.2 The Data Set. 
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the US provision of fair use. This doctrine is court made and the codification is argued 
to not have changed its substance. Therefore, the decisions have to be backdated as to 
what is actually exempt. Following the literature though, the same logic does not apply 
to weighting of factors and conditions as applied by the courts (L. Yankwich 1954; A. 
Latman 1958; W. Fisher III 1988; B. Beebe 2008).  
 In addition, 'repealed' does not always mean fully repealed, especially in older 
acts. For example, the 1911 UK act is said to have repealed all prior acts, however, it 
did not. The separate musical copyright enforcement acts remained in force as did sec. 
7 and 8 of the 1862 Fine Arts Copyright Act. Similarly, the German Copyright Act of 
1901 did not repeal all sections of the previous act: §§ 57-60 remained in force 
(Germany 1870; Germany 1901). It is important to check the actual amendment 
schedules for older laws as sometimes, single paragraphs remained in force. This error 
can also be prevented by referring back to contemporary commentaries. 
 It should be noted at this point that the international convention are classified 
according to their full potential. For example, the 1967 Stockholm Act was never 
ratified, however, the Paris revision 4 years later included substantially the same terms 
but by then these were acceptable to the developed countries. Therefore, in order to 
catch the full normative potential of a treaty, its optional provisions are taken at face 
value.  
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Coding the International Level 
 Particular attention needs to be paid to the International Level because it is an 
aggregate. The international system as it appears in this thesis represents the 
strongest level of protection that the international system has to offer in terms of 
copyright and related rights protection. As such, it is the sum of the separate 
international agreements which exist in the field. This gives rise to an ideal type 'super-
agreement' which reflects the level of protection which is possible. It aims to show 
what a country which is member to all of these agreements has to implement. It 
therefore provides a comparative yard stick both in terms of additional stringency 
which a national system shows as well as the consensus at the international level.40 
 The international dimension was aggregated on what protection is available for 
a type of work at the international level. To do this, for every point in time, the 
provisions contained in the separate international agreements were compared directly 
and aggregated. In terms of rights granted, this means that for every work type which 
is protected at the international level the longest term available and the maximum of 
economic as well as moral rights was recorded. For example, until 1960 the 
international protection is solely determined by the protection guaranteed via the 
Berne Convention. By 1970, the 1961 Rome Convention added the protection of sound 
recordings and performers and broadcasts to the list of protected works.  
 In terms of formalities, the aggregation reflects what is necessary to ensure 
benefits from all included agreements for the specific work type. Therefore, all possibly 
relevant requirements are included. The 1952 UCC adds the ©-note requirement as a 
precondition for protection. Although the UCC is generally not as stringent as Berne (P. 
                                                          
40
 It should be noted here that this consensus is somewhat biased by the way a treaty can take effect at 
the national level because the way a treaty takes effect varies. In some countries, treaties take effect 
after a ratification or similar legislative action. Treaties are considered self-executing to the extent that 
they are detailed enough while vague provisions need to be supplemented by national legislation. Most 
civil law countries as well as the US fall within this category. As for the second group, here treaties only 
take effect and to the extent that the provisions have been transposed into national laws. The treaties 
therefore only take effect via the national legislation and not directly. Most common law and 
Scandinavian countries belong to this group (S. Ricketson 1987: 131- 132) This is important as the effect 
of negotiating and signing a treaty therefore varies significantly-posing less of a risk of unintended 
interference with the national system to the second group. 
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Goldstein 2003: 151- 152), the formality is included here because the membership 
between the two international agreements is not identical. Therefore to fully benefit 
from all possible protection, the ©-note is of importance. Because the question of 
copyright ownership is important for the type of analysis here, the approach followed 
by the national case studies of coding for the ownership in terms of employer 
ownership has been followed here too. Therefore, the strongest work for hire doctrine 
of the agreement in question was included. 
 In terms of exemptions, the minimum scope was coded-the scope of an 
exemption which always applies irrespective of what agreement one looks at. 
Minimum scope of protection in practice is somewhat counter-intuitive though: the 
more limited the exemption, the stronger is the level of protection granted. Therefore, 
the works and rights an exemption can affect has to be included. The minimum here 
means all which can be affected and therefore their maximum number in practice. In 
terms of conditions, it is also the maximum of conditions as the higher their number, 
the harder it is to rely on the exemption.  
 Similarly to the national level, the exemptions tend to be rather complex. As 
before, equivalent purpose were coded together. This way, the Berne fair use, TRIPs' de 
minimis and Rome's private use exemption all reflect the same aim: to exempt minor 
uses without significant commercial importance from copyright regulation. Secondly, 
international agreements tend to have general clauses along the lines of permitting all 
usual copyright exemptions as they exist at the national level. This exemption was also 
aggregated. As for moral rights exemptions, the number is very small which reflects 
their minor importance at the international level. 
 In difference to the rights and exemptions, enforcement was coded by decade. 
The importance was the number of possible enforcement mechanisms at any given 
point time. The data does allow a more qualitative interpretation outside of the 
number of enforcement tools though. There is a qualitative shift between the Berne 
Convention's optional dispute settlement mechanism and the WTO mandatory one. 
Overall, it should be noted here that the modern state of the art here is essentially 
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TRIPs as no other agreement contains any additional or stricter provisions. 
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5. Processing the Data 
 The previous section has provided a detailed description of the coding schedule 
and therefore the available data by the end of the coding process. At this stage, it is 
clear which particular aspects were protected or omitted from the policies at any 
particular point in time. Nonetheless, this binary data does not lend itself to analysis. 
Instead, provisions have to be grouped together in such a way as to provide additional 
information on the policy of a whole. For example, the individual economic rights 
which are protected need to be considered together. In addition to knowing which 
particular ones these are, it is necessary to clarify how many of these there are at any 
given point in time.  The nature of these variables are equidistance ordinal-interval 
variables. Outside of these variables, some information remains binary. 
 
5.1 Counts 
 The first group of interval variables are those which can be counted. They are 
calculated by looking at the individual categories of a copyright system and determine 
how many specific provisions can be recoded under each heading. It is important to 
emphasise here that their values are directly comparable across case studies because 
all the data was derived from a set of standardised definitions. The term EW refers to 
the all economically valuable work types and their collected provisions which are not 
moral rights. It is therefore the maximum provision if the scope of protection is 
considered for CR, NR and Performers. For example, let us assume that CR works 
benefit from three economic rights. Performers have two rights which overlap with the 
ones from the CR works. However, NR works benefit from two rights which are 
identical to the CR/ Performer ones but also one more which only applies to them. In 
this case, the number of economic rights for ER would be four.  
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The following variables fall within this category:  
 Number of Work Types 
 Number of Number of Formalities 
 Number of EW Economic Rights 
 Number of EW Exemptions 
 Number of EW Conditions for Exemptions 
 Number of EW Exemptions with a Remuneration Condition 
 Number of Economic Work Exemptions with a Non-commercial Use Condition 
 Number of Economic Work exemptions with a Compensation Condition 
 Number of Economic Work Sanctions 
 Number of Copyright Works Economic Rights 
 Number of Copyright Works Exemptions 
 Number of Copyright Works Conditions for Exemptions 
 Number of Copyright Works Sanctions 
 Number of Moral Rights 
 Number of Moral Rights Exemptions 
 Number of Moral Rights Sanctions 
 Number of Neighbouring Rights Economic Rights 
 Number of Neighbouring Rights Exemptions 
 Number of Neighbouring Rights Conditions for Exemptions 
 Number of Neighbouring Rights Sanctions 
 Number of Performer Rights 
 Number of Performer Exemptions 
 Number of Performer Conditions for Exemptions 
 Number of Performer Sanctions 
 Number of Sanctions 
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5.2 Values 
In addition to these interval variable whose content can be counted, there are 
those  which represent a value. The term of protection falls within this category. It is 
clear that the case studies cannot be directly compared because some legislation refer 
to a number of years from the date of publication while others calculate the end of 
copyright from the author’s death. Therefore, it is necessary to convert these ’life+ x 
years’ terms into a number of years.  
This conversion from ‘life’ to years however is problematic for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, although equivalences exist for ‘life’ in the different legislations, they vary 
across case studies. For example, the following equivalences have been used:  
 
 UK  
o by 1880: life+ 7 years or 42 years from publication 
o from 1990 onwards: life+ 50 years and 50 years from 
publication 
 US:  
o 1980: life+ 50 years or 75 years from publication 
o from 2000: life+ 70 years or 95 years from publication 
 Germany:  
o 1880 onwards: life+ 50 years and 50 years from publication 
until the 1965 Copyright Act 
o after 1965: then it shifts the authorship presumption to other 
actors rather than provide equivalent term 
Therefore, the core question is what timeframe one assumes the author to live 
after the publication of his work. This will naturally vary greatly between authors and 
the kind of work in question. As a result, any decision is bound to be arbitrary to some 
degree. However, as long as the measure is the same for all case studies, the intended 
effect of comparability is achieved. The choice here is to use the equivalence provided 
by the UK in 1880 (=35 years).41 On one hand, it assumes the longest term of all case 
studies here. Given the overall trend to expanding the term of protection, stringency is 
                                                          
41
 Life+7 years are considered the same as 42 years. Therefore, life is the equivalence of 42 years- 7 
years= 35 years.  
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therefore not artificially reduced. Secondly, this equivalence is from 1880 and 
therefore the base year approach in stringency.42 
 
5.3 Ordinal-Interval Variables 
Outside of these countable variables, some of copyright’s essential 
characteristics cannot be counted as such. However, all of them can be understood as 
gradually increasing whereby the categories designed here are equal distanced ordinal 
and therefore interval variables. This affects two particular provisions. The first one is 
the impact of formalities. There are three distinctions here in the law however the 
boundaries between them are blurry. Formalities can have a constitutive impact. 
Alternatively, they may affect the enforcement but not the existence of copyright as 
such. Finally, formalities can have no effect at all. These three categories represent 
distinct situations. 
However, the boundaries between them are blurry and if one considers ranking 
them, five distinctions can be drawn, independently of the categories above. 
Formalities can either have no impact at all. These are assigned the score 1. 
Alternatively, compliance with formalities may not affect the existence of copyright as 
such but some of them can limit the enforcement. For example, they may prevent 
infringement actions until compliance has been achieved. The variable score is two in 
these cases. Thirdly, formalities can always have an enforcement effect (score 3). 
Fourthly, formalities can always have an enforcement effect. In addition, some of them 
are constitutive and therefore are required for copyright to exist (score 4). Finally, 
score 5, represents those situations where formalities are always constitutive and 
therefore also always affect enforcement. The second interval variable is originality. 
Determining the level of originality of any copyright policy requires categories which 
are able to account for degrees of originality. It distinguishes between ‘sweat of brow’, 
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 For an explanation, see 6.1 Methodology: Laspeyres Index and especially 6.4.1 Normalization and 
Aggregation. 
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‘judgement’ and ‘creativity’. 43 However, the boundaries between these terms are 
fluent. The level of originality is distinguished by five different possible categories. The 
lowest level of originality is termed ‘skill and labour’ and refers to the practical absence 
of an originality requirement (score: 1). The second category is the intermediate step 
between ‘skill/ labour’ and ‘judgement’ as outlined before. It therefore describes a 
very low but existing level of originality (score: 2). The third category refers to 
‘judgement’ which is (as outlined above) a limited but noticeable originality 
requirement (score; 3). The fourth group then is the ‘creativity-judgement’ one. Here 
the level required is noticeable higher than before and references to individuality are 
made (score 4). Finally, the firth category is ‘creativity’ (score: 5).  
 
5.4 Ungrouped data 
 Not all of the information reflected in the binary data is grouped or can be 
placed on some kind of ranking. This for example is the case with individual first 
ownership provisions which can vary from work type to work type. This also applies to 
the stated justifications stated for legislating or the terminology to describe a 
particular work.  Similarly, the provisions for foreigners cannot be combined without a 
further frame of references. This ungrouped data remains in its binary form and is not 
recoded into a variable. Nonetheless, this information is relevant for the analysis. 
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 This distinction is in practice already included in the coding. For a detailed explanation of the 
terminology, please see Copyright Requirements in 4.22 General Provisions. 
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5.5 Summary 
 In conclusion, the binary data derived from coding the policies is now 
transformed into one of 4 data types. The first one covers those areas where the 
particular provisions can be counted, for example the number of economic rights. The 
second group are variables which represent an absolute value. Here this refers to the 
different terms of protection. The third group then are ordinal-interval variables. Here, 
the relevant value could not be counted as such but clear distinctions can nonetheless 
be drawn. Finally, some binary data which remains ungrouped. 
Data Type Variable 
Count based interval 
variable 
Number of Work Types 
Number of Number of Formalities 
Number of EW Economic Rights 
Number of EW Exemptions 
Number of Conditions for Exemptions 
 
Number of EW Exemptions with a Remuneration Condition 
 
Number of EW Exemptions with a Non-commercial Use 
Condition 
 
Number of EW Exemptions with a Compensation Condition 
Number of EW Sanctions 
 
Number of CR Economic Rights 
Number of CR Exemptions 
Number of CR Conditions for Exemptions 
Number of CR Sanctions 
Number of MORAL RIGHTS 
Number of MORAL RIGHTS Exemptions 
Number of MORAL RIGHTS Sanctions 
Number of NR Economic Rights 
Number of NR Exemptions 
Number of NR Conditions for Exemptions 
Number of NR Sanctions 
Number of Performer Rights 
Number of Performer Exemptions 
Number of Performer Conditions for Exemptions 
Table 18: Overview of the individual variables and the related data types.  
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 Number of Performer Sanctions 
Number of Sanctions 
Value based interval 
variable 
Term for CR 
Term for NR 
Term for MORAL RIGHTS 
Term for Performers 
5 point interval 
variable 
Impact of Formalities 
Originality 
Ungrouped binary 
data 
Act Structure 
Justifications 
Ownership 
Relationship between author and the work 
Transferability of rights 
Limitations on contracts 
Types of Infringement 
Protection of Foreigners 
Table 18: Overview of the individual variables and the related data types. 
 
5.6 Illustration Example: Coding the Statute of Anne 
 
5.6.1 Introduction 
To illustrate how the coding and recoding into variables works in practice, the 
Statute of Anne44 will be used. It is an appropriate illustrating example because it is 
considered the first modern copyright law. In addition, it is comprehensive enough to 
cover enough areas to be recognisable as a copyright policy. On the other hand, it is 
sufficiently narrow in scope to facilitate the illustration process. It should be noted that 
the Statute of Anne is not divided into sections. However, to structure the discussion 
the ordering from the coding schedule will be used: from general considerations such 
as justifications and ownership; to formalities; controlled used; exemptions and finally 
sanctions. In order to give some idea of location in the act, this section relies on the 
page numbers from the Copyright Primary Sources’ transcript of the Statute (UK 1710).  
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 The UK’s Statute of Anne is the first modern copyright law. 
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5.6.2 Coding the Statute 
 
Reasoning behind the Statute of State 
The Statute of Anne starts out with the reasoning of why legislation has been 
brought in. In the coding schedule, these aims are classified as ‘Justifications’.45 The 
Statute highlights the detrimental impact of piracy on rights holders. More importantly 
though, it also explicitly gives emphasis to the incentive justification by referring to the 
‘encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful books’ (p.1). This means 
that the rationale for protection is to ensure the dissemination of works and not 
because the author has expended labour when creating it or because his personality is 
reflected in it. It is therefore ‘utilitarianism’ rather a natural right- based reasoning. In a 
similar vein, a significant proportion of the statute focuses on the danger of monopoly 
pricing and explicitly provides for limits on the cost of books (pp. 3-5). Curtailing the 
price of books in this sense ensures that their distribution is not impeded by 
unnecessarily high prices. As a result, protecting the author/ right holder is a means to 
an end and not an end in itself. 
 
Ownership 
The focus now moves on to who benefits from protection. In terms of 
ownership, the act does not make a reference to the state of law before publication 
except that the author holds the right. As a result, the coding has to see the author as 
the presumed owner. It should also be noted though that the act makes no reference 
to foreigners or the right being granted to authorship as such. Rather, it is the act of 
publication which brings the act into force (p.1). In the early 18th century, legal acts 
were not extra- territorial which means that they did not  take effect outside of a 
sovereign state’s borders. In this light, it is necessary to assume that only those works 
which are published in the UK are subject to this Statute and therefore gain copyright 
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 Please see 4.2.2 General provisions.  
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protection.46 The right owned by the author is fully transferable to other people. This 
can be deduced by the act referring consistently to both authors and ‘proprietors’. In 
addition, it contains no limitations on the transferability of rights, for example 
guaranteed remuneration rights for the author. In terms of the coding, the act 
therefore has to be coded in the area of contract as ‘transferable’ and ‘fully’. 
The Statute provides the rights holder with a limited protection for books. 
Throughout, the legislation only refers to ‘book’ when it discusses the focal point of 
protection. In terms of the coding schedule, this only matches the description of 
‘literature works’, defined in the coding schedule as any expression which takes the 
shape of a text.  
In line with the rationale that copyright is designed to ensure the creation and 
circulation of works, the Statute of Anne clarifies that copyright is a limited right. An 
unlimited right would have a restricting effect on the distribution of works due to the 
monopoly effect this exclusive right can create. In particular, the statute explicitly 
states that the term of protection is limited to ‘no longer’ than 14 years from the time 
of publication (p. 1).47 However, if the author is still alive after this term, he can get 
another 14 years (p. 6). The maximum term of protection is therefore 28 years. The 
limit on the property right is reinforced by a section on monopoly pricing. By limiting 
how the property can be used, this also clarifies that the right is not perceived as a real 
property, such as real estate. In summary, the statute provides for a fully transferable 
right which remains in force for at least 14 years and a maximum of 28 years.  
 
  
                                                          
46
 This would normally be backed up by looking at contemporary sources and commentaries. 
47
 For literature works published before the 10/4/1710, it is 21 years (p. 1). 
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Formalities 
At this stage, the focus moves to the requirements to gain protection. To 
identify which formalities exist, the list of possible formalities in the coding schedule 
needs to be compared to the legislation. For each of them, it also has to be determined 
what their influence is on the existence and enforcement of copyright in case they are 
not complied with. Two qualifications are explicitly included in the act. First, all works 
need to be registered (p. 2). This ‘registration’ requirement is not constitutive for 
copyright protection to exist but it is a requirement to enforce it. The act states that 
the requirement is intended to protect those who could not otherwise have been 
expected to know that the work was under protection in the first place (p.2). Therefore, 
the registration is a practical necessity providing all parties with legal certainty about 
the copyright status of a book, although it does not create the status as such. The 
second formality is also non-constitutive but has no practical bearing on enforcement 
either. For all registered works, copies have to be deposited with the Register who 
then distributes them to the deposit libraries (p. 4). This ‘deposit’ formality is only 
enforced with fines and does not lead to a loss of copyright (p.5).  
In addition to these explicit formalities, one more is implied by the terminology 
used in the act. It consistently refers to books and does not protect anything else. This 
focus on the physical copy therefore implies that a ‘tangible medium’ is also required. 
From a 1710 mind-set, it is not possible to have an intangible book. This means in 
practice that the ‘tangible medium’ requirement is constitutive and therefore affects 
the existence of copyright.  
In summary, there are three formalities explicitly named or implied in the act 
which vary in their effect on copyright. Their impact is always coded in its range, 
including both the minimum and the maximum impact of formalities. For the Statute 
of Anne, the weakest impact of the formalities is ‘no impact’ (from the ‘deposit’ 
requirement) while the strongest one is ‘constitutive’ (from the ‘tangible medium’ 
formality). In conclusion, the Statute of Anne includes three formalities (tangible 
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medium, registration and deposit) although the impact varies from none in practice to 
constitutive for the existence of copyright.  
In addition to these administrative formalities, the coding schedule makes clear 
that the required originality threshold needs to be examined as well. This act does not 
include any reference to a minimum requirement of originality. As a result, it is 
considered here to be very low and therefore ‘sweat of the brow’ because no 
minimum is defined or indirectly implied.48 
 
Controlled Uses: the economic rights 
Once a book has met these requirements, a number of rights (controlled uses) 
are granted. Generally the shape of rights is identified by comparing what is explicitly 
protected to what kind of behaviour is considering to be infringing. This means in 
practice that in addition to what is explicitly listed, it is also necessary to look at which 
kind of behaviour is subject to sanctions. When we look at which rights are stated, the 
first one is the reproduction right or as the Statute phrases it ‘the sole right and liberty 
of reprinting’ (p.1). This refers to making a one to one copy. The act also refers to the 
‘importation’ right because it defines as infringing behaviour ‘…shall print reprint or 
import or cause to be printed reprinted or imported any such Book or Books without 
the consent of the proprietor’ (p.1). Therefore, copyright owners can prevent the 
import of infringing copies, meaning those copies that were made without the consent 
of the rights holder. 
However, in addition to these two clearly stated rights, another one is implied. 
This refers to the ‘distribution’ right and therefore the selling of a physical copy of the 
work. Making a copy as such does not bring economic harm unless the copy is then 
distributed. This logic is reinforced by the nature of the act as a whole: it is geared 
towards the commercial exploitation of works. After all, it refers in its justifications to 
                                                          
48
 Normally, secondary sources would be used here to identify the level of originality as determined by 
the courts. 
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the impact that piracy has on the livelihoods of the proprietors (p.1). It is therefore 
only natural that selling the physical copies of the work is part of the problem and the 
solution. In this spirit, it is clarified later on that infringement includes the selling in 
addition to publishing a work (p.1). In summary, although the act only explicitly refers 
to the reproduction right, the infringement side adds the distribution and importation 
right to the list.  
Exemptions 
The next area of consideration is possible exemptions. When trying to identify 
what exemptions apply, it is paramount to refer back to the coding schedule’s list of 
possible exemptions and their conditions in an effort to identify those implied in the 
text. In practice, this means that both the explicit exemptions and the description of 
infringing behaviour need to be compared to the coding schedule. Only referring to 
both areas and the possibilities of what can be exempt will allow for a clear 
understanding of what a user can or cannot do.  
The Statute of Anne is limited in scope and so it is not surprising that it contains 
few exemptions: two to be exact. The first one is only implied. The infringing behaviour 
is focused on the commercial importance of works as it refers to ‘print reprint or 
import‘… ‘sell publish or expose to sell’ (p.1). This also means that making a private 
copy for yourself with no intent of selling it is not included. In terms of the exemption 
label, the coding schedule refers to this as the ‘private use’ exemption. As the use has 
to be non- commercial in order to be considered private use, the exemption condition 
is (in the terminology used in the coding schedule) ‘non-commercial use only’. 
Furthermore, as has been mentioned before, the Statute of Anne is only concerned 
with works that have been published. This in turn also means that the exemption also 
only applies if a work has been published, making this a condition to rely on it (in the 
coding schedule: ‘published’).  
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In addition to this implied exemption, the second one is stated explicitly: there 
is no import or distribution right for Greek or Latin books (p. 4). A look at the coding 
schedule reveals that the description which comes closest for this particular case is 
‘Foreign Language/ Foreign Country’ which is defined as works either written in a 
foreign language or published in a foreign country. In addition to this, the limitation 
does not apply to all foreign works but only to the Greek or Latin ones. Therefore, the 
specific language used is important which in terms of exemption conditions translates 
into the ‘nature of the work’ condition.49 In addition, as mentioned before, the Statute 
of Anne is only concerned with published works. Therefore, the condition that the 
work has been previously published in order to rely on this exemption also has to be 
met (‘published’ in the coding schedule). In summary, there are two exemptions here 
which include four conditions overall.  
 
Sanctions 
Finally, the Statute of Anne contains a range of sanctions as remedies against 
infringing behaviour. As with the other areas, determining their existence requires 
both looking at what is explicitly stated but also read between the lines, using the 
coding schedule as guidance. Here, most of the sanctions are stated. First of all, 
infringing copies can be seized and then destroyed by the copyright owner (pp. 1-2).  In 
terms of the coding schedule, this falls within the definition of the sanctions ‘seizure/ 
delivery up’ and ‘destruction’. Furthermore, the act states that infringers need to pay a 
fine for each infringing page (p.2). In terms of sanctions, this refers to a ‘fine’. The 
same punishment also applies in cases where works are not deposited as the act 
requires (p.5). In addition to these sanctions, the losing party is liable to pay the ‘legal 
costs’, including those of the opposing party (p.3). Finally, one sanction is only implied 
but essential to the judicial process. In any court case, the judge would ask the 
defendant to stop the behaviour in question which in turn falls within the ‘injunction’ 
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 Nature of the work is defined as: ‘Exemption only applies if the work matches a certain criteria’. 
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definition as outlined in the coding schedule.50 Without this option, infringement 
would not be legally ordered to stop, leading the process ad absurdum. Overall, this 
act provides for five possible sanctions to remedy a breach of copyright. 
 
Summary 
In conclusion, the following provisions can be drawn from the 1709 Statute of 
Anne using the coding schedule. First, there is only one work type (‘literature work’) 
which benefits from the reproduction, distribution and importation right and these are 
enforceable for 14 years (28 years if the term is renewed) as long as it is present in a 
tangible form. To actually enforce the right, the work has to be registered. It also 
needs to be deposited although there is no practical impact on the copyright if the 
owner fails to do so. Any infringement can be enforced by seizing the infringing copies, 
destroying them and finally fines. In addition, the legal costs have to be paid by the 
losing party. All infringing behaviour will be logically ordered to stop. Infringement 
however cannot be enforced at all if the work is printed in a foreign country because 
foreign publications do not benefit from protection. Furthermore, non-commercial 
infringement is not covered and neither is the distribution or importation of Latin and 
Greek language works.  
 
  
                                                          
50
 Injunctions are defined as ‘Injunction against an individual with the aim to stop the infringing 
activity’ in the coding schedule.  
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5.6.3 Processing the Data 
 The information drawn from the statute now needs to be recoded into 
variables. In practice, this was already done in the section above. The discussion was 
divided by copyright areas, for example it outlined the different rights together and 
referred to the different exemptions in the same section. This highlights how natural it 
is to discuss copyright provisions by their broader purpose: it adds clarity. From the 
summary above, the following variables and values can be determined.  
 The counted variables represent the number of items in a particular category. 
For example, the statute only protects one type of work (‘literature work’) and 
therefore the count for work types is one. The same technique is applied to determine 
the values for the economic rights, sanctions, exemptions and exemption conditions. 
In addition, there is the protection in years which is a numerical value. It is transposed 
directly (’28 years’) for the term of protection variable. The third type of variable is the 
5 point scale for the impact of formalities. The statute only affects works in tangible 
form which means that this requirement is constitutive. The registration requirement 
on the other hand is only relevant for enforcement while the fines have no impact on 
how the state of copyright as such. A mixture of enforcement and constitutive 
formalities scores a 4 on the effect scale.51 The level of originality is not mentioned and 
accordingly not required as far as this exercise is concerned. This translates into a 
score of 1 as only ‘skill/ labour’ is required.  
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 For further detail, please see section 5.3 Ordinal- Interval Variables. 
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Category Number of Provisions 
Work Type 1 
Economic Rights 3 
Term of Protection 14 years 
Formalities 3 
Impact of Formality 4 
Originality 1 
Sanctions 4 
Exemptions 2 
Exemption Conditions 4 
Exemptions (Non-commercial) 1 
Table 19: Summary of substantive variables for the Statute of Anne (1709). 
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6. Copyright Stringency 
 
 It has already been emphasised that the scope of protection (its stringency) 
reflects the degree of government intervention. Without the government granting 
copyright, the user of a work would be free to copy it. The government intervenes to 
limit this freedom. At this stage now, it is necessary to clarify how the scope copyright 
can be determined. The Processing the Data was made the available data directly 
comparable across countries. However, these variables have one major weakness: 
although they are comparable across case studies, they cannot be easily compared 
with each other. Stringency is not a one-dimensional concept but instead is 
determined by a number of variables with varying impact. This implies that their 
respective impact (more or less stringency) has to be seen in comparison to each other. 
This is problematic because the different areas have very different data levels and as 
such it is difficult to determine to what extent stringency has increased overall. The 
proposed solution here is to use a composite index. 
 By using the literature on policy evolutions, the scope of protection as 
understood in law can be made measureable. In policy convergence, the strength of 
particular provisions is considered under the term stringency. As outlined above, it 
focuses on the strength of particular legal provisions, understood as the degree of 
government intervention (K. Holzinger et al. 2005: 776- 777). In essence, it maps how 
the substantive provisions have evolved over time focusing on how government has 
acted. As the following section will show, these evolutions are not only traceable but 
also measurable. 
It is common to compare policies over time according to their overall level of 
stringency. As long as a policy comes in degrees, the evolution in stringency can be at 
least ranked (K. Holzinger et al. 2005: 777). Copyright policy does meet this 
requirement of degrees. Landes and Posner have modelled the scope of intellectual 
property law in an effort to determine the most efficient design. Essentially, they link 
the variable for the level of protection (z) (understood as an index) to how it 
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simultaneously affects the price of copies; the number of copies produced by the 
copyright owners; the number of unauthorised copies; the economic return of creating 
a work; and the total number of works created. Stricter levels here are linked with 
more control over the use of the work by the copyright owner (W. Landes et al. 2003). 
The important conclusion from their work for this thesis is that the scope of protection 
can be identified and traced over time. It is clear that stricter levels of protection are 
linked to owner control. 
The actual level of stringency is determined by comparing not only the 
presence of particular instruments but also their precise setting. Landes and Posner do 
not assign develop a way to assign values to their stringency index variable z (W. 
Landes et al. 2003). Similarly, the majority of studies referring to RTB or RTT do include 
some sense of the strength of protection (D. Drezner 2001). Here as well, what makes 
a law more stringent is intuitively linked to the level of government intervention in a 
qualitative way. Essentially, less stringency is the outcome in the absence of 
government action (D. Vogel 1997: 63- 77; D. Murphy 2004). Vogel stresses though 
that stringency is not the same as effectiveness (D. Vogel 1997: 6-7). Holzinger and 
Knill applied this to quantitative analysis of policies. They recorded the precise setting 
of instruments in addition to their presence (K. Holzinger et al. 2008). In sum, in 
politics is common to perceive stringency as intuitively identifiable. Although it is not 
always explicitly stated, this means in relation to government intervention.  
The setting of particular instruments provides the same information for 
quantitative studies. For example, work on the convergence of company law uses 
indices to determine the level of workers and shareholder protection that case studies 
provide for. Here, proxies reflecting the aspects which in combination show the level 
of protection offered are used in the analysis. The indices are based on functional 
theory which identifies the impact of each proxy on the investigated outcome (S. 
Deakin et al. 2007; J. Armour et al. 2009; M. Siems 2010). As these examples show, 
components reflecting the same phenomenon can be combined as long as the 
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theoretical basis is given. The result is a reflection of the scope of protection, here 
termed stringency. It is the underlying data which determines the accuracy of these 
claims.   
In conclusion, copyright policy shows degrees of protection and the 
combination and setting of instruments indicates the level of stringency. Both of these 
characteristics therefore have to be recorded. Therefore, depending on the quality of 
the underlying data, it will not only be possible to rank stringency but also to measure 
it.  
 
6.1 Methodology: Laspeyres Index 
 The aim of the stringency analysis is to trace the evolution of the scope of 
protection over time. This is achieved here by using a Laspeyres Index. The 
methodology for constructing this index type has been outlined in Feinstein and 
Thomas (C. Feinstein et al. 2002: 510- 513).  An index is made up of a number of 
different components. Each of them is expressed relative to a base year and assigned a 
particular weight. In essence therefore, the formula to arrive at the index value of any 
particular variable looks like this: 
        
         
 x weight. The weight is to be determined by 
the researcher and depends on the underlying problem. The individual components 
are then combined. The overall results show the quantity of what is measured over 
time whereby all numbers are relative to the base year (C. Feinstein et al. 2002: 510- 
513).  
 To apply this methodology to the concept of stringency, it is first necessary to 
look at copyright protection and how the scope can be represented by variables. The 
OECD and European Commission have pointed out that the underlying concept has to 
be defined in detail first. This includes a clear definition of the concept, an outline of 
the relevant subgroups and an identification of the indicators which can represent the 
concept (OECD; European Commission 2008: 22-23). In a second step then, the 
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individual variables have to be transformed into index numbers by expressing them 
relative to the base year. At this stage, it is also essential to look at each variable and 
identify how it relates to the scope of protection. The key focus needs to be if it 
strengthens or weakens protection. Finally, the individual indices have to be combined, 
following the theory outlined in the first section.  
 
6.2 Stringency as a Laspeyres Index 
 
6.2.1 Defining Stringency as a Concept  
 The indicator is designed to measure the concept of stringency of copyright law. 
As established before, the stringency corresponds here with government intervention. 
The government limits unrestricted copying. Increasing stringency is reflected in the 
protection the government provides for the copyright owner and/ or author. In turn, 
falling stringency is reflected in the freedom of the user to exploit a work. It has also 
already been established in the literature review that copyright policy includes a 
number of core areas: copyrighted works, neighbouring rights and Performers. In 
addition, there are some prerequisites which have to be met, for example formalities. 
Finally, copyright policy also has an enforcement component. On the basis of this 
understanding of copyright policy, stringency can be divided into six distinct areas 
(which will be described in detail in 6.2.2 Stringency Areas). 
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6.2.2 Stringency Areas 
 The first stringency area is the copyright threshold. Here, the importance is the 
extent to which work can generally benefit from protection, both in terms of the kind 
of works which are affected but also the threshold which needs to crossed. Secondly, 
the scope of economic copyright protection defines the financial return copyright 
provides to copyright works, neighbouring rights and Performers. These areas are 
about the actual strength of protection in the sense of the exploitation of a work. The 
benefits from this kind of protection go to the copyright owner, irrespective if he is 
also the author. It protects his rights against users and the authors. Those behaviours 
explicitly permitted under copyright and which therefore ensure the continued access 
of the user to the work clarify the lines of protection.  
 Thirdly, the scope of moral rights is also essential. The government here 
intervenes to protect the author from both the users as well as the owners of the 
copyright. This kind of protection is in addition and also at the expense of the 
protection granted under the economic exploitability dimension. Exemptions here 
indicate how extensive the cost to the copyright owners and users (as opposed to the 
owner) can be. Finally, the enforcement has to be considered because irrespective of 
how extensive protection may be, the actual enforcement capabilities are important 
on their own and have to be seen as an independent area. These six areas in 
combination provide a picture of stringency in copyright policy which is captured in the 
value of the index. 
 
6.3 The Variables 
 The concept of stringency outlined above provides the basis for selecting the 
variables which best represent the concept. The indicators are selected on the basis of 
what can be clearly deduced from the policies. They are all outputs and therefore 
describe the actual characteristics of the policy. The variables used here from the 
Processing the Data and represent the basic data set. All of them are in interval 
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variable form. This means that the concept here can be measured rather than only 
ranked. It is valid to perform mathematical and statistical operations on interval 
variables which cannot be used for ordinal ones. It needs to be highlighted that the 
relationship between the particular variable and stringency varies. If they benefit the 
user, then the level of stringency is falling as they increase in number. However, if they 
benefit the author instead, then stringency levels are rising. 
 specific type of 
work affected 
Falling 
Stringency 
Rising Stringency 
Number of Work 
Types 
 decrease increase 
Number of 
Formalities 
 increase decrease 
Number of Rights  CR, NR, Moral 
Rights, 
Performers 
decrease increase 
Term of Protection CR, NR, Moral 
Rights, 
Performers 
decrease increase 
Number of 
Exemptions 
CR, NR, Moral 
Rights, 
Performers 
increase decrease 
Average Number 
of Conditions 
attached to an 
Exemption 
CR, NR, 
Performers 
decrease increase 
Term of Protection CR, NR, Moral 
Rights, 
Performers 
decrease increase 
(specific) 
Sanctions  
CR, NR, Moral 
Rights, 
Performers 
decrease increase 
Sanctions  decrease increase 
Impact of 
Formalities 
 decrease increase 
Originality  decrease increase 
Table 20: Summary of copyright variables and their relationship to the level of 
stringency. 
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 In the case of falling stringency levels, the trend is downwards towards less 
protection. This means that the number of separate work types and rights decrease 
over time for all groups of works and moral rights. The term of protection will also 
expected to get shorter. In addition, exemptions will be broadened by increasing their 
number while reducing the number of conditions attached to them. Another signal for 
a decrease in stringency is an increase in constitutive formalities and higher originality 
requirements which have the effect of raising the threshold to gain protection in the 
first place. It therefore limits the scope of overall protection. This imposes a cost on 
the potential rights owner in the form of either no protection or higher cost of 
compliance. In summary, falling stringency is characterised by providing less rights to 
fewer works with broader exemptions while at the same time raising the threshold for 
protection as a whole.  
 Rising stringency is the binary opposite. If the level of stringency increases, the 
number of works protected and the rights these enjoy will increase over time to cover 
as many uses as possible-for as long as possible. Moreover, the number of moral rights 
also increases. At the same time, the exemptions which apply to moral and economic 
rights decrease as a whole. However, the number of conditions which have to be 
fulfilled to benefit from an exemption will rise, becoming increasingly onerous and 
therefore limiting the scope of the exemptions. Furthermore, the threshold to profit 
from protection will be reduced as formalities lose their constitutive importance or are 
abolished while the originality level is lowered to ensure that more kinds of works are 
covered. In essence, rising stringency in copyright policy takes shape as more economic 
and moral rights for more kinds of works for longer terms while limiting the scope of 
exemptions.  
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6.4 The Stringency Index 
 The previous sections have outlined the structure of the stringency as well as 
the possible variables. By constructing a composite index, these two distinct 
considerations can be connected. The following section outlines how the relevant 
variables are combined to arrive at an overall measure of stringency for each of the six 
stringency areas. It will first clarify the normalisation process. It then discusses the 
individual index areas and the relevant variables for each.  
 
6.4.1 Normalization and Aggregation  
In a Laspeyres index, the data needs to be normalised according to a reference 
point (base year). This base year was chosen to be the average of the three national 
case studies in 1880. Neutrality and comparability are the most desirable 
characteristics. These can be best fulfilled by relying on an average of all systems in the 
sample prior to internationalization taking a hold and therefore possibly exert an 
influence. Therefore, the values present in 1880 for each variable used here in the 
three national case studies (Germany, US and UK) were averaged. These were then 
used to normalise the data. In summary, the data has been normalised by using the 
reference year 1880.  
The normalized data has been aggregated following the actual theoretical 
framework. The core aspect is that some variables show rising stringency while others 
do not and that these can potentially balance each other. Therefore, variables where 
rising numbers indicate more stringency are added up. On the other hand, if rises in 
absolute number actually mean less stringency in policy terms, then the variable is 
subtracted.  
The individual variables are combined with equal weight for each of the sub-
areas considered here. The choice was made here to weigh at the sub-level because it 
is essential that all individual variables carry the same weight within each area rather 
than overall. These were then only added up and not weighted again as this would 
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have no systematic impact.  In essence, the trend is the same irrespective if the 
weighting is repeated at overall index level – only the scale would differ. The result is 
the overall stringency level for a case study compared to the average in 1880. 
 
6.4.2 Summary: The Components of the Stringency Index 
 In this final section, the stringency areas are discussed in detail. It outlines the 
particular indicators used and how these affect stringency. It also describes the 
calculations.  
 
Copyright Threshold 
The copyright threshold seeks to measure how extensive copyright protection 
is as a whole rather than the stringency of the actual provisions. In terms of variables, 
these centre on those aspects which prevent a work from being protected. Firstly, the 
required level of originality defines if a work can benefit from copyright. Here, the 
higher the level of originality, the more limited is protection because less works will 
fulfil the criterion and therefore be able to benefit from protection. Originality is only 
relevant to CR works but strongly informs the threshold as a whole-it impacts on the 
perception of copyright policy. The second variable is the number of work types which 
are protected. These include for example literature works, musical works or sound 
recordings. The higher the number works types which are protected, the more 
stringent is the policy (if the work has the required level of originality).  
Finally, the formalities can prevent a type of work which is sufficiently original 
and is an eligible kind of work from gaining actual protection or can make it lose it. The 
variables for this are both the number of formalities as well as their effect on securing 
and enforcing copyright protection. The lower the number of formalities, the more 
stringent is the copyright policy as a whole because more works will benefit: less effort 
is involved in securing compliance. Similarly, the less impact non-compliance with 
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formalities has (indicated by a higher score), the more stringent is the policy. Again it 
allows more works to benefit from protection automatically.  
For the Threshold of Copyright, the work types, originality and the impact of 
Formalities52 are all added up. They all indicate rising stringency as the numbers get 
larger. The number of formalities however is subtracted. Here, higher numbers show 
less stringency. The result is then divided by the number of variables, here four.  
 
Scope of Protection for Groups of Works 
The considerations in this area are relevant for three groups of works: the CR 
works, the NR works and the Performers. Each of them constitutes a separate 
component in the overall stringency index. However, they are identical in the types of 
variables they are based on. Therefore, they can be outlined here together.  
In general, the scope of economic rights outlines the protection a copyright 
owner has over the use of the work. Five variables describe this: the first one is the 
number of rights whereby each right is essentially a specific kind of use or exploitation 
of a work. The more rights a copyright owner has, the more he can control the use of 
the work and therefore the higher the level of stringency. Outside of the rights, the 
uses which are not protected are also important. Here, the number of exemptions 
serves as the variable for the protection not granted. Therefore higher numbers of 
exemptions represent less stringency. The government has not intervened to grant the 
protection to the rights owner but left the uses explicitly unregulated by copyright 
policy.  
On the other hand, any condition the government imposes on the applicability 
of exemptions reduces their scope and therefore enhances stringency. As a result, the 
                                                          
52
 It should be noted that the impact of formalities uses the absolute distinctions drawn in chapter 5. 
However, if formalities have a constitutive effect, they do not have an effect on the level of stringency. 
Therefore, 0 is assigned if formalities can prevent copyright from taking effect. A value of 1 is relevant 
when the maximum effect is enforcement limitations. Finally, a 2 is assigned if formalities have no effect.  
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average number of conditions attached to an exemption is also included in the index. 
Finally, the actual term of protection is important here. The longer the term of 
protection, the more stringent is the policy. Finally, the last variable concerns the 
enforcement of protection specifically, as measured by the number of sanctions that 
are available to remedy the infringement of protected in works. The enforcement is 
stronger if there are more sanctions available. Therefore, rising numbers of sanctions 
means an increase in the level of stringency. 
For CR, NR and Performers, the number of rights, the term of protection, the 
condition average and the number of sanctions are added up. The number of 
exemptions is subtracted from them because here higher numbers show falling 
stringency. The result is then divided by five (the number of variables used). 
 
Scope of Protection for Moral Rights 
The scope of moral right focuses on the protection given to authors as opposed 
to both the copyright and users. However, they follow the same logic as the scope of 
Economic Works.53 The first variable is therefore the number of moral rights granted. 
The higher the number of rights protected, the more stringent is the policy because 
again situations are removed from the freedom of exploitation. However, moral right 
exemptions are very specific in nature which means that no actual conditions apply to 
them. As before, exemptions exclude things from protection and therefore the higher 
their number, the less stringent is the copyright system. In addition to these two 
variables, the term of the moral rights is also important. As before, the longer the term, 
the more stringent is the policy. Finally, the number of sanctions available to moral 
rights is also included. The more there are, the more stringent is the policy because the 
enforcement capability is stronger. 
                                                          
53
 The term Economic Works is used here as a summary term for copyright works, neighbouring rights 
and performers.  
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The four variables are combined by subtracting the exemptions variable from 
the number of rights, the term of protection and the number of sanctions. The result is 
then divided by 4. 
 
Enforcement 
Enforcement is a vital part of any policy and in terms of copyright reflected in 
how copyright breaches are handled. This means that the actual sanctions which apply 
to copyright infringement are the variable here. The higher the number of sanctions 
available, the more stringent is the policy. It needs to be noted how this area varies 
from the sanctions considered earlier. This is not the same as the added number of 
sanctions for the individual types. Instead, this section seeks to capture the 
comparative importance of sanctions as a component of copyright policy rather than 
its practical effect. The enforcement concept only has one variable and therefore 
aggregation is not necessary here.  
 The following table summarises the structure of the composite index. The first 
column highlights the sub-index level in question. In the two adjacent columns then, all 
relevant variables and their relationship with stringency are provided.  
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Conceptual Area Variable Rising Number Means in 
Terms of Stringency 
Threshold of Copyright Number of Work Types Increase 
Level of Originality Increase 
Number of Formalities Decrease 
Importance of Formalities Increase 
Scope of Protection  for CR 
works 
Number of Economic 
Rights 
Increase 
Number of Exemptions Decrease 
Number of Average 
Conditions per Exemption 
Increase 
Term Increase 
Number of Sanctions Increase 
Scope of Protection for 
Moral Rights 
Number of Moral Rights Increase 
Number of Moral Rights 
Exemptions 
Decrease 
Term Increase 
Number of Sanctions Increase 
Scope of Protection  for NR 
works 
Number of Economic 
Rights 
Increase 
Number of Exemptions Decrease 
Number of Average 
Conditions per Exemption 
Increase 
Term Increase 
Number of Sanctions Increase 
Scope of Protection  for 
Performers 
Number of Economic 
Rights 
Increase 
Number of Exemptions Decrease 
Number of Average 
Conditions per Exemption 
Increase 
Term Increase 
Number of Sanctions Increase 
Enforcement Number of Sanctions Increase 
Table 21: Summary of the components and the weighting of the components in the 
composite index. 
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6.5 Illustration Example: Stringency in the Statute of Anne 
 To illustrate this methodology, it will be applied to the Statute of Anne. The 
Processing the Data stage has given us the following basic values for the Statute of 
Anne:  
Category Number of Provisions 
Work Type 1 
Economic Rights 3 
Term of Protection 28 years 
Formalities 3 
Impact of Formality 4 
Originality 1 
Sanctions 4 
Exemptions 2 
Exemption Conditions 4 
Protection of Foreigners 1 
Table 22: Summary of substantive variables for the Statute of Anne (1709). 
 Like in the actual thesis, the comparative standard (base year) will be 
Germany’s, the UK’s and the US’ average provisions in 1880. It should be noted that 
there neither neighbouring rights nor Performers benefitted from protection in 1880 in 
any of the case studies. They are also not considered in the Statute of Anne. As a result, 
they are not included in the discussion here. The following table shows these:  
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Provision Germany US UK Average  
Work Type 5 5 5 5 
Originality 2 5 5 4 
Formalities 3 4 3 3.33 
Impact of 
Formalities 
3 1 2 2 
Economic Rights 5 6 7 6 
Exemptions for 
Economic Rights 
9 9 3 7 
Average 
Conditions for 
Economic Rights 
Exemptions 
2.67 6.33 1.33 3.44 
Sanctions for 
Economic Rights 
5 3 5 4.33 
Term for 
Economic Rights 
65 42 42 49.67 
Moral Rights 2 1 3 2 
Exemptions for 
Moral Rights 
0 0 0 0 
Term for Moral 
Rights 
65 0 0 21.67 
Sanctions for 
Moral Rights 
0 0 0 0 
Sanctions 5 4 5 4.67 
Table 23: Provisions in 1880 for Germany, the US and the UK as well as their average. 
  To assess the stringency levels for the Statute of Anne, each variable has to be 
normalised according to the average from 1880. This means that the each individual 
provision has to be divided by the related 1880 average provision. The fourth column 
presents the results. 
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Provision Average  Statue of Anne Statute of 
Anne:  
Index Score 
Work Type 5 1 0.2 
Originality 4 1 0.25 
Formalities 3.33 3 0.9 
Impact of 
Formalities 
2 4 2 
Economic Rights 6 3 0.5 
Exemptions for 
Economic Rights 
7 2 0.29 
Average 
Conditions for 
Economic Rights 
Exemptions 
3.44 2 0.58 
Term for Economic 
Rights 
49.67 28 0.56 
Sanctions for 
Economic Rights 
4.33 4 0.92 
Moral Rights 2 0 0 
Exemptions for 
Moral Rights 
0 0 0 
Term for Moral 
Rights 
21.67 0 0 
Sanctions for 
Moral Rights 
0 0 0 
Sanctions 4.67 4 0.86 
Table 24: Normalisation of the Statute of Anne's provisions by the base year 1880. 
 In the final step now, the individual normalised variables have to be combined 
in such a way as to reflect the overall level of stringency. It was outlined before, that 
the scope of protection is reflected by six areas although only four of these are 
relevant in 1880. These are aggregated accordingly:  
  
152 
 
Conceptual Area Variable Statute of Anne:  
Index Score 
Aggregated 
Index Scores 
Threshold of 
Copyright 
Work Types 0.2 0.83 
Originality 0.25 
Formalities 0.9 
Impact of 
Formalities 
2 
Scope of Protection  
for CR works 
Economic Rights 0.5 0.45 
Number of 
Exemptions 
0.29 
Number of Average 
Conditions per 
Exemption 
0.58 
Term 0.56 
Sanctions 0.92 
Scope of Protection 
for Moral Rights 
Moral Rights 0 0 
Moral Rights 
Exemptions 
0 
Term 0 
Sanctions 0 
Enforcement Number of 
Sanctions 
0.86 0.86 
Table 25: Summary of the components and the weighting of the components in the 
composite index. 
 The final stringency index score for the Statute of Anne is 0.83+0.45+0+0.86 
and therefore 2.14. 
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7. Copyright Culture 
 The previous part has outlined how the data used for analysis has been 
assembled and transformed for the stringency index. Here, this original data will 
provide the basis for analysing copyright policies in terms of their cultural position. It 
has pointed out that the copyright systems in the Western world fall into one of two 
distinct groups according to their legal traditions. The first group are those countries 
which follow the continental or Roman approach to law and have developed what is 
commonly referred to as the Author's Rights system (AR). On the other hand, countries 
with a common law tradition have Common Law copyright systems (CL). Each of these 
is assumed to have certain characteristic features in their epitomized forms.  
 This chapter will first summarise the general difference between AR and CL 
copyright systems. It will then provide a detailed discussion of the differences, focusing 
on 11 distinct areas where the systems are expected to vary. For each of these, 
relevant variables will be outlined. In the final section then, it will be shown how the 
variables need to be recoded for this analysis, transforming them into equidistance 5 
point interval variables.  
 
7.1 The Characteristics of the AR and CL Copyright Systems 
As outlined before, there are two ideal types identified in the literature. They 
vary on how they approach copyright: the underlying rationale for protection. In CL 
countries, both the incentive to create and the labour justification play a role. In AR 
countries however, all protection is based on the author’s personality which is 
reflected in the work. This difference in the rationale affects all other policy 
components.  
Ideal type CL systems aim for the maximum dissemination of works and 
therefore seek to ensure that the works are economically exploitable. This means that 
the right is owned not by the employer at the expense of the author and moral rights 
are absent. Economic rights and exemptions are designed to ensure the dissemination 
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without hampering the public access more than necessary. In addition, protection is 
not automatic in that only those of value are protected which necessitates formalities. 
However, it does allow for a low originality threshold and the inclusion of new works 
such as sound recordings. Protection is not granted to foreigners, their public value is 
home-country bound.  
AR systems, on the other hand, emphasise the author and his personality. This 
necessitates a high originality threshold but works against formalities or the inclusion 
of technical works. Also, protection is automatic because foreigners can meet the 
originality requirement. Once protection is granted, it is strong with very few and 
narrow exemptions (with remuneration) and all benefits go to the author. Finally, the 
author also benefits from strong moral rights and ownership rules tilted in his favour-
both of which weaken the position of employers.  
 
7.2 The Ideal Types as Comparative Standards 
The previous sections have described how AR and CL systems vary in how they 
conceptualise copyright protection and therefore approach it. Nonetheless, it is 
necessary to take a closer look at the differences between the ideal types by splitting 
the possible variation into measureable distinctions. To get a more accurate picture of 
the position of a copyright system, the variation between the ideal types is 
operationalized as 11 specific dimensions on which they are expected to differ. The 
difference between the ideal CL and the AR types are subdivided into 5 groups which 
form a spectrum with AR and CL at the opposite far ends. In general, an ideal CL gets 
classified into group 1. Group 2 includes those systems which have moved away from 
the ideal CL but still significantly lean towards it. On the other hand, group 3 describes 
the middle point between the two ideal types and essentially means that the system in 
question does not tilt towards either. Group 4 includes systems which tilt towards AR 
but are not actually ideal types. Finally, ideal AR types are located in group 5. Each of 
these intervals is qual in distance and therefore all variables base don it are always 
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equidistance interval variables. Following from this, a system which repeatedly scores 
only 1 point for each dimension examined will be an ideal CL. By the same token, 
scoring only 5 points for each dimension characterises an ideal AR. However, most 
case studies will fall somewhere in the middle and their development will become 
clearer as more dimensions are examined. The following part will outline the 11 
distinct dimensions and how they vary by outline the five categories for each of them. 
In addition, for each part the relevant classified variables are listed and the rationale 
behind their selection.  
 
7.2.1 Act Structure 
 The first dimension examined is the structure of the key acts as such. The 
variable used to assess this part is based on the ungrouped binary data and follows the 
outline of the dimension at large. On the far end of the spectrum then, if an act falls 
precisely into the CL prediction, it will be considered group 1. It will start with 
definitions, followed by a combined section on CR and NR. This will be followed by 
ownership considerations, the term of protection, economic rights and infringement. 
Exemptions and moral rights feature at the end of the act. Performers are treated 
separately (S. von Lewinski 2008: : 41, 54, 62- 63). Group 2 applies if an act follows the 
general predictions for a CL system. Of key importance here that economic rights 
precede the moral right provisions (if present), CR and NR are treated on equal ground 
and the term of protection appears relatively early in the act. An act is classified within 
the third group if it does not fit either the AR or the CL predictions.  
 Category 4 applies if an act falls within the general AR scheme. This means that 
it handles moral rights before economic rights; CR and NR are dealt with separately 
and the term of protection appears late within the act. It also includes provisions on 
contracts, collective rights management and enforcement. In terms of the spectrum, 
an act which falls squarely into the AR predictions is classified as group 5. Here, moral 
rights will be followed by provisions on the work itself; NR; economic rights; 
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exemptions and then the duration of protection. The final sections will focus on 
copyright related contracts, collective management organizations and finally 
enforcement (S. von Lewinski 2008: : 41, 51, 62-63).  
 
7.2.2 Justifications 
 The second characteristic is the importance of justifications. In an ideal CL 
system, the copyright system is founded on utilitarianism in that it is seen as an 
incentive to create. Copyright here is a tool to achieve the public policy goal of 
disseminating knowledge and does not have links to natural justice. The prediction 
holds that moral rights are not protected while the economic rights are defined 
narrowly to only grant as much incentive as is needed to achieve the public policy goal. 
By the same token, the exemptions will be broad and not include remuneration for the 
author. One step further on the spectrum, classified as group 2, are systems which 
combine the utilitarian nature of copyright with a labour-inspired natural right. This 
means that although copyright is designed to be a public policy tool, there is a strong 
dimension seeing copyright as a natural right because of the labour and other 
resources the copyright owner has spent on the work. In practice, one would expect to 
see some stronger protection for economic rights but no or very weak moral rights. 
Exemptions will be strong although a few of them will entail some remuneration for 
the author. 
 Separate of this group are those systems where both natural rights theories 
have equal strength while utilitarianism plays little role. The expenditure of labour is 
rewarded as much as the personality of the author is protected. The expectation is to 
see economic rights paired with weak and narrowly defined moral rights. The 
exemptions will be significant and some of them include remuneration provisions. 
These cases will be classified as group 3. Systems which mix a personality based 
natural rights understanding with utilitarian considerations are classified as a 4. Here, 
the emphasis is on protecting the personality of the author. At the same though, public 
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policy goals like the dissemination of knowledge have also left a mark. This means that 
strong economic rights are coupled with weaker but significant moral rights. 
Exemptions will be narrow but still comparatively broad. Most of them entail a 
remuneration provision. In an ideal AR system, classified as 5, only the personality of 
the author is important and all protection is geared towards him. As a result, broad 
economic and moral rights receive protection. At the same time, exemptions are very 
limited in scope and always provide for the remuneration of the author.  
This dimension is shaped by the public benefit in comparison to the author’s 
benefit. In utilitarianism, only beneficial works should get protection. This is 
represented by the Number of Formalities and the Impact of Formalities variables. In 
addition, the extent of economic protection is relevant. This is shown by the number of 
EW, their maximum term, the exemptions as well as the average number of conditions 
which apply. Finally, the value of the author needs to be considered. This is 
operationalized here by the MORAL RIGHTS, their term of protection and exemptions. 
It also includes exemptions for EW which have a specific remuneration component: the 
author therefore always benefits, even though the use serves the public benefit. In 
sum, the Justifications dimension is determined by variables which represent the 
extent of protection and its link to the public benefit as well as the value of the author. 
 
7.2.3 Originality 
 The third dimension examined is the originality threshold. This variable is made 
up of only the originality variable as the distinctions here are identical to the data 
processing definitions.54 The utilitarian-focused CL systems (group 1) only require that 
a work is not copied from another work, called the 'sweat of the brow' doctrine. Here, 
labour and skill alone justify the copyright and therefore the threshold is practically 
non-existent. In group 2 are systems which require a bit more than skill and labour by 
including a rather small amount of judgement/ individuality. The half-way house 
                                                          
54
 It needs to be highlighted here that this ordinal ranking is opposite to the one used in stringency 
because the reference frame work is different.  
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(group 3) is the expenditure of judgement, a concept understood to mean that skill 
and labour alone are not enough but not requiring creativity. It is in a sense more the 
independent thought in exercising skill and labour which allows a work to qualify for 
copyright, reflecting a medium originality standard. Similarly, group 4 systems require 
judgement or individuality as the basis but only a small amount of actual creativity. AR 
systems (group 5) protect the author's personality and as a result have a very high 
threshold which requires creativity in the sense that the author’s personality has to be 
reflected in the work.   
 
7.2.4 Focus of Protection 
 Fourthly, the systems vary on what is the focus of protection. The variable here 
is derived directly from the binary data and reflects a combination of information as 
outlined in this section. The qualitative data is combined according to the particular 
features described below. In a pure CL system (group 1) with its utilitarian inspiration, 
the protection centres on the physical copy as the exploitable thing. This kind of 
protection is characterised by an emphasis on the medium itself rather than the work. 
Also, in terms of terminology, the protection would be granted to a book rather than a 
literary work.55 One step across the spectrum, any fixed expression is protected. This 
differs from the first group in that a fixed expression is more broadly defined. 
Particularly, a change in medium is covered under infringement. In essence, while the 
protection is awarded to an abstract form of a work, it has to take a definite shape/ 
expression in order to cross the protection threshold. The third group here contains 
systems where any author expression is protected. This means in practice that the 
work has to be expressed but the originality requirement is higher compared to group 
2. At least judgement has to be evident now, sweat of the brow alone is not enough. 
Group 4 covers works which include at least judgement but the expression is not 
necessarily fixed. This means, for example, that a speech is protected as such and not 
                                                          
55
 One good example about terminology is the German term for infringement in the early years was 
'Nachdruck' which translates to 'reprint' rather than infringement. 
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only via the (infringing) recording. Finally, in an ideal AR system (group 5), the 
protection focuses on the authors personality. This raises the originality threshold to 
creativity and requires no fixation of the work.  
 
7.2.5 Emphasis of Protection 
 The fifth contrasting feature covers the emphasis on moral or economic rights 
in relation to each other. A CL system will exclude moral rights and only protect 
economic rights (group 1). A system which provides for stronger economic than moral 
rights but has provisions for both will be classified as group 2. The strength of rights is 
the result of examining the number of rights granted and the number of exemptions. 
Furthermore, if moral and economic rights are provided for to the same extent, the 
system is grouped under 3. However, if moral rights outweigh the economic rights but 
both groups are independently provided for, then group 4 applies. The ideal AR system 
will focus on moral rights and anything else will be derived from these, usually 
extensive economic rights (group 5).  
 The variables used to determine the Emphasis of Protection compare economic 
exploitability with the author’s individual protection. Economic exploitability is shaped 
by the presence of formalities and the shape of the positive protection granted. 
Therefore, the number of formalities and their impact are used in addition to the EW, 
their term, exemptions and average conditions which apply to them. It also includes 
the number of sanctions which are available for enforcement. The author’s individual 
rights are represented by the moral rights, their term, exemptions and enforcement. 
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7.2.6 Ownership 
 The sixth distinguishing characteristic then focuses on the default ownership of 
a work. The variable used here is based on the qualitative data coded in its binary form. 
The content follows the description of the section. In an ideal CL system (group 1), the 
employer or commissioner always gets first ownership since they have borne the 
investment necessary to create the work. This is in line with the CL focus on 
utilitarianism and essentially provides who ever ensures a work gets made the 
adequate return for their investment. Systems in group 2 make the ownership of the 
work dependent on the type of work. These systems have a strong work for hire 
doctrine coupled with the default investor/ employer ownership for some works, 
especially NR. The ownership will belong to the investor if in doubt. One step further 
along the spectrum, systems in group 3 will make first ownership entirely dependent 
on the type of work whereby CR ownership goes to the author and NR ownership to 
the investor. In group 4, first ownership again depends on the nature of the work but is 
tilted towards the author. For example, a weak work for hire doctrine including 
provisions to the effect that the copyright is owned by the author unless stated 
differently in the contract are expected here. Finally, in an ideal AR system (group 5), 
the author is first owner of the work irrespective if the work was done in the course of 
employment or similar circumstances.  
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7.2.7 Scope of Economic rights 
 The scope of economic rights as such is another, the seventh, relevant 
difference. In an ideal CL system, group 1, the economic rights will be limited to the 
extent necessary to provide an adequate incentive for the creation and dissemination 
of works. Exemptions in turn will be broad and not include any remuneration for the 
authors.56 A system which falls into the second category will have broader but still 
limited economic rights, paired with broad exemptions. However, some of these will 
entail remuneration provisions. Group 3 includes the systems which have broad 
economic rights but also broad exemptions of which a significant number have 
remuneration provisions. Moving across the spectrum towards the AR systems, a 
system which is covered by the 4th category will have broad economic rights but the 
exemptions are relatively narrow. In addition, a significant number of these will be 
subject to mandatory remuneration. On the far end of the spectrum, a system 
reflecting the ideal AR (group 5), will have extensive economic rights, very narrow 
limitations and all of these will be subject to remuneration provisions. 
 The variables used here cover two areas: the actual exploitability of works and 
the guaranteed economic benefit of the author. In terms of what can gain protection 
in the first place, the number of work types, formalities and their impact need to be 
considered. The level of originality is not relevant here because it only applies to CR 
works and not NR or Performers while all of these are relevant for this particular 
dimension. As far as EW protection is concerned, the focus is on the number of EW, 
their term of protection and the shape of exemptions (both their number and the 
average conditions which apply to them). In addition, the strength of the enforcement 
is included via the number of EW sanctions. The compensation of the author is 
reflected in the variable EW Exemptions with a Remuneration Condition. 
 
                                                          
56
 An economic right is considered broad if it provides many separate rights which affect a large number 
of work types. Similarly, an exemption is broad is it applies to a large number of work types with no or a 
limited number of conditions. 
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7.2.8 Protection of NR 
 The scope of rights is relevant to another predicted difference, the 8th, as well: 
the protection of NR. In an ideal CL system (group 1), NR get the same protection as 
CR-they are fully assimilated. The first ownership is granted to the investor. The second 
group also provides strong protection for NR although has either a shorter term or the 
provided rights are weaker. Again the ownership rules favour the investor. Group 3 
systems provide significant although less protection in terms of duration and the rights 
granted. In addition, first ownership is not automatically granted to the investor any 
more. On the AR side, neighbouring rights only receive limited protection with a 
narrow scope of rights and significantly shorter terms compared to CR. The first 
ownership rules are tilted to benefit the author rather than the investor. (group 4) 
Finally, an ideal AR system (group 5) provides no NR protection because there is no 
author personality present to protect in the work.  
 The Protection of NR is determined by variables showing how NR are protected 
and who benefits from the protection. NR protection here is relevant in comparison to 
CR works rather than the substantive protection granted on its own. This variable is 
based on the qualitative, binary data and based classified using the features outlined 
above. In addition, the enforcement is important and therefore the NR sanctions are 
also included. Finally, it is important to consider who actually benefits from the 
protection, in the form of the assumed first ownership. This variable is the same as for 
dimension 6 (Ownership). 
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7.2.9 Formalities 
 Formalities are the 9th key dividing feature between CL and AR systems. An 
ideal CL system will seek to limit protection to those works most worthy of protection. 
As a result, these systems have extensive formalities and these are constitutive for 
copyright to exist. Further down the spectrum, group 2 systems have some formalities 
and these will also be preconditions for copyright to exist. In group 3, systems have 
some formalities which are a precondition to enforcing the copyright. However, 
copyright exists even if formalities are not complied with. One step down the spectrum 
towards AR systems, formalities exist but they have no practical effect. Compliance 
with them is symbolic in terms of copyright although sometimes they are still 
mandatory for other reasons (group 4). In an AR system (group 5), no formalities are 
required. This is in line with authorship being the constituting element for protection. 
This dimension is represented by only two variables: the number of formalities and 
their impact. 
 
7.2.10 Protection of Foreigners 
 Another aspect of the difference between the ideal systems, the 10th one 
examined here, is their approach to the protection of foreigners. Utilitarianism argues 
that the public benefits from the access to works. However, copyright incentives come 
at a price which the public has to pay. There is no need to protect a foreign author 
considering that his incentives are not determined by a foreign country's payment for 
his works. As a result, ideal CL type systems (group 1) will grant no protection to 
foreign works and opt for the free-riding instead which benefits their public access goal 
without having to pay the cost. One step further towards the AR systems though, a 
country will provide some limited protection to foreign works but paired with 
extensive formalities (group 2). This way, protection will be in effect limited to a few 
works as compliance with these formalities requires a conscious, usually expensive or 
onerous effort. Therefore, the access remains high while the cost is comparatively low.  
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The next group of systems provides for reciprocity in protection, coupled with 
some formalities (group 3). Here the protection an author receives depends on the 
protection foreign authors receive in his own country. In addition, the formalities again 
limit the actual scope of works affected by the copyright restrictions in practice. 
Systems classed as group 4 will follow the same reciprocity approach but not require 
compliance with formalities. The scope of works benefiting from copyright protection 
does therefore increase. Foreign works get full national treatment in ideal AR systems 
(group 5) without having to meet any formalities because as protection is based on 
authorship as such: all authors need to be treated the same. The Protection of 
Foreigners is operationalized by only three variables. The first one is a qualitative data 
based on which represents the scope of substantive available protection as outlined 
above. The other two indicate the strength of formalities: their number and their 
impact. 
 
7.2.11 Contractual Freedom 
 Finally, as differentiating characteristic 11, the systems vary on their 
understanding of how transferable the rights granted are. CL provides for full 
contractual freedom in line with the assumption that the exploitability of a work is the 
most important aspect of copyright. This means in practice that if rights can be freely 
assigned, the work will be exploited to its full potential and therefore the maximum 
benefit for the public. Many rights are automatically owned by the employer, all rights 
are assignable or can be waived. Systems in group 2 also provide for full contractual 
freedom although some rights can only be assigned in return for a guaranteed 
remuneration which cannot be waived. A more limited contractual freedom can be 
found in systems belonging to group 3 where not only certain remuneration rights are 
guaranteed but also some rights as such. The freedom is even more limited in systems 
where some rights are guaranteed, coupled with extensive remuneration rights. (group 
4) Finally, in an ideal AR system, the author is protected most extensively. The fear is 
that an author or performer is in a significantly weaker position during negotiations 
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and could therefore lose out from the benefits he deserves. As a result, extensive 
rights are guaranteed and full remuneration rights exist.  
 The area of contractual freedom is shaped by contract and ownership 
provisions in combination with those aspects weakening the rights of the copyright 
owner. On one hand, contractual aspects are influenced by the ownership rules. Here, 
the variable is the same as in dimension 6 (‘ownership’). In addition, a qualitative data 
based variable is designed here which provides the necessary information on the 
assignability of rights as described above. The second area of concern here are those 
aspects which weaken the copyright owner both vis-à-vis the users and authors. In 
respect to the user, contracts are affected by those exemptions which require non-
commercial use. It implies that commercial uses are still commercially valuable and 
therefore will be assigned. The same logic applies to exemptions with a remuneration 
condition. Considering the authors, the moral rights, their term and the exemptions 
which apply are also relevant.  
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 1 (CL) 2 3 (middle) 4 5 (AR) Data Points 
1) Structure of 
the Act 
Follow structure 
completely 
Rough outline 
followed 
Structure is a mix Rough outline AR 
 
Follow structure 
completely 
- Act Structure 
2) Justification Utilitarianisms 
(incentive for creation) 
Utilitarianism 
natural right 
(labour) 
Both [same 
strength 
Incentive 
natural right 
(labour and 
personality)] 
Natural right-
personality 
utilitarianism 
Natural right-
author 
personality 
- Formalities 
- Impact of 
Formalities 
- EW: Economic 
Rights 
- EW: Term 
- EW: Exemptions 
- EW: Average 
Conditions 
- EW: Exemptions 
with 
Remuneration 
- Moral rights 
- Moral rights: 
Term 
- Moral rights: 
Exemptions 
Table 26: Spectrum outline for the classification for ideal types.  
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3) Originality None 
sweat of the brow (skill 
and labour) 
Low 
(skill, labour, 
tilting towards 
judgement) 
Some indiv  
(judgement) 
Reflect some 
author 
personality 
(judgement+ 
tilting towards 
creativity) 
Reflect author 
personality 
(creativity) 
- Originality 
 
4) Focus of 
Protection 
Tangible copy Fixed expression Any author 
expression 
Unfixed author 
personality 
Author 
personality 
- Focus of 
Protection 
5) Emphasis of 
Protection 
Economic rights 
no moral rights 
Stronger econ 
than moral rights 
Same strength 
moral rights and 
econ rights 
Stronger moral 
rights than econ 
rights 
moral rights only - Formalities 
- Impact of 
Formalities 
- EW: Economic 
Rights 
- EW: Term 
- EW: Exemptions 
- EW: Average 
Conditions 
- EW : Sanctions 
- Moral rights 
- Moral rights: 
Term 
- Moral rights: 
Exemptions 
- Moral rights: 
Sanctions 
Table 26: Spectrum outline for the classification for ideal types.  
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6) Ownership Employer/commissioner 
(based on investment) 
Depends on 
nature of the 
work 
(tilt towards 
employer) 
Depends entirely 
on nature of the 
work 
Depend son 
nature of work  
(tilt towards 
author) 
Author based on 
his personality 
- Ownership 
7) Scope of 
Economic Rights 
Limited scope combined 
with broad exemptions 
and no compensation 
Limited rights; 
broad 
exemptions; 
some 
remuneration 
Extensive rights 
and extensive 
exemptions with 
some 
remuneration 
Extensive rights; 
limited 
exemptions and 
some author 
compensation 
Extensive rights 
with very limited 
exemptions and 
full author 
compensation 
- Work Type 
- Formalities 
- Impact of 
Formalities 
- EW: Economic 
Rights 
- EW: Term 
- EW: Exemptions 
- EW: Average 
Conditions 
- EW: Exemptions 
with 
Remuneration 
- EW: Sanctions 
8) Protection of 
NR 
Full assimilation to CR 
with ownership at 
investor 
Strong protection 
with investment 
tilt 
Some protection 
mixed rights 
ownership 
Very limited 
protection 
ownership tilted 
to author 
No protection - Ownership 
- Scope NR 
- NR: Sanctions 
Table 26: Spectrum outline for the classification for ideal types.  
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9) Role and 
Shape of 
Formalities 
Extensive formalities as 
precondition for CR 
existence 
some formalities 
as precondition 
for CR 
Some formalities 
as CR 
enforcement 
condition 
Some formalities 
but no practical 
effect 
No formalities - Formalities 
- Impact of 
formalities 
10) Protection of 
Foreign Works 
No protection Some protection 
extensive 
formalities 
Reciprocity with 
formalities 
Reciprocity  
no formalities 
National 
treatment 
no formalities  
- Protection of 
Foreign Works 
- Formalities 
- Impact of 
Formalities 
11) Contractual 
Freedom 
Full contractual 
freedom 
Full contractual 
freedom; 
limited 
remuneration 
guarantees; 
many rights 
automatically go 
to investor 
Some contractual 
freedom; some 
rights 
guarantees; 
some 
remuneration 
guarantees 
Limited 
contractual 
freedom as some 
right are 
guaranteed and 
extensive 
enumeration 
rights 
Very limited 
contractual 
freedom as rights 
are extensively 
guaranteed + full 
enumeration 
rights 
- Contract 
- Ownership 
- EW: Exemptions 
with 
Remuneration 
- EW: Exemptions 
with Non-
commercial 
- Moral rights 
- Moral rights: 
Term 
- Moral rights: 
Exemptions 
Table 26: Spectrum outline for the classification for ideal types.
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7.3 The Classification of Variables 
 In the previous part, the general differences between AR and CL systems have 
been outlined. Based on this general outline, this section will develop a spectrum to 
allow for any copyright system to be located in relation to the ideal types. The first part 
will clarify the idea of the spectrum in general. The latter one will then introduce the 
specific dimensions and their content. Table 1 provides the overview of the discussed 
features and will be used as a guide with the discussion highlighting key differences 
between the groups.   
 The variables from the second stage by themselves are not linked to the ideal 
types. To operationalize the 5 point spectrum outlined above, every individual variable 
also has to be transposed onto this scale: the strength of a particular provision has to 
be linked to its relative position in terms of the predictions made by the ideal types. 
This is done by giving substance to such terms as ‘weak’, strong and ‘average’. To do 
this, the first step was to select the maximum value in the sample. This way, rising 
stringency is controlled for in this analysis. On the basis of this maximum value then, 
the average provision was calculated by taking the mean.57 This value represents the 
neutral state-defined as leaning neither towards CL nor towards AR.  
At this stage now, the individual values were calculated for each indicator 
based on the minimum and maximum brackets. In summary, the terms, ‘very strong’, 
‘strong’, ‘average’, ‘weak’ and ‘limited’ are giving specific numeral meaning based on 
the maximum value in the sample. The following table summarized this:  
Percentage Term 
81%-100% very strong 
61%-80% strong 
41%-60% average 
21%-40% weak 
0%-20% limited 
Table 27: The link between maximum provisions and the relative terms used to 
describe copyright provisions. 
All of the general variables have been reclassified in the light of the CL-AR 
dichotomy. They are therefore placed on the five point spectrum where 1 indicates CL 
                                                          
57
 All other categories here represent ranges. As a result, the average score was also considered as a 
range in order to not unduly bias against it. This means the average was broadened from 41% to 60%. 
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and 5 is representative of AR. Their exact location is determined in relation to the 
maximum value in the sample. The six general differences between AR and CL systems 
are broken down and the relevant variables which can be used to measure these 
differences in practice are selected. The following discussion will outline the ideal 
types as analytical standards for comparison and how these are operationalized.  It 
should be noted that the cultural classifications are now independent of the actual 
level of protection.  
In addition, there is a second type of classified variables. These are derived 
directly form the binary data and reflect the presence of particular combination of 
provisions at a given point in time. In case a dimension is only described by one of 
these variables, their content is identical to the dimension scale at large. Therefore, 
what is described as a score of 1 in an area will in turn also be a 1 for this variable. The 
content of these variables is outlined in the Calculation section to avoid repetition.  
 
7.4 Calculation 
 The previous section has illustrated how the values for the particular 
dimensions on which AR and CL systems systematically differ are determined. The final 
value for the cultural score is calculated by drawing on these values. All 11 individual 
scores are combined and then averaged. This final mean indicates any copyright’s 
overall position in relation to the ideal AR and CL type as the external measuring bar. 
Therefore, the respective values for the Act Structure, Justifications, Originality, Focus 
of Protection, Emphasis of Protection, Ownership, Scope of Protection, Protection of 
NR, Formalities, Protection of Foreigners and Contractual-ability are all added up. They 
are then divided by 11 which provides the final score.  
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7.5 Summary  
 In summary, the six key differences identified have been subdivided into 11 
dimensions: Act Structure (of a statute), Justifications, Originality, Focus of Protection, 
Emphasis of Protection, Ownership, Protection of NR, Formalities, Protection of 
Foreigners, Contract-ability. For each of these, a spectrum, divided into 5 groups, was 
developed by outlining key differences in identifiable features. These provide the 
framework to assess a copyright system's characteristics in comparison to the ideal 
types. This framework now needs to be enhanced with specific criteria for 
classification. 
 The variation between them in turn can be broken down into five separate 
distinguishable positions. The variation is operationalized using a number of variables, 
each of which by itself is already linked to the assumption of AR and CL systems 
(classification process). The score for each dimension is the mean of the constituent 
values.  
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Work Type             X         
Formalities   X     X   X   X X   
Impact of Formalities   X     X   X   X X   
EW: Economic Rights   X     X   X         
EW: Term  X     X   X         
CR: Rights         X             
Moral Rights   X     X           X 
MORAL RIGHTS: Term   X     X           X 
EW: Exemptions   X     X   X         
EW: Exemption Average 
Conditions    X     X   X         
EW: Exemptions with 
Remuneration   X         X       X 
EW: Exemptions with Non-
Commercial                     X 
EW: Exemptions with 
Compensation                       
MORAL RIGHTS: Exemptions   X     X           X 
EW: Sanctions         X   X          
NR: Sanctions         X   X X       
MORAL RIGHTS: Sanctions         X             
Act Structure X                     
Focus of Protection       X               
Originality     X                 
Ownership           X   X     X 
Scope of NR               X       
Protection of Foreign Works                   X   
Contract (law)                     X 
Table 28: Calculation table for cultural scores, showing which variables are combined 
for the particular 11 AR-CL dimensions. 
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7.6 Illustration Example: Copyright Culture in the Statute of Anne 
 To illustrate how the culture methodology works in practice, the Statute of 
Anne’s position will be assessed. Like with stringency, culture cannot be assessed 
independently. The earliest complete set of data available to the author is 1880 and 
therefore, these will be used.  
 
7.6.1 Classification 
 In general, the make up of the eleven dimensions which distinguishes AR and 
from CL systems has been outlined in Table 28. 
 As a result, each of these first has to be made available in the necessary 5 point 
spectrum format. For those variables which are either counted or represent a value, 
this means classifying the values. The link between the value and the spectrum 
position is determined by the nature of the variable. For example, strong moral rights 
indicate AR systems and therefore the maximum value would be 5. On the other hand, 
a large number of exemptions would score a 1 because the variable points to CL 
systems. The classification of terms follows the scheme of Table 27.  
 For each variable, the classification schemes have be completed. Therefore, the 
percentage-boundaries outlined in Table 27 are applied to the respective maximum 
values for each variable. Once this has been, it is now possible to apply them to the 
Statute of Anne values. For example, the Statute of Anne provides protection for one 
type of work. Overall, the maximum provision in the sample is five work types. This 
means that the provision of the Statute of Anne need to be classified as a category 1 
because 1 work type is within the 0% -20% range of the maximum value. Table 29 
shows the areas where strong provisions are reflective of AR:  
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maximum value in the 
sample 5 7 65 3 65 4.9 0 9 6 5 6 
5 (max) 5 7 65 3 65 4.9 0 9 6 5 6 
5 (min) 5 6 53 3 53 3.92 0 8 5 5 5 
4 (max) 4 5 52  52 3.91 0 7 4 4 4 
4 (min) 4 5 40  40 2.94 0 6 4 4 4 
3 (max) 3 4 39 2 39 2.93 0 5 3 3 3 
3 (min) 3 3 27 2 27 1.96 0 4 3 3 3 
2 (max) 2 2 26 1 26 1.95 0 3 2 2 2 
2( min) 2 2 14 1 14 0.98 0 2 2 2 2 
1 (max) 1 1 14 0 14 0.97 0 1 1 1 1 
1 (min) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Statute of Anne 1 3 28 0 0 2 0 0 4 4 0 
Statute of Anne (classified) 2 3 3 1 1 3 058 1 4 4 1 
Table 29: Complete classification scheme for the individual measurable variables 
which indicate AR. 
 
On the other hand, the CL ones are:  
                                                          
58
 This will be omitted because provisions did not exist in any case study. 
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: 
maximum value in the sample 4 10 8 0 
1 (max) 4 10 8 0 
1 (min) 4 9 7 0 
2 (max) 3 8 6 0 
2 (min) 3 7 5 0 
3 (max) 2 6 4 0 
3 (min) 2 5 4 0 
4(max) 1 4 3 0 
4 (min) 1 3 2 0 
5 (max) 0 2 1 0 
5 (min) 0 0 0 0 
 
Stature of Anne 3 2 1 0 
Statute of Anne (classified) 2 5 5 059 
Table 30: Complete classification scheme for the individual measurable variables 
which indicate CL. 
 
  
                                                          
59
 Will be omitted from the calculations because there is no maximum provision and therefore a 
classification is impossible.  
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7.6.2 Classification from Binary Data 
 In addition to these, it is necessary to determine the scores for those indicators 
which are based on the ungrouped binary data. The first one here is the act structure. 
The Statute of Anne does not contain definitions, NR or moral rights. Nonetheless, 
ownership rules are defined in second position as the act consistently refers to 
proprietors and authors although it does not explicitly explain them. The basic term of 
protection is mentioned early on (14 years). Economic rights are the next section, 
followed by infringement and then closing on exemptions. All of this justifies the Act 
Structure as a 1 and therefore ideal CL type.  
  The second variable is the Focus of Protection. The score is a 1 here as well 
because the protection focuses only on the tangible medium: the terminology refers to 
a book and there is no adaptation right or originality requirement apply. Thirdly, the 
Emphasis of Protection also scores 1 as no MORAL RIGHTS are available in this act. As 
for the ownership, there are no explicit provisions here. However, the act consistently 
refers to authors and proprietors which implies a strong work for hire doctrine. In 
addition, only books are protected and therefore the extent of protection cannot vary 
according to work type. As a result, it needs to be classified as a 1.  
The Statute of Anne does not include foreign authors in the protection. Not 
only does it not mention anything in this respect in terms of positive protection, it 
explicitly excludes foreign language works published outside of the UK from protection. 
They cannot only be imported, but also reprinted and distributed.60 In the absence of 
NR protection, the variable cannot be assessed and is therefore omitted. Finally, for 
contractual freedom, the act does not provide for any limits on the assignability. 
Although the second set of 14 years is automatically owned by the authors, it is 
optional anyway since it is only available if the author is still alive. This means that it is 
not an assignability limitation as such. In sum, the score here is also 1.  
 
  
                                                          
60
 The usual process would be to check at this stage for court cases on this topic.  
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7.6.3 Calculation 
Table 31: Calculation table for cultural scores, showing which variables are combined 
for the particular 11 AR-CL dimensions. 
 
                                                          
61
 The protection of neighbouring rights was not feasible until 1920. Including it would only cause 
Ownership on its own to be included twice and therefore bias the result. Therefore, it is omitted. 
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Work Type             1         
Formalities   2     2   2   2 2   
Impact of Formalities   3     3   3   3 3   
EW: Economic Rights   3     3   3         
EW: Term  3   3  3     
Moral Rights   1     1           1 
Moral Rights: Term   1     1           1 
EW: Exemptions   5     5   5         
EW: Exemption 
Average Conditions    3     3   3         
EW: Exemptions with 
Remuneration   -         -       - 
EW: Exemptions with 
Non-Commercial                     5 
Moral Rights: 
Exemptions   -     -           - 
EW: Sanctions         4   4         
NR: Sanctions         -   -        
Moral Rights: 
Sanctions         1            
Act Structure 1                    
Focus of Protection       1              
Originality     1                
Ownership           1        1 
Scope of NR               -       
Protection of Foreign 
Works                  1   
Contract (law)                    1 
 
Statute of Anne 1 2.6 1 1 2.6 1 3  2.5 2 1.8 
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In summary, the culture score table for the Statute looks like this:  
In conclusion, the overall cultural score for the Statute of Anne is the mean of 
1+ 2.6+ 1+ 1+ 2.6+ 1+ 3+ 2.5+ 2+ 1.8 and therefore 1.8. The score indicates that the 
approach to copyright policy in the Statute of Anne is strongly CL in nature. In addition, 
three of the 10 relevant dimensions show ideal type scores (1). The UK is common law 
country and therefore a score comparatively close to CL is what was to be expected.  
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Part 3: Empirical Evidence 
 The first part of this thesis has outlined those copyright debates and underlying 
assumptions which this thesis seeks to answer. These were:  
 Proposition Explanation 
1 Stringency levels have increased over 
time. 
The level of overall stringency has risen 
between 1880 and 2010. 
2 Technological innovation has caused 
the rising levels of stringency. 
The rise in stringency levels has been a 
response to the development of new 
technologies and how these were 
incorporated into copyright policies. 
3 The effect of stringency on the 
individual has been particular 
pronounced in the digital age.  
The digital age has had a particular 
effect on stringency, accelerating the 
trend of rising levels of protection.  
4 Corporations have over-proportionally 
benefited from rising stringency levels 
in comparison to users. 
Corporations and not users have 
benefitted from copyright reforms. 
5 Corporations have over-proportionally 
benefited from rising stringency levels 
in comparison to authors. 
Corporations and not authors have 
benefited from copyright reforms.  
6 Copyright systems have converged 
over time. 
Copyright systems have become more 
similar over time. 
7 Older copyright policies will show the 
strongest link to the traditional cultural 
approach. 
Legal traditions and therefore the 
closeness between a policy and the 
respective traditional approach are 
most pronounced in earlier stages of 
the policy. 
8 Copyright policies have moved way 
from their respective ideal types over 
time. 
Copyright policies have become 
hybrids over time, moving away from 
their traditional approaches to 
copyright.  
9 Copyright policies have become 
increasingly settled over time in how 
they perceive the purpose of copyright 
time. 
Copyright policies have become more 
coherent over time and therefore 
across the different policy areas. 
10 The cultural convergence of copyright 
has been caused by technological 
innovation. 
The convergence of copyright policies 
on a similar approach has been in 
response to technological challenges. 
11 The cultural convergence of copyright 
has been caused by individual actors. 
The convergence of copyright policies 
on a similar approach has been in 
response to the influence of a 
particular actor on another one. 
Table 32: Reminder of Table 1: List of propositions that have been made in the 
literature. 
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In the second part, a methodology was developed to provide the empirical evidence to 
investigate these questions. This part now will use the empirical evidence to re-
examine the basic assumptions and arguments relating to the evolution of copyright 
policy. 
 Chapter eight will focus on the evolution in terms of stringency. It examines in 
detail how the stringency levels have shifted over time and the extent to which 
technology, the main driving force identified in the existing literature, explains this. 
Chapter nine then moves to the relative balance of benefits between copyright owners, 
authors and users. The main emphasis is if the relative benefits provided to the 
different groups have changed over time and if so, which one has benefitted the most.  
 The focus then moves away from stringency towards culture. In chapter 10, the 
focus is on the importance of culture to copyright policies is investigated. It examines 
the link between case studies and their respective ideal types in 1880; the evolution in 
relation to them over time and if the systems have settled in their understanding of 
copyright. Finally, chapter 11 examines the case studies in relation to each other, 
especially if and the degree of cultural convergence between them. In addition, it also 
clarifies to what extent the causal forces commonly identified in this respect explain 
the evolutionary pattern.  
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8. Stringency Evolution 
 This chapter focuses on the overall evolution of copyright policy in terms of 
their stringency. This relates mainly to questions one and two from Table 32. It seeks 
to answer a series of questions drawn from the existing literature on copyright. First, is 
the agreement on rising stringency levels justified and have these increases been 
caused by new technology?  
 Examining the stringency pattern as a whole and the contributory forces is 
important because it forms the basic assumption when copyright evolution and reform 
is discussed. On one hand, much of the current political debate is based on rising 
stringency levels in the past. Copyright owners argue that they have right to further 
protection because unauthorised uses are piracy and harming their incentive to create. 
They more or less explicitly refer to past amendments providing for new uses and 
rights. For example, the recording industry started out as a pirate itself but is now one 
of the most vocal copyright advocates calling for stronger protection (L. Lessig 2004: 56; 
B. Kernfeld 2011). On the other side of the spectrum, copyright users argue that 
stringency levels have risen too much, making copyright a threat to innovation and an 
intrusive force in private lives (J. Gantz et al. 2005; Institute of Public Policy Research 
2006; L. Bently et al. 2009: 35; M. Svensson et al. 2012: 3). In this sense, much of the 
opposition to and support for expanding the scope of protection is inspired by the 
perception of strong increases in the past. Given that these forces shape political 
debates and therefore the future path of reform, examining this basic tenant of their 
arguments is essential.  
 In addition to the importance of copyright as an issue, the question of rising 
stringency levels is also a crucial test for the methodology used here. There is practical 
unanimity of the long-term increases in stringency. As such, it presents a very strong, 
most-likely case to find a certain result. If the empirical evidence generated by the 
stringency index does not replicate these findings, the operationalization of the 
concept as such is cast into doubt. The index is designed to reflect an existing concept, 
operationalize rather than redefine it. Therefore, its findings should overlap with the 
existing literature, given that it is for all intents and purposes in agreement on this 
issue. 
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 8.1 Evolution 
 The first question to be examined is how the stringency levels have developed 
over time. The focus is the overall direction of change. There is agreement in the 
literature on copyright that the scope of protection, the stringency of the policy, has 
increased over time. Rising stringency levels are the result of a number of different 
forces which have been presented in detail in  
2.4.2 The Evolution of Copyright Stringency in the Literature. At this stage, it is 
beneficial though to summarise them again. Calls for stronger protection are justified 
by the lack of efficient enforcement of existing protection (P. Yu 2009); technological 
innovation (B. Kernfeld 2011: 218); the economic damage created by international 
piracy (J. Braithwaite et al. 2000; P. Yu 2009) and the detrimental effect this has on 
authors (S. Sterk 1996: 1199); the choice of morally charged language (S. Ricketson et 
al. 2006: 21) and finally the weakness of consumer groups late (J. Braithwaite et al. 
2000: 72).  
 However, although the literature refers to forces which increase protection, it 
also notes that the same factors can hinder rising stringency levels. Essentially, if the 
push for more protection becomes too strong, it creates a backlash which in turn 
negatively affects the legitimacy of copyright.62 Over time, resistance to expansions in 
the scope of protection has developed (K. Bowrey 1996: 327), inspired by a number of 
contributing forces. These are the intrusive impact copyright has developed on 
individuals and their lifestyle (K. Bowrey 1996: 327; J. Gantz et al. 2005; B. Kernfeld 
2011);63 7he exaggeration of piracy (J. Barnes 1974: 96- 97; S. Ricketson et al. 2006: 21; 
B. Kernfeld 2011: 193); the unclear benefit of copyright policy as an incentive to create 
and disseminate works (J. Campbell 2006: 8-9; E. Höffner 2010: 385) and the strong 
role played by corporations (J. Ginsburg 2001: 1646; L. Lessig 2004: 233).  
 The methodology can contribute to this question because it traces the 
stringency levels over time. It is therefore able to identify periods of rising and falling 
stringency levels. Given that the consensus is clearly on levels of rising stringency, it 
                                                          
62
 For a detailed explanation, please see Tilting Balance in 2.4 Stringency: The Scope of Protection. 
63
 This has been well documented in relation to music piracy by Kernfeld (B. Kernfeld 2011).  
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would be undermined by instances when it has fallen.64 In addition to the general 
pattern of change, there has also been debate about the actual extent of change. 
Although authors agree on rising stringency levels, the precise scope of this change 
remains disputed and depends on the significance attributed to forces limiting rising 
stringency levels. The methodology used here can contribute to this question because 
the numerical data is directly comparable across countries. This means that the extent 
of change cannot only be analysed over time but also across case studies. 
 
8.1.1 Evidence 
 
Figure 2: The overall stringency levels for Germany, the US, UK and the International 
Level between 1880 and 2010 
Figure 2 shows that clearly all case studies examined here have seen strong 
rises in stringency over time. However, the extent of the increases varies across case 
studies. The strongest increase has been experienced by the International Level. The 
index rose from 1.64 in 1890 to 28.44 in 2010 which is a rise of 1634%. The second 
strongest increase is observable for the US (+1939%) as the score rose from 1.86 in 
1880 to 37.92 in 2010. Germany and the UK have seen significantly less change. 
                                                          
64
 The exception is the UCC for which lower stringency levels have been identified (P. Goldstein 2003: 
151- 152). 
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Germany expanded its scope of protection by 542%: from 3.28 in 1880 to 21.04 in 
2010. Finally, the UK only raised its stringency level from 2.66 in 1880 to 24.01 in 2010 
and therefore by 379%. In sum, all case studies have seen a significant rise in 
stringency levels over time.  
 These results confirm the general consensus. This was to be expected given the 
close link between the existing literature and the operation of the stringency concept. 
The methodology used here is a numerical reflection of how the scope of protection 
has been assessed in the legal literature. It relies on the same kind of indicators and 
the same understanding of how particular provisions affect the stringency level. As a 
result, arriving at a similar conclusion would corroborate the validity of the 
methodology. Given that there has been practically no disagreement on this issue in 
the existing literature, any contradiction by the empirical evidence would have been 
most likely caused by misinterpreting the concept (H. Eckstein 1975). In sum, the 
empirical evidence confirms the long-term trend towards rising stringency levels and in 
doing so corroborate the methodology.  
 It should be noted though that the comparative levels have changed 
significantly. In 1890, Germany was the most stringent with an index score of 3.28, 
followed by the UK (2.78), the US (1.86) and finally the International Level (1.64). This 
ranking is not surprising. As an AR country, Germany can be expected to provide strong 
protection to fewer kinds of works. Personality-based natural right reasoning lends 
itself to strong protections for authors.65 Furthermore, neighbouring rights and 
performers did not play a role yet in 1890, so the impact of these newer work kinds is 
limited. These are most likely to raise stringency levels in common law countries such 
as the US and the UK because they are expected to treat neighbouring rights in the 
same way as they do copyright works. In addition, the International Level66 was 
designed to only provide a minimum standard. Therefore, it is to be expected that 
provisions are comparatively weak.  
                                                          
65
 See the explanations of copyright justifications, especially The features of Author Rights and Common 
Law Copyright Systems in 2.3.2 Conceptualising Copyright Culture. 
66
 At this point, the International Level was only made up of the Berne Convention. 
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 However, the picture fundamentally changed by 2010. Now, the US was the 
most stringent (37.92), followed directly by the International Level (28.44). The UK had 
(24.01) while Germany provided for 21.04. The 2010 position can be explained by the 
US’ often highlighted leadership (J. Braithwaite et al. 2000). The fact that it has seen 
the strongest expansion by any case study indicates how it has changed its approach to 
protection in practice. The International Level is also in line with expectations. Former 
largely omitted areas such as enforcement have entered the international stage.67 
However, it is surprising that its overall provisions are actually more extensive than 
those of the national case studies. Nonetheless, the main explanation is the absence of 
detailed exemptions which remain a national prerogative.68 This means that copyright 
owners benefit from international guarantees more extensively than the users do. The 
comparable rise between Germany and the UK however cannot be as easily explained. 
Both countries did not expand the level of protection as strongly as the US did. 
 However, although the stringency levels increased overall, Figure 2 also shows 
that this trend was not continuous. There have been instances when stringency levels 
fell rather than rise. All national case studies have seen instances where stringency 
levels fell. The UK’s scope of protection only expanded continuously from 1880 to 1980. 
It rose from 2.66 in 1880 to 28.28 in 1980. However, the protection decreased by 18% 
as the score dropped from 28.28 to 23.18 between 1980 and 1990. This significant fall 
has not balanced after 1990. The index rose again after 1990 but only to 24.01 and 
therefore remains 15% lower than it had been in 1880. Similar periods of falling 
stringency levels are also observable for the US. The US has seen a fall in stringency 
levels between 1940 and 1950 (from 2.38 to 2.12) and after 2000 (from 38.49 to 37.92). 
These are declines of -11% and -1% respectively.  
 Germany has also experienced significant periods of falling stringency levels. 
Germany’ the scope of protection has been continuously expanded until 1950. The 
index rose from 3.28 in 1880 to 19.71 in 1950. This is a relative increase of 501%. 
                                                          
67
 See for example the strong on enforcement in TRIPs and the possibility of using the WTO Settlement 
Mechanism.  
68
 See for example the debate on Information Society Directive (EU 2001) or the nature of exemptions in 
the Berne Convention, Rome Convention and others (Rome Convention 1961: art. 15).  
 
 187 
 
However, the score started to drop by 1960 and especially between 1960 and 1970. It 
fell from 19.71 to 19.49 in 1960, 13.66 in 1970 and 13.38 in 1980. These are relative 
declines compared to the previous decade of 1%, 30% and 2%. The stringency levels 
have also fallen after 2000: from 23.82 in 2000 to 21.04 in 2010. This is a relative 
decline of 12%. Therefore, Germany has seen falling stringency levels across four 
decades. This is a comparatively long time, given that the study only covers 130 years 
and the consensus has been firmly on rising stringency levels. 
 In addition to the national case studies, the International Level has also 
experienced declining stringency levels. However, here it has been identified in the 
literature before. Goldstein has argued that the International Level’s scope of 
protection has been lowered by the 1951 UCC (P. Goldstein 2003: 151- 152). This is 
confirmed by the data. The stringency levels fell between 1950 and 1960 from 3.61 to 
3.13. This is a relative fall of 13%. However, similar predictions do not exist for the 
other case studies. Nonetheless, they still have experienced falling stringency levels.  
 
8.1.2 Causes for Falling Stringency Levels 
 The protection at the International Level fell as Goldstein had argued between 
1950 and 1960. The causes for the decline at the International Level can be directly to 
the UCC. The threshold of protection fell from 1.24 to 0.59 because the number of 
formalities increased (from 0 to 0.6) while their impact became more significant. This 
in turn has lowered the impact score from 3 to 1. The issue of formalities was the main 
aim of the UCC and it is therefore not surprising that these areas account for the 
change (P. Goldstein 2001: 28). In conclusion, the UCC has affected the International 
Level in exactly the way describes by Goldberg.  
 The UK’s fall in protection between 1980 and 1990 was mainly caused by rising 
number of exemptions rather than a removal of rights. The protection for 
neighbouring rights fell from 11.73 to 9.9 as the number of exemptions increased from 
8 to 22. Similarly, a stark rise in the number of moral rights exemptions (0 to 9) actually 
pushed the overall scope down from 2.13 to 0. The trend was further reinforced by 
weaker performer protection (down from 11.4 to 9.36). Again, the main influence here 
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was the rising number of exemptions: from 4 to 18. In sum, the UK has seen falling 
stringency levels between 1880 and 1990 because the number of exemptions has risen 
strongly for all types of works except the traditional copyright ones. This fall in 
stringency contradicts the literature consensus. 
 US protection fell first from 1940 to 1950 and then again between 2000 and 
2010. The US first decline was caused by a rising number of exemptions for copyright 
works (from 2.86 to 3) which reduced the scope of protection for this kind of work 
from 0.47 to 0.43. In addition, the number of sanctions also fell from 1.5 to 1.29. The 
second in stringency between 2000 and 2010 is also linked to exemptions. The number 
of exemptions increased for copyrighted works (from 6 to 6.14); neighbouring rights 
(32 to 34) and performers (17 to 19).69 Therefore, the data for the US contradicts the 
consensus on rising stringency levels twice and each time it is caused by the rising 
number of exemptions. 
 Germany’s declining stringency scores had mixed causes. An increase in the 
number of copyright exemptions from 1.86 to 2 contributed to an overall falling 
stringency in this area from 0.61 to 0.58 between 1950 and 1960. The strong drop by 
1970 is largely due to the reconceptualization of performers and the kind of protection 
they benefit from.70 It is further supported though by the rising number of moral right 
exemptions (from 3 to 8) which pushes the overall moral right stringency down from 
1.02 to 0.96. The continued falls between 1970 and 1980 are only caused by rising 
numbers of exemptions. The protection of neighbouring rights fell from 4.85 to 4.7 
because the number of exemptions rose from 15 to 16. At the same time, the 
protection of performers was also weakened (4.63 to 4.24) as the number of 
exemptions increased from 14 to 16. The fall between 2000 and 2010 was also caused 
by the rising number of exemptions for performers, copyright works, and neighbouring 
                                                          
69
 There were also very small changes in the average number of conditions for neighbouring rights (5.25 
to 5.24) and performers (5.06 to 5.05) but these are too small to be of significance.  
70 For a more detailed account, please see 
 
8.2.1 Technological Works and their Impact on Stringency in this chapter. 
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rights.71 In addition, the term of protection for moral rights declined strongly (kinski-
klaus.de  2006): 4.85 to 2.08 which pushed the overall level of protection down from 
1.21 to 0.52. In conclusion, the falling stringency levels between 1950 and 1980 and 
between 2000 and 2010 in are the result here of rising number of exemptions, a 
reduction in the term of protection for moral rights as well as bringing the idiosyncratic 
performer protection into line with the rest of the world.  
 
Conclusion 
 Although the precise causes include one factors such a reconceptualization of 
kinds of works (Germany), a reform on sanctions (US) and a shorter term of protection 
(Germany), the dominant cause is undoubtedly the rising number of exemptions. 
Essentially, the number of exemptions rose so strongly that it outweighed the 
increases in other areas of protection. They have played a role in every instance of 
falling stringency levels identified here with the exception of the International Level.  
 
8.1.3 Conclusion 
In sum, the overall level of stringency has increased over time and done so very 
strongly. The important finding here is that the extent of change, the degree of rising 
stringency levels is now identifiable. The data for each indicator is directly comparable 
across case study and time, giving an idea of how much change has occurred rather 
than only referring to increases. Overall, the increases range between 379% and 1939% 
between 1880 and 2010. Therefore, the relative increases vary significantly between 
case studies. By using the available information more systematically, it was especially 
established that the International Level as it stands is more stringent than any of the 
national case studies and that the US’ preference for strong protection is recent (after 
1976). This confirms the political arguments about significant rises in protection. 
However, although the overall scope of protection may have increased, this is not the 
                                                          
71
 Copyright works: exemptions increased from 4 to 5.29 pushing the overall level of protection down 
from 0.67 to 0.51. For neighbouring rights, the scope fell from 9.41 to 8.33 as the number of exemptions 
increased from 20 to 27. Finally, the performers’ protection declined from 9.54 to 8.48 in response to 
the exemptions increasing from 19 to 26.  
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same as a tilting balance between users and copyright owners. These claims need to 
be examined separately.72 
However, there have also been significant instances of falling stringency levels 
in all case studies. This confirms the literature on the International Level but it strongly 
contradicts the consensus on the national case studies examined here. A significant 
amount of the recent political debates has been based on the rising stringency 
assumptions. However, if this is only partially true, then linked arguments such as the 
tilting balance between users and copyright owners may also be less extensive than 
previously claimed. Therefore, it is essential to examine why stringency levels have 
risen and fallen. The closer the overlap between the driving forces that have been 
previously identified as important and the empirical evidence, the more credence the 
political arguments can maintain.  
These findings highlight that arguments about rising stringency levels cannot be 
fully transposed from one case study to another. The national case studies examined 
here are very similar in their characteristics: they are Western, industrialised nations. 
As such, their evolution is expected to be the most similar across time (L. Hancher et al. 
2000: 272-273, 280; J. Jordana et al. 2004: 9; A. Lenschow et al. 2005: 289). The 
traditional copyright in terms of scope of protection divide is drawn between 
developing and developed countries. However, as the data shows, even among the 
case studies examined here the increases vary significantly. This has implications for 
future studies. Case studies need to be examined individually and it is invalid to make 
assumptions about their stringency levels. National variation is too significant to make 
accurate estimates. In addition, causal factors can be expected to have had a 
differential impact. The case studies were more similar in 1880 than in 2010. If case 
studies are very similar in their characteristics and the dependent variable (here the 
scope of protection) varies, then the effect of independent variables (causal factors) 
most likely varies too.  
                                                          
72 The analysis can be found in 9.1 Copyright Owners v Users. 
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It is important to note though that the change in in US attitude and at the 
International Level is recent. This is especially relevant for the debate with copyright 
critics and developing countries. As already mentioned, there is a widespread dispute 
between developing countries and industrial nation about the scope of copyright. 
Developing countries argue that overly extensive protection will harm their economic 
growth because at their developmental stage, access is important. They are net 
importers of works, not exporters. Industrialised countries on the other hand argue 
that strong copyright protection is not hindering but enabling economic growth. 
Similar debates are carried out at the national levels between copyright supporters 
and those questioning the effectiveness of copyright.73 
The comparatively recent change in US attitude supports the argument of 
copyright critics and developing countries that strict copyright protection is not a 
requirement for economic growth. The US has not seen any notable change in 
protection levels between 1880 and 1970 and therefore at the time when it rose to 
international importance. In fact, in 1970 when the debates were at their height, the 
comparative protection at US federal level was significantly lower than that available 
internationally.74 In conclusion, the pattern of recent rising stringency levels in the US 
and the International Level are of key importance to the perception of copyright policy. 
 
8.2 Causes for Change 
 The previous sections have show that stringency levels have increased over 
time but not continuously. In addition, the extent of change has varied significantly 
across case studies. The US and the International Level have seen stronger rises in 
protection compared to Germany and the UK. Given these findings, it is essential to 
take a closer a look at how the literature can explain these patterns.  
 There is a strong consensus in the literature that rising stringency was caused 
by technological innovation (the third proposition from Table 32). It is important to 
examine the effect of technology on rising stringency levels because it is so dominant 
                                                          
73
 These debates and their effects have been outlined in section 2.4 Stringency: The Scope of Protection. 
74
 The stringency index was 2.12 for the US and 11.88 at the International Level. 
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in the literature. Given the strength of this consensus, it is practically already an 
assumption and therefore merits examination. In addition, much of the current 
debates about copyright reform is created by disagreement if new uses have been and 
should be included in copyright protection. Essentially, while copyright owners argue 
for an expansive view of copyright (B. Kernfeld 2011), user advocates have increasingly 
started to object this.75 Tracing back how this issue has been handled in the past can 
therefore provide insights on how it will be most likely treated in the future.  
The influence of technology on copyright stringency has been summarized well 
by Kernfeld. He argues that unauthorized use has always been a feature of copyright 
protection and most of it was the result of technological developments. These create a 
new way of using or exploiting a copyrighted work which had not been anticipated by 
the copyright owners. It therefore alters the balance between the owners and users of 
copyrighted material in favour of the user-the new use is not yet protected by 
copyright. Copyright owners react by labelling the new form of exploitation 'piracy' 
and lobby for enhanced protection. This in turn leads to legal change as copyright 
owners seek to benefit from the new uses (B. Kernfeld 2011: 218). In sum, new 
technology creates new uses for copyright works which are then added to the existing 
protection.  
 Technology impacts in a variety of ways. This section will first investigate how 
the introductions of neighbouring rights which are by definition technological works 
have affected stringency. It will then first examine the impact technological innovation 
had on existing works by examining the number of work types, economic rights, 
exemptions and sanctions.  
 
  
                                                          
75
 For an account of user resistance, please see Factors Contributing to Lower Stringency Levels in  
2.4.2 The Evolution of Copyright Stringency in the Literature. 
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8.2.1 Technological Works and their Impact on Stringency 
 The main way to examine the impact of technology is to see how the archetype 
of technical works, neighbouring rights, have shaped the stringency of the copyright 
systems examined here. The second group is not a technical work as such but gained 
prominence because of them. New technology made the recordings of performances 
economically significant and these were given copyright protection as a result. In 
general, the expectation is an increase in stringency at those points in time when 
performers and neighbouring rights gain protection.  
 The UK has introduced the first neighbouring right, sound recordings, in the 
1911 Copyright Act (UK 1911)76 and protection for performers more than a decade 
later (UK 1925). In line with the expectation, the inclusion of sound recordings 
increased the neighbouring rights protection from 0 to 10.37. The overall stringency 
levels increased from 3.56 to 14.16. Therefore 10.37 of the overall 10.6 (98%) increase 
between 1910 and 1920 is explained by the neighbouring rights alone. Introducing 
protection for performers had a similar impact. The overall stringency level rose from 
14.16 in 1920 to 25.77 in 1930 of which 11.27 (98%) was caused by the performers. In 
sum, introducing protection for performers and neighbouring rights has had a major 
contribution on the overall rising stringency levels.  
The International Level first protected neighbouring rights and performers 
following the 1961 Rome Convention. The scope of protection for neighbouring rights 
increased from 0 to 4.04. At the same time, the protection of performers rose from 0 
to 4.36. The overall increase in stringency levels at this time was from 3.13 to 11.88. 
This means that 46% of the overall increase can be explained by the neighbouring 
rights and another 50% by the performers. Therefore, 96% of the expanding protection 
between 1960 and 1970 can be attributed to the addition of new kinds of work. In 
2010, the two work types still account for 82% of the overall scope.77  
In the US, a similar pattern is observable for the introduction of performance 
and neighbouring rights. Neighbouring rights were first introduced in 1980 and the 
relevant index rose from 0 to 16.52. Overall, the stringency level increased from 2.12 
                                                          
76
 Broadcasts were added in the 1956 Copyright Act (UK 1925; UK 1956). 
77
 23.26 of the overall stringency level of 28.44. 
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to 19.21. This means that 97% of the change is accounted for by neighbouring rights 
alone. Performers only gained federal protection by 2000. Here the stringency levels 
increased from 0 in 1990 to 0 to 15.81. Overall, the stringency levels increased at this 
point from 19.71 to 38.48. This means that actually the protection for performers even 
reversed the trend at the time: the stringency levels would have fallen by 16% without 
them. 
 Germany is different from the other case studies: not all new additions raised 
the overall stringency level. The first jump in protection (Germany 1901) is the result of 
the protection for performers. Overall, the stringency level rose from 2.9 to 16.06 and 
the protection of performers from 0 to 12.32. Therefore, 94% of the overall change can 
be attributed to the introduction of performers. Neighbouring rights protection was 
introduced in the course of the 1965 Urheberrechtsgesetz. The protection for this area 
increased from 0 to 4.25. However, the overall stringency level did not rise but fall: 
from 19.49 to 13.66, despite the influence of the neighbouring rights. The reason for 
this lies in Germany’s idiosyncratic approach to performers in 1910.  
 This German pattern is the result of applying the definitions consistently over 
time.  The neighbouring right sound recording is defined here as the recording of a 
work and it is owned by the sound recording producer. In distinction, the performer is 
protected for his performance of the work. The basis of his protection is therefore him 
acting, singing or in some other way performing the work in question. What form this 
performance takes, for example video, broadcast or sound recording, is irrelevant to 
the definition.78 These definitions fit the approach taken in the UK, US and the 
International Level without any issues. However, using them for Germany shows that 
Germany’s solution was very different from that of the other case studies.  
 In 1901, Germany included the new technology of making mechanical 
instruments to record music. However, it granted the rights to control the recording 
not to the copyright owners of the underlying work or to the producer of the record. 
Rather, the performer, the person who sang the work, owned the rights. In terms of 
the definition used here, this means that the protection has to be classified as 
                                                          
78
 For more detail, see section in Work Types in 4.2.3 Protection of Authors and Copyright Owners. 
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protection for performers. However, the scope of protection granted is very extensive 
because it is treated as an adaption of a copyright work which by definitions has the 
same scope of protection as the original (Germany 1901: §2). 
 The 1965 Urheberrechtsgesetz then recognised performers as a separate group 
from the neighbouring rights and copyright works. As a result, rights relating to sound 
recordings were now granted to their producers (a new category of rights) while 
performers were re-classified into a category of their own. However, treating 
performers independently brought with it a strong reduction in the term of protection: 
from 85 years down to 25 years.79 The result was that the stringency index of 
performers fell from 16.13 to 4.63. This in turn was not balanced by the neighbouring 
rights (4.25). Relying on consistent definitions across time has uncovered an aspect 
neglected in the commentaries: sound recordings until 1965 were not protected as 
sound recordings but as the works of performers. In sum, the lack of impact on the 
overall stringency levels by the introduction of neighbouring rights is the result of the 
idiosyncratic solution adopted by Germany. However, the protection of performers did 
have the expected effect.   
 In summary, new technology accounts for the rising stringency levels. If the 
pattern of major increases is compared to the areas of protection, it is clear that 
introducing neighbouring rights also strongly expands the scope. The one exception 
here is Germany but its importance should not be overrated. It adopted an 
idiosyncratic solution in 1910 and moved back into line by 1970. Therefore, rising 
stringency levels is caused by treating these innovations as copyrightable in itself. 
However, the protection of technological works is not the only way technological 
innovation affects the level of stringency. It also changes how existing works are used 
and therefore copyright protected. 
 
  
                                                          
79
 For the methodology behind converting terms of protection into years, please see 5.2 Values which 
explains the process and justifications in detail.  
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8.2.2 Technological Impact on Existing Works 
 Technology can affect the protection of existing works. On one hand, the 
owners can benefit from the new work types it creates, the new uses which are 
subjected to copyright (economic rights) and the enforcement via new technological 
measures. Users on the other hand can profit from new exemptions which are 
introduced to limit the effect of the technology. These theoretical considerations will 
now be examined in detail.  
year G
e
rm
an
y 
U
S 
U
K
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 L
ev
el
 
1880 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.0080 
2010 2.60 2.40 2.60 2.00 
Table 33: Stringency values for work types in 1880/1890 and 2010. 
 The impact of technology is visible in the kinds of protected works: available 
work types (Table 33). In 1880, the stringency levels were at 2.66 (UK), 3.28 (Germany), 
1.86 (US) and 1.64 for the International Level in 1890. By 2010, works such as 
unoriginal photographs, films, sound recordings, broadcasts, computer programs and 
databases have all gained protection. As a result, the index rose to 2.6 (Germany and 
the UK); 2.4 for the US and 2 for the International Level. The actual scope of protection 
the particular works benefit from can vary though, depending on their classification 
and the approach to neighbouring rights. For example, computer programs are 
considered literature works. They therefore benefit from the full scope of protection 
for copyright works. On the other hand, sound recordings are neighbouring rights. The 
scope of protection can therefore be weaker if the case study in question attributes 
these kinds of works with less importance.81 In conclusion, rising work type scores 
have facilitated rising stringency levels.  
                                                          
80
 This value is for 1890 because the International Level was only established in 1886.  
81
 For example Germany and other AR countries. 
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1880 0.83 1.00 1.17 0.8382 
2010 2.33 2.17 2.50 2.33 
Table 34: Stringency values for economic rights in 1880/ 1890 and 2010. 
 Another major area is the number of economic rights.83 The relative stringency 
levels here all expanded strongly as Table 34 clearly shows. Germany saw an increase 
from 0.83 in 1880 to 2.33; the US from 1 to 2.17; the UK from 1.17 to 2.5 and the 
International Level from 0.83 (1890) to 2.33 in 2010. Looking at the new additions 
clarifies the technological impact: they represent the shift form the physical work to 
the intangible copy (J. Ginsburg 1990a: 1885- 1887). One major challenge to copyright 
was the making of mechanical instruments. It was included in Germany, the US and the 
Berne Convention by 1910 and the UK by 1920. Similarly, broadcasting and other 
wireless transmission increasingly gained recognition: Germany (1926), International 
Level and UK (by 1930) and the US (by 1980). Practically all rights not covered by 1880 
represent new uses made possible by new technology, with the exemption of the 
rental and lending rights. Therefore, economic rights do account for rising stringency 
levels. 
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1880 1.07 0.86 1.07 0.4384 
2010 1.93 1.93 2.36 1.93 
Table 35: Stringency values for sanctions in 1880/1890 and 2010. 
                                                          
82
 This value is for 1890.  
83
 The analysis focuses on the rights available for copyright works because they benefit from the 
strongest protection and have the most rights available to them. 
84
 This value is for 1890.  
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 Finally, Table 35 indicates that technology has also affected the enforcement 
area. The enforcement stringency scores have increased from 1.07 to 1.93 (Germany); 
0.86 to 1.93 (US), 1.07 to 2.36 (UK) and 0.43 to 1.93 (International Level). However, the 
majority of these increases are not related to technology. Only the injunctions against 
Internet Service Providers and the Digital Rights Management (DRM) provisions are. It 
is noticeable that both of these are comparatively new and are designed to control 
digital works, especially online. These therefore could be linked to the perception of 
strong copyright intrusion in the digital world. In conclusion, sanctions did contribute 
to higher stringency levels but technology is not the only force influencing this area.  
 In sum, technology has contributed strongly to the changes in work types, 
economic rights and less extensively also for sanctions. However, while technology 
explains much of the change for the positive protection of copyright owners, it has 
played less of a role in exemptions and therefore the protection of users. Overall, the 
number of exemptions has strongly increased between 1880 and 2010. It rose from 
1.29 to 5.29 in Germany; 1.29 to 6.14 in the US; 0.43 to 5.14 in the UK and 0.7185 to 
1.14 at the International Level. However, these rises cannot be attributed to 
technological change as such. Actually, there are very few purely technology 
exemptions. The coding schedule lists all the different exemptions that have been 
identifiable in any of the case studies between 1880 and 2010.86 Among the 
exemptions for economic works, four exemptions are technical necessities: correct 
errors in computer programs, de-compilation, technical necessity and temporary 
reproductions. These are four out of 88 distinctive examinations and therefore only 5%. 
In addition, very few conditions on exemptions can be explained by technology. Only 
five of the potential 38 conditions which have been identified between 1880 and 2010 
can represent technological specificities.87 This is only 13% of the whole. In sum, there 
are very few exemptions which are driven by technical necessity. 
 In sum, new works, rights and sanctions were introduced in response to new 
technology. The result was a rise in stringency levels in all case studies and therefore a 
                                                          
85
 This value is for 1890.  
86
 The coding schedule can be found in The Exemptions in 4.2.4 Protection of Users.. 
87
 Nature of the work; Information or Format not available; incidental/ part of the technological process; 
reproduction method; and circumvention measure. 
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clear expansion in the scope of protection in these areas. However, technology had 
significantly less impact on the number of sanctions. Nonetheless, the main 
explanatory gap relates to exemptions. There are very few purely technological 
exemptions. However, it their strong increases which are the main explanatory factor 
for falling stringency levels and therefore the undermining of the consensus.    
 As the previous section has shown, the rises cannot be attributed to 
technological change. However, if one takes a broader look and also includes those 
exemptions which are linked to technology but also political lobbying, the number 
increases significantly. The number rises from four to 2388 and therefore to 26%. For 
performers, this affects one exemption (audio-visual works) and therefore 1 out of 12 
exemptions overall (8%) and two for moral rights (audio-visual works and computer 
programs): 7%. This means that although the exemptions are the result of new 
technology, they are not necessary for the technology to work. Rather, particular 
groups secured them to limit the cost imposed by copyright on them, for example 
libraries and teaching. In sum, the number of exemptions which can be explained in 
reference to both politics and technology together is significantly higher than 
technology alone. In conclusion, technology by itself has little explanatory power when 
it comes to exemptions. However, linking it with political influence as represented by 
the narrow exemptions granted to interest groups does provide an insight.  
 
  
                                                          
88
 These exemptions are: Back-up copy, circumvention, coin-operated machines (games), coin-operated 
machines, correct errors, de-compilation, digital audio transmission, encryption research, ephemeral 
recordings, Library: back-up copy, Library: copy a digital work, Library: copy from the Internet, Library: 
make work accessible online, manufacturing of sound recordings, non-commercial broadcasting, paper 
reproduction, retransmission, reverse engineering, special broadcasting, Teaching: make work 
accessible online, Teaching: broadcasting, Teaching: record a broadcast, technical necessity, temporary 
reproduction. 
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8.3 Conclusion 
 This section has shown that stringency levels only partially conform to the 
existing consensus. It matches expectations because stringency levels in all case 
studies have strongly increased over time. In addition, much of these rises can be 
explained by the development of new work types, uses and enforcement capabilities 
as well as recognising technological works and other economically important 
contributions as copyrightable in their own right. However, stringency levels have not 
been continuously rising. Instead, there have been significant periods of falling 
stringency levels. These were caused by a number of nationally specific changes and 
the systematic strengths of exemptions. Their importance has been previously 
underemphasised in the literature and their continued strength has not been 
adequately explained at this point. It seems that political dynamics rather than 
technology have more explanatory potential here.   
 In sum, chapter has demonstrated two things. First, the literature is very good 
in explaining why the positive protection for copyright owners has changed: they 
successfully lobbied for the inclusion of new technology in copyright policy. However 
(and secondly) the explanatory power of why users continue to benefit, represented as 
the scope of exemptions, cannot be explained by the same logic. Very few exemptions 
are the result of technical necessity. Instead it seems to be that the political 
dimensions has been neglected in the arguments.   
 The neglect of the political dimension to copyright evolution overlaps with the 
dominant view of how copyright imposes a cost. In legal copyright analysis, the public 
domain denotes those uses which are not covered by copyright policy: they are 
outside the scope of protection (J. Litman 1990). For example, when copyright owners 
are granted a new right this particular use is now covered by copyright. It moves from 
the public domain to the copyright domain-as a result, the public domain shrinks. 
Similarly, when the term of protection is extended, it takes longer for copyright works 
to be freely usable. It takes more time for them to move from the copyright domain 
into the public domain. Therefore, the scope of protection is traditionally focuses on 
the positive protection of copyright owners, defined in the copyright right-public 
domain dichotomy.  
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 This approach also means that the influence of exemptions is underemphasised. 
The impact the protection given the copyright owners develops in practice. Although 
granting new rights does impact on the public domain, it is exemptions which are key 
for innovation (R. Anderson 1998: 660). Clearly conceptualizing the scope of 
exemptions in comparison to the positive protection of copyright owners provides a 
more detailed picture of how the line between copyright owners and authors has 
shifted over time. Without it, the image is skewed in favour of assuming that copyright 
owners have benefited more than they actually did. 
 The importance of exemptions has repercussions for the perception of 
copyright policy. Much of the political debate has centred on the perceived continuous 
increase in stringency levels over time. Although this is (partially) true, exemptions 
have been significantly more influential than previously assumed. This in turn also 
means that users have benefitted more extensively than has been commonly argued. 
It therefore sheds doubt on the shifts between copyright owners and users and 
authors which have inspired much of the opposition to copyright policy. In addition, 
not all authors which have identified rising stringency levels have necessarily also 
argued that the balance of power has shift away from the users towards the copyright 
owners. As a result, the next chapter will examine these arguments about who has 
benefitted in detail.   
  
 
 
 
  
 202 
 
9. The Comparative Strength of Interested Groups 
 Chapter eight has shown that overall stringency levels have risen strongly over 
time, although the trend was not continuous. One of the main causes was the 
importance of exemptions. Given that these benefit users in particular, it is important 
to assess how the benefits derived from copyright policies have been distributed. In 
essence, this chapter interprets the previous findings in the light of interested groups 
and how they have benefitted over time. 
 It is common to distinguish between three major interested groups in copyright: 
copyright owners, authors and users. Of these three, copyright owners have been 
identified as the main beneficiary of recent reforms. On one hand, rising stringency 
levels have arguably shifted the balance between corporate owners and users in the 
favour of the first as the available rights have been expanded example (J. Litman 1986; 
M. Rose 1993; J. Ginsburg 2001; J. Ginsburg 2002; J. Gantz et al. 2005; J. Campbell 
2006; P. Yu 2009). In addition, they have benefitted more than the authors, despite 
their reliance on the romantic author discourse to justify their claims (J. Ginsburg 2001: 
1646; L. Lessig 2004: 233; J. Gantz et al. 2005: 1; J. Campbell 2006: 12). However 
because the previous section has shown that especially the exemptions have been 
stronger than previously identified, it is necessary to evaluate these claims about the 
corporate winner in copyright reform.  
 This question of corporate gain is essential for the perception of copyright in 
public. Much of the criticism of copyright policy is more or less directly linked to the 
perceived undue gain of corporations. For example, arguments about the need of 
authors have been criticised because the actual design of policies does not benefit the 
individual author but the employer/ corporate owner (J. Ginsburg 2001: 1646). The 
opposition to copyright reforms and therefore their future trajectory is crucially 
depends on the role and benefit of corporations. It is therefore essential to examine if 
they have benefitted as much as has been argued.  
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9.1 Copyright Owners v Users 
There is a voice in the literature focusing on the extension of copyright policy 
and how it has benefitted corporate owners and not the users (see for example (J. 
Litman 1986; M. Rose 1993; J. Ginsburg 2001; J. Ginsburg 2002; J. Gantz et al. 2005; J. 
Campbell 2006; P. Yu 2009). Essentially, corporations arguably dominated the political 
process. The main reason is their ability for effective collection action in support or 
opposition of particular policies.  
Copyright owners are attributed with more influence in the political process 
because business interests can mobilise more easily. First, business organizations and 
especially transnational companies have an advantage in resources: more information, 
money and technical expertise (W. Mattli et al. 2009: 16, 32). In addition, they can 
mobilise more efficiently because the costs and benefits are distributed over a small 
group (M. Olsen 1969; W. Mattli et al. 2009; C. Veljanovski 2010).89 Furthermore, they 
have less heterogeneity in their interests (F. van Waarden 2002: 44); the rewards are 
proportionally bigger (M. Olsen 1969); and decision-making is quicker and requires less 
negotiation (J. Greenwood 2002: 24). All of this reduces the transaction cost associated 
with collective action. In sum, copyright owners influenced policies mainly because 
they have inherent advantages in terms of collective action and resources. 
 The influence of copyright owners is facilitated by the weakness of consumer 
groups, especially at the international level. Opposition to business groups, in 
particular large corporations, will come from civil society rather than other business 
sectors (M. Cowles 2002) Citizen groups are in an advantage if they have a good 
organization and a large constituency because they can mobilize their members, offer 
more votes, more legitimacy and more media access (J. Berry et al. 2007: 179). 
However, copyright policy up to the 1990s did not trigger a broad scale public interest. 
Furthermore, the discourse highlighting the competitive advantages of stronger 
copyright protection means that the perceived policy cost was not significant enough 
                                                          
89
 According to Peltzman, effective group is limited due to informational and organizational costs. If a 
group is large, the interests of members are naturally more diverse and the individual member has a 
lower stake in the outcome. As a result, the benefits do not outweigh the information costs. Secondly, 
the cost of mobilizing resources, both in terms of money and votes, and contributing to the resources of 
the appropriate politician or organization rises faster than the group size. The larger the group, the 
higher the organizational costs and the more significant becomes the free-riding problem. Therefore, 
the political process limits both the effective group size and their potential gains (S. Peltzman 1988: 236). 
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to trigger opposition (G. Becker 1988).90 In addition to these reasons, consumer groups 
failed to recognise the trends for a long time. For example, by the time consumer 
groups understood the importance of TRIPs, it was too late to shape the outcome (J. 
Braithwaite et al. 2000: 72). It was only during the 1990s WIPO negotiations that 
consumer protection groups actively lobbied against expanding the scope of copyright 
protection (J. Braithwaite et al. 2000: 64). 
Counter-mobilization was also hindered by the limited openness and 
accessibility of the process. Due process can potentially prevent capture of the policy 
process because it provides inclusiveness, fairness, openness, transparency and 
accessibility (W. Mattli et al. 2009: 4, 15).  However, especially international 
negotiations lack this kind of openness.91 User and consumer groups have been 
particularly frustrated with their lack of access to the public policy making process on 
copyright (P. Yu 2009: 1). The problem is compounded by the behaviour of the courts. 
Once lobbyists have shaped legislation, judges are reluctant to second-guess the 
legislators (W. Kingston 2002: 335).  
In conclusion, given the strength of business interests and the weakness of the 
opposing consumer ones in the policy process, the copyright owners had more 
influence than copyright users on the policy design.  
 The result of this trend was a perceived overstretching of copyright policy. It 
has been argued, copyright policy has been strongly shaped by the pressure of interest 
groups rather than an underlying coherent philosophy (W. Patry 1996: 907). Corporate 
interests feel threatened by technological change and therefore capture government. 
It is an attempt to ensure that their interests are protected (L. Lessig 2004: 6; B. 
Kernfeld 2011). The balance of power has shifted in their favour and away from the 
users or the public good (J. Litman 1986; M. Rose 1993; J. Ginsburg 2001; J. Ginsburg 
2002; L. Lessig 2004; J. Gantz et al. 2005; J. Campbell 2006; P. Yu 2009). It should be 
noted though that this conclusion is not drawn by every author writing about rising 
stringency levels.  
                                                          
90
 For the discourse, see for example the recitals in (EU 2001: recital 4, 9)). 
91
 One major example are the negotiations for the ACTA agreement which was ultimately rejected by 
the European Parliament. 
 205 
 
9.1.1 Evidence 
 To examine if the balance has shifted between users and copyright owners, it is 
essential to examine the different types of works independently to see if existing 
works are provided with more protection over time.92 If existing works would have 
gained more comparative protection without equivalent changes to user benefits, the 
balance would have necessarily tilted. Work type stringency is defined by five 
indicators. The first four benefit the copyright owners: the number of economic rights, 
the term of protection, the average conditions on exemptions and the number of 
sanctions. Users in turn benefit from the number of exemptions.93 The individual kinds 
of work will now be discussed in turn, starting with copyrighted works, then 
neighbouring rights and performers. 
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1880 0.56 0.62 0.62 0.1594 
2010 0.51 0.32 0.60 1.31 
Table 36: Stringency values for copyright work in 1880/1890 and 2010. 
 Table 36 clearly shows that the protection of copyrighted works has been 
subject to hardly any increases in protection. Only the International Level has 
strengthened the protection available for copyrighted works. Its index score rose from 
0.15 to 1.31 between 1880 and 2010. This is an increase of 765%. However, the other 
case studies saw falling stringency levels between 1880 and 2010. The UK experienced 
a very minor shift towards the users as the stringency level fell from 0.62 to 0.6 (-3%). 
Germany also reduced the level of protection: from 0.56 to 0.51. This is a decline of 9%. 
                                                          
92
 Arguments on rising stringency levels focus on a particular work type: for example, one can do less 
with a book today than one could 100 years ago. Therefore, the analysis has to centre on exactly this: 
the comparative stringency across time for a type of work rather than the overall stringency level. It is 
not about if a work should be protected in the first place (here: threshold of protection) or the general 
enforcement of copyright (enforcement). The emphasis is therefore on individual work kinds because 
these represent the scope of protection available if one considers for example a book.  
93
 For a full explanation, please see 
 
6. Copyright Stringency. 
94
 The International Level only began with the 1886 Berne Convention; therefore this data is from 1890.  
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Nonetheless, the most pronounced reduction is observable for the US. It lowered the 
level of protection by 48% as the index is declined from 0.62 to 0.32. In sum, Germany, 
the UK and the especially the US are providing less protection to owners of copyright 
works today in comparison to the users. Only the International Level has expanded the 
scope although it did so very strongly.  
 The protection of neighbouring rights has been more beneficial to the copyright 
owners than users over time.95 Similar to copyrighted works, the International Level 
has seen the strongest expansion in protection. The index rose from 4.04 to 12.35 
between 1970 and 2010. This is a rise of 206%. Germany has also expanded the scope 
of protection, although significantly less extensively. The index shows an increase of 72% 
(from 4.85 to 8.33 between 1970 and 2010). Similarly, the US also raised the stringency 
level: from 16.52 in 1980 to 19.05 in 2010. This is an increase of 18%. However, the UK 
has actually reduced the stringency. The UK saw a fall of 6% as the index fell from 
10.37 in 1920 to 9.77 in 2010. In sum, while Germany, the US and the International 
Level raised their stringency levels for neighbouring rights, the UK reduced it.  
 In the area of performers, the trend has been clearly favouring the users and 
not the copyright owners.96 Germany saw the strongest overall level of reduction. The 
index fell from 12.32 in 1910 to 8.48 in 2010 and therefore by 31%. This is not 
surprising given the reclassification of performers as a distinct category from copyright 
works in 1970.97 The UK also saw a strong fall in protection: down by 12% (from 11.27 
to 9.95 between 1930 and 2010). The US in comparison has introduced federal 
performers’ protection very late explaining the little change overall: down by 3% 
between 2000 and 2010. Finally, the International Level has increased the scope of 
protection for performers. The index rose from 4.36 in 1970 to 10.91 in 2010 and 
therefore by 150%. In sum, while Germany, the UK and the US all reduced the scope of 
                                                          
95
 Introduction of neighbouring rights: Germany (1970); UK (1960); US (1980) and the International Level 
(1970). 
96
 Introduction of protection for performers: Germany (1920), UK (1930), International Level (1970) and 
the US (2000).  
97 See explanation in 
 
8.2.1 Technological Works and their Impact on Stringency in 8.2 Causes for Change. 
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protection, the International Level again favoured the owners by raising the stringency 
level.   
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9.1.2 Discussion 
 
 Copyright Works Neighbouring Rights Performers 
Increase Decline Increase Decline Increase Decline 
Germany  X X   X 
US  X X   X 
UK  X  X  X 
International 
Level 
X  X  X  
Table 37: Summary of stringency developments affecting the balance between 
copyright owners and users. 
 As summarised by Table 37, the individual work types do not reflect the overall 
strong increase in protection, except at the International Level. Both the US and the UK 
have reduced the scope of protection for every type of work examined here. They 
therefore expanded the number of exemptions more extensively than the comparative 
increases in economic rights, terms of protection, average conditions and sanctions 
combined. This is clearly unexpected. 
Germany and the US followed a similar path. They reduced the stringency 
levels for performers and copyrighted right works. However, they provided more 
protection for neighbouring rights. While stronger neighbouring rights protection was 
to be expected for the US, it seems surprising for Germany given that copyrighted 
works and performers arguably should be worthy of more protection in an AR 
country.98 However, the performer shift can be explained by Germany abolishing the 
anomaly of treating it as a copyrighted work.99 In addition, the scope of neighbouring 
rights lacked behind the international standard. Despite the increases in Germany for 
neighbouring rights and reductions in the UK and the US, Germany has still provided 
less protection than them.  
Finally, the International Level has strongly expanded the available protection 
in all areas under consideration. In addition, all increases were the strongest of any 
                                                          
98
 AR is based on originality and artistic ability. These characteristics are more reflected in copyright 
works and performers than neighbouring rights.  
99 For a full account, please see 
 
8.2.1 Technological Works and their Impact on Stringency in 8.2 Causes for Change. 
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case study in question. This trend should not come as a surprise through. Users benefit 
from exemptions, the one weakness international agreements traditionally have. 
Exemptions are perceived as national prerogatives: 100 the result is vague exception 
clauses.  
There are a number of contributing factors to the difference between the 
findings here and the expectation raised in the literature. The first explanation is the 
narrow scope of exemptions. The study here relies on a clear, mutually exclusive 
definition of exemptions. This approach has the side effect of highlighting how 
exemptions have adapted over time because it emphasises comparability. This means 
on one hand that it is clear how the same exemptions have evolved and how its scope 
has changed. However, it also highlights how certain groups of public benefit uses have 
gained new permitted uses. For example, the provisions on teaching or libraries have 
kept up with the change over time as their number increased. While these changes 
might be easily assimilated into existing perceptions of the scope of exemptions, by 
coding according to purpose these differences become clearer. Part of the explanation 
is therefore the increased attention to detail as a result of maintaining comparability 
over time and case studies. 
Secondly, the difference between the findings here and the literature is a 
problem of scope rather than analytical content. Both the benefits for users and 
owners have been extensively analysed before, however, they are linked with each 
other. In essence, literature arguing that the balance between users and copyright 
owners focuses on what users cannot do anymore. They discuss in detail how 
copyright affects users in ways that have not been before. This is essentially the 
dividing line between the copyright and public domain outlined before. However, they 
do not pay the same attention to the new permitted uses which have gained 
recognition.101 They do not spend the same effort on describing how exemptions have 
changed in response to new owner benefits, for example economic rights. In sum, 
                                                          
100
 This problem, for example, became very apparent in the EU were member states were not able to 
agree on exemptions in the Information Society Directive (EU 2001) Similarly, the Berne Convention, 
Rome Convention and others have a catch all exemption provisions, see for example (Rome Convention 
1961: art. 15).  
101
 See for example the discussions in: (J. Ginsburg 1990a; J. Litman 1990; J. Ginsburg 2001; J. Litman 
2001; J. Ginsburg 2002; L. Lessig 2004). 
 210 
 
although both the changes to positive protection available to copyright owners and the 
exemptions have been discussed before, these two components are not combined 
systematically. Nonetheless, all of the exemptions are known and discussed 
extensively in commentaries on copyright law. 
The third possible explanation is the timeframe. Much of the resistance to 
copyright reform is recent and claims for tilting balances are especially pronounced for 
digital works. This is confirmed by a number of authors highlighting the detrimental 
impact that digital technology had on users lobbying (L. Lessig 2004; J. Gantz et al. 
2005; I. Alexander 2007; B. Kernfeld 2011).  In other words, it is possible that the 
distance between the evidence of copyright benefits and the perception is due to a 
digital impact.102  
 
9.2 The Digital Impact on Users 
 The previous sections have shown that overall stringency levels increased but 
the impact has not shifted the balance between copyright owners and users. The 
question therefore arises if the perception of rising stringency, especially the 
acceleration of its effects on users might be linked to digital technology rather than 
copyright as a whole. The focus here is on the strength of exemptions, especially those 
aspects limiting their scope. 
  
  
                                                          
102
 This is outlined in 2.4.3 The Scope of Protection. 
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9.2.1 Evidence 
 Digital technology has affected the way users can rely on exemptions. Some of 
the exemptions have additional conditions attached to them in case that a work is in 
digital form. This makes compliance and therefore reliance with the particular 
exemption more difficult.  
 
Figure 3: Number of exemptions which have additional conditions when the work is 
digital rather than analogue. 
As the following table shows, all case studies require additional measures to be 
taken for an exemption to apply to the digital age. Although it made no such 
requirements by 2000, Germany demanded extra precautions in 24.3% of the 
exemptions by 2010 (9 out of 37 exemptions). It is the least technologically neutral. In 
addition, these special requirements also apply to exemptions commonly considered in 
the broader public benefit: use in schools and teaching/ research. Similarly, the US 
strongly increased the provisions. In 2000, only 7.1% had special requirements for 
digital works. This rose to 11.6% by 2010 (from 3 to 5 out of 42 and 43 exemptions 
respectively). The UK presents itself as the most technologically neutral in this respect. 
Here, only 3.2% in 2000 (1 out of 31) and 5.6% in 2010 (2 out of 36) include additional 
provisions. Therefore, depending on the country in question, access to digital works is 
potentially more limited.  
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Exemptions are also impacted on indirectly. The protection for DRM shifts the 
emphasis of what copyright controls. Before, only the actual act of copying was subject 
to control. DRM however can determine how a work is used, even before there is any 
copying. For example, the Adobe Digital Editions software lets copyright owners 
determine how often a book is read. At the same time, the circumvention is essentially 
banned irrespective of what further use it the work would have been submitted to (L. 
Lessig 2004: 157). As a result, certain kinds of behaviour which were formerly outside 
of copyright controls (or not enforced) have now entered the realm of copyright policy 
(J. Ginsburg 2001: 1632). It is therefore necessary to examine how many of the 
exemptions explicitly allow for the circumvention of DRM-a necessity in order to rely 
on them in the digital environment.  
 
Figure 4: Number of exemptions explicitly allowing for the circumvention of DRM. 
Despite the wide range of works which can be subjected to DRM, the up-front 
removal of it is only allowed in a minority of cases. The US has the most extensive 
provisions in this respect with seven exemptions explicitly catering for circumvention. 
However, this is only 17% of the exemptions available. The UK in turn provides for 9.7% 
with three out of 31 exemptions. In addition, neither the UK nor the US have any 
provision permitting it for private use. Therefore, strictly speaking, copying a CD onto 
the computer to have the mp3 files for a handheld player is now subject to 
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enforcement, even though it was largely ignored before (I. Alexander 2007: 654). 103 
For Germany, only 2.7% of exemptions permit the circumvention of DRM (one out of 
the 37 possible exemptions). In conclusion, only a small number of exemptions 
explicitly allow for the breaking of DRM although they can be applied to all digital 
works. This in turn means that the other exemptions are potentially not applicable as 
the use of the work is prevented as a whole by limiting access rather than just focusing 
on copying.  
 To remedy the situation of preventing exemptions to apply, all case studies 
provide for procedures through which they can be enforced. In the US, the copyright 
register is tasked to review the provisions regularly (US 1976: 1201(a)(1201)(iii)). In the 
UK, this has to be done to the Secretary of State but it does not apply to all exemptions, 
especially news reporting, criticism and review (H. MacQueen et al. 2008: 197). 
Similarly, in Germany an administrative procedure is available to fine those copyright 
owners which do not make works available. However, it is limited to particular 
exemptions and does not include private copying (T. Fuchs 2008: paragraph 95a and 
95b; M. Schaefer 2011: 225). What this means is that although private copying of for 
example a CD is allowed, it cannot be used once DRM applies to it. At the same time, 
levies still apply to blank media and copying equipment. In sum, all of these solutions 
are narrower than the actual copyright provisions because they are time consuming, 
potentially costly and are not automatic. Furthermore, Germany and the UK have 
restricted their substantive applicability. This means that the DRM provisions further 
narrow the scope of exemptions available for digital works and have the effect of 
making copyright exceptionally stringent in practice once a work is digitalised. 
 
  
                                                          
103
 Making a private copy was never actually legal; however, this was not enforced in practice (J. Gantz 
et al. 2005: 54).  
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9.2.2 Conclusion 
 In conclusion, there is a clearly identifiable digital impact on copyright 
exemptions. In particular, the scope of exemptions is more limited if works are digital 
because additional conditions apply to them. Furthermore, the protection of DRM and 
the limited circumvention possibilities limit the access to work. These findings are 
important because they partially explain the resistance that copyright policy has faced.  
 Works are increasingly used in the digital form and exemptions here are more 
limited than they are if the work is in analogue form. As the Internet gained 
prominence, more individuals were affected by provisions and the impact increasingly 
affected lifestyle choices. Especially criminalising such everyday activities like making 
an mp3 from a CD have a significant impact on how copyright is perceived and the 
intrusive feeling it has created in parts of society.  
 Secondly, these changes affect mainly the young, exactly the same group 
strongly reflected in the resistance campaigns. It is them who use the Internet 
extensively and tend to be up to date on new technology. They are also the ones 
infringing attitudes by using torrents in torrents and vote for pirate parties (T. Reuter ; 
M. Svensson et al. 2012). Therefore, by targeting activities of the young, it also them 
which oppose copyright most extensively.  
 Thirdly, much of the impact of restrictive practices here is communicated more 
widely, amplifying its impact. On one hand, stories about negative behaviour spread 
widely and reach a large number of people. The Internet does not only offer cheap 
copying capabilities but also real time communication and the potential of 
campaigning. Groups such as 38 Degrees already actively exploit the ability of the 
internet to connect and elicit support from a large number of like-minded individuals 
and use this for lobbying.104  
 Fourthly, despite the major impact the provisions had on the individual, they 
have not significantly reduced the problem of piracy. Infringing websites continue to 
operate and the number of take-down is increasing and not inclining.105 In sum, the 
                                                          
104
 See for example the campaign homepage 38 Degrees (38 Degrees 2013). 
105
 See for example the Google Transparency Report (Google 2013a). 
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findings that copyright is most restrictive for digital works has significant repercussion 
on how copyright is perceived, now and in the future. This in turn is likely to affect the 
political realm and therefore future copyright reform. 
 In sum, the literature has argued that there are major shifts towards copyright 
owners and away from users. This however can only be confirmed for the International 
Level. All of the other case studies have balanced the protection of users with 
copyright owners over time once the work had gained protection. The strong increases 
in stringency are not the result of protecting existing works more extensively but by 
adding more kinds of works to the scope of protection.106 This is significantly different 
for digital works which are subject to more restrictive exemptions than analogue works.  
 The explanation for this difference is one of focus. While the increase in 
benefits for copyright owners has been described over time, less attention has been 
paid to the built safeguards for users and especially how these compare systematically 
in extent. However, there is another possible explanation which warrants examination. 
In essence, copyright users may be subject to more restrictive provisions in the digital 
world. This will be the focus of the next section.  
This finding is important especially in the light of future copyright reform. As it 
stands now, copyright policy has lost legitimacy because it has been argued that 
copyright protection has benefitted copyright owners more than users. If this is not 
true, then significant parts of the anti-copyright camp’ argument is significantly 
weakened. The digital impact does explain the perception of rising stringency levels 
among young people in particular to some extent though. However, if there has not 
been a shift from the users towards copyright owners, have the copyright owners 
benefitted over proportionally from protection in comparison to authors as has been 
claimed before? This question needs to be examined because it is an intrinsic part of 
the argument against corporations in copyright policy.  
  
                                                          
106 For the full analysis, please see 8.2.1 Technological Works and Impact on Stringency and 
8.2.2. Technological Works. 
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9.3 The Comparative Strength of Copyright Owners v Authors 
 The previous section has established that the overall balance between 
copyright owners and users has not shifted over time, except when works are digital. 
However, the conflict between users and corporations is only one side of the conflict. 
Copyright interests do not only vary between copyright owners and users. Copyright 
owners also have different interests than authors. In general, corporate owners rely on 
copyright to safeguard their profits (M. Kretschmer 2003: 339). For example, much of 
the content industry relies on a windowing strategy which requires the separation of 
markets. Since the 1970s/80s, they have been selling to different market segments and 
territories at different prices (S. Wang 2003: 9). The aim is to extract the maximum 
profit from a work. The model came under strain in the 1990 because the Internet 
makes this strategy obsolete because digitalisation reduces distance (S. Wang 2003: 9). 
Recent reforms nonetheless have ensured that this model remained viable. Market 
separation is maintained DRM, for example the zoning of DVDs (S. Wang 2003: 30). 
This example illustrates how the content industry has used copyright policy to ensure 
its business models continue to work rather than enhancing the benefit to authors 
directly.  
The issue is also reflected in the debates about the types of works which are 
copyrightable (L. Bently et al. 2009: 35). These controversial works are of more 
importance to corporate owners than authors. The protection is based on the 
economic benefit and usually corporate owned. One core example here is the on-going 
debate about databases. In the US, a database was denied protection on the basis it 
lacks the necessary originality to qualify as a copyrightable work (Feist Publications, 
Inc. v Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc.  1991). However, the same work can get 
protection in the EU, even though a less extensive one than other kinds of works (EU 
1996: chapter III).  
In difference to corporate owners, the interests of authors are more diverse (J. 
Litman 1986; M. Rose 1993; J. Ginsburg 2001; J. Ginsburg 2002; J. Gantz et al. 2005; J. 
Campbell 2006). Kretschmer has summarised these (M. Kretschmer 2003: 338). The 
interests can be grouped in two categories: reputational interests and economic ones. 
In the first group are the economic interests of authors. They want to benefit 
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financially from the economic value of their work (M. Kretschmer 2003: 338). It should 
be noted that the economic dimension gains in importance the more successful an 
author becomes (E. Höffner 2010: 388). For example, reduced CD sales only affect 
those artists selling a large number of them and therefore only a small percentage of 
all artists (J. Litman 1986: 857- 904). This can put them in line with the interests of 
corporate, profit-oriented copyright owners (M. Kretschmer 2003: 339). 
 In the second category, authors want their work to be widely disseminated and 
be named as the author. This is the only way for them to get known and therefore gain 
a reputation. Furthermore, authors have an interest in creative exchange and 
especially the use of other works in their own (M. Kretschmer 2003: 338).107 Projects 
like the creative commons and open source software confirm these interests not 
linked to financial return (J. Campbell 2006: 8-9; Creative Commons 2013a). In sum, 
copyright owners have an interest in profit and financial return while authors also 
benefit from wide dissemination and are concerned about their reputation.  
 
9.3.1 Evidence 
Economic exploitation and the protection of authors are two distinct areas in 
copyright policy. To examine this conflict, the analysis will be limited to the traditional 
area of conflict: copyrighted works. Here, both the authors and the copyright owners 
play a role which is not the case for the other areas. Neighbouring rights are not 
granted on the basis of originality and the owner is by the definition the employer. 
Similarly, the performers benefit from the performance rights, not the author who 
actually wrote the underlying work which is being performed. Economic exploitability is 
represented by the economic rights which define the protection of particular work 
kinds: economic rights, the term of protection, exemptions, conditions on exemptions 
and sanctions. Authors are protected by moral rights as well as limits on contractual 
terms and the transferability of rights. These ensure their economic benefit separately 
from that of the copyright owners.  
It needs to be noted at this point that the actual index levels for copyrighted 
                                                          
107 
This is also commonly referred to as standing on the shoulders of giants: works are not created in 
isolation but rely on the work that others have done before them. 
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works and moral rights cannot be directly compared. They are relative to the provisions 
in 1880 for each indicator and therefore a higher or lower absolute value is not 
meaningful. However, the relative change, expressed as percentages, can be used 
instead.   
 The authors are benefitting today from the strongest comparative protection in 
Germany. Germany has weakened its moral rights protection in comparison to the 
copyrighted works as such and therefore their economic exploitability. The copyrighted 
works saw a decline from 0.56 to 0.51 (-9%) between 1880 and 2010 while the moral 
rights also declined from 1 to 0.52 (-48%). This means that authors have lost ground 
compared to copyright owners. At the same time, the ownership rules are now 
favouring authors more strongly. Although authors always had first (assumed) 
ownership, the presumption is stronger today. Explicit contractual terms are necessary 
for a work for hire to transfer first ownership (Germany 1965: §43). Finally, authors also 
benefit from guaranteed remuneration rights including for new uses and a number of 
these cannot be assigned.108 In sum, authors in Germany have not been weakened 
over time. The impact of less extensive moral rights in comparison to economic 
exploitability has been softened by more favourable contractual and ownership 
provisions.  
 The International Level provides the second strongest benefits to author 
compared to copyright owners. The economic rights expanded by 765% between 1890 
and 2010: from 0.15 to 1.31. Moral rights saw an even stronger increase (885%) as the 
index rose from 0.13 to 1.23. However the International Level provides little substance 
on the questions of work for hire and contract limitations. This is not indicative of 
strong roles for either copyright owners or authors because it depends on the member 
state how they fill this gap. In conclusion, the International Level does increasingly 
provide benefits to the authors. However, the impact is limited because both work for 
hire and the contractual limitations are largely omitted.  
 The US has not strengthened authors in comparison to employers. Copyrighted 
works have seen a strong fall in protection between 1880 and 2010: -48% (0.62 to 
                                                          
108
 There are numerous limitations here, including remuneration for cable retransmission §20b; resale 
right §26 or lending/ rental §27; remuneration for new uses: §32c in the in the 1965 
Urheberrechtsgesetz.  
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0.32). At the same time, moral rights expanded by 23% (from 0.13 to 0.15). Therefore, 
the US has attributed more importance to authors over time than owners. However, 
although moral rights have been strengthened, the US has a very strong work for hire 
doctrine. Assumed ownership generally lies with the employer and rights are 
transferable (US 1976: s. 201 b) and d)). In sum, while moral rights have increased, the 
economic benefit is attributed to the employer by default and not author. The balance 
therefore has not changed over time. 
 The UK has a seen a widening gap between copyright owners and authors. The 
copyrighted works here saw a fall of protection of 3% between 1880 and 2010 (from 
0.62 to 0.6) while the moral rights fell to 0 (a decline of 100%). The exemptions 
affecting moral rights are so numerous that they balance the positive provisions. This 
means that authors do not have a practical importance and are also less relevant than 
owners.  At the same time, the work for hire doctrine provides the employers with the 
benefit of the doubt (UK 1988: s.11 12)). Similarly the only right not assignable is the 
remuneration from rentals (UK 1988: s. 93B). In sum, the UK clearly favours copyright 
owners as a result of stronger economic rights, a strong work for hire doctrine and few 
reserved rights.  
 
9.3.2 Conclusion 
  In conclusion, copyright owners and authors have seen shifting balances. 
Generally, both the UK and the US provide significantly more benefits to copyright 
owners compared to authors. The comparative strength of moral and economic rights, 
first ownership rules and the transferability of copyright all point in this direction. In 
Germany, the effect is weaker because ownership and transferability rules are geared 
more towards authors. However, moral rights have benefited less from increases over 
time than economic ones. The International Level is more difficult to assess. The gap 
between moral and economic rights increased slightly over time. At the same time, 
there is very little detail on contracts and ownership. In conclusion, authors have kept 
up with copyright owners in Germany, but lost ground in the US and the UK. Overall, it 
has to be said that copyright owners are the main beneficiaries from copyright reforms.  
 These findings are important because they explain part of the copyright 
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resistance. While the users have not lost out overall, the results here show clearly that 
reform has favoured the economic benefits over the interests of the authors. This in 
turn has significant repercussions on arguments that put the interests of the authors in 
the spotlight but actually benefit the copyright owner rather than the author. In the 
course of future reforms, particular attention has to be paid to the effect that any 
reform has on this balance. If copyright aims at protecting authors and not simply 
protect business interests, more emphasis needs to be placed the benefit that authors 
actually get. For example, strengthening remuneration rights or contractual protections 
can remedy the changes.  
 
9.4 Conclusion 
 This chapter focused on the distribution of benefits derived from copyright 
policy. While the previous chapter had established that stringency levels had risen and 
therefore more economic value benefitted from protection, its findings of significant 
changes to exemptions necessitated the examination of the actual distribution of 
these gains. Given that the literature focuses especially on the interest and gain of 
corporations, their relative benefits compared to users and authors was examined.  
 The empirical evidence derived from the methodology has shown that the 
economic benefit attributed to corporations has been more limited than expected. 
Corporations did benefit more from gains in protection than authors. These are given 
comparatively few prerogatives and the contractual limitations do not remedy their 
bargaining power. However, corporations have not caused a similar shift away from 
users. Rather, the relative benefit of corporations and users has remained in balance 
between 1890 and 2010. The only exception is digital works: here, the conditions 
which apply to exemptions and the role of DRM have reduced their scope.109 This is to 
the determinant of the users. 
 The findings are important because the perception of shifting balances has 
been a strong argument against copyright protection in its current form. Independent 
of the actual evidence, the perception of corporate gain at the expense of users has 
                                                          
109
 For more detail, please see 9.2 The Digital Impact on Users. 
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created opposition. As Ginsburg noted, it is the perception rather than the facts which 
creates this effect (J. Ginsburg 2002: 7- 8). This is reinforced by the loss attributed to 
authors at the hand of these corporations. However, given that users did not actually 
lose out as much as previously thought, their arguments do not match reality. Instead, 
their reliance on the needs of authors to back up their own claims emphasises that 
authorial claims to copyright are the only politically viable argument. Both authors and 
user rely on the rights and damages done to authors to justify their own policy 
preferences. This emphasises that the only morally acceptable point at this time on 
which all major groups agree is that the authors have a right to benefit from their work 
in some way and that users and corporations are currently harming it.  
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10. The Importance of Culture  
 While chapters eight and nine discussed the evolution of stringency and its 
distributary effects in detail, this chapter focuses on culture. The literature on 
convergence argues that copyright systems have converged into some kind of hybrid 
systems (F. Grosheide 1994: 204; J. Sterling 2003: 17; H. MacQueen et al. 2008: 41; S. 
von Lewinski 2008: 63). This pattern is based on a number of implicit assumptions 
which Table 38 summarises.  
 Proposition Explanation 
7 Older copyright policies will show the 
strongest link to the traditional cultural 
approach. 
Legal traditions and therefore the 
closeness between a policy and the 
respective traditional approach are 
most pronounced in earlier stages of 
the policy. 
8 Copyright policies have moved way 
from their respective ideal types over 
time. 
Copyright policies have become 
hybrids over time, moving away from 
their traditional approaches to 
copyright.  
9 Copyright policies have become 
increasingly settled over time in how 
they perceive the purpose of copyright 
time. 
Copyright policies have become more 
coherent over time and therefore 
across the different policy areas. 
Table 38: Extract from Table 1, summarising the underlying propositions of cultural 
convergence. 
 First, legal tradition needs to be important early on in the timeframe. If 
copyright policies are based on historical systems, then the further back one goes, the 
more clearly traditional attitudes should be reflected in the policies. Secondly, the case 
studies have moved away over time from their ideal types. As a result, their cultural 
scores should move towards the neutral level of three. Thirdly, being a hybrid is not 
limited to the overall pattern, but also the individual dimensions. In particular, as 
specific features such as moral rights spread, there is not an expectation that these 
changes are fully integrated into policies. As a result, the coherence of the systems 
falls. This chapter will examine these assumptions in turn and assess how they link to 
the general convergence hypothesis.  
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10.1 Legal Origin 
 It has been argued in the literature that legal tradition affects copyright as 
much as it does other policies. Examining the role of legal traditions is important 
because it influences how the copyright evolution is perceived. At this stage, it has 
been argued that copyright systems have converged over time on some kind of middle 
ground (F. Grosheide 1994: 204; J. Sterling 2003: 17; H. MacQueen et al. 2008: 41; S. 
von Lewinski 2008: 63). Although the extent of convergence is debated, they all agree 
that the systems have moved away from the ideal types and turned into hybrid 
systems instead. This basic pattern underlies all further arguments about how 
copyright systems have developed. For example, the bridging influence of the Berne 
Convention or other international agreements (G. Davies 2002: 335; P. Goldstein 2003: 
152; H. MacQueen et al. 2008: 43; S. von Lewinski 2008: 34; P. Goldstein et al. 2010: 14) 
requires convergence to be feasible. Similarly, the Americanisation of copyright (J. 
Braithwaite et al. 2000: 66) is also based on the assumption that the US approach has 
been transplanted to other case studies and therefore converged in these aspects. 
However, if the case studies do not systematically vary in 1880, then the assumptions 
on convergence have to be at least re-examined if not dropped. It should be noted that 
if there is any variation and it cannot be adequately explained by the detailed historical 
accounts, then the methodology would have to be re-examined.  
 Legal traditions refers to the historical attitudes on the nature and role of the 
law; its role in the society and polity; the organisation and operation of a legal system; 
and on how law should be made (J. Merryman 1985: 2). In Europe, the distinction is 
commonly made between common law and civil law. It is this tradition which shaped 
the copyright ideal types. As the 2.3.2 Conceptualising Copyright Culture described, 
there are two distinct approaches to copyright policy: AR and CL.110 Given the link 
between legal tradition and the ideal types, they can be used as proxies for the 
importance of legal origin. 
In theory, legal tradition should be more important earlier in the timeframe. 
Von Lewinski points out that the clearest differences between the systems were visible 
                                                          
110
 For a full explanation of how these ideal types are conceptualised and operationalized, please see 7. 
Copyright Culture.  
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in the 19th century (S. von Lewinski 2008: 37). Similarly, Sterling highlights that the 
differences were clearly established by 1886 when the Berne Convention was signed (J. 
Sterling 2003: 15). Legal origin will therefore be more important early in the timeframe, 
especially 1880. To investigate the importance of legal origin, the focus will be on the 
earliest time point: 1880. Each case study will be examined in detail on how it relates 
to its respective ideal type and what explains the position.  
 
10.1.1 Evidence 
Table 39 summarises the scores for 1880 for all four case studies.  
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Germany 3.0 3.1 4.0 1.0 3.6 3.0 3.1   3.5 3.3 3.4 3.1 
US 2.0 2.6 1.0 1.0 3.0 4.0 3.0  1.0 1.0 2.6 2.1 
UK 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 3.5 2.0 3.5  2.5 2.3 3.2 2.5 
International Level 3.0 3.4 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.0 3.8  5.0 4.3 3.2 3.5 
Table 39: Cultural scores for the copyright systems of Germany, the US, the UK and 
the International Level in 1880. 
 In 1880, the UK was significantly further away from CL than expected. Its score 
of 2.5 is in fact closer to 3 than 1. Overall, it is not clearly favouring the CL approach 
even at the dimensional level: six have scores below 3 and five are at or above 3. Only 
the level of Originality and the Focus of Protection are ideal types (score: 1). These 
scores were to be expected because the low originality levels required in the UK have 
been discussed before (W. Copinger et al. 1915: 52).  
 The details of why the UK shows such a significant variation to its ideal type 
have been describes in the past. Core CL features such as numerous constitutive 
formalities are absent though. Instead, in the UK they are few in number and only 
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 Neighbouring rights were not invented yet in 1880. As a result, this dimension is omitted until 1920 
when the first neighbouring rights gained protection. 
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affect the enforcement of copyright. Secondly, there is a significant underlying current 
of Locke’s Labour theory in the discourse of UK, copyright policy.112 This reflects a 
natural right approach which provides a stronger claim to protection than a statutory 
privilege does (M. Rose 1993). It is therefore not surprising that the author is given 
added importance, as indicated by the Emphasis of Protection (score 3.5). The same 
logic also explains the rather expansive protection given to copyright owners (Scope of 
Protection: 3.5).113 In sum, the CL approach to copyright is not fully reflected in the 
data at the earliest time point examined here. This is largely caused by the importance 
attributed to the author and the limited role of formalities. The reasons for this have 
been previously identified by other authors although their importance for legal 
tradition have not been recognised.  
Germany in 1880 has a cultural score of 3.1 which at first also seems to be far 
away from AR (score: 5). The majority of areas score between 3 and 3.5. Only 
Originality is clearly AR in nature with a score of 4. By drawing on the particular 
components outlined in the literature, the result is far less surprising though. Germany 
in 1880 recognised copyright as a natural right. However, this focus did not mean that 
protection was to be all-inclusive and perpetual. Rather, the incentive approach was 
always important and is reflected in the inclusion of exemptions114 and long-standing 
restrictions in the term of protection (G. Davies 2002: 182- 183).  
In addition, a work is not understood in the Hegelian sense yet: the focus is still 
on the physical copy, not a broader understanding of work. The Emphasis of Protection 
only scores a 1 and is therefore an ideal CL type. The limited understanding of 
authorship is also reflected in the approach to moral rights protection. They were only 
protected by case law in 1880 and only formally codified in 1965.115 Furthermore, 
moral rights are not dominant in the German tradition: the moral and economic 
aspects of copyright are one unified right (monistic approach to copyright) (W. Bappert 
                                                          
112
 See especially Rose on the battle of the booksellers and copyright at common law (M. Rose 1993). 
113
 The discourse provides justifications that authors should be given strong rights. These in turn benefit 
the employers but they are not at the forefront of considerations when protection is extended. See 
section on discourse in 2. Literature Review: Justifications in 2.3.2 Conceptualising Copyright Culture. 
114
 Interestingly enough, Davies also points out that even France debated the public interest in a positive 
sense (G. Davies 2002: 183). 
115
 Even France, the ideal author rights case study commonly used for comparisons, has not codified its 
moral rights until 1957. 
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1962). This is less than the dualistic approach exercised by the French which provides 
for perpetual rights. Given these limitations already pointed out in the literature, it is 
not surprising that Germany was practically neither CL nor AR in nature by 1880. Their 
relevance for the cultural stance was not recognised though. 
 The US’ approach in 1880 is as expected. The culture score is 2.1 and therefore 
comparatively close to its ideal type. The distance is 1.1 compared to the CL ideal type 
and 0.9 the neutral level 3. Overall, seven dimensions are below 3 and only three are 
above it. In addition, there are four ideal types: Originality, the Focus of Protection, 
Formalities and THE Protection of Foreigners. All of these should not be surprising. The 
incentive to create justifications dominated the discourse in the US. The Constitution, 
case law on fair use as well as secondary literature all refer to this.116 It is therefore to 
be expected that the copyright focuses on the physical copy of the work. Locke’s 
argument however on a right to copyright is significantly less prevalent.117 Without a 
rights-based understanding, there is not an incentive to move away from low 
originality levels and narrowly focused rights.118 In sum, the US is CL in nature as the 
literature had predicted. 
 In 1890, the International Level is close to the neutral level but with an AR tilt. 
The score of 3.5 and therefore the distance to the ideal AR is 1.5. All individual 
dimensions are at or above 3. Therefore, none of them has a tilt towards CL. 
Interestingly enough, it is actually more AR in nature than Germany. The tilt towards 
AR was predicted in the literature (G. Davies 1995: 1-2). The literature highlights that 
the two important innovations in the Berne Convention was the absence of formalities 
for foreigners and the national treatment clause. Both Formalities and the Protection 
of Foreigners score an ideal AR score (5). Finally, the overall neutral level reflects the 
need to bridge the AR-CL gap (G. Davies 2002: 335; P. Goldstein 2003: 152; P. 
Goldstein et al. 2010: 14). Four individual dimensions are exactly neutral in their 
                                                          
116
 In fact, because the Constitution itself refers to the utility justification, all sides need to refer to it.  
117
 This is a direct result of the constitution and its reliance on the incentive approach. The intent of the 
legislator is very clear.  
118
 The concept of a broad underlying work like in Hegel is linked to the author as a personality. Similarly, 
the right of the author to benefit implies that he is entitled to all the fruits of his labour. Both of these 
arguments open up the path for control over derivative works (W. Bappert 1962). 
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adopted solution. In sum, the International Level is as predicted: neutral with a slight 
AR bias because of the Berne Convention.  
 
10.1.2 Conclusion 
 The results for the four case studies examined here show that the case studies 
do vary systematically depending on their ideal type but these are not as important as 
expected. Rather, Germany, the UK, the US and the International are all closer to the 
neutral level of 3 than their respective ideal types.  
 Although these findings seem to be unexpected at first sight for Germany and 
the UK, this should not be the case. All of the factors affecting the case studies have 
been identified in the literature before. Issues such as the importance of authors in the 
discourse; the role of formalities and foreigners and the question of originality have all 
been discussed before in some detail. However, these findings were not applied to the 
conclusions drawn in the AR-CL literature. As a result, their systematic implications on 
how the different areas of protection link with each other have been underemphasised. 
 One note of caution has to be added here. This study starts in 1880 and 
therefore decades after the first copyright laws in Germany (1837), the US (1790) and 
the UK (1710) were implemented. It is possible that the case studies have already 
dropped their particular ideal type features. However, on the basis of what has been 
researched on this issue before, doubts need to be articulated. In respect to the US, 
Ginsburg has demonstrated how the first copyright act was less CL in nature than 
expected (J. Ginsburg 1990b).119 As for Germany, the first copyright law was Prussian 
(1837). It is therefore not long before the start of the timeframe for this study. 
Nonetheless, only a systematic examination of all case studies from their first 
copyright laws onwards with the methodology used here can provide a definitive 
answer to this question. However, this is outside the scope of this study. 
                                                          
119
 The findings from the Statute of Anne used the illustration example in Part 2 cannot be used to draw 
any conclusions because its sample values have been compared to the US and German provisions in 
1880 and therefore 170 years later. This biases the results. 
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 Given that legal traditions were not as prominent in 1880 as previously 
assumed, the question arises if the case studies have nonetheless become hybrids over 
time. A hybrid in this sense would show a score closer to three and probably more 
variation between dimensions.120 These two indicators will now be discussed in turn.  
 
10.2 The Importance of Ideal Types over Time121 
 The previous section has established that the notion of ideal types and 
therefore legal tradition had some bearing on the case studies, however, not as 
extensively as expected. This now raises the question that if the case studies still move 
away from their respective ideal types as has been argued in the literature?122  
 Examining the question of ideal types over time is important for two distinct 
reasons. First, it is a prerequisite for the kind of convergence identified in the literature. 
If the case studies have not moved away from their ideal types, then they have not 
become hybrid systems. This does not exclude the possibility of convergence as such. 
However, it means that the convergence between two systems would have not been a 
balanced sigma-convergence, triggered by both case studies moving towards each 
other on some kind of hybrid-system centre ground. Secondly, the contributing factors 
to convergence, such as the role of individual actors or technology arguably have 
worked in the form of sigma-convergence. Therefore, if the case studies did not move 
away from their ideal types, the effect of these contributing forces also has to be 
reassessed. In sum, it is important to see if case studies have moved away from their 
ideal type because it is a fundamental assumption in the sigma-convergence 
arguments and the causal factors which have contributed to it.  
 The position of case studies relative to the ideal type is reflected in two values. 
The first one is the absolute distance to the ideal type. In addition, its movement over 
time will also be measures by the convergence rate. This describes the relative change 
in position between two consecutive points in time. The 
                                                          
120
 They are assumed to become hybrids because specific features are imported rather than widespread 
change. As a result, change is assumed to be limited to particular dimensions as well. 
121
 This section has been accepted for publication by the journal Script-ed in abridged form. 
122
 This has been discussed in the literature review, in particular in 2.3.4 The Convergence of Copyright 
Culture. 
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                         where x describes the distance to the ideal type at 
the t2 and t1. If this rate is positive, then the system has diverged. However if it is 
negative, then the systems have converged. The convergence rate is used here 
because it does not only show the direction of movement but also how strong the 
trend it. The higher the convergence rate, the more pronounced is the trend in 
question.  
 To examine this question, the case studies will be examined individually. For 
each of them, its relationship with its respective ideal type will be discussed in detail. 
The focus will be on identifying the intervals when they have converged or diverged 
from it. 
 
10.2.1 Evidence 
 
Figure 5: The evolution of copyright culture in Germany, the US, UK and the 
International Level between 1880 and 2010. 
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UK 
 The UK is a common law country: its ideal type is therefore CL. This means that 
rising scores indicate divergence while falling ones show convergence with the ideal 
type. Therefore, rising cultural scores corroborate the hypothesis of less important 
ideal types while falling ones contradict it.  
 The UK did diverge overall from its ideal type between 1880 and 2010. Its score 
rose from 2.5 to 2.7. However, Figure 5 emphasises that this trend was not continuous 
but characterised by significant periods of convergence. The UK’s cultural evolution 
can be divided into four intervals: 1880-1910; 1910-1960; 1960-1990 and 1990-2010. 
The continued reversals mean in practice that the trend is more like an oscillation than 
a sustained trend in any particular direction.  
 In the first interval, the UK has fluctuated but overall converged with its ideal 
type (CL). The cultural score fell from 2.5 in 1880 to 2.3 in 1910. The distance to the 
ideal type therefore declined from 1.5 to 1.3. It should be noted though that there was 
a short-lived divergence between 1890 and 1900 when the score increased from 2.2 to 
2.4. This means that the earliest interval was characterised by an overall convergence 
and therefore contradicting the divergence hypothesis.  
 After 1910, the UK’s copyright system shifted away from the ideal CL type until 
1960. The cultural scores rose from 2.3 (1910) to 2.8 in 1960. The distance to the ideal 
type therefore also increased: from 1.3 to 1.8. The development is caused by a single 
event. The convergence rate for 1910-1920 is positive with a value of 0.5. The shift is 
therefore not indicative of a long-term readjustment. Rather, the data points to the 
importance of the 1911 Copyright Act which dominated the whole interval. In sum, the 
second interval provides support for the divergence hypothesis.  
 The UK converged with its ideal type between 1960 and 1990. The cultural 
score fell from 2.8 to 2.4. As a result, the distance to its ideal type decreased from 1.8 
to 1.4. Looking at the convergence rates clarifies that the trend was continuous: they 
range from 0 to -0.2.  In summary, the period from 1960-1990 has seen sustained 
convergence. This does not confirm the literature’s divergence prediction.  
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 Finally, the UK reversed its cultural trend after 1990 and diverged from its ideal 
type. The score rose from 2.4 in 1990 to 2.7 in 2010. Therefore, the distance to its ideal 
type increased from 1.4 to 1.7. The convergence rates clarify that the divergence has 
been continuous: the rates are 0.1 for 2000 and 0.2 for 2010. In conclusion, the final 
two decades have seen a divergence again. This is line with the literature which 
predicted a shift away from the ideal type as they lose importance.  
  In conclusion, the hypothesis of divergence from its ideal type can only be 
partially confirmed in respect to the UK. The UK did diverge overall from the ideal type 
as predicted. However, there were periods of convergence between 1880 and 1910 as 
well as from 1960 to 1990. Furthermore, the numerous reversals of trends means that 
the overall extent of change is limited. It has only moved by 0.6 between 1880 and 
2010. The most appropriate description for the UK is therefore oscillation rather than 
convergence or divergence. 
  
US 
 The US is a common law country and therefore needs to be compared to the CL 
ideal type. This means that rising cultural scores indicate the divergence that is 
predicted in the literature. On the other hand, falling scores show convergence.  
 The US overall meets the expectation raised in the literature: it diverged from 
its ideal type. Its cultural score increased from 2.1 in 1880 to 2.7 in 2010. The distance 
to its ideal type rose accordingly from 1.1 to 1.7. The cultural scores remained stable 
for long periods of time though. It remained at 2 between 1920-1960; 1.9 between 
1970-1980 and 2.7 between 2000 and 2010. In addition, the divergence has not been 
continuous. The convergence rates vary from -0.1 to 0.5. There are two intervals of 
convergence as Figure 5 illustrates. 
 The first convergence phase was early on (between 1900 and 1910). Here, the 
values fell from 2 to 1.9. The distance to the ideal CL correspondingly declined from 1 
to 0.9. However, the time-frame is very short: only one decade. Therefore, not too 
much importance should be attributed to this short term drop. It is important to note 
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though that 1910 is exactly the point in time when the 1909 Copyright Reform first 
appears in the data.  
 The second fall in scores is between 1960 and 1970. They drop from 2.0 to 1.9 
which reduces the distance to the ideal type from 1 to 0.9. This does not corroborate 
the divergence hypothesis. However, the change observable here is very small (only 
0.1). Furthermore, the trend is more than reversed by 1990. The score rose from 1.9 in 
1980 to 2.4 in 1990. This is higher than the previous level of 2 (1920 until 1970). The 
impact of this convergence phase is therefore limited in scope and time. 
 In conclusion, the US has diverged overall. There are two minor convergences 
but these are limited in time and change in score. Most importantly though, the US 
remained remarkably stable and actually did not evolve for most of the timeframe. The 
dominant trend in the US was less evolution than cultural inertia.  
  
Germany 
 Germany is a civil law country and therefore its ideal type is AR. As a result, 
falling scores here indicate divergence and rising ones convergence. To meet the 
literature assertion of less important ideal types, Germany’s cultural scores need to 
decline.  
 A look at Germany’s cultural evolution in Figure 5 clearly shows a move 
towards AR between 1880 and 2000, followed by a minor shift to CL by 2010. These 
will now be examined in turn. Germany’s evolution was a stable long-term trend 
towards AR. It converged from 1880 until 2000 as its cultural scores rose from 3.1 to 
4.2. The distance between AR and the Germany fell accordingly from 1.9 in 1880 to 0.8 
in 2000. This means that it essentially shifted away from the largely neutral level to 
becoming profoundly AR in character with a score higher than 4. This long term 
convergence strongly contradicts the literature. The ideal type for Germany has 
become more important and not less.  
It should be noted at this point that there has been very little movement during 
the Second World War. First of all, there were no reforms in this time period. The last 
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statutory copyright reform was the extension of protection in 1933. As a result, the 
score remained stable and only fluctuated between 4.2 and 4.1 (1940-1950).123 This 
indicates that copyright is a peace time issue in Germany and not subject to reform at 
a time of war.  
Germany has seen a divergence from its ideal type between 2000 and 2010. Its 
cultural convergence score dropped from 4.2 to 4.1. As a result, the distance to its AR 
ideal type has increased from 0.8 to 0.9. Germany had not really evolved since 1930, 
despite a series of reforms including the introduction of neighbouring rights.124 
Therefore, any movement is noticeable. The importance of this shift should not be 
overrated though. 0.1 is a very small change and does not reflect a change in attitude. 
In addition, the study ends in 2010. This means that it is not clear if the trend 
continuous or was limited to a single decade. Furthermore, Germany is still 
significantly AR in nature. The recent developments are in line with the literature 
because the cultural score fell. This means that the system moved towards the 
neutrality and away from AR. However, the importance of the change is limited at this 
stage. 
In conclusion, the German cultural evolution contradicts the literature. On one 
hand, It is closer to its ideal type in 2010 than it was in 1880. The AR ideal type has 
therefore gained importance and not lost it as the literature argues. The divergence 
observable after 2000 does confirm the hypothesis. Nonetheless, it is very limited in 
scope if it is compared to trend overall. As a result, the argument that the ideal types 
are less relevant today has to be rejected for Germany.  
 
  
                                                          
123
 The methodology depends on the maximum values present in the sample as a whole to control for 
the impact of rising stringency. As a result, it is possible that values change without domestic activity. 
124
 The one exception is the short-lived fall in score from 4.2 to 4.1 in 1960 which was reversed by 1970. 
The trigger here was the UK’s introduction of neighbouring rights which changed the indicator 
environment. It is therefore only of indirect importance to Germany.  
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International Level 
 In terms of cultural evolution, the expectations vary for the International Level. 
The Berne Convention was the only multilateral treaty between 1890 and 1950. For 
this timeframe, the cultural scores should indicate AR (G. Davies 1995: 1-2). However, 
it should be very close to the neutral level of 3 because it bridges the gap between CL 
and AR (G. Davies 2002: 335; P. Goldstein 2003: 152; P. Goldstein et al. 2010: 14). In 
addition, after 1950, the shift should clearly go to CL because new treaties reflect CL 
considerations (UNESCO 1951; Rome Convention 1961; WIPO 1996).125 
Overall, the convergence score for the International Level dropped from 3.5 in 
1890 to 2.9 in 2010. However, as Figure 5 shows, this hides that the international 
evolution is mainly made up of two phases: the Berne Convention and the spread of 
other international agreements.  
Early copyright developments at the international level are entirely shaped by 
the Berne Convention: it was the only relevant multilateral agreement in existence 
until 1950.126 In this timeframe, the convergence score rose from 3.5 in 1890 to 3.7 in 
1950. The distance to the ideal type AR therefore fell from 1.8 to 1.3. The trend was 
largely shaped by the 1927 Rome revision: the score rose from 3.3 to 3.6 between 
1920 and 1930 (convergence rate: -0.3). In line with the expectation about the nature 
of the Berne Convention, the system is a mixture of CL and AR with a leaning towards 
AR. In sum, early developments confirm the literature as the Berne Convention pulls 
the International Level closer to AR. 
The second part of the evolution is characterised by the proliferation of 
international agreements. The scores dropped from 3.6 in 1950 to 2.9 in 2010. The 
distance to the ideal AR increased from 1.4 to 2.1. The trend was not fully continuous 
though. The strongest decline in score occurred between 1950 and 1960 with a 
convergence rate of 0.6 as the score fell from 3.7 to 3.1. The timing isolates the UCC as 
the driving force because it is the only addition to the data in this decade. With the 
exception of 1980, the remaining scores are all at 2.9. In 1980, the score dropped from 
                                                          
125
 For example, the permission for formalities in the UCC and the neighbouring rights introduced by the 
Rome Convention. 
126
 There were other multilateral conventions in the Americas but none of the case studies were 
members and the provisions were not actually any stricter.  
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2.9 to 2.8. This means that 1980 has seen a minor, short-lived change with no longer-
term significance. The dominant trend is inertia and therefore the absence of change. 
The values stayed largely stable. The falling scores match the literature which 
highlighted that with the Berne Convention losing its predominance, CL characteristics 
became more prominent. 
In summary, the International Level is at a large distance from both AR and CL. 
Also, its tilt has reversed over time. The Berne Convention had an identifiable affinity 
with the AR system while the proliferation of international protection made the system 
more CL in nature. Overall, this meets the literature’s expectations and is therefore not 
surprising.  
 
10.2.2 Conclusion 
 The general argument in the literature here is that the ideal types lost 
importance over time although there is not any agreement on the extent of this. 
However, the evidence for this is mixed. On one hand, the two CL case studies UK and 
US have diverged overall and moved closer to the neutral level. Nonetheless, both of 
them always remained on the CL side of the spectrum. Germany on the other hand 
actually moved closer to its type. The fact that divergences focus on CL case studies 
could be merely coincidence: the number of case studies is too small to draw any 
definite conclusions. Therefore it is not possible to generalise on how other case 
studies would behave.  
 The second major observation is that the maximum movement varies 
significantly among case studies. Germany has seen the most change as its cultural 
score rose from the 3.1 in 1880 to 4.2 in 2000. This is a change of 1.1 and therefore 
more than a whole category on the AR-CL spectrum. The International Level is very 
close to this: 0.9 overall. The highest value was 3.7 (1950) and the lowest 2.8 (1980). 
The US has seen the third most extensive shift. Its minimum score was 1.9 (1910) and 
the maximum 2.7 in 2000 and 2010. It therefore has evolved by 0.8 over time. 
However, the UK has only seen a maximum change from 2.2 (1890) to 2.8 (1930) and 
therefore of 0.6. The continued reversal of trends as the copyright system oscillated 
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explains this. The average change of all case studies together was 0.9. Not a single 
instance in any of the case studies shows such a strong evolution at once. This is an 
indicates that culture changes incrementally over time. The cultural approach is not 
redefined at once. Instead, it is path dependent: past choices affect the (perceived) 
reform options available to policy-makers. 
 Given the absence of one sustained trend, two questions are raised. First, how 
do these fluctuations influence the coherence of the copyright systems. Hybrids 
cannot only be identified by their overall scores but also the distance between the 
individual dimensions: the coherence of their copyright approach. Secondly, have case 
studies actually converged over time despite these fluctuations? Convergence does not 
necessarily require that systems move to the centre because theoretically, the 
convergence point can be anywhere on the spectrum. However, the oscillation of case 
studies as they move to and away from their ideal types makes convergence with each 
other significantly more unlikely.  
  
10.3 Coherence of the Copyright Systems 
 The previous section has traced the developments overall and demonstrated 
that case studies have converged and diverged with their respective ideal types. There 
has not been one continuous trend rather the cultural scores have oscillated over time. 
In addition, although the US, UK and the International Level have become hybrids 
according to their overall cultural scores, Germany has not. This merits a closer 
examination of how these changes link to the individual dimensions level.  
 The question of coherence, meaning the variation in scores between the 
individual dimensions, is a key aspect of examining the strength of legal tradition. 
Cultural values, represented here by legal tradition, are especially strong if they play a 
role in policy. Although they are not static over time, their strength affects the 
likelihood of change (A. Lenschow et al. 2005). For example, if a case study has based 
its protection consistently on the personality of the author, then the introduction of 
neighbouring rights is less likely than in a system which has recognised both the 
personality and the economic importance of works as justifications. The change in 
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attitude required in the first case is larger than in the second, making change less likely 
(L. Hancher et al. 2000: 272-273, 280; J. Jordana et al. 2004: 9; A. Lenschow et al. 2005: 
289). In sum, examining the coherence of copyright system sheds light on the strength 
of the motivation behind the approach. It therefore also identifies those case studies 
were the overall cultural position is the result of widely varying positions in the 
individual dimensions. These are the true hybrids.   
 It has been argued that copyright systems have become hybrids over time (F. 
Grosheide 1994: 204; J. Sterling 2003: 17; H. MacQueen et al. 2008: 41; S. von Lewinski 
2008: 63). This is linked to the introduction of particular features from other respective 
other culture. For example, a CL introducing moral rights or an AR country introducing 
neighbouring rights will make them hybrids. However, there is not an assumption in 
the literature that these changes follow a coherent vision. In practice, this means that 
the systems become less coherent over time as only some areas are affected. 
 To analyse if a copyright system is consistent in its approach to copyright, the 
differences between the individual dimensions, and therefore the spread of the 
distribution, have to be compared. If reforms followed a coherent vision, then the 
differences between the individual dimensions will have been reduced. They will have 
similar or even identical scores in the individual dimensions because the ideal types 
represent a common understanding. They are based on the assumption that the 
underlying justifications for protection affect the design of copyright policies. As such, 
all individual dimensions are linked in how they relate to the purpose of copyright.127 
However, if reforms are short-term fixes and only designed to handle a narrow issue, it 
is likely that the differences between dimensions will increase over time. Therefore, 
examining the differences between dimensions can show if the copyright systems have 
settled over time on one understanding. 
 There are a number of different ways to analyse the spread of a distribution. 
The variance and standard deviation are most commonly used but they are not 
appropriate in this particular case. The variance is the sum of all differences between 
the individual values and the mean (  ) squared.  
                                                          
127
 For a detailed description of the ideal types and its individual dimensions, please see 7. Copyright 
Culture. 
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         ∑(   )  
The standard deviation is the square root of the variance divided by the mean.  
                   √
∑(   ) 
 
 
 However, the size of the standard deviation and the variance both depend on 
the size of the underlying values. This is important because both measures are not 
comparable across case studies if the data varies systematically between them. This is 
exactly the assumption here: AR systems are expected to have higher values than the 
CL systems do. To ensure that the distribution measure is comparable across case 
studies, it is more beneficial to rely on an indicator which is unaffected by the size of 
underlying values.  
The Coefficient of Variation provides this neutrality. It is the standard deviation 
divided by the mean.  
                         (  )  
√∑(   )
 
 
 
 
High CV scores indicate differences between the individual dimensions and the mean 
and therefore inconsistency in the overall approach. Lower values reflect consistency 
because the dimensions are closer to the average. They are all in the same position 
compared to the ideal types.  
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10.3.1 Evidence 
 
Figure 6: Coherence of copyright policies between 1880 and 2010. 
 It is clear from Figure 6 that all case studies have seen falling CV scores over 
time and therefore became increasingly coherent in their approach to copyright policy. 
Table 40 clarifies though that the actual level of coherence varies significantly across 
case studies. The UK saw increasing coherence as its CV score fell from 0.44 to 0.35 
between 1880 and 2010. In the same timeframe, the US also became more consistent: 
from 0.54 to 0.35. Similarly, Germany’s CV fell from 0.37 to 0.08. Finally, the 
International Level also saw an overall decline: from 0.34 in 1880 to 0.21 in 2010. 
year Germany US UK 
International 
Level 
1880 0.37 0.54 0.44 0.34128 
2010 0.08 0.36 0.35 0.21 
Table 40: Coefficient of Variation values for Germany, the UK, the US and the 
International Level in 1880 and 2010. 
  
                                                          
128
 This value is from 1890 because the International Level was not established yet in 1880.  
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10.3.2 Discussion 
 Three observations about the pattern stand out. First, it is noticeable that all 
national case studies were most consistent in 2010. Germany reached its most 
coherent state at a CV score of 0.08 in 2010. Although the CV for UK is at 0.35, it is 
more than four times as high. It is also its point of most coherence. Similarly, the US 
also had a CV of 0.35 in 2010-again the most coherent in the timeframe examined here 
(in combination with 1960-1970). In conclusion, 2010 was for all national case studies 
the most consistent point in time. 
 Secondly, the common law case studies UK and the US are significantly less 
consistent in their approach than Germany and even the International Level. The 
lowest CV scores for the UK and the US are the same as Germany’s was in 1910 and 
the International Level in 1890/ 1900. This means that 140 years of increasing 
coherence has only brought them to the same level from which Germany and the 
International Level started in the first place. This is especially surprising because the 
International Level is a mix of different multilateral agreements. Inconsistency would 
have therefore been expected here. In sum, those case studies starting from an AR 
point have lower CV scores than the CL ones. However, the sample is too small though 
to be definitive in this respect: it could be a coincidence. 
 Thirdly, the age of the legislation does not have an identifiable impact on the 
coherence of the copyright system. Amendments have contributed to inconsistencies 
early in the timeframe, as has been amply identified for a long time in the UK (Report 
of the Royal Commission  1878). The same is not true anymore today. Germany has by 
far the lowest CV and therefore most coherent approach to copyright. However, its 
copyright act is also the oldest in 2010: 48 years. In fact, amendments have removed 
inconsistencies and not added them. Similarly, the US and the UK have identical 
coherence levels although the US act is 12 years older than the UK’s. In conclusion, the 
age of the copyright act is not related to the consistency of the approach. 
Amendments instead can even increase coherence. They did not become hybrids but 
legal tradition is important. The copyright systems have become more systematic in 
their approach and understanding.  
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10.3.3 Conclusion 
 In conclusion, all case studies have seen a rise in inter-dimensional similarity, 
indicated by overall falling CV scores. Germany and the International Level especially 
have systematically lower CV scores than the UK and the US. This is especially 
surprising given that Germany’s act is by far the oldest and the International Level is 
made up of a number of overlapping multilateral agreements making contradictions 
more likely. If these high incoherence levels are indicative of CL countries in general 
cannot be determined here because the number of case studies is too small. 
 The increases in the coherence of the approach mean that the individual case 
studies have brought their individual components of protection in line with each other 
when they reformed. Even when the overall cultural scores are oscillating and 
changing direction, the differences between the individual dimensions was still 
declining. This means that the reforms actually brought the individual components 
more into line than had been the case before. In this sense, the US and the UK have 
started to settle on a near neutral level approach to copyright. Although these have 
become hybrids in their overall position, this pattern reflects a systematic realignment 
of all provisions and therefore cultural change. They are therefore are hybrids by 
design, not accident. This contributes to the current of knowledge by highlighting that 
even though aspects from other copyright systems may have been adapted over time, 
this can result in change of the perception of copyright. Changes can be widespread 
than narrowly focused.  
 Germany on the other hand has moved continuously towards AR and seen 
falling CV scores along the way. Here, the evolution is not becoming a hybrid, but 
continuously changing its attitude to all components in a more AR manner. Most 
notably, even the falling convergence scores between 2000 and 2010 has not been 
accompanied by less coherence over time. Therefore, Germany has become more ideal 
type and more settled in this approach as well. It was a concerted reform rather than 
ad hoc. Therefore, changes in perception are not only possible if case studies become 
more hybrid but also when they move closer to an ideal-type vision.  
 Finally, the International Level is the only case study were recent reforms have 
been ad hoc in nature. Although its overall CV score also fell, they have been rising 
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again since 1970. Therefore, since neighbouring rights were introduced, the variation 
and differences across areas has increased. In addition, this has especially accelerated 
after 1990, emphasising that the 1990s’s reforms made ad hoc changes and did not 
reflect one coherent vision. This is not surprising given that it has been repeatedly 
argued that the TRIPs agreement has been a fundamental change in approach (C. 
Correa 2007; D. Gervais 2008; A. Taubman et al. 2012). This shows that the adoption of 
new features does not necessarily fit the rest of the provisions well. 
 In sum, the main contribution of this section is that the US, UK and the 
International Level have become hybrids. However, not fully in the way that expected. 
It also shows that there should not be an assumption that changes in position are ad 
hoc. Although changes in the cultural position can be the result of narrow reforms 
intending to solve specific problems at the time, this is not always the case. Both 
moves to and way from the ideal types can be the result of changes in how copyright is 
understood. Even if the case studies oscillate in their overall cultural position, they can 
still be following one vision. Therefore, it is not possible to draw conclusions on how 
settled a copyright system is but just examining the changes in the overall cultural 
position. Instead, only the size of differences between the individual dimensions can 
provide this answer.  
 
10.4 Conclusion 
 In conclusion, legal traditions have been of limited importance at the start of 
the timeframe. Nonetheless, the ideal types have still seen a decline in relevance for 
the US, the UK and the International Level. In all of these cases, the policies moved 
away from the respective ideal times between 1880/1890 and 2010. In addition, 
despite the overall changes of position and therefore the inclusion of features which 
are not linked to the traditional approach, the systems have increased in coherence. In 
sum, while the UK, US and International Level have become hybrids over time, changes 
were carried out evenly across dimensions.  
 At the same time though, Germany moved towards ideal type, although its 
approach in 1880 was neutral rather than a reflection of AR. The ideal type therefore 
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gained in importance. However, despite this trend, the coherence of the system 
increased. This means that Germany consciously moved towards AR and started to 
settle as an increasingly AR case study.  
 These findings have significant repercussions for the study of convergence 
because the basic assumptions underlying a sigma-style convergence could not be fully 
confirmed here. Although convergence is still possible, the continuous fluctuations in 
convergence scores make it unlikely that all case studies reacted in the same way at 
the same time.  In addition, if the overall convergence pattern does not match, then 
the effect of causal factors does also deviate. As a result, both the convergence pattern 
and contributing forces need to be re-examined.  
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11. Convergence129 
 The previous chapter has focused on describing the case studies’ relationship 
with their respective ideal types. The main emphasis was the on the assumptions 
underlying the cultural convergence hypothesis. Although not all of them could be fully 
confirmed, the deviations were not significant enough on their own to invalidate the 
argument that copyright has converged. As a result, the degree of convergence will be 
assessed in this chapter and the pattern will be compared to the driving forces 
commonly identified in the literature. 
 
11.1 Cultural Convergence 
The previous chapter has examined the basic assumptions underlying the 
convergence hypothesis. The importance of legal origin in 1880 was not as strong as 
presumed. However, more important were the findings that the case studies have not 
seen one shift away from their ideal types towards the neutral centre ground.130 
Therefore, some of the basic assumptions underlying the sigma-convergence 
consensus in the literature could not be proven here. Although this does not 
necessarily mean that there has not been any convergence, it is necessary to examine 
rather than assume this. 
 Analysing if convergence has actually occurred is important for a range of 
different reasons. First, the degree of convergence influences the possibility for future 
international consensus. It is argued in the literature that convergence is more likely if 
case studies share a similar culture. Essentially, they share an understanding of what 
copyright should do. Amending a policy imposes a cost which is generally lower if there 
is significant overlap between the existing policy and the proposed reform (D. Drezner 
2007: 68- 71). In respect to copyright, this means that the more case studies have 
converged over time, the easier it will be for them to find consensus because the cost 
of implementation is less. In this respect, cultural convergence is also a good indicator 
for future action. Sharing an understanding of the purpose of copyright influences how 
challenges are perceived: the problem definition and the range of available solutions. 
                                                          
129
 This chapter has been accepted for publication by the journal Script-ed in abridged form. 
130
 This has been established in 10.2 The Importance of Ideal Types over Time. 
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This in turn means that future issues, for example as a result of technological 
innovation, will be more likely met with similar responses.  
 Finally, the convergence pattern is also relevant for the role of causal forces. By 
identifying how and to what extent copyright policies have converged, it is possible to 
examine if the contributing forces identified in the literature have influenced the case 
studies as predicted. If these do not match the observable pattern, then other factors 
must have been relevant which are not adequately accounted for yet.  
 This section focuses on the same approach taken in the literature: identifying 
cultural convergence clubs. Convergence clubs are groups of case studies which move 
towards each other in their overall position (sigma-convergence). They have become 
more similar in their overall cultural stance. In turn, they exclude those case studies 
which have diverged instead. The clubs will be identified by using the overall distance 
between the case studies positions in 1880 and 2010. The discussion will then move to 
individual dimensions in an effort to identify the actual extent that policies have 
converged.  
 
11.1.1 Evidence 
 
Figure 7: Convergence trends in copyright culture between 1880 and 2010. 
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 Figure 7 makes it clear that there has been some convergence between 1880 
and 2010. The US, the UK and the International Level have all moved closer to each 
other. In 1890, the US and the International Level were at a distance of 1.4. This 
declined to 0.2 in 2010. The UK also shifted towards to the International Level: the 
distance fell from 1.3 to 0.2. At the same time, the US and the UK became more similar 
as well: the differences declined from 0.4 to 0. This means that the UK and the US 
were closer to each other than the International Level in 1880. However, they are all 
very similar in 2010.  Therefore, the US, the UK and the International Level form a 
convergence club. 
 Germany is not a member of this convergence club for the timeframe 1880 to 
2010. Instead, the distances between the German copyright policy and the other three 
case studies have all increased over time. It rose from 1 to 1.4 in comparison to the US; 
0.6 to 1.4 in relation to the UK and from 0.4 to 1.2 relative to the International Level. In 
addition, the size of the distances is noticeably large. In practice, the 2010 difference 
between Germany and the other case studies are all larger than the maximum distance 
in 1880 within the convergence club. In sum, Germany has not converged with the UK, 
the US or the International Level. Rather, it moved away from all of them.  
 To assess the degree of convergence, it is essential to look at the developments 
at the level of the individual dimensions. For example, it would be possible for the 
overall convergence score to become more similar over time while the trend for the 
majority of dimensions actually shows divergence. When the individual dimensions are 
compared between 1880 and 2010, the dominant trend is clearly falling differences. 
There have been convergences in seven dimensions between the UK and the US, eight 
between the US and the International Level and eight between the UK and the 
International Level. The US and the UK have three identical dimensions and the US 
with the International Level has four. At the same time, very few have seen a 
divergence: only three for the UK-US; three between the US and the International 
Level and two between the UK and the International Level.  
 When these findings are compared to the overall scores, it is clear that there is 
not a direct link between the number of converging dimensions and the overall degree 
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of convergence. The US and the International have seen the strongest shift towards 
each other. However, at the dimensions’ level, it only has the second largest number 
of converging dimensions and actually the largest number of diverging ones. In 
addition, there are hardly any identical scores. Therefore, the number of areas which 
have converged, diverged or are identical are not good indicators. They reflect the 
overall convergence trends but not its extent.  
 The Coefficient of Variation (CV) can contribute to the discussion here because 
it provides a measure for inter-dimensional variation. As mentioned before, the CV 
indicates how far the individual values are away from the mean.131 This is especially 
relevant here because the focus is on sigma-convergence. Sigma-convergence refers to 
a convergence pattern where all case studies are shifting towards each other rather 
than an external benchmark. By relying on the CV, it is therefore possible to assess the 
extent to which two or more case studies are way from the overall mean (=the mean 
of all case studies under consideration). In addition, the CV is independent of the size 
of the underlying values. Therefore, all values are directly comparable across case 
studies, irrespective of which case studies are included.  
 The UK, US and International Level have seen falling CV scores. The combined 
score for all three case studies has decreased from 0.53 to 0.31. This confirms the 
already identified convergence club. The same is true for the individual case study 
combinations. The CV between the US and the UK between 1880 and 2010 has fallen 
from 0.54 to 0.35. Similarly, the US has also moved closer in the individual dimensions 
to the International Level: from 0.52 to 0.29. The same applies to the UK and the 
International Level: the CV score fell from 0.49 to 0.28. Falling CV scores are not 
surprising given the overall convergence. However, they are significantly less extensive 
than the small distances in 2010 between the cultural positions would have suggested. 
The minimum distance between the case studies was 0 (UK and US) while the CV is still 
0.35. This means that variation at the dimension level remains and needs to be 
examined. 
                                                          
131
 For a full account of how the CV works, please see 10.3 Coherence of the Copyright Systems. 
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 It should be noted though that the case study combination with the smallest 
distance to each other does not have the lowest CV scores. In 1890, the US and the UK 
combined had a CV score of 0.57 and therefore nearly on par with the one between 
the US and the International Level in 1890 (0.52). However, the absolute difference to 
the UK was only 0.1 but 1.4 to the International Level. This means that although the 
absolute distance varies, the same CV score can be observable. The same can be 
observed in 2010. The largest overall distance in 2010 was between the International 
Level and the UK in 2010: 0.2. At the same time, the CV score was 0.28. However, the 
UK and the US were at 0 overall. Nonetheless, their CV score is 0.35 and therefore 25% 
higher.132 This confirms that convergence has to be analysed not only at the final 
culture score but also the individual dimensions level. Final scores represent averages 
which can hide significant variation between individual dimensions. In conclusion, 
overall scores show convergence, especially between the US and the UK. However, the 
differences across dimensions indicate that actually the UK and International Level and 
not the US combined with the UK are the most similar.  
 
11.1.2 Conclusion 
 In summary, the US, the UK and the International Level form a convergence 
club while Germany diverged from all of them. The overall distance, the number of 
converging dimensions and the overall fall in CV scores all indicate that the UK, the US 
and International Level have converged with each other. However, the overall distance 
in cultural score between them is deceptive. The UK and the International Level are 
the closest to a common mean and not the UK and the US.  In addition, there remains 
significantly more variation at the dimensions’ level than the maximum distance of 0 
suggests. Similarly, hardly any dimensions have identical scores.  
 These findings mean that the overall convergence in final position actually 
masks the lack of convergence in individual dimensions. The continued variation also 
explains why technological challenges are not met with similar responses across 
                                                          
132
 One possible additional explanation here could be that the US and the UK individually already have 
comparatively high CV scores-raising them already for case study combinations. For a detailed 
discussion, see 10.3 Coherence of the Copyright Systems. 
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countries. Case studies occupy similar overall positions on the cultural spectrum and 
have become increasingly coherent in how they understand the role of copyright. 
However, the way they conceptualise the approach in individual dimensions continues 
to vary across case studies. As a result, the exact perception of what copyright policy 
should do continues to differ across case studies. This in turn means that when 
challenges (especially technological ones) require a copyright response, the 
interpretation of the problem and possible solutions varies. This is essentially what has 
been observable for the Google Books problem outlined in the introduction. However, 
it is not the only one.133 
 In terms of the literature, the evidence confirms those identifying important 
differences despite some convergence.134 Although the overall positions have moved 
closer to each other and therefore the systems are more similar overall, the 
differences in the individual dimensions mean that significant cultural differences 
remain. This is especially important for the possibility of reaching consensus at the 
international level. If countries share one vision, the reaching consensus is more likely 
because the required change in position to accommodate proposed changes is smaller 
(D. Drezner 2007). However, given that the convergences here are not across all 
dimensions, the possibility for consensus is diminished. Actually, it could explain the 
difficulty in reaching agreement already experience in recent years.  
 Finally, the lack of cross-dimensional convergence is also important for 
assessing the contributing factors for convergence. Given that the convergences only 
affect the overall level rather than cover all dimensions equally, it is likely that 
converging forces also only affect individual dimensions. They are therefore narrow in 
scope. At the same time though, as the previous section has shown, the intra-case 
study coherences have increased. Therefore, those influences causing convergence 
have been incorporated into the copyright system in a way as to fit the other 
dimensions. In sum, while reform innovations fit the broader approach, the precise 
balances struck vary across countries. As a result, the copyright policies become more 
                                                          
133
 Kernfeld describes in detail how responses to other technological challenges, such as piano rolls 
(mechanical instruments) and home taping have also varied across countries (B. Kernfeld 2011). 
134
 See for example: (F. Grosheide 1994: 204; H. MacQueen et al. 2008: 41; S. von Lewinski 2008: 63). 
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coherent while at the same time convergence is limited to comparatively few 
dimensions. In sum, driving forces are expected to cause overall convergence by 
influencing particular dimensions in such a way as to enhance the coherence of the 
overall approach. The following two sections will examine to what extent this is true.  
 
11.2 Technology and Convergence 
 One of the convergence forces attributed with change is the role of technology. 
The case studies are similar in their developmental state and therefore have faced 
similar social and economic challenges (C. Knill 2005: 769; A. Lenschow et al. 2005: 
807). Since the spread of technology does not stop at the border, its impact on culture 
can be one major explanatory force. In particular, economic pressures result into the 
inclusion of neighbouring rights and other particular technological innovations into the 
policies of the case studies (J. Drexl 1994: 103; P. Goldstein et al. 2010: 21).  
 In terms of technology, only the role of neighbouring rights is relevant. The 
methodology used to assess culture controls for rises in stringency and therefore 
incremental change.135 This also means that it controls for incremental technological 
change: adding new work types, rights or sanctions is unlikely to make an impact by 
design.136 In addition, only the distinction between copyright works and neighbouring 
rights is a distinguishing factor between AR and CL systems. Therefore, the analysis will 
be limited to the introduction of neighbouring rights as a category of rights.  
 The impact of technology is examined by focusing on how the introductions of 
technical works (neighbouring rights) have shaped the culture of the copyright systems. 
Strong neighbouring rights are an indicator for CL and therefore scores should be 
dropping when they are introduced. This in turn would make AR systems more hybrid 
and move CL systems towards their ideal type. The analysis also draws on secondary 
sources to contextualise particular data trends and therefore provide the necessary 
depth of qualitative information necessary to draw conclusions on causal forces. 
                                                          
135
 For a complete description, please see 7.3 The Classification of Variables. 
136
 The impact of incremental technological change on stringency has been examined in 8.2.2. 
Technological Impact on Existing Works. 
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11.2.1 Evidence 
 In the UK, the introduction of neighbouring rights did not have an impact on 
the overall cultural stance. The 1956 Copyright Act introduced neighbouring rights as a 
distinct category, including broadcasts. The overall scores remained stable at 2.8. A 
look at the Protection of NR dimension reveals that although the UK is common law 
country, when it fully recognised neighbouring rights it moved away from its ideal type. 
The score in this dimension rises from 1 in 1950 to 1.3 1960. It is the scope of 
protection indicator which measures the comparative strength of provisions to 
copyright which has moved away from the ideal type (from 1 to 1.3). However, 
although neighbouring rights alone did benefit from the common law stance, other 
areas did. Overall, three areas saw rising scores137 and another two falling ones.138 In 
sum, the cultural impact is practically non-existent and the changes made are actually 
representative of more AR. The introduction did not lead to a reassessment in other 
areas following a more neighbouring rights friendly mind-set. As a result, reforms in 
these areas counteracted the influence of neighbouring rights.  
 The introduction of neighbouring rights did not impact on how Germany 
approached copyright policy. The cultural scores remained largely stable at 4.1 to 4.2 
between 1960 and 1970. This can be explained by the limited importance Germany 
attributed to neighbouring rights compared to the traditional copyrighted works. The 
Protection of NR dimension is very AR in nature and with a score of 4.3. This is less 
than the ideal type score of 5 Germany had in 1960 when it denied neighbouring rights. 
Especially the scope of protection for neighbouring rights in comparison to copyright 
works to 4. At the same time, the 1965 reform was very extensive and changed the 
provisions in a large number of areas. Three dimensions saw rising scores139 and only 
two, including neighbouring rights falling ones.140 Therefore, the introduction of 
neighbouring rights was outweighed by changes in other areas. In conclusion, 
Germany’s cultural approach was not affected by its introduction of neighbouring 
rights. This is explained by their very limited scope. This means that neighbouring 
                                                          
137
 Justifications (3.5-3.7); Emphasis of Protection (3.9-4.1) and Protection of NR (1-1.3). 
138
 Scope of Protection (3.9-3.8) and Contract-ability (3-2.8). 
139
 Act Structure (3-4); Justifications (3.4 to 3.7); Scope of Protection (3.4-4) and Contract-ability (3.5-4). 
140
 Ownership: 5 to 4 and Protection of NR: 5 to 4.3. 
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rights had no cultural impact and, due to a historical anomaly, caused a fall in 
stringency. 
 The US 1976 reform also did not have a significant cultural impact. The score 
stayed at 1.9. This is especially surprising given the large scale reform and the strong 
neighbouring rights provisions it introduced. However, the Protection of NR dimension 
is very CL in nature. It shows a drop in score from 2.3 to 1.3. This can be explained by 
the ideal CL type ownership provisions and the strong neighbouring right sanctions: 
they both have a score of 1. Nonetheless, the actual scope of neighbouring rights 
protection is not entirely on par with copyright works. The score is therefore 2. Also, 
other dimensions have become more AR in nature. Four dimensions have seen rising 
cultural scores141 and only one falling ones.142 In summary, adding neighbouring rights 
strongly raised the stringency levels. However, the cultural impact is significantly less 
extensive.  
 The introduction of neighbouring rights triggered a significant cultural shift at 
the International Level. The score dropped from 3.7 in 1960 to 3.1 in 1970. This is 
caused by the Protection of NR dimension. It dropped from 4.3 to 2.3. The movement 
was shaped by the scope of protection indicator143 which saw a fall from 5 to 3. This 
means that neighbouring rights are not actually on equal footing with copyrighted 
works. However, their importance as indicated by the relative protection provided to it 
has definitely improved. In addition, there have not been balancing changes in the 
other dimensions. As a result, the overall scores actually fell. In sum, neighbouring 
rights here have strongly affected the culture of the copyright system.  
  In conclusion, the difference between the expected result of falling cultural 
scores and the result has been the wider focus of the methodology used here. All case 
studies have seen a change in the dimension directly representative of neighbouring 
rights: the Protection of NR. However, there have not been accompanying changes in 
other areas. This is because the fundamental difference between AR and CL systems is 
                                                          
141
 Justifications (2.3-2.4); Emphasis of Protection (2.5-2.7); Scope of Protection (2.8-3) and Contract-
ability (1.8-2). 
142
 Protection of NR (2.3-1.3). 
143
 This indicator shows the comparative strength of neighbouring rights compared to copyright works. 
For more detail, see  7.2.8 Protection of NR. 
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how they justify the protection and as a result the importance of the author as distinct 
from economic uses. Therefore, the importance of neighbouring rights is only one 
symptom of this broader underlying difference and not a cause in itself. As a result, the 
focus in the other dimensions is not on the distinction of neighbouring rights against 
copyright works but economic works and moral rights. It is this confusion and the 
resulting overemphasis of neighbouring rights as their own category of works in the 
convergence literature which explains the different results when a broad methodology 
incorporating all aspects of AR and CL systems is used. The main reason why there is 
variation is therefore the scope of analysis.  
  
11.2.2 Conclusion 
The findings from this chapter contradict the literature. The introduction of 
neighbouring rights and therefore works which are protected for their economic 
merits rather than authorial originality are linked in theory to the common law 
approach. Therefore, it would have been expected that at the common law countries 
in particular should have seen a shift towards their ideal types. Similarly, the absence 
of neighbouring rights protection is the author rights ideal types’ approach. Therefore, 
once an AR country provides protection for neighbouring rights, their score should also 
fall.  
However, the systematic impact in terms of culture is very limited. Only the 
International Level has seen a change in its cultural position as a result of introducing 
neighbouring rights. Germany, the UK and the US did not shift significantly. Although 
neighbouring rights protection by itself is a CL characteristic, the extent has varied 
significantly and was especially limited in Germany. In addition, the lack of change is 
caused by reforms in other areas. With the exception of the International Level, the 
introduction of neighbouring rights forms part of large scale reforms which affects all 
areas of protection. In these other areas, the preferences are titled towards AR. As a 
result, the overall change in cultural position is limited. In sum, the introduction of 
neighbouring rights does not cause cultural change because it does not change the 
approach taken in other dimensions. This shows that a narrow focus when determining 
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convergence, for example focusing on particular features and their spread, is not well 
suited to determining cultural change. It leaves out too many relevant considerations.  
The lack of technological influence also means that the one general force 
identified in the copyright literature did not have a cultural impact. While technological 
innovation explains the rises of stringency very well, it has little explanatory power for 
culture. It therefore shaped the individual provisions but not the link between them. 
As a result, it is necessary to focus on the other causal forces for convergence 
identified as important in the literature: the role of individual actors. This will be the 
focus of the next section.  
 
11.3 The Role of Actors 
 Influences are not necessarily general trends like technology. The literature 
points out that the international agreements, the US and the EU have all exercised 
pressure on other states to change amend their policies. 
 The first actor contributing to convergence is the impact of international 
copyright protection. On one hand, states do not legislate in isolation. For example, 
copyright debates from other countries were reprinted even early on (C. Seville 2006: 
11), allowing ideas therefore spread across countries. Similarly, international 
organisations provide a forum in which these influences can be discussed (K. Holzinger 
et al. 2005: 790- 792). In addition, multilateral harmonisation has also been influential. 
This is based on one key assumption: its ability to bridge the gap. The philosophical 
differences between AR and CL have shaped international negotiations and as a result, 
international agreements represent a compromise between them (H. MacQueen et al. 
2008: 43; S. von Lewinski 2008: 34). In this sense, strong multilateral agreements have 
led to an approximation of the systems (S. von Lewinski 2008: 63). The international 
dimension has therefore bridged the traditions, at least to some extent.  
 Another key actor which has contributed to convergence is the US. The US has 
an interest in other countries adopting its system (W. Kingston 2002: 333- 334). It is 
argued that it has exercised an important influence on both international and national 
copyright provisions. The US has spread its preferences by a mixture of example, 
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leadership, the use of its economic power, financial support to WIPO and technical 
expertise (W. Kingston 2002: 333- 334). The result was increased competition among 
the legal systems as the US sought to transplant CL features into the international level 
and therefore AR countries are required to bridge the gap (J. Braithwaite et al. 2000; S. 
von Lewinski 2008: 33- 34). 
 It is also argued that the EU has had a converging influence on the national laws 
of its member states-even to the point of making a true European copyright model 
possible. (P. Goldstein et al. 2010: 21) EU harmonization can lead to less convergence 
in practice than the legislation may indicate (L. Bently et al. 2009: 47). The actual level 
of harmonization is often less in practice because nationally sensitive issues are left 
untouched (L. Bently et al. 2004: 47; A. Littoz-Monnet 2006: 450).144 The EU has been 
able to harmonize significant aspects of copyright law. However, some diversity 
remains, especially in the nationally sensitive areas. This section will now investigate 
these claims.  
 Identifying the influence of a case study on another requires a detailed 
examination of the differences between the two. If an actor has been influential, he 
will push for legislation which mirrors his own (W. Kingston 2002: 333- 334). The 
assumption is that his own policy will reflect what he perceives as the best approach to 
an issue. This pressure in turn would be identifiable in the data as convergence. If they 
move closer to each other, then the case studies are converging. If they are moving 
apart, then the trend is divergence. It should be noted that the literature does not 
explicitly refer to the dimension distinction used here but instead argues that the case 
studies have become more similar overall. This means that only those instances where 
the overall culture scores have moved closer to each are relevant here.   
 The assumption in the literature is overall convergence. Therefore, the first 
step has to be identifying those instances when the convergence scores moved owards 
each other. Table 41 shows the cultural values for all case studies including the EU.145  
                                                          
144
 Copyright exemptions have proven difficult to harmonize, see for example the (EU 2001). 
145
 The EU was added here because it is attributed with a converging influence, especially on its member 
states.  
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1880 3.1 2.1 2.5     
1890 3.1 2.1 2.2 3.5   
1900 3.3 2.0 2.4 3.5   
1910 4.0 1.9 2.3 3.4   
1920 4.1 2.0 2.7 3.3   
1930 4.2 2.0 2.8 3.6   
1940 4.2 2.0 2.8 3.6   
1950 4.1 2.0 2.8 3.7   
1960 4.1 2.0 2.8 3.1   
1970 4.2 1.9 2.7 2.9   
1980 4.2 1.9 2.6 2.8   
1990 4.2 2.4 2.4 2.9   
2000 4.2 2.7 2.5 2.9 3.3 
2010 4.1 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.5 
Table 41: Cultural scores for Germany, the US, the UK, the International Level and 
the EU 
From the table it is clear that there are the following instances of convergence:  
 1910-1920: UK and the International Level 
 1950-1960: US and the International Level 
 1980-1990: US and the International Level; US and Germany 
 1990-2000: US and the International Level 
 2000-2010: EU and UK; EU and Germany; US and Germany; UK and the 
International Level 
 A convergence pattern itself does not imply causality. Instead, it is necessary to 
identify the specific change causing the convergence and trace the amendment back to 
the particular actor in question. For example, copyright culture is understood here as 
11 distinct dimensions. For each of these, the case studies can move closer or further 
away. Looking at these individual dimensions means that particular indicators can be 
isolated as the causes for convergences. By linking these indicators to the relevant 
secondary literature then allows establishing who has influenced whom and how this 
happened. In conclusion, to examine convergence, the overall scores are examined. 
However, to trace causality, the focus has to move to the specific indicators and 
 257 
 
amendments which triggered it. This can only be done by using secondary literature to 
support the analysis. 
 Nonetheless, identifying what has driven a convergence is complicated by 
secondary effects. First, if an actor influences a case study, the resulting movement 
can have a secondary effect on other case studies. If case study A pushed for 
amendments which made case study B more AR in nature, then case study B would 
also move closer to all case studies already more AR than itself (for example case study 
C). As a result, there would be two sets of convergences observable: case studies A and 
B and B to C.  It is therefore essential to examine each convergence individually 
because some are likely to be coincidental secondary effects.  
 Secondly, the methodology to assess culture is based on controlling for 
increases in stringency. This means that the classification of provisions is based on the 
percentage of the maximum value in the sample. If one case study changes its 
provisions strongly and with it the maximum in the sample, this can cause the relevant 
cultural indicator for other case studies to change as well.146 For example, the 
maximum number of moral rights is 10 at time point t. If case study A has three moral 
rights, the resulting score will be a 2 (21-40% of the maximum value). However, if the 
maximum number falls to 5 moral rights, then providing for three rights is classified as 
3 (41-60% of the maximum value). In sum, internal changes in a case study can have 
repercussions for other case studies because it affects an indicator’s environment. 
 In sum, for each convergence period identified above, it is essential to trace 
who has shaped whom and how. The convergences have to be traced back to the 
individual dimensions and indicators to establish causality. The link between actor’s 
preferences and reforms can be established by relying on secondary sources. As has 
been emphasised before, there is extensive literature on the details of reforms.147 In 
addition, by taking such a detailed approach, secondary effects can be isolated and 
therefore those instances where reform is coincidental. 
                                                          
146
 For a detailed description of this methodology, please see 7. Copyright Culture. 
147
 For an overview, please see 2. Literature Review. 
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 This section will now discuss the influence of those actors emphasised in the 
literature: the International Level, the US and the EU. For reasons of clarity, the 
evidence will first be presented chronologically rather than by actor. This way, each 
instance of convergence is examined in detail. Afterwards, the conclusion will draw 
together the findings by actor and therefore identify the particular influence each of 
them had on other case studies.  
 The period under examination are those identified before:  
 1910-1920: UK and the International Level 
 1950-1960: US and the International Level 
 1980-1990: US and the International Level; US and Germany 
 1990-2000: US and the International Level 
 2000-2010: EU and UK; EU and Germany; US and Germany; UK and the 
International Level 
 
11.3.1 Evidence 
 
1910-1920: The International Level and the UK 
 The first major drop in distance is 1910-1920 between the UK and the 
International Level.148 It fell from 1 to 0.6.  Overall, the UK saw a shift towards AR as its 
score increased from 2.3 to 2.7. The International Level moved towards CL: the values 
fell from 3.4 to 3.3. The UK and the International Level therefore moved towards each 
other, although the shift was more pronounced for the UK.  
 Three individual dimensions saw a rise in similarity between the two case 
studies.149 All of the amendments causing convergence occurred in the UK but only 
some can be linked to the International Level. The UK weakened the importance of its 
formalities by reducing their number and relevance. As a result, the indicators rose 
from 2 to 5 (Formalities) and 3 to 5 (Impact of Formalities) respectively. These 
amendments can be attributed to the Berne Convention. The major innovation in the 
Berne Convention was that it freed foreigners from additional formalities. Seville 
                                                          
148
 It should be noted that the Berne Convention was the only multilateral agreement in force at this 
point in time. 
149
 Focus of Protection (2-1), Formalities (2,5-0) and Protection of Foreigners (2-0). 
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argues that by 1911, formalities were also seen as inappropriate for nationals, at least 
to the extent that they affected copyright (C. Seville 2006: 9). 
 In addition, there was also change in the Focus of Protection. 150 The 1920 
reforms expanded the adaptation right to all work types. This in turn means that the 
Focus of Protection shifted from 1 to 2. This change however cannot be directly linked 
to the Berne Convention. The Berne Convention provided for the adaptation right for 
all relevant works in 1890 already, however, the UK only changed position in 1920. It 
should be noted though that the UK failed to systematically reform its provisions 
despite major efforts in this direction since 1878 (Report of the Royal Commission  
1878; C. Seville 2006: 39). This could explain the delay. However, it not conclusive and 
has not been identified as a cause in the literature either. In sum, the International 
Level has had an influence on the UK’s cultural evolution although it was not the only 
determining factor.  
 In conclusion, the International Level partially explains the cultural impact on 
the UK between 1910 and 1920. By changing the perception of formalities, the UK 
amended its legislation in such a way as to be closer to the Berne Convention. 
However, it is not the only determining influence.  
 
1950-1960: The US and the International Level 
 The shift between 1950 and 1960 brought the US and the International Level 
closer as the distance fell from 1.7 to 1.2. Only the International Level changed overall 
position: from 3.7 to 3.1. The US remained stable at 2. Overall, the distance between 
the two case studies fell because six individual dimensions moved closer to each 
other.151 These were shifted by three developments. Most importantly, the UCC 
brought a change in formalities to the international level. Both their number and their 
impact increased significantly. The relevant scores dropped from 5 to 4 (Number of 
Formalities) and 5 to 1 (Impact of Formalities) respectively. The rising importance of 
                                                          
150
 The Focus of Protection describes what is actually protected, ranging from the physical copy (score 1) 
to the author’s personality (score 5). 
151
 Justifications (1.5-1.2), Focus of Protection (2-1), Emphasis of Protection (1-0.9), Scope of Protection 
0.6-0.2), Formalities (4-1.5), Protection of Foreigners (3-0.6). 
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formalities also means that the indicator for the scope of protection for foreigners fell 
from 3 to 2.152 Overall, these amendments affect five of the six dimensions in question. 
The change to formalities can be attributed to the influence of the US. As has been 
highlighted before, the US strongly supported the UCC and opposed the lack of 
formalities in the Berne Convention and put pressure on the level of originality (P. 
Goldstein 2001: 28) which in turn shifted the Focus of Protection from 4 to 3.153  
 The US influence does not explain the whole change. First, it should also be 
noted that membership in a multilateral agreement has had an effect on the US 
although a very limited one. The cultural score for the scope of protection for 
foreigners rose from 2 to 3 in the US.154 The impact however is not strong enough to 
affect the overall cultural position of the US. Secondly, there were two developments 
which were external to the International Level and the US. In 1956, the UK raised the 
number of protected work types and lowered its available sanctions. Both of these 
changes impacted on the indicators’ environments. As a result, the International 
Level’s classifications dropped for Work Types (from 4 to 3) and for Economic Work 
Sanctions they increased (2 to 3). Part of the impact was therefore the changing overall 
indicator environment. In sum, the International Level has only exercised a very small 
impact in return, limited to the scope of protection for foreigners. This was supported 
by UK reforms with indicator-wide implications. 
 In conclusion, the US influenced the UCC but it was not the only influence. The 
US had a significant impact on the design of formalities and their impact and originality 
at the international level because it actively shaped the UCC. This in turn had 
repercussions on the Protection of Foreigners as well. Nonetheless, external changes, 
especially the UK amending the provisions for Work Types and Sanctions also played a 
role. These triggered a reclassification which cannot be attributed to the US.  
                                                          
152
 It moved from ‘some formalities’ (=publication location requirement) to ‘extensive formalities’ 
because now additional requirements in the form of the © apply in addition to the location of 
publication rules. 
153
 This is even if the originality indicator as such is not shifting. For the analysis if the originality level is 
considered to have dropped, see Appendix 2. 
154 It moved from ‘limited protection with extensive formalities’ to ‘reciprocity with some formalities’. 
Overall, foreigners benefit from the member in multilateral agreements. 
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1980-1990: The International Level and the US 
 The International Level, in particular the Berne Convention also influenced the 
US between 1980 and 1990. At this time, the US increased its cultural score from 1.9 to 
2.4 while the International Level experienced a minor shift from 2.8 to 2.9. Only two 
areas show convergence: Justifications and the Emphasis of Protection. These shifts 
can both be attributed to the International Level. Membership in the Berne 
Convention forced the US to amend its approach to formalities and moral rights (G. 
Davies 1995: 4; G. Davies 2002: 336). As a result, it changed the number of formalities 
and their impact indicators from 1 to 3 and 1 to 5 respectively. It also introduced 
explicit moral rights protection. This in turn shifted the relevant indicators to AR as 
well: the cultural values for number of moral rights and for the term rose from 1 to 2. 
However, the US also provided for a large number of exemptions affecting them: the 
indicator fell from 5 to 1. In conclusion, joining the Berne Convention required the US 
to amend its approach to formalities and moral rights. These changes triggered a 
convergence.  
 In conclusion, the International Level has caused a cultural shift convergence. 
The changes to formalities and moral rights changed the cultural position of the US via 
their impact on Justifications and the Emphasis of Protection.  
 
Secondary Effect 
 In addition to these direct influences, the influence of the International Level 
had some secondary effects. The US shift caused by the Berne Convention also 
explains its convergence with Germany. Overall, the difference between the US and 
Germany fell from 2.3 to 1.9 because the US has moved closer to AR (1.9 to 2.4) while 
Germany remained stable (at 4.2). Of the five dimensions which have seen falling 
distances155, three are entirely caused by the US’ changes to formalities and moral 
rights.  The differences fell from 0.9 to 0.3 (Scope of Protection); 4 to 1 (Formalities) 
and 2.6 to 0.6 (Foreigners).The US had introduced a large number of exemptions when 
                                                          
155
 These are: Justifications (1.3-1), Emphasis of Protection (1.2-1), Scope of Protection (0.9-0.3), 
Formalities (4-1) and the Protection of Foreigners (2.6 – 0.6). 
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it introduced moral rights. This changed the overall environment in this area.156 The 
result is a reclassification for Germany’s number of moral rights exemptions indicator: 
from 1 to 2. This one change explains Germany’s movement in the Emphasis of 
Protection and Justifications. In conclusion, the US has not influenced Germany into a 
convergence by making it amend its policies. Rather, the US’ own changes affected the 
indicator environment for moral rights exemptions which in turn triggered a 
reclassification for the German value (from 1 to 2). In sum, while the US has moved 
because of the International Level, it also moved towards Germany. The US-Germany 
convergence is incidental and not the result of the case studies actively shaping each 
other. 
 Like with Germany, the US shift also explains the growing similarity to the UK. 
The distance between the US and the UK fell from 0.7 in 1980 to 0 in 1990. The US 
moved upwards from 1.9 to 2.4 while the UK moved downward: from 2.6 to 2.4. 
Overall, five dimensions have converged in this decade.157 The first major influence for 
change was the US changes to its formalities and moral rights provisions. As discussed 
before, these amendments were caused by the International Level and not the UK.  
 However, the convergence was also caused by internal developments in the UK. 
First, the UK had a major reform in 1988 (CDPA). Adding a large number of exemptions 
is common at these large scale reforms.158 In addition, it also amended existing 
provision to account for more general developments. The impact of formalities also 
moved (from 5 to 4). In addition, the CDPA amended moral rights. These changes 
cannot be attributed to the US. First, the timing is practically identical. The CDPA was 
in 1988, the same year the US joined the Berne Convention. Secondly, the US changes 
are caused by the Berne Convention which the UK had been a compliant member of 
for over 100 years at this time.  In conclusion, the convergence between the UK and 
the US is an indirect result of the International Level’s influence as well as internal UK 
reform. It is not caused by US influence on the UK.  
                                                          
156
 The US changed the maximum value in the sample. As a result, the 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% boundaries 
shifted. For a more detailed explanation, see 7.3 The Classification of Variables . 
157
 Justification (1-0), Emphasis of Protection (0.9-0.4), Scope of Protection (0.7-0.4), Formalities (3.5-
0.5), Protection of Foreigners (2.3-0.4). 
158
 For a detailed discussion of how major reforms link to stringency, see 8. Stringency Evolution, 
especially 8.11.Evidence and 8.2 Causes for Change. 
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 In summary, the International Level triggered a rise in the US’ cultural scores. 
This was mainly the result of the formalities and moral rights provisions. However, as 
the cultural scores increased, the distance to those case studies which already had 
higher scores also fell, namely the UK and Germany. The cultural similarity can be 
explained by the effect the International Level had on the US in combination with 
domestic reform in Germany and the UK. However, these reforms cannot be linked to 
the influence of any particular actor on the others and are therefore coincidental 
rather than the result of targeted action as is examined here.  
 
1990-2000: The US and the International Level 
 The US converged with the International between 1990 and 2000. The US 
moved from 2.4 to 2.7 while the International Level remained stable at 2.9. The 
distance between them therefore fell from 0.4 to 0.2. Four dimensions account for this 
convergence.159 First of all, it is noticeable that the Originality and Focus of Protection 
convergences are caused only by the US and here the real cause is internal. The 1992 
Feist case raised the level of originality (Feist Publications, Inc. v Rural Telephone 
Service Company, Inc.  1991).160 This cannot be attributed to the International Level 
because originality was not a topic in either TRIPs or the WIPO agreements.  
 Similarly, the Scope of Protection was also largely shaped by domestic US 
developments. The copyright term and exemptions with remuneration indicators are 
US internal and therefore not International Level dependent. However, the sanctions 
available for Economic Works changed significantly at both the US and the 
International Level. The score increased in the US from 4 to 5 and 2 to 5 for the 
International Level. This stance is confirmed if one considers the Protection of NR 
which has also converged. Here the International Level reduced the scope indicator 
from 3 to 2 and brings it to the same level as the US. It expanded the term of 
                                                          
159
 Originality (2-0), Focus of Protection (1-0), Scope of Protection (0.4-0.2) and the Protection of NR (1-
0.7). 
160
 Some authors argue that the case has not changed the originality requirements. For an analysis 
assuming that it had no importance, see Appendix 2. 
. 
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protection for neighbouring rights161 to the same level as copyright works although the 
number of rights remained less than those available for copyrighted works.  
 Given that the International Level shifted more extensively and the importance 
attributed to the US in the 1990s agreements, it is most likely that the International 
Level converged with the US and not vice versa. The US played a major role in shifting 
the forum away from WIPO towards the WTO (J. Braithwaite et al. 2000: 64; P. 
Goldstein 2001: 52-53). Both of these agreements have strong provisions for 
neighbouring rights and enforcement and therefore the main interest of copyright 
owners in the US (J. Braithwaite et al. 2000; P. Goldstein 2001: 59). This is despite the 
official implementation in 1998 (US Digital Millennium Act) was four years after TRIPs 
and two years after the WIPO Treaties. In conclusion, the 1990 to 2000 convergence 
between the US was caused by internal considerations in the US and the US shaping 
the International Level. This indication is confirmed by the stringency developments. 
 In conclusion, the US actively shaped the International level although this only 
explains part of the convergence trend. Most of the rising similarity in culture was 
caused by internal US developments in the form of the Feist case and its impact on 
originality. Changes to the Protection of NR and the Scope of Protection can be linked 
to the US though.  
 
  
                                                          
161
 For phonograms and performers only via the WPPT. 
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2000-2010: The Influence of the EU 
 
EU and UK 
  The EU had an effect on the UK between 2000 and 2010 although it did not 
cause convergence but a case of parallel movement.162 The UK moved from 2.5 to 2.7 
while the EU shifted from 3.3 to 3.5. They are therefore both moving towards AR. The 
difference between them remained stable as a result. Changes here between the two 
case studies are limited to Originality and the Focus of Protection. Essentially, the UK 
shifted from 1 to 2 for Originality. As a result, its score in both dimensions also 
increased. This means that the distances in these two compared to the EU fell from 2 
to 1. This change in the UK has been clearly attributed with the EU before (G. Davies 
2002: 345- 346). 
 However, it should be noted that other areas have seen divergences. The most 
change here was in the area of Contract-ability. The distance increased from 0.1 to 1.3. 
The causes for this are mixed. On one hand, the EU shaped the UK’s moral rights 
provision by requiring a resale right. Therefore, the EU is the cause that the number of 
moral rights indicator increased from 3 to 4. On the other hand, most of the impact 
was internal to particular case studies. First, the UK changed its contract provisions (3 
to 1). At the same time, the EU had changed the number of exemptions with 
remuneration provisions. The indicator rose from 1 to 5.163 Finally, Germany had 
changed the term of its moral rights164 which pushed the UK indicator in this field from 
4 to 5. In conclusion, the EU’s influence on the UK has not triggered an overall 
convergence but contributed to a parallel movement of the two case studies closer to 
AR. Other relevant factors include domestic reforms in Germany, the UK and the EU. 
 In conclusion, the EU’s influence explains parallel movement with the UK to 
some extent. In response to the EU, the UK raised its originality level. However, the 
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 Although this is not strictly speaking a case of sigma-convergence, it has been argued by Seeliger that 
it is a noticeable development (R. Seeliger 1996). Therefore, it will be included in the analysis here, 
especially since the cause for the parallel movement is linked to a direct influence. 
163
 This is a result of it establishing these rights in the first place rather than amending existing ones. 
164
 In the Kinski case (kinski-klaus.de  2006), it was decided that the economic dimension of moral rights 
was only active for 10 years after the authors death. Therefore, the minimum term for moral rights fell 
from 70 years after death (=105 years) to 10 years after death (= 45 years). 
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impact is narrow in scope. Strong divergences triggered by internal developments not 
only within the EU and the UK but also Germany account for this.  
 
EU and Germany 
 Germany and the EU have converged between 2000 and 2010. The distance fell 
from 0.9 to 0.6. Germany shifted from 4.2 to 4.1 while the EU shifted from 3.3 to 3.5. 
The distance between the two case studies has fallen in four areas.165 The EU did not 
really influence Germany though. Germany had re-shaped its exemptions, especially 
those with remuneration conditions.166 It also changed the term for moral rights. 
However, only the permission for temporary reproduction can be directly linked to the 
EU (Germany 1965: §44a; EU 2001: art 5 1)). This is only one out of nine new 
exemptions. The impact should therefore not be overrated. In addition, the EU’s 
approach to exemption has been attributed with little impact in relation to member 
states (L. Bently et al. 2009: 47; B. Lindner et al. 2011: 41). It can therefore not be 
established that the EU shaped the number of conditions applicable. Furthermore, the 
reduction in the moral rights term is also not caused by the EU but by the recognition 
that moral rights have a distinct economic dimension (kinski-klaus.de  2006). 
 Similarly, there is not a clear indication that Germany has shaped the EU’s 
approach. The EU’s shift between 2000 and 2010 is the result of it adding new 
provisions, especially exemptions. As a result, its exemptions for Economic Works 
changed from 4 to 3 and those with remuneration requirements from 1 to 5. None of 
these changes can be linked directly to Germany. It has been emphasised before that 
the EU exemption provisions are a list of exemptions available anywhere in the EU (B. 
Lindner et al. 2011: 41). 
 In conclusion, the EU and Germany have converged. This is the result of the EU 
putting Germany’s originality requirements under pressure. In addition, internal 
amendments within the EU and Germany which are not linked to the other case study 
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 Justification (1.1-0.6), Emphasis of Protection (0.7-0.4), Scope of Protection (1-0.3), Contract-ability 
(1.7-0.7). 
166
 The changes are: number of exemptions for Economic Works (2 to 1); Conditions affecting Economic 
Work exemptions (4 –5) and number of exemptions with a remuneration conditions (stable at 5). 
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also account for some of the cultural change. These however are the only causes of the 
stringency convergence. Therefore, EU has had some influence but this is not the sole 
determinant for cultural convergence.  
 
Secondary Impact 
 The changes between 2000 and 2010 also developed a secondary impact. In 
particular, the UK moved closer to the International Level and Germany to the US. 
However, these are entirely coincidental and need to be considered secondary effects 
rather than the result of the influence of individual actor’s on each other. 
 
UK-International Level 
 The UK and the International Level have also converged between 1990 and 
2010. It is the result of the UK moving towards AR (from 2.4 to 2.7) while the 
International Level remained stable 2.9. The distance between the two case studies fell 
accordingly from 0.5 to 0.2. However, a closer look shows that the UK’s developments 
cannot be attributed to the International Level. Five dimensions have seen a fall in the 
distance between the case studies.167 Between 2000 and 2010, the UK raised its 
originality level. This raised the scores in the Originality and Focus of Protection 
dimensions. However, this cannot be linked to the International Level because no 
change requiring this has occurred there. Instead, it is the result of the EU.  
 In this vein, the International Level’s shift for moral rights term is not the result 
of its action, but events in Germany.168 Finally, the International Level lowered its 
Protection of NR by reducing the comparable scope to CR works169 and moves away 
from the UK by doing so. This in turn is an effect of the US on the International 
Level.170 Finally, the UK acted independently the number of exemptions for Economic 
Works, the conditions which apply to exemptions, moral rights and the rising number 
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 These are: Justifications (0.4-0.2); Originality (2-1), Focus of Protection (1-0); Emphasis of Protection 
(0.1-0) and Protection of NR (0.3-0). 
168
 Germany significantly lowered its available term by restricting the economic dimension of moral 
rights to 10 years after the death of the author. (kinski-klaus.de  2006). 
169
 Indicator: Scope for neighbouring rights protection. 
170
 See 1990- 2000: The US and the International Level. 
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of exemptions affecting these (all of which explain the change in the Justifications 
dimension). None of these provisions have been subject to regulation at the 
international level after 1990 or have been shaped by any other actor. In conclusion, 
the UK and the International Level both move towards AR between 1990 and 2010. 
However, they are affected by some third party trend because they do not shape each 
other. 
 In conclusion, the UK and the International Level converged between 2000 and 
2010 in terms of culture. However, this was not caused by the case studies influencing 
each other. Instead, it was the combination of independent domestic reforms, 
secondary impacts by Germany and the EU as well as US influence.  
 
US-Germany 
 The convergence between the US and Germany (2000-2010) can also be 
partially attributed to the EU. Germany moved from 4.2 to 4.1 while the US remained 
stable at 2.7. The difference fell accordingly from 1.5 to 1.4.The convergence was the 
result of four individual dimensions171 moving closer to each other. Germany raised its 
number of exemptions, the conditions which apply to them and strongly reduced the 
minimum term for moral rights. The US also changed its conditions for exemptions; 
however the changes to its moral right term are repercussions from Germany’s 
amendments rather than its own action. These few changes however explain the 
change in three converging dimensions. In addition, Germany was under pressure with 
its originality requirement due to the EU (G. Davies 2002: 345- 346). This in turn shifted 
the Focus of Protection from 5 to 4.172 Therefore, it was not the US which made 
Germany shift between 2000 and 2010 but the EU. While Germany had some minor 
impact because it lowered its term of moral so significantly, the impact was secondary 
and not direct. In conclusion, the US did not trigger amendments in Germany or vice 
versa. 
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 Justifications (1.3 to 0.9), Focus of Protection (2-1), Emphasis of Protection (1-0.6), Scope of 
Protection (0.7-0.5). 
172
 For the analysis where the impact is considered more extensive, see Appendix 2. 
 269 
 
 In conclusion, Germany and the US did converge in terms of culture. However, 
the growing similarity in culture is not the result of either one influencing the other 
case study. Rather, it the incidental result of a mixture of internal reforms and EU 
pressure in Germany. The lack of direct influence in turn already explains why the 
stringency provisions have not converged.  
 
11.3.2 Discussion 
 The empirical evidence was presented chronologically, identifying instances of 
convergence. As a result, a number of observations can be made about the influence 
of particular actors. These will now be discussed in turn. 
 
International Level  
 The International Level has shaped other case studies at two distinct moments. 
First, it moved the UK closer to AR between 1910 and 1920. However, these changes 
did not cause a convergence in stringency as well, mainly because the UK started to 
protect sound recordings. In addition, the International Level also raised the cultural 
scores in the US between 1980 and 1990. Again, it did not cause a stringency 
convergence.  
 A few common observations can be made. First, both case studies were 
influenced by the same multilateral agreement: the Berne Convention. Depending on 
how one judges the Berne Convention, this is not surprising. On one hand, it is the 
most stringent multilateral agreement examined here. Therefore, if any multilateral 
agreement was likely to require amendments, it is the Berne Convention. On the other 
hand, it still only sets minimum standards and neglects core areas of copyright policies, 
especially enforcement. Both the US and the UK had already established comparatively 
comprehensive copyright systems. They were therefore unlikely to be affected by 
minimum standards.  
 Secondly, the influence of the Berne Convention has caused a shift towards AR 
in both the US and the UK. This is closely linked to the changes it actually required: the 
abolition of formalities. The extent of the Berne Convention’s influence varies though. 
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The Berne Convention does only affect the works of foreigners. Because the US had 
numerous constitutive formalities, the distance to the Berne requirements made it 
necessary to actually amend its policy. The UK had always complied with the no 
formalities rules for foreigners since 1890 and therefore from the beginning. However, 
it still had a change of attitude which invalidated them as a whole. This is reflected in 
the 1911 Copyright Act (C. Seville 2006: 9). In both countries, it was not perceived as 
viable to have more restrictive provisions for your own nationals compared to 
Foreigners. As a result, the US and the UK abolished the constitutive and enforcement 
relevant formalities. 
 It should be noted that the Berne Convention also required changes to the 
moral rights. However, here the moral impact has been significantly smaller. The large 
number of exemptions the US in particular is indicative of only partially accepting the 
concept as such.173 This therefore shows how the Berne Convention exerted both a 
moral and a direct influence on policy. 
 Finally, while the Berne Convention has shaped culture, its direct influence has 
not caused a stringency convergence. However, the changes made to the US in 
particular did account at least partially for its stringency convergences with the UK and 
the Germany which it triggered indirectly. This means that while the required changes 
are too narrow for direct stringency convergence, it is possible in favourable 
circumstances. The UK’s domestic reforms and the US impact on the moral rights 
exemptions indicator environment have provided these. In conclusion, the 
International Level only contributes but does not determine the growing similarity in 
terms of stringency. 
  In summary, it is clear that the International Level, in the shape of the Berne 
Convention, has had a converging influence over time. However, the actual impact is 
limited to formalities and significantly less so moral rights. Therefore, its major effect is 
constrained to the one area it is most precise about: no additional formalities for 
foreigners.     
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 The comparative stringency level fell.  
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The US 
 The US has influenced other case studies but within this sample, the effect is 
limited to the International Level. The US influenced the design of multilateral 
agreements at two distinct points in time. First, it ensured that the UCC would permit 
constitutive formalities. This was the one main point of disagreement with the Berne 
Convention. However, by joining a multilateral agreement, even one that follows its 
preferences, it still developed an impact in terms of available protection for foreigners. 
Therefore, the US strongly influenced the UCC both in cultural and stringency terms. 
However, it was also influenced in return although less extensively. 
 The second instance of US influence on the International Level was the 1990s 
TRIPs and WIPO treaties. Here, the US ensured stronger comparative protection for 
neighbouring rights and stronger enforcement provisions. This has been well-
documented before and is not surprising. Corporate copyright owners in the US 
targeted these areas specifically. The result was growing similarity in terms of culture 
and stringency. However, the convergence is also the result of independent US action 
which is not related to the international activity at all. It is therefore US internal and 
external action which caused this convergence.  
 In conclusion, the US has only influenced the International Level and exactly at 
those junctions already identified in the literature. The actual impact though was 
limited early on to the formalities. It later extended to enforcement and neighbouring 
rights.  
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The EU 
 The EU has influenced other case studies but this is limited to its member 
states. In particular it has put the understanding of how original a work needs to be 
under pressure in both Germany and the UK. The impact of this varies. The EU and the 
UK did not actually converge but move in parallel towards AR. In essence, the changes 
were two narrow to actually trigger an overall convergence.  
 The second major observation has to be the limited impact on stringency levels. 
There has not been any stringency convergence here between the EU and another 
case study. Rather, changes were the result of significant domestic reforms in Germany, 
the UK and the EU. Finally, it is also not possible to identify member state influences 
on the EU, neither for culture not stringency.  
 
11.3.3 Conclusion 
 While technology does not explain cultural shifts well, the cross-national 
influences provide more insights. Three actors were highlighted as influential in the 
literature: the International Level, the US and the EU. Their role has been analysed 
here by relying on both the data, supported by a detailed analysis of secondary 
literature. The degree that they have shaped other case studies has varied though both 
in extent and the timing.  
 The clearest impact on culture can be attributed to the International Level, 
especially the Berne Convention. It had an influence on the US which abolished 
constitutive formalities and introduced explicit moral rights provisions. These changes 
are the result of both the International Level’s legal and moral pressures. Similarly, the 
UK also abolished all effects of formalities on copyright policy. These were not 
triggered by a need to comply but reflected the long-term change in attitudes which 
was strengthened by the Berne Convention. Unsurprisingly, the impact of the Berne 
Convention on both case studies is consistently in the direction of AR. 
 The impact of the US on culture is also clear but limited to International Level. 
It has actively shaped both the UCC and the 1990s TRIPs and WIPO agreements. 
Changes here strongly reflect US preferences. The 1951 UCC allowed for compulsory 
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formalities ad therefore accommodated the point of main contention with the Berne 
Convention. After 1990, the focus shifted to neighbouring rights and most importantly 
copyright enforcement at the international level. These US preferences feature 
strongly in the treaties concluded in 1994 TRIPs agreement and 1996 WCT/ WPPT. 
 The EU also had some direct cultural impact although it is limited to its member 
states. The main effect was on the areas of moral rights and originality. However, the 
impact was very narrow in scope. This explains why some cultural dimensions 
continuously diverge, especially between the UK and the EU and also why Germany did 
not overall converge with the EU despite the impact it had on its originality level.  
 Convergences are often caused by independent internal reforms rather than 
the particular amendments favoured by other case studies. In essence, only the 
growing similarity between the US and the International Level (1950-1960) has not 
been supported by favourable domestic reforms. This means that although case 
studies directly influence each other, they are seldom the only cause. Rather, the 
changes are accompanied by other reforms which are not caused by the other case 
study. However, as it stands, the shape of particular reforms cannot be explained by 
the theories emphasised in the literature.  
 In sum, the influence of particular actors does not explain all changes. As the 
discussion has also amply demonstrated, case studies experiences shifts as a result of 
major internal reforms and seminal court cases. These cannot be linked to any external 
influence but have arisen from within.  
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 Affected Area Primary Impact Secondary Impact 
Interval Convergence 
between 
Culture Stringency International 
Level 
US EU International 
Level 
US EU Germany UK 
1910-
1920 
International 
Level-UK 
X  X        
1950-
1960 
US-
International 
Level 
X X X X      X 
International 
Level-UK 
X      X    
1980-
1990 
International 
Level-US 
X  X        
US-Germany X X    X X    
US-UK X X    X X    
1990-
2000 
US-
International 
Level 
X X  X       
US-Germany X       X   
2000-
2010 
EU-UK X    X    X  
EU-Germany X    X      
UK-
International 
Level 
X X     X X X  
US-Germany X       X   
Table 42: Summary of the impact of individual actors on other case studies.
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11.4 Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the empirical evidence has only partially confirmed the current 
consensus. Although the UK, the US and the International Level have converged in 
their overall scores, the individual dimensions do continue to differ significantly. This is 
especially undermining the consensus given that they have settled in their approaches 
at the same time: the coherence of the systems has increased as convergence 
continued. Furthermore, Germany, the system with the least inter-dimensional 
variation, has actually diverged between 1880 and 2010. Given this pattern, it is not 
surprising that copyright responses to challenges have varied significantly in the past 
and still do. It also explains why international consensus has proven so elusive.  
 In line with the gaps in the pattern, the driving forces identified by the 
literature can only be considered partial explanations at best. On the basis of the data 
in conjunction with an extensive analysis of secondary sources to support and 
contextualise it, a number of conclusions have been drawn. First of all, the 
introduction of neighbouring rights and therefore the main cultural impact that 
technology has developed over time, had little impact on the culture of the case 
studies examined here (with the exception of the International Level). The influence of 
individual actors has more explanatory power but is not the only contributing force. 
Essentially, there is a major gap in the explanation: the specific shape that national 
reforms take. Although particular features spread over time and this can be linked to 
the preferences of other actors, much of the change cannot.  
 It is especially notable that the area of exemptions is practically independent of 
actor influences. Given that both the stringency and cultural developments lack an 
explanation for the development of exemptions, it seems to be most fruitful to focus 
on them in future study. One avenue of further study in this respect could be to take a 
more general approach by drawing on the literature in political science, for example 
such theories as regulatory competition to answer the question. It is a reflection of the 
political and economic pressures already identified in the stringency analysis but adds 
the role of economic discourse. For example, it may be possible that exemptions 
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reflect a need to accommodate innovation potential.174 It is of key importance to add 
cross-national theories which focus more on the domestic dimension to the discussion.  
 The main problem with the weakness of explanation is that it limits the 
predictability of the future. At this stage, it is not clear what has caused a significant 
part of the convergence up to this point. Without an adequate explanation for why 
copyright systems have converged up to this point, the future evolution remains 
unclear. It is impossible to make predictions for the future. It is especially difficult to 
predict how the external forces already identified will interact with the under-
theorised domestic dimension.  
 
  
                                                          
174
 Exemptions are key for innovation (R. Anderson 1998: 660). 
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Part 4: Conclusion 
 
 This thesis set out to examine the evolution of copyright policy by 
distinguishing between the overall approach to copyright in terms of culture and the 
strength of protection defined as stringency. It provided a tool kit to move from 
qualitative data to quantitative one in both areas in an effort to generate directly 
comparable evidence. The evidence was then used to examine 11 distinct assumptions 
and arguments about the development of copyright policies, ranging from their 
evolution to causal forces (Table 1). While the identification of trends relied largely on 
the data, causal forces were identified by using the data in combination with 
secondary literature. 
 The evidence shows that the stringency levels have strongly risen in all case 
studies without becoming more similar over time. As was expected, these increases 
can be to a large extent be attributed to new technologies and their inclusion in 
copyright over time. Digital technology has accelerated the process, especially in the 
US and at the International Level. 
 However, the development of exemptions is not adequately theorised at this 
stage. This had a number of impacts. First and contrary to the literature, the stringency 
levels have not been rising continuously. Instead, the rising number of exemptions has 
caused the scope of protection to fall in all case studies at some point of time. In 
addition, these exemptions also account for the stable balance between copyright 
owners and users. Digital works are subject to more limited exemptions and therefore 
unusually stringent provisions. Nonetheless, none of the three kinds of works 
(copyright works, neighbouring rights or performers) as such have seen a change in the 
balance towards the copyright owners. It is clear though that authors have lost out 
compared to corporate owners. Therefore, arguments on the undue gain of right 
holders compared to users are not corroborated by the evidence, though authors are 
definitely at a disadvantage. As a result, arguments against an expansion of copyright 
are weakened unless the basis for resistance is the exploitation of authors.  
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 Proposition Conclusion 
1 Stringency levels have increased over 
time. 
The level of overall stringency has risen 
between 1880 and 2010. However, 
there have been significant instances 
of falling stringency levels, too. 
2 Technological innovation has caused 
the rising levels of stringency. 
Most of the rise in stringency levels 
has been a response to the 
development of new technologies and 
how these were incorporated into 
copyright policies. Digital works are 
affected by the most stringent 
provisions. 
3 The effect of stringency on the 
individual case study has been 
particular pronounced in the digital 
age.  
The digital age has developed an 
effect, mainly in the area of 
exemptions.  
4 Corporations have over-proportionally 
benefited from rising stringency levels 
in comparison to users. 
Corporations have not benefitted more 
from copyright reforms than users. 
5 Corporations have over-proportionally 
benefited from rising stringency levels 
in comparison to authors. 
Corporations and not authors have 
benefited from copyright reforms.  
6 Copyright systems have converged 
over time. 
The copyright policies of the UK, the 
US and the International Level have 
become more similar over time 
although the extent is limited. 
Germany has not converged. 
7 Older copyright policies will show the 
strongest link to the traditional cultural 
approach. 
Legal traditions have some but only a 
very limited relevance early on in the 
timeframe. 
8 Copyright policies have moved away 
from their respective ideal types over 
time. 
Copyright policies in the US, the UK 
and at the International Level have 
become hybrids over time but 
Germany has not.  
9 Copyright policies have become 
increasingly settled over time in how 
they perceive the purpose of copyright 
time. 
Copyright policies have become more 
coherent over time and therefore 
across the different policy areas. 
10 The cultural convergence of copyright 
has been caused by technological 
innovation. 
Technological innovation has not 
contributed to the convergence of 
copyright policies. 
11 The cultural convergence of copyright 
has been caused by individual actors. 
The influence of an actor on another 
explains some of the cultural 
convergence. 
Table 1: List of propositions that have been made in the literature and the 
conclusions drawn on the basis of the empirical evidence. 
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 These findings have a profound impact on the how the scope of protection 
needs to be understood. First, it is not sufficient to focus on the rights of copyright 
owners/ authors. Instead, any change in the law has to be directly compared to how 
the scope of exemptions has developed. Only looking at both of these components 
together and attributing them with equal importance provides an accurate image of 
the scope of protection over time.  
 Another insight is that the debate should not just focus on the user- copyright 
owner debate. More attention needs to be paid to the gain that corporations make in 
comparison to the authors and the users; and if these developments are in line with 
the stated aims of copyright policy. The data has clearly shown that corporations have 
gained more than authors. But the Internet gives a growing number of authors the 
ability to create, disseminate and benefit from their works directly and maintain direct 
control over their works. This in turn shrinks the need/role of intermediaries. In this 
light, is it still necessary for the copyright to benefit corporations (= the intermediaries) 
more than the authors? Or is this application of the analogue logic to the digital in 
effect counter-productive, limiting the spread of works, the benefit to the author and 
author control? Similarly, the Internet and digitalisation could provide for significant 
additional public benefit by allowing for new transformative uses and access to works 
formerly practically unavailable, for example out of print or orphan works. Is the larger 
gain of corporations compared to users necessary, in particular the imbalance in the 
digital field where exemptions are exceptionally narrow? It seems that those areas 
where the intermediaries are needed the least actually provide them with the most 
profit. More research into new models of exploitation and how the balance has to be 
struck in the digital work is necessary though to answer these questions. 
 As for culture, it is clear that convergence is not widespread. Although the US, 
UK and International Level have nearly identical scores in 2010, the variation between 
their individual dimensions remains strong. Furthermore, Germany has strongly 
diverged from all three. These findings have a significant impact on the state of 
knowledge of copyright. In terms of the evolution as such, it is clear that convergence 
has been limited and even when it has occurred, significant variation remains. 
Therefore, the differences that can be observed are not just on the surface but 
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functional: copyright systems continue to understand even fundamental issues 
differently and as a result respond in varying ways once new challenges arise. There is 
no such thing as one purpose of copyright and one balance between users, authors 
and corporate owners.   
 These findings of a lack of convergence fit a larger pattern of unexpected 
relationships. First, the case studies have not been close to their respective ideal types 
in 1880. Therefore, the basic assumption of strong variation early on in the timeframe 
cannot be confirmed here. This particular pattern has significant repercussions. While 
no particular country has arguably ever been representative of a legal family on its 
own, it has been maintained that the legal tradition a country belongs to does have an 
influence on the shape of copyright provisions and the choices made by the legislators, 
especially prior to international coordination efforts. However, the analysis here has 
demonstrated that this is not the case. The ideal types are not good predicators for 
how a late 19th century copyright law would look like in practice. 
 In addition, this thesis has shown that case studies have not been subject to 
one shift carrying them away from their respective ideal types. Rather, the UK, US and 
International Level have been characterised by oscillating trends and Germany even 
moved closer to its ideal type during the period examined. However, the national 
systems did become more coherent over time and therefore settled into their 
approaches. This was especially unexpected given the instability of the evolutionary 
trends and the move away from the respective ideal types. Nonetheless, it shows that 
although the idea of particular copyright traditions has not been defining early on or 
acted as a pole of attraction as such, it has gained currency over time as the individual 
copyright components are brought in line with each other. The understanding of how 
legislation should respond to an issue once it has adopted a point has therefore spread. 
This means in conclusion that the importance of ideal types as the theoretical 
underpinning of the policy choices is more relevant later on in the time frame.  
 Secondly, the explanatory power of the converging influences outlined in the 
literature is very limited. Technological change does not account for shifts although it 
may have had a minor contributing influence. In addition, although the individual case 
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studies have influenced each other, this is in most cases combined with other internal 
reforms. Here again, the role of exemptions in particular on the overall pattern has not 
been matched by the theory. This means that while some limited convergence has 
occurred and countries have shaped each other to some extent, the explanatory 
framework is largely incomplete. It is necessary to go back to the contemporary 
literature in an effort to what has shaped policies, in addition to technological issues 
and cross- national or international coordination, moving the focus away from the 
legal reasoning to the political realm.  
 From the data collected here and its analysis, it is clear the main theoretical gap 
is the evolution of exemptions. Their number has risen in all case studies and they 
cover similar areas. However, it is not clear why this is. One possible avenue to 
examine the evolution of exemptions is to draw on interest group theory. A look at the 
exemptions made clear that certain interest groups were very successful in preventing 
being subjected to copyright, for example libraries. Taking a more systematic look, 
theories such as regulatory competition which systemises the influence of interest 
groups and adds the economic discourse can provide insights. If it can be established 
that a case study follows a particular understanding of what copyright needs to do to 
enhance the competitiveness of a country as a whole, the link between them and the 
particular shape of exemptions may be explainable.  
 In sum, it is argued here that the missing piece in the puzzle is the political 
dimension. Copyright is not only shaped by copyright owners but also the influence of 
users. Answering the question of exemptions is essential because the innovation 
potential strongly depends on the copyright exemptions, especially if innovation is 
incremental. It is them which actually determine if a copyright system contributes to 
the competitiveness of a system as the Knowledge Society based arguments 
emphasise. Given that the interaction between different interest groups falls within 
the field of political science, it is most likely that their theories can shed light on the 
issue. For example, regulatory competition focuses on the question of competitiveness 
and how interest groups relate to it.  
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 In conclusion, although the literature is able to explain a significant amount of 
the observable change, there are still significant gaps. The most pronounced one is the 
lack of explanations for how exemptions have evolved over time. It is proposed here 
that an examination drawing on political theories on interest groups, especially 
regulatory competition can make a significant contribution to the debate.  
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Part 5: Appendix 
Appendix 1: Data 
 The data relating to the methodological calculations used in this thesis can be 
found in the two Excel data spreadsheet delivered with this thesis.175 Their particular 
structure is discussed in this short appendix. The first part will cover the data on 
culture while the second one focuses on stringency. For a methodological explanation 
and justification please see chapters 6 and 7. A list of abbreviations can be found in 
Appendix 4: Glossary of Abbreviations. 
 
Stringency: Copyright Stringency 
 This section describes the layout of the stringency spreadsheet. There are two 
kinds of tabs here: those focusing on the individual indicators and then the calculation 
one.  
 In the stringency spreadsheet, all tabs except the final one describe the 
individual indicators. The structure is the same for each of these. The first table 
describes the data as it is: the data as it drawn from the policy. For example, the 
number of work types (tab 1) shows that Germany protected 5 different types of 
works in 1880. The base year value for 1880 is given on the right hand side of the first 
table. This is calculated by averaging the provisions in Germany, the US and the UK. 
The second table then is the index value for each time point and case study. In essence, 
the numerical value in table one is divided by the base year. For example, Germany 
provides 5 work types in 1880 which is exactly the same as the base year value. As a 
result, its index value is 1.00. It is these values which are used for the stringency index.  
 After all of the individual indicators have been transformed into index score, 
the focus moves to the calculation of the index (tab: index (1880)). For each of the six 
stringency areas, there are two rows of tables. For example, the first index area is the 
threshold of protection. The first row shows the index values for the indicators that are 
used in a particular area. The threshold is made up of four different ones: work types, 
                                                          
175
 To ensure the integrity of the formulas used, it is essential that Excel 2013 is used.  
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originality, formalities and the impact of formalities. The index values for these four 
indicators are placed in next to each other in the first row of tables.  
 The second row contains the actual calculations. The first table (labelled ‘scaled 
by the number of indicators’) shows the index value uncorrected. It is the sum of the 
individual components divided by their number. How the particular indicators are 
combined has been described in 6.2.2. Stringency  Areas. 
. The second table is the corrected version. In some cases, the scores are negative 
because the number of exemptions outweighs all other provisions. However, this is not 
conceptually possible: as a result, negative values have to be set to 0.176 0 here means 
that there is not any stringency enhancing effect from the provisions. The corrected 
scores for the six individual areas are then combined to an overall index value. This 
table can be found at the bottom of the spreadsheet.  
 In summary, the stringency data sheet contains all the calculations for the 
stringency index. The first series of tabs refers to the individual indicators and shows 
how their values were transformed into index scores. The tab ‘index (1880)’ then 
demonstrates how these individual indicators were combined to arrive at the area and 
overall stringency scores.  
 
  
                                                          
176
 The six areas are distinct und independent of each other. If negative values would be permitted, 
weak provisions (for example in moral rights) would reduce the level of stringency in the other areas. 
This contradicts the underlying logic of a Laspeyres index and have it was applied to copyright.  
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Culture: Copyright Culture 
 The calculations for culture are divided into four major blocs: preparatory; the 
classifications; calculations and analysis.  
 The first two tabs in the spreadsheet are preparatory. Their main purpose is to 
summarise the underlying data as generated by the coding and processing 
methodology177 and to determine the classification scheme for each of them. The ‘data’ 
tab contains all the information drawn from the policies. It is the collection of all 
indicators which represent values and numbers. 
 The second tab is the classification schemes used to place individual indicators 
on the 1 to 5 spectrum.178 The first two tables contain the formulas used for the actual 
classification of indicators. They determine the lines between the 5 individual 
categories that are possible in the 1-5 CL- AR spectrum.179 For example, if the 
maximum value in the sample is 10, then the minimum score required to score a 5 is 9 
because it has to be at least 81% of the maximum value. The formulas are identical in 
both tables and only the column headings vary, depending on if an indicator is linked 
to AR or CL. The tables below are the classification schemes as they apply to the 
specific indicators, in particular their relationship to the ideal types. For each indicator, 
the appropriate one of the first two tables was selected and linked in. The actual 
spectrum has to be based on the indicator’s maximum value in the sample at each 
point in time. As a result, all of the values in the sample (the information is drawn from 
the ‘data’ tab) are represented on the right hand side of the table from which the 
highest value is automatically selected into the ‘maximum value’ column. Based on this, 
the borderlines between the classification categories are defined for each indicator. In 
sum, the classification scheme for each specific indicator is created.  
 The second group of tables are the classifications ones (one for each case 
study). The purpose here is to place the indicator values which a case study has on the 
1-5 spectrum. To do this, its values have to be compared to the classification schemes 
created in the previous section. The first table in this tab is the information drawn from 
                                                          
177
 For a detailed explanation, please see Part 2: Methodology for Copyright Stringency and Culture.  
178
 For a methodological explanation, please see 7.3 The Classification of Variables. 
179
 It should be noted that if the value in the ‘maximum value’ column is changed, then the borderlines 
between the different spectrum positions shift accordingly. 
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the data tab and therefore the indicator values as they are. The second table is the 
data value’s equivalent on the 1 to 5 spectrum. The table contains the formulas used 
to place a particular indicator, relying on the borderlines defined in the ‘classification 
scheme’ tab (which are for this purpose copied at the bottom of the spreadsheet). In 
addition, the data drawn directly from the legislation, for example the Act Structure, 
are also included at the end of the classification table. The definition of these 
indicators can be found in 7.2 The Ideal Types as Comparative Standards. In sum, all 
the data has now been placed on the 1-5 spectrum.  
 The third group then are the calculation tabs. Again there is one tab for each 
case study. The first table in a calculation tab is taken from the ‘classification’ tab for 
the relevant case study. It is the classified values (the data placed on the 1 to 5 
spectrum). These indicators are then combined to form the individual dimensions in 
the same way as has been outlined in 7.4 Calculation and especially Table 26: Spectrum 
outline for the classification for ideal types. The tables 2- 12 represent these individual 
cultural dimensions and the relevant indicators for each of them. The right hand 
column of each of them shows the average score and therefore the dimension score. 
Table 13 (the final table at the bottom of the spreadsheet) then combines these 
dimension scores to arrive at the overall cultural value.   
 The final group of tabs are the analysis one. First, there is ‘comparison of 
culture’ tab which summarises the dimension and overall scores for each case study. It 
is followed by a series of tabs labelled by the name of the case study it concerns. In 
each of them, there are four tables. The first one shows the cultural scores as they had 
been calculated in earlier tabs. To the right hand side of this is the second table which 
presents the standard deviation and CV scores for each time point. The third table is 
below and reflects the difference between the case studies’ scores and the respective 
ideal type for each point in time. Finally, the fourth table calculates the convergence 
rates which is based on the differences shown in the third table.  
 In sum, the culture data sheep provides all the required information and 
calculations to trace the original data drawn from the policies to the final cultural score 
as well as the calculations based on them. It provides the underlying data and the 
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classification scheme for each indicator. These two are then combined in the 
‘classification’ tabs to place the original data on the 1 to 5 spectrum. The ‘calculation’ 
tabs then show the actual calculations, especially how the individual indicators were 
combined to arrive at the dimension and overall cultural scores. Finally, analysis tabs 
summarise the cultural scores and provide the calculations based on them.   
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Appendix 2: Alternative Values 
 As the methodology has outlined, both ordinal indicators and those based on 
ungrouped data are not calculated in comparison to a maximum value in the sample. 
Instead, values are assigned on the basis of the specific characteristics defined in 
advance.180 For example, the absence of protection for neighbouring rights will score a 
5 for the scope of neighbouring rights indicator because rejecting neighbouring rights 
as copyright-able is archetypical for AR.181 However, assigning values rather than 
calculating them introduces an inherent degree of subjectivity. Any judgement 
naturally depends to some degree on the person carrying it out, irrespective of how 
detailed the definitions are (R. Lawless et al. 2010). To at least partially account for this 
issue, the variations were recorded for those situations where more than option could 
be justified. 
 In practice, variation can affect the following indicators because they all rely on 
the author’s judgement:  
 Act Structure 
 Focus of Protection 
 Originality 
 Ownership 
 Scope of NR 
 Scope of Protection for Foreigners 
 Contract (law) 
It should be noted that all of these indicators are used for the analysis of culture but 
only the originality indicator is relevant for stringency as well. This section now 
describes which indicators were actually affected in this study and to what extent this 
has an effect on the conclusions drawn in this thesis.  
 
  
                                                          
180
 For an explanation of the methodology, please see 7.2 The Ideal Types as Comparative Standards.  
181
 For the full description, please see 7.2.8 Protection of NR. 
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Differences 
 This section will outline which indicators have experienced issues at the 
classification stage in practice and why. It is important to discuss them together 
because the stringency methodology can potentially develop effects beyond the case 
study actually experiencing the difficulty. If an indicator is amended in 1880, then this 
affects the base year value for this specific indicator. This in turn has repercussions for 
all case studies’ index values at all points in time.182 On the other hand, the effect on 
culture is limited to the case study in question. These indicators are not calculated in 
relation to the maximum value in the sample. Instead, it is the specific characteristics 
on which the classification is based. This also means that the relative position to other 
case studies is not relevant here.  
 The UK has been in practice unaffected by the variation issue. None of the 
indicators here is characterised by a lack of consensus. For the International Level, only 
the level of originality between 1960 and 1990 is affected. The 1952 UCC advocates a 
lower level of originality (‘judgement- skill/labour’) than the Berne Convention 
(‘judgement’) (P. Goldstein 2001: 28; P. Goldstein 2003: 151- 152). However, the 
extent to which this changes the originality level at the International Level as a whole 
depends on how important the UCC is perceived as a whole. If the UCC is seen as an 
equal agreement to the Berne Convention, then it can be argued that the overall 
originality has not fallen. Essentially, the Berne Convention prevents it. This is the 
interpretation taken in the main body of this thesis. However, the UCC can be seen as 
more influential than the Berne Convention because its membership was larger 
(UNESCO 2012; WIPO 2013a). In this case, the originality level for the International 
Level needs to be lowered accordingly: from ‘judgement’ to ‘judgement- skill/labour’. 
The dispute is not relevant anymore after 1990. The TRIPs agreement is based on the 
Berne Convention and explicitly refers to it. This definitely reduced the importance of 
the UCC, to a point where its provisions only govern in very few instances today.183 
This appendix will examine the effects of treating the UCC as dominant. In summary, 
                                                          
182
 All index values are calculation in relation to a base year. For a more detailed explanation, please see 
6.4 The Stringency Index. 
183
 The membership of the Berne Convention and the UCC strongly overlaps but is not identical. 
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the International Level’s originality level is amended as a result of the UCC and shifts 
from ‘judgement’ to ‘judgement- skill- labour’ between 1960 and 1990.  
 The US also only presented a classification issue in the area of originality. For 
most of the timeframe (1880-1990), it is clear that the US only required ‘skill/ labour’ 
to be present for a work to be considered copyrightable. However, the 1992 Feist case 
arguable changed this by requiring judgement (Feist Publications, Inc. v Rural 
Telephone Service Company, Inc.  1991). This is the argument adopted in the body of 
the thesis. Accordingly, the indicator rose by two categories from ‘skill/ labour’ to 
‘judgement’ between 2000 and 2010. However, it is also possible to take a more 
limited stance. Although the case refers to some degree of judgement, it can be 
argued that the ‘skill/ labour’ standard was not fully replaced. As a result, the 
originality level only moves from ‘skill/ labour’ to the ‘judgement- skill/ labour’ 
category. This appendix will adopt the more limited influence argument, assuming an 
originality level of ‘judgement- skill/ labour’ between 2000 and 2010. 
 Germany was more extensively affected by uncertainty on the particular 
indicators. There were two indicators with classification issues. The first one was the 
originality level which shows variation for most of the timeframe. Until the 1965 
Urheberrechtsgesetz, the common attitude refers to a level of ‘creativity- judgement’, 
especially in the case law.184 However, the statute is less demanding and there have 
been cases advocating a significantly lower threshold.185 The lower level of protection 
matches the definition for the ‘judgement- skill/ labour’ originality category. In sum, 
between 1880 and 1960, the main thesis relies on the high level of originality. In this 
appendix now, the ‘judgement- skill/labour’ one will be adopted.  
 The second unclear instance is the originality level in 2010. Essentially, the EU 
has started to harmonise copyright and preferred the originality at the ‘judgment- 
skill/ labour’ level (G. Davies 2002: 345- 346). If this is pressure is considered sufficient 
however depends on how much influence is attributed to the EU. If the EU is seen as 
                                                          
184
 In the extreme, even letters were at some point found to lack the required originality for copyright 
protection (41 RGZ 43 (1998)). 
185
 For example, a catalogue was granted copyright on the basis of judgment in the sorting of a 
catalogue (70 RGZ 266 (1909)).  
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influential on the member states, then the originality level needs to be amended for 
Germany. As a result, the originality level needs to be lowered from ‘judgement’ to 
‘judgement- skill/ labour’. However, if the EU influence is seen as limited, especially 
since the threshold is not clearly defined and the legislation is a directive and not a 
regulation,186 then the impact can be justified as insufficient. This appendix will now 
assume that the EU has had this influence. Therefore, the originality level for 2010 is 
lowered to ‘judgement- skill/labour’.  
 The second affected indicator is the ownership one. In the 1965 
Urheberrechtsgesetz, the line between authors and copyright owners is not clearly 
drawn. On one hand, the rights attached to neighbouring rights are owned by the 
employer. On the other hand, there are significant limitations on contractual rights 
which protect authors (and performers). As a result, it depends on how one weighs 
these two aspects. In the main thesis, the emphasis was placed on the contractual 
limits. As a result, the ownership indicator is classified as a 4: ‘tilted towards the 
author’. In this appendix now, it will be argued that the protection depends entirely on 
the type of work in question, emphasising the first ownership rules. As a result, the 
ownership indicator is assigned the score 3. The variation is limited to 1970 to 1990 as 
reforms after 1990s give additional guarantees to authors, shifting the indicator to a 
clear 4. In summary, the ownership provision is lowered from 4 to 3 between 1970 and 
1990. 
 In conclusion, there are two indicators for which more than one value can be 
reasonably assigned. The most common one is the level of originality. This affects the 
US, International Level and Germany. In addition to originality, Germany’s ownership 
classification is also not entirely clear. Since the values differ from the ones used in the 
main body of this thesis, the conclusions previously drawn have to be re-examined. 
 
  
                                                          
186
 Only a regulation is binding in its all components. Directives give member states leeway in how they 
implement the legally binding goal. 
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Impact of the Variation 
 This thesis has examined the following propositions and drew conclusions on 
each of them. The following table summarises them.  
 Proposition Conclusion 
1 Stringency levels have increased over 
time. 
The level of overall stringency has risen 
between 1880 and 2010. However, there 
have been significant instances of falling 
stringency levels, too. 
2 Technological innovation has caused the 
rising levels of stringency. 
Most of the rise in stringency levels has 
been a response to the development of 
new technologies and how these were 
incorporated into copyright policies. 
Digital works are affected by the most 
stringent provisions. 
3 The effect of stringency on the individual 
case study has been particular 
pronounced in the digital age.  
The digital age has developed an effect, 
mainly in the area of exemptions.  
4 Corporations have over-proportionally 
benefited from rising stringency levels in 
comparison to users. 
Corporations have not benefitted more 
from copyright reforms than users. 
5 Corporations have over-proportionally 
benefited from rising stringency levels in 
comparison to authors. 
Corporations and not authors have 
benefited from copyright reforms.  
6 Copyright systems have converged over 
time. 
The copyright policies of the UK, the US 
and the International Level have become 
more similar over time although the 
extent is limited. Germany has not 
converged. 
7 Older copyright policies will show the 
strongest link to the traditional cultural 
approach. 
Legal traditions have some but only a 
very limited relevance early on in the 
timeframe. 
8 Copyright policies have moved way from 
their respective ideal types over time. 
Copyright policies in the US, the UK and 
at the International Level have become 
hybrids over time but Germany has not.  
9 Copyright policies have become 
increasingly settled over time in how 
they perceive the purpose of copyright 
time. 
Copyright policies have become more 
coherent over time and therefore across 
the different policy areas. 
10 The cultural convergence of copyright 
has been caused by technological 
innovation. 
Technological innovation has not 
contributed to the convergence of 
copyright policies. 
11 The cultural convergence of copyright 
has been caused by individual actors. 
The influence of an actor on another 
explains some of the cultural 
convergence. 
Table 44: List of propositions that have been made in the literature and the 
conclusions drawn on the basis of the empirical evidence. 
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 Given that the data has now been amended, it is necessary to re-examine each 
of these propositions to see if any of the conclusions has been affected by the changes.  
 
Impact on Stringency Observations 
 The main thesis examined a series of propositions relating to copyright 
stringency (Error! Reference source not found.). First, it was confirmed that the overall 
stringency levels increased strongly but the trend was not continuous. Much of this 
change can be explained by technological innovation and the response of copyright to 
them. Secondly, it also analysed the distribution of copyright benefits over time. It 
concluded that copyright owners have benefitted more than authors but remain in 
balance in comparison to users with the exception of digital works.  
 For stringency only one of the possible indicators is relevant: originality. 
However, originality is already affected in 1880 because of the changes in Germany. 
This means that the base year is also influenced: it increased from 4 to 4.67 as 
Germany’s originality stringency level increased from 2 to 4. This has repercussions for 
all case studies.  
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1880 0.50 0.86 1.25 1.07 1.25 1.07     
1890 0.50 0.86 1.25 1.07 1.25 1.07 0.75 0.64 
1900 0.50 0.86 1.25 1.07 1.25 1.07 0.75 0.64 
1910 0.50 0.86 1.25 1.07 1.25 1.07 0.75 0.64 
1920 0.50 0.86 1.25 1.07 1.25 1.07 0.75 0.64 
1930 0.50 0.64 1.25 1.07 1.25 1.07 0.75 0.64 
1940 0.50 0.64 1.25 1.07 1.25 1.07 0.75 0.64 
1950 0.50 0.64 1.25 1.07 1.25 1.07 0.75 0.64 
1960 0.50 0.64 1.25 1.07 1.25 1.07 0.75 0.43 
1970 0.50 0.64 1.25 1.07 1.25 1.07 0.75 0.43 
1980 0.50 0.64 1.25 1.07 1.25 1.07 0.75 0.43 
1990 0.50 0.64 1.25 1.07 1.25 1.07 0.75 0.43 
2000 0.50 0.43 0.75 0.86 1.25 1.07 0.75 0.64 
2010 0.50 0.43 0.75 0.86 1.00 0.86 0.75 0.64 
Table 43: Comparison of stringency values of the originality indicator for Germany, 
the US, the UK and the International Level. 
 The first observation is the result of the methodology itself. The effect of the 
changes to originality is most pronounced for the stringency indicator itself and less so 
at the threshold of protection (see Table 44 and Table 45).187 For Germany, the 
amended originality threshold was 72% higher in 1880 but 14% lower in 2010. 
However, the impact on the threshold of protection as a whole is more limited. The 
amended values are 12% lower in 1880 and 2% higher in 2010. Therefore, the effect at 
the threshold level has fallen over time. In sum, changes to the originality indicatory 
have significantly affected the stringency score for the indicator itself. However, the 
effect at the threshold level has decreased over time and is very small (2%) by 2010. 
                                                          
187
 The threshold of protection is the average of the provisions for the number of work types, the 
originality level, the number of formalities and the impact of formalities. 
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 The US has seen a similar pattern. It should be noted though that all the 
amendments between 1880 and 1990 are the result of base year changes. Its 
originality indicator itself was only adjusted between 2000 and 2010. In 1880, the 
originality indicator is 14% lower than it was previously. However, in 2010 the 
originality threshold was 15% higher. At the threshold of protection level, the value 
was 18% larger in 1880 and is 3% smaller in 2010. As was the case with Germany, the 
indicator level itself is affected significantly and continuously over time. However, the 
impact on the threshold of protection falls over time and is limited in 2010. 
 For the International Level, the change is 15% lower in 1890 and 2010. This is 
line with the observations in the case studies: a significant, stable impact on the 
indicator level. At both time points, the effect is created by the base year changes. 
However, the effect on the threshold of protection has always been limited here. The 
differences in both 1890 and 2010 exist but the scores are only 3% higher in 1890 and 
2% in 2010.  However, it should be noted that the differences between 1960 and 1990 
and therefore when the originality amendments affect the indicator are larger. In 1960, 
the difference is 15% and 13% between 1970 and 1990. In conclusion, the 
International Level has seen little overall effect on the threshold of protection but the 
originality indicator is affected, especially during the time period when its own 
provisions were amended. 
 In the UK, the change is less extensive and only the result of base year changes. 
The values for originality indicator are 14% lower in 1880 and 13% lower in 2010. 
Therefore, the differences are significant but have been stable over time. Furthermore, 
like with Germany, the effect has been less pronounced at the threshold of protection 
level: 9% higher in 1880 and 3% higher in 2010. In conclusion, the amendments of the 
originality indicator’s base year affect mainly the indicator itself and continuously do 
so over the timeframe examined here. However, the effect at the threshold level is 
declining over time and is marginal in 2010.  
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1880 0.74 0.65 0.22 0.26 0.54 0.59     
1890 0.74 0.65 0.22 0.26 0.47 0.51 0.91 0.94 
1900 0.74 0.65 0.19 0.24 0.47 0.51 1.16 1.19 
1910 0.99 0.90 0.19 0.24 0.47 0.51 1.21 1.24 
1920 0.99 0.90 0.24 0.29 1.09 1.14 1.21 1.24 
1930 0.94 0.90 0.24 0.29 1.14 1.19 1.21 1.24 
1940 0.94 0.90 0.24 0.29 1.14 1.19 1.21 1.24 
1950 0.94 0.90 0.24 0.29 1.14 1.19 1.21 1.24 
1960 0.94 0.90 0.24 0.29 1.19 1.24 0.51 0.59 
1970 1.16 1.13 0.24 0.29 1.19 1.24 0.58 0.66 
1980 1.16 1.13 0.39 0.44 1.12 1.16 0.58 0.66 
1990 1.21 1.18 1.04 1.09 1.17 1.21 0.58 0.66 
2000 1.26 1.28 1.09 1.06 1.34 1.39 0.69 0.71 
2010 1.26 1.28 1.09 1.06 1.29 1.33 0.69 0.71 
Table 44: Comparison of stringency values for the threshold of protection for 
Germany, the US, the UK and the International Level. 
 The discussion up to this point has shown that the effect at the threshold of 
protection stringency area is small. However, the impact of the changes on the level of 
stringency needs to be examined nonetheless because differences at the threshold 
level are carried forward to the overall stringency level. 
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1880 3.28 3.37 1.86 1.82 2.61 2.66     
1890 3.28 3.37 1.86 1.82 2.73 2.78 1.62 1.64 
1900 2.90 2.99 1.99 1.95 2.73 2.78 1.81 1.84 
1910 16.06 16.15 2.33 2.29 3.52 3.56 2.29 2.32 
1920 15.81 15.90 2.38 2.34 14.11 14.16 2.29 2.32 
1930 15.63 15.66 2.38 2.34 25.73 25.77 2.72 2.74 
1940 19.71 19.74 2.38 2.34 25.73 25.77 2.72 2.74 
1950 19.71 19.74 2.12 2.08 25.73 25.77 3.59 3.61 
1960 19.49 19.52 2.12 2.08 27.93 27.98 3.05 3.13 
1970 13.66 13.70 2.12 2.08 27.91 27.95 11.80 11.88 
1980 13.38 13.42 19.21 19.17 28.24 28.28 12.59 12.67 
1990 18.24 18.27 19.71 19.67 23.14 23.18 12.82 12.90 
2000 23.82 23.80 38.49 38.51 23.44 23.49 28.41 28.44 
2010 21.04 21.02 37.92 37.95 23.97 24.01 28.41 28.44 
Table 45: Comparison of the stringency index for original and amended values for 
Germany, the US, the UK and the International Level. 
 There are two important observations. First, the differences in the overall 
stringency levels are very small. The difference in Germany in 1880 is 2% higher and 1% 
lower in 2010. For the US, the value is 3% lower in 1880 while the scores are practically 
identical in 2010. At the International Level, the 1890 values are within 1% of each 
other in both 1890 and 2010. Finally, in the UK the index scores are 2% higher in 1880 
and nearly the same in 2010. In conclusion, the effect of amending the originality level 
is very small in 1880 and in 2010. This is not surprising given that most of the variation 
was already reduced at the threshold of protection level.  
 Secondly, despite this, the changes in 1880 do affect the relative increases. A 
minor change in the comparatively small index scores in 1880 develops a major impact 
when the percentage increases are calculated. The relative rises are smaller for those 
case studies were stringency levels in 1880 have increased. In Germany, the increases 
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have been 541% and 523% for the original and amended levels. The overall increase 
was 818% and 802% respectively in the UK. Similarly, the International Level’s increase 
was 1654% for the original values and 1634% for the amended ones. However, the 
increases were higher if the stringency levels had fallen in 1880. In the US, the original 
values saw an overall increase of 1038% while the alternative values rose by 1085%. In 
conclusion, the differences are mainly relevant in the relative overall increases but less 
so for the actual index score.  
 The changes to originality have not affected the pattern of relative stringency 
positions. The ranking remains the same with Germany being the most stringent, 
followed by the UK, the US and the International Level in 1890. By 2010, the US is the 
most stringent; the International Level is in second place while UK is third and 
Germany fourth. The identical ranking is not surprising given that the actual difference 
between the two sets of stringency values is small.  
 In addition, because only originality is amended, the impact is limited to the 
threshold of protection where originality is directly used in the calculations and by 
extension in the overall stringency level. This also means that none of the patterns 
observed here, in particular the distribution of benefits between copyright owners and 
users and authors are affected by the changes nor is the importance of technology as a 
causal factor. None of these use the originality indicator or the threshold of protection 
area directly. They therefore also do not need to be re- examined.  
 In conclusion, all four case studies show the same pattern. At the originality 
indicator level, the effect has been noticeable, ranging between 72% in 1880 for 
Germany and 14% -15% for the remaining three case studies. The closeness of the US, 
the UK and the International Level is linked to the change in the base year. By 
amending the base year, its index scores have changed although their actual indicator 
value as such was not amended. This also explains why their variation remained stable 
over time. Germany necessarily has seen more change because its change is a 
combination of the change in base year (which it caused) and the amended value for 
the actual indicator. In addition, the effect of the amendments is significantly more 
limited at the threshold of protection level. In 2010, it only ranged from 2% to 3%. This 
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decline in effect can be explained by the effect of the other indicators as well as 
standardising the result by their number. Finally, the amendments have not caused a 
change in the relative stringency positions between case studies nor has it affected any 
of the particular points examined in greater detail in the main body of this thesis. In 
sum, amendments to the originality indicator have affected the stringency levels of 
this indicator and to a more limited extent also the threshold of protection and overall 
stringency levels. However, it not affected the conclusions previously drawn. 
 
Impact on Culture 
 The second set of propositions focused on cultural change (Error! Reference 
source not found.). In particular, it was first examined if the case studies were close to 
their ideal types in 1880 in an effort to assess how important legal tradition was at this 
point in time. The results showed that although legal tradition is reflected in them, the 
extent is limited significantly. The variation can be explained relying on the literature 
though and should have therefore not come as a surprise. Secondly, the overall trend 
in comparison to the respective ideal type was analysed. Only the UK, US and the 
International Level moved away from their respective ideal types as had been 
expected although the actual extent of the shifts has been rather small. Germany 
however strongly moved towards it. Its ideal type therefore gained in importance 
rather than lose it. Thirdly, the inter-dimensional variation was investigated to 
examine if individual case studies are coherent in their approach or if their attitudes on 
particular issues varies widely. It was shown that they all became increasingly coherent 
over time, irrespective of the direction of their movement. 
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1880 3.1 2.9 2.1 2.1 2.5 2.5     
1890 3.1 2.9 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 3.5 3.5 
1900 3.3 3.1 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.4 3.5 3.5 
1910 4.0 3.8 1.9 1.9 2.3 2.3 3.4 3.4 
1920 4.1 3.9 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.7 3.3 3.3 
1930 4.2 4.1 2.0 2.0 2.8 2.8 3.6 3.6 
1940 4.2 4.1 2.0 2.0 2.8 2.8 3.6 3.6 
1950 4.1 4.1 2.0 2.0 2.8 2.8 3.7 3.7 
1960 4.1 4.1 2.0 2.0 2.8 2.8 3.1 3.0 
1970 4.2 4.1 1.9 1.9 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.8 
1980 4.2 4.1 1.9 1.9 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.7 
1990 4.2 4.1 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.9 2.8 
2000 4.2 4.2 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.9 2.9 
2010 4.1 4.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.9 
Table 46: Comparison of cultural scores between the higehr and amended values for 
Germany, the US, the UK and the International Level. 
 Table 46 presents the original and amended overall cultural scores for each of 
the case studies.188 The time points when changes have affected any of the indicators 
are presented in italics. As expected, there has not been any effect on the UK. The 
cultural scores for are identical. This also means that none of the observations made 
on its evolutionary pattern are affected.  
 Germany shows the most extensive differences in terms of indicators and this is 
reflected in the variation between the original and amended values. However, even 
here the impact is rather limited. The maximum cultural change in Germany is 0.2 and 
this occurs mainly early on (1880- 1920). This is not surprising given that the 
disagreement on the level of originality is most pronounced at this point. In addition, 
                                                          
188
 Original values refers to the values used in the main body of this thesis which are higher on the 
individual indicators. Lower values are the ones used in the annex only. 
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the Protection of NR does not play a role yet at this point in time, emphasising the 
effect of the remaining dimensions.189 However, from 1930 onwards, the difference is 
only 0.1 and therefore very small.190  
 The implications for this in analytical terms are most clearly identifiable for the 
importance of the tradition early on in the timeframe. In particular, Germany is further 
away from its ideal type (2.2) in 1880 than to the ideal CL (1.8) with a score of 2.8. 
Therefore, the finding that the ideal type had little influence in 1880 is amplified. The 
additional difference needs to be attributed to a lack of emphasis on case law in the 
literature (70 RGZ 266 (1909)). Nonetheless, the other contributing factors highlighted in 
10.2 The Importance of Ideal Types over Time still apply (for example the limits on 
protection or the state of moral rights) because there is not any variation in these 
indicators. In conclusion, the distance to AR in 1880 is larger and therefore the 
importance of AR is reduced. This reinforces earlier findings and the explanations 
outlined before still apply and explain most of the variation. Only the importance of 
case law needs to be added.  
 Secondly, the overall trend characterised of a pronounced move towards AR is 
still the same. The values strongly rise over time from 2.9 to 4.0 which in turn reduced 
the distance to the AR ideal type from 2.2 to 1. Because the starting point is closer to 
CL, the trend is even slightly more extensive than the trend based on the original 
values. The overall increase is 1.2 while the original value trend only rises by 1. In 
summary, the trend in comparison to the ideal types is identical.  
 Thirdly, the trend in copyright coherence is also the same as previously 
identified. As Table 47 shows, the CV scores are original for the values derived from 
the amended values than the original values. The difference is the largest in 1910 with 
a variation of 0.9 and the smallest in 2000 when there is not any difference at all. 
Nonetheless, again the trend is identical: the coherence of the German copyright 
policy increased over time as the CV values fall. In conclusion, although the German is 
                                                          
189
 There are between 1880 and 1910 only 10 relevant dimensions rather than 11. Therefore, each of 
them gains in importance because the overall cultural score is the average of dimensions at a given 
point in time.  
190
 This is the result of adding the 11
th
 dimension in 1920 because the UK now provided protection for 
sound recordings.  
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less coherent when the amended values are used rather than the original ones, the 
overall pattern of falling inter- dimensional variation has not been affected. 
 The US and the International Level are both affected by a difference in the 
originality threshold of one unit between the original and the amended values. 
Although the exact timing differs, the effect is the same: a fall in the overall 
convergence score of 0.1. For the International Level, this is observable between 1960 
and 1990 and for the US only in 2000.191 A change of 0.1 is very small and has 
therefore not changed the nature of the case studies when it is compared to the ideal 
types.  
 The changes in the values do not affect the evolutionary findings of this thesis. 
First, none of the amendments here affects the case studies in 1880, therefore the 
conclusions drawn on the importance of the ideal types historically are not affected. In 
addition, the difference is small and constant which means that it replicates the overall 
evolutionary trends. Therefore, the long- term evolutionary pattern in comparison to 
the ideal types also remain the same as previously described.  Both of them move 
away from their respective ideal types. 
 Finally, there has also not been a change on the pattern of coherence. Actually, 
the change in the US did not have any coherence impact at all. This means that 
considering the originality level at the amended threshold is actually in line with 
existing provisions. As for the International Level, the lower originality threshold has 
actually enhanced the overall consistency of the system. The CV scores between 1960 
and 1990 are lower than they were before. The impact is limited though because once 
the change has taken effect, it remains at this level. Furthermore, the amended values 
are in line with the long- term pattern previously identified. The inter-dimensional 
variation at the International Level is falling over time.  
                                                          
191
 The change in originality affects both 2000 and 2010 but is not any impact on the overall score in 
2010.  
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1880 0.26 0.37 0.54 0.54 0.49 0.44     
1890 0.27 0.37 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.48 0.37 0.34 
1900 0.29 0.38 0.49 0.49 0.53 0.48 0.37 0.34 
1910 0.21 0.31 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.47 0.38 0.35 
1920 0.22 0.15 0.40 0.40 0.51 0.51 0.21 0.21 
1930 0.19 0.17 0.39 0.39 0.50 0.50 0.18 0.18 
1940 0.20 0.17 0.39 0.39 0.50 0.50 0.18 0.18 
1950 0.20 0.17 0.39 0.39 0.50 0.50 0.17 0.17 
1960 0.20 0.17 0.36 0.36 0.49 0.48 0.20 0.16 
1970 0.13 0.10 0.35 0.35 0.49 0.49 0.20 0.17 
1980 0.13 0.10 0.39 0.39 0.46 0.45 0.19 0.17 
1990 0.13 0.09 0.43 0.43 0.36 0.36 0.20 0.17 
2000 0.09 0.09 0.36 0.36 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.20 
2010 0.11 0.08 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.21 0.21 
Table 47: Comparison of CV scores between the original and amended values for 
Germany, the US, the UK and the International Level. 
 In conclusion, using the amended values has only had a very small impact. 
Although the changes do affect the cultural values on their own, the effect is very 
limited in scope and for the US and the International Level also in timing. When the 
amended cultural scores are examined in light of the prepositions investigated in this 
thesis, there is also not any significant impact. In respect to Germany, only the legal 
origin was really affected but even here, the findings only amplified the argument and 
did not contradict it. For the International Level and the US, there has been not been 
any effect at all. The original findings do still apply entirely in relation to the 
importance of the legal tradition, overall cultural trends and the coherence of 
copyright systems. In sum, there has been a very small change in cultural scores but it 
has not significantly affected the conclusions.  Given that there has been some change 
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though, the question now arises if there has been any effect on the observable cultural 
convergence patterns.  
 The first major observation is that the convergence clubs remain the same. This 
means that Germany has not converged with any other case study. The distance 
between it and the other case studies is larger in 2010 than it was in 1890.192 
Nonetheless, the US, the UK and the International Level still form a convergence club. 
Given that the 1890 and 2010 scores are identical for both original and amended levels 
in the US and the International Level, the overall extent of this is the same as well: 0.4 
to 0 between the US and the UK, 0.2 between the US and the International Level and 
0.2 between the UK and the International Level.  
 In terms of the actual degree of convergence, measured by the CV, the picture 
is also the same. There has been a very small increase in the inter-dimension variation 
between the US and the UK (0.36 in 2010 rather than 0.35) and between the US and 
the International Level (0.31 rather than 0.3). However, there has not been any change 
in the combined value between all three case studies: it is still at 0.31 in 2010. Overall, 
the effect of the change is so small that it is not of any significance. It definitely does 
not change the conclusion of more variation between dimensions than the overall 
score would indicate. 
 The second question is if the driving forces are still the same as previously 
identified. The overall scores make it clear that technology has not developed an 
impact on convergence. The introduction of neighbouring rights in the individual case 
studies is not accompanied by changes to their approach to copyright and therefore 
cultural change.193 This is line with the findings in the main body of the thesis.  
 The thesis also examined the role of individual actors on convergence, focusing 
on actual instances of convergence.194  
  
                                                          
192
 Convergence was discussed from 1890 onwards because the International Level does not have any 
scores for 1880. 
193
 UK in 1960, Germany and the International Level in 1970 and the US 1980. 
194
 For detailed accounts of the pattern and relevant causal forces for the individual convergence 
periods, please 11.3 The Role of Actors. 
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The periods of convergence are the same:  
 1910-1920: UK and the International Level 
 1950-1960: US and the International Level 
 1980-1990: US and the International Level; US and Germany 
 1990-2000: US and the International Level 
 2000-2010: EU and UK; EU and Germany; US and Germany; UK and the 
International Level 
 The effect of changes in the US is limited to 2000 and 2010 and the 
International Level to 1960 to 1990. As a result, the first convergence phase (UK- 
International Level) can be excluded because there were not any relevant 
amendments in the data at this time. In addition, because neither the UK nor the EU 
was affected at all, the 2000 to 2010 convergences between the EU and the UK and 
the UK and the International Level can also be excluded from re-examination. The 
remaining instances will now be discussed in order.  
 The 1950 to 1960 convergence between the US and the International Level 
reduced the distance between them from 1.7 to 1.2. Using the amended values, the 
convergence is from 1.7 to 1.1 and therefore by 0.1 stronger than before. The reasons 
previously identified still apply: amendments to the formalities and the protection of 
foreigners, as well as external changes based on UK reforms. In addition though, the 
lower originality level at the International Level has caused a convergence in this 
indicator. The distance between the two case studies fell from 2 to 1 between 1950 
and 1960 while it remained at 2 previously. Given the US influence on the UCC (P. 
Goldstein 2001: 28) and its preference for a low originality threshold, it is credible to 
assign additional change to the US. However, as already mentioned, the additional 
convergence is limited to 0.1 and therefore not very extensive. In sum, the degree of 
convergence is stronger and this additional change can be attributed to the US. 
 The next convergence period is 1980 to 1990. Originally the US and the 
International Level converged from 0.9 to 0.5 in this interval. Now, the change in 
difference is from 0.8 to 0.4. It has been previously highlighted that once the effect on 
the case studies of amending the values is constant. As a result, its effect is limited to 
the point of first introduction. This explains why the strength of convergence has not 
changed: it remained at 0.4. Similarly, given that originality did not play a role in this 
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convergence, the causal factors have also not changed. By extension, this also means 
that there not any relevant changes to the relationship between the US and Germany 
for which the convergence is a secondary effect of the influence of the International 
Level. In sum, the 1980- 1990 convergence period remains unaffected. 
 The third interval is between 1990 and 2000 and again affects the International 
Level and the US. The distance based on the original values fell from 0.4 to 0.2. Now, 
the change is more limited: from 0.4 to 0.3. The original convergence was largely 
caused by the rising originality threshold in response of the Feist case in addition to a 
serious of domestic reforms in the US. Here, the lower originality threshold does make 
an impact. For the US, the originality levels now only rose 1 to 2 rather than from 1 to 
3. As a result, the convergence in this area is more limited than it was before. At the 
same time, the International Level’s originality level rose from 2 to 3 because of the 
growing importance of the Berne Convention. This means that the convergence in this 
dimension is now absent. In conclusion, it is the remaining domestic changes 
emphasises previously which explain the convergence here while the originality is not 
a cause anymore.  
 The EU and Germany have converged between 2000 and 2010. The distance 
between them fell from 0.9 to 0.6 but this change has not been the result of any direct 
influence. Using the amended values, the extent of convergence has increased from 
0.7 to 0.5. The smaller convergence is the result of a Germany’s lower score in 2000 
and 2010 (4.1 and 4 rather than 4.2 and 4.1) while the EU has not seen any change. In 
terms of driving forces, originality needs to be added. The distance falls from 1 to 0 
here and this can be linked to the EU (G. Davies 2002: 345- 346). The importance of 
this is amplified by the lower overall change. However, none of the other causal factors 
are affected. In sum, if a stronger effect is assumed on Germany, then the EU turns 
into one of several driving forces between Germany and the EU. 
 Germany had also converged with the US between 2000 and 2010. Here, the 
distance fell from 1.5 to 1.4 between 2000 and 2010. Using the amended values, the 
convergence is more pronounced 1.6 to 1.3. This additional change can be explained 
by the originality dimensions. The difference here fell from 2 to 1. However, this does 
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not change the actual causal forces. The German originality amendment is driven by 
the EU while the US one is domestic (Feist Publications, Inc. v Rural Telephone Service 
Company, Inc.  1991). In addition, the remaining change is still the same as previously 
identified. In sum, the stronger convergence observed here is not linked to the US 
influencing Germany or vice versa. This means that while the extent of convergence is 
larger, the causality for this is unaffected. 
 In conclusion, the impact of the amended values on the degree of convergence 
is very small. While the overall scores are identical in the beginning and the end of the 
timeframe, the inter- dimensional variation has only increased very slightly. This is not 
enough to be considered significant. In addition, the effect on causal forces has also 
been limited. The majority of convergence instances are either not affected at all or 
the causality remains unchanged. The extent of an actor influencing another has only 
been extended twice: the US influence on the International Level between 1950 and 
1960 and the EU’s impact on Germany between 2000 and 2010.   
 
Conclusion 
 This appendix has examined the impact of uncertainty in the classification of 
particular indicators. It has been clarified that the originality indicator has posed issues 
for Germany, the US and the International Level and the ownership one only for 
Germany. There have not been similar difficulties with the UK and the EU. The effect of 
these possible amendments are limited though in practice. 
 As this appendix has shown, the effect of amendments to the originality and 
the ownership indicators has not changed either the cultural pattern previously 
observed nor has it contradicted any of the conclusions drawn from them. The effect 
on stringency is only significant for the indicator itself but small at the threshold level 
and marginal at the overall stringency level. The only impact it has is on the relevant 
increases. In addition, because only originality is affected, the amendments are not 
relevant for assessing the role of technology or the distribution of benefits. In terms of 
culture, the importance of legal tradition, long- term trends and coherence are the 
same. Furthermore, technology remains without a converging effect while the majority 
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of individual actor influences also remains the same. The only effect is the stronger 
impact of the US between 1950 and 1960 on the International Level and the EU on 
Germany between 1990 and 2000. Overall therefore, the choice of indicators in favour 
of the original values has not systematically biased the results and conclusions drawn 
from it.  
 
 
 
 
  
 309 
 
Appendix 3: Base Year195 
 This thesis uses a Laspeyres index to determine the change in stringency levels 
over time. The method is based on the standardisation of values by using a base year. 
This ensures that the data from the different constitutive components can be 
combined and compared over time. The base year therefore forms a common 
standard of reference for the values. 196 Although the thesis’ main body relies on 1880 
as the base year for reasons mentioned before,197 this choice was not the only possible 
one. In this annex now, the evolutionary trends are examined in the light of adopting 
different base years, in particular the time frame’s mid- and end- points (1950 and 
2010). It will discuss the scope of variation between the different base years’ index 
values and identify the specific underlying causes and effects of this pattern. In 
particular, it will show how although the trends at the indicator level remain the same, 
the relative size of these indicators to each other can change from one base year to 
another. This in turn can lead to variation at the overall index level. 
 The first major observation is that the overall trends are the same irrespective 
of what base year is adopted as they all show an increase in stringency over time. 
However, the trends vary strongly in terms of magnitude. The absolute index scores 
are lower the later the base year. For example, the UK has seen increases from 2.66 to 
24.01 (for the 1880 base year); 1.86 to 7.11 (for the 1950 base year) and 1.03 to 4.62 
(for the 2010 base year). The smaller 1880 base year emphasise the jumps in the 
expansion of protection compared to the 1950 and especially 2010 ones.  
                                                          
195
 The data is available in the spreadsheet labelled ‘base year annex’. 
196
 For more details, please see section 6.4.1 Normalization and Aggregation. 
197
 For more details, please see chapter 6 on Stringency and in particular 6.4.1 Normalization and 
Aggregation. 
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 This effect is most clearly visible for key reforms, as the example of Germany 
shows. Here, the scope of protection was strongly enhanced by the 1901/1907 
reforms- visible in the data in 1910. From the 1880 view point, the increase is from 2.9 
to 16.06. In comparison, the magnitude of change is less for the 1950 base year (only 
2.46 to 4.3) and even more so from the 2010 angle (1.25 to 2.52). The explanation lies 
in the frame of reference and therefore the perception of change. The level of 
stringency has increased over time. As a result, taking the average provisions for a later 
point of time will provide a higher base year average. As the base year average 
increases, the index value for the indicator becomes smaller because the 
standardisation requires that the indicator value is divided by the base year average.198 
Therefore, the higher the base year average, the smaller is the index value.  
However, the relative rate of change varies across the case studies. Looking for 
example at the International Level, the 1880 base year shows an overall increase of 
1632% (from 1.64 to 28.44); 574% for the 1950 base year (from 1.28 to 8.64) and 293% 
for the 2010 base year (from 0.96 to 3.76). The relative change is therefore 
increasingly declining for the later base years. The same pattern is also visible for the 
US where the relative increases are 1936%, 394% and 339%. Germany and the UK, on 
the other hand, have the lowest rate of increase for the 1950 base year while 1880 has 
the highest, followed by the 2010 one. For example, Germany has seen respective 
increases of 542%; 105% and 253% while the UK has experienced change of magnitude 
of 803%, 282% and 347%. In these cases then, although the magnitude of the index 
value is smaller, the relative change is the least extensive in 1950 rather than 2010. 
                                                          
198
 For more detail on the Laspeyres index, please see section 6.1 Methodology: Laspeyres Index. 
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The reason for this pattern is the relative size of the components to each other. 
The overall index score is a combination of the individual indicators’ index scores. As a 
result, their relative influence depends on their absolute size in comparison to each 
other. However, each indicator is independently calculated which means that its value 
is divided by its own base year value. As a result, it is possible that the actual index 
values can rise/ fall more strongly in some indicators than in others. This in turn means 
that some components gain more comparative influence than they would have if a 
different base year was adopted. 
To illustrate this, the example of Germany will be used here. The Threshold of 
protection in 1880 using the 1880 base year has an index value of 0.65. Utilizing the 
2010 base year however shows that the Threshold of Protection is 0. The difference is 
caused by a single indicator: the number of formalities. The 1880 base year converts 
the absolute number of exemptions from 3 to an index value of 0.65 (1880 base year 
average is 3.33). In comparison to this, the 2010 average is only 1.33 which in turn 
translates the number of formalities into an index score of 2.25 and therefore 
significantly higher. In essence, the existence of 3 formalities in 1880 is emphasised in 
the 2010 base year compared to the 1880 one because formalities are less common in 
2010 than they were in 1880. As a result, their relative importance (as reflected in the 
index value for this area of copyright stringency: Threshold of Protection) has 
increased. In summary, the relative size of individual components to each other 
explains differences in the relative magnitude of change.  
It should be noted that this effect is especially strong for the exemptions. In 
particular, the effect of exemptions as balancing the increases in copyright owners’ 
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enhanced protection is weaker for later base years. 2010 has significantly higher 
number of exemptions for all work types which in turn increases the base year value. 
For example, for copyright works, the base year has increased from 7 in 1880, to 15.67 
in 1950 and 38.67 in 2010. Unsurprisingly, the index value of the exemptions has fallen 
accordingly. In the UK in 1880, the value has fallen from 0.43 (1880 base year), to 0.19 
(1950 base year) and 0.08 (2010 base year). Looking at the 2010 time point in 
comparison, the values are also significantly lower: 5.14, 2.3 and 0.93 respectively. 
Therefore, the 1880 emphasises and the 2010 base year strongly de- emphasises the 
role of exemptions in copyright policy, exactly because the number of exemptions has 
increased so strongly over time.  
 Despite this change in emphasis, the actual evolutionary patterns are largely 
identical for all case studies. The International Level has not seen any variation in 
trends the stringency levels rise and fall at the same moments in time, irrespective of 
which base year is used. However, in a small number of instances, the direction of 
evolution varies between base years. Germany’s data exhibits the most pronounced 
variation of all case studies. In particular, the 1970 and 1980 time points differ. In 1970, 
the 1880 trend indicates a fall in the scope of protection by 30% while the other ones 
have seen increases of 48% and 47% for 1950 and 2010 respectively.199 A look at the 
index’ sub- level reveals that the only area where different trends are identifiable is 
the Protection of Moral Rights. Here, the 1880 trend has seen a slight fall in protection 
from 1.02 to 0.96 (-6%) while the 1950 base year has seen a minor increase (+2%) 
(from 1.16 to 1.18) and the 2010 one shows a doubling of the scope from 0.46 to 0.76 
                                                          
199
 The 1880 base year stringency index increases falls from 19.49 to 13.66 while the 1950 and 2010 
both increase (from 3.94 to 5.85 and from 3.6 to 3.83 respectively). 
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(+100%). By 1980, the variation in index level trends is still observable but significantly 
smaller. The scope of protection continues to fall for the 1880 base line (-2% as the 
scores drop from 13.66 to 13.38) while they continue to increase for the 1950 (from 
5.85 to 6.14) and 2010 trends lines (from 3.83 to 3.9).  
However, the key observation is that the trends at the individual indicator 
levels do not vary. In particular, the number of moral rights, their term and the 
exemptions which apply have all increased to the same extent (67%, 167% and 133% 
respectively) while the number of sanctions has not seen any change at all. Therefore, 
while the relative size of the indicators to each other has been influenced by the 
change in base year, the actual direction of change and its relative strength at the 
indicator level have not. This is not surprising given that the base year is stable for each 
indicator and the underlying data as such is not affected. This in turn means that 
increases are the same across base years despite the change in the actual index value. 
This stability at the indicator level’s trends is essential for the actual way the analysis 
was conducted. In the thesis’ main body, causes were identified by relying on the 
specific indicator in combination to the secondary literature. Because the trends at the 
indicators’ level are not affected by the different base years, neither are the causal 
conclusions drawn from them. 
 The same phenomenon is also present in the case of the UK and the US. The UK 
has seen a variation in trends between in 1980 and 1990. For the 1980 variation, the 
stringency levels increase for the 1880 and 1950 base lines (from 27.95 to 28.28 and 
from 8.67 to 8.75 respectively). However, from a 2010 view point, the level of 
stringency has fallen from 3.49 to 3.39. Despite this, the indicator level only varies for 
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the Threshold of Protection. It shows no change for 1880 base year but small increases 
for 1950 and 2010 base year trends.200 It should be noted though that the indictors 
used to calculate this stringency area actually show the same evolutionary patterns.  
 The second instance of varying trends in the UK is 1990. Here, the 1880 and 
1950 base lines both fall (from 28.28 to 23.18 and 8.75 to 6.73 respectively) while the 
2010 one increases (from 3.39 to 4.07). The area causing this variation is Protection of 
Copyrighted Works. As before, there has been no change from an 1880 perspective 
(0.57) while both the 1950 and 2010 lines have seen rising stringency levels (from 0.59 
to 0.66 and from 0.47 to 0.54). But again, all indicators used in the calculation show 
the same evolutionary pattern. As the UK example shows, variation in the overall index 
level does not mean that the trends at the actual indicator level have been affected. 
Rather, it is the relative size of the components to each other accounting for the 
difference. 
 For the US, the only difference in evolutionary patterns is in 2010 where trends 
based on the 1880 and 1950 base years show a decline in stringency while the 2010 
one increases. The 1880 base year indicates a fall from 38.49 to 37.92 and the 1950 
base year a decline from 7.01 to 6.93. At the same time, the 2010 base year reports an 
increase of 4.06 to 4.16. However, a closer look at the indicators clarifies that they 
have all increased and fallen at the same time. Therefore, the trends at the specific 
indicator level are identical as they have been in the previous instances. 
  In conclusion, choosing different base years does have some influence on the 
overall trends but not the indicators as such. The later the base year is in the time 
                                                          
200
 The 1880 trend is stable at 0.57 while the 1950 one increases from 0.58 to 0.59 and the 2010 one 
rises from 0.46 to 0.47.  
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frame, the higher is the base year average which in turn reduces the magnitude of 
change. In addition, the specific way a Laspeyres index works with each indicator being 
calculated independently has the effect of possible changes in the relative size of 
indicators to each other. This in turn can lead to differences at the overall index level 
and relative extent of change over time. Having said this, these instances are very rare 
(5 out of 56 time comparison points, each being based on 24 specific indicators). 
However, the process tracing approach adopted in this thesis to identify causality is 
not affected because the indicators all show the same trend. Finally, it should be noted 
that one of the key rules of analysing Laspeyres’ Indices is that they can never be 
compared across different base years (C. Feinstein et al. 2002: 510- 513). In this light, 
the issues identified here are not data related as such but are a well- known part of the 
methodology itself. 
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Appendix 4: Glossary of Abbreviations 
 This glossary provides explanations for all the abbreviations used in the thesis 
as well as the related data.  
Abbreviation Explanation 
AR Author Rights system 
Base year 1880 This is the average strength of provisions in 
1880, drawn from Germany, the US and the 
UK 
CL Common Law Copyright system 
CR Copyright works 
CV Coefficient of Variation 
E Explicitly exempt 
ER Economic rights 
EW Economic Works which refers to the 
combined protection of copyright works, 
neighbouring rights and performers 
EX Exemptions 
EX average Number of average conditions that apply to 
an exemptions 
EX: CR Number of exemptions which apply to 
copyright works 
EX: ER (Numeration) Number of exemptions with a remuneration 
condition 
EX: ER (Non- commercial) Number of exemptions with a non- 
commercial use condition 
EX: ER (Compensation) Number of exemptions with a compensation 
for the author/ rights owner condition 
EX: MR Number of exemptions that apply to moral 
rights 
EX: NR Number of exemptions that apply to 
neighbouring rights 
EX: Performer Number of exemption that apply to 
performers 
Formality Number of formalities 
Index  The index scores, calculated by dividing the 
numerical values by the base year.  
Index (1880) Tab showing the calculation of the index with 
the base year 1880 
NR Neighbouring rights 
MR Moral rights 
P Partial 
SEM Single European Market 
Term Term of protection 
Table 48: Summary of abbreviations used in the data spreadsheets. 
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US Copyright Law Amendment History 
Year Name of the Amending Law Common Name of the Law Reference 
1870  Copyright Act 16 Stat. 198 
1874  Copyright Amendment 18 Stat. 78 
1879  Post Office Amendment Act, Act of March 3, 1879, 55th 
Cong., 3d Sess., 20 Stat. 359. 
20 Stat. 259, 359 
1882  Copyright Amendment Act 22 Stat. 181 
1891  International Copyright Act (Chace Act) 26 Stat. 1106 
1895  Printing Law 28 Stat. 608 
1895  Copyright Amendment Act 28 Stat. 965 
1897  Copyright (Musical Performance of Musical 
Compositions) Act 
 
1897  Copyright Amendment Act 29 Stat. 694 
1909  Copyright Act 35 Stat. 1075 
1912 Public Law 62-303  37 Stat. 488 
1913 Public Law 62-405  37 Stat. 724 
1914 Public Law 63-78  38 Stat. 311 
1919 Public Law 66-102  41 Stat 368 
1926 Public Law 69-464  44 Stat. 818 
1928 Public Law 70-478  45 Stat. 713 
1938 Public Law 75-421  52 Stat. 6 
1939 Public Law 76-244  53 Stat.1142 
1940 Public Law 76-434  54 Stat. 51 
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Year Name of the Amending Law Common Name of the Law Reference 
1940 Public Law 76-450  54 Stat. 106 
1941 Public Law 77-258  55 Stat. 106 
1947 Public Law 80-281 Copyright Act 61 Stat. 652 
1948 Public Law 80-501  62 Stat. 869, 1009 
1948 Public Law 80-773  62 Stat. 202 
1949 Public Law 81-84  63 Stat. 153 
1951 Public Law 82-248  65 Stat. 710, 717 
1952 Public Law 82-575  66 Stat. 752 
1954 Public Law 83-331  68 Stat. 52 
1954 Public Law 83-743  68 Stat.1030 
1956 Public Law 84-452  70 Stat. 63 
1957 Public Law 85-313  71 Stat. 633 
1962 Public Law 87-646  76 Stat. 442, 446 
1962 Public Law 87-668  76 Stat. 555 
1962 Public Law 87-846  76 Stat. 1107, 
1116 
1965 Public Law 89-142  79 Stat. 581 
1965 Public Law 89-297  79 Stat. 1072 
1967 Public Law 90-141  81 Stat. 464 
1968 Public Law 90-416  82 Stat. 397 
1969 Public Law 91-147  83 Stat. 360 
1970 Public Law 91-555  84 Stat. 1441 
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Year Name of the Amending Law Common Name of the Law Reference 
1971 Private Law 92-60  85 Stat. 857 
1971 Public Law 92-140  85 Stat. 391 
1971 Public Law 92-170  85 Stat. 490 
1972 Public Law 92-566  86 Stat. 1181 
1974 Public Law 93-573  88 Stat. 1873 
1976 Public Law 94-553 Copyright Act 90 Stat. 2541 
1978 Public Law 95-598  92 Stat. 2549 
1978 Public Law 95-94 Legislative Branch Appropriation Act 91 Stat. 653 
1980 Public Law 96-517  94 Stat. 3015 
1982 Public Law 97-180 Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act 96 Stat. 91 
1982 Public Law 97-215  96 Stat. 178 
1982 Public Law 97-366  96 Stat. 1759 
1984 Public Law 98-450 Record Rental Amendment 98 Stat. 1727 
1984 Public Law 98-620 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act 98 Stat. 3335, 
3347 
1986 Public Law 99-397  100 Stat. 848 
1987 Public Law 100-159  101 Stat. 899 
1988 Public Law 100-568 Berne Convention Implementation Act 102 Stat. 2853 
1988 Public Law 100-617  102 Stat. 3194 
1988 Public Law 100-667 Satellite Home Viewer Act 102 Stat. 3935 
1988 Public Law 100-702 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act 102 Stat. 4642, 
4672 
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Year Name of the Amending Law Common Name of the Law Reference 
1990 Public Law 101-318 Copyright Fees and Technical Amendments Act 104 Stat. 287 
1990 Public Law 101-319 Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform and 
Miscellaneous Pay Act 
104 Stat. 290 
1990 Public Law 101-553 Copyright Remedy Clarification Act 104 Stat. 2749 
1990 Public Law 101-650 Visual Artists Rights Act 104 Stat. 5089 
1990 Public Law 101-650 Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act 104 Stat. 5089, 
5133 
1990 Public Law 101-650 Computer Software Rental Amendments Act 104 Stat. 5089, 
5134 
1991 Public Law 102-64 Semiconductor International Protection 
Extension Act 
105 Stat. 320 
1992 Public Law 102-307 Copyright Amendments Act 106 Stat. 264 
1992 Public Law 102-307 Copyright Renewal Act 106 Stat. 264 
1992 Public Law 102-492  106 Stat. 3145 
1992 Public Law 102-561  106 Stat 4233 
1992 Public Law 102-563 Audio Home Recording Act 106 Stat. 4237 
1993 Public Law 103-182 North American Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act 
107 Stat. 2057, 
2114 and 2115 
1993 Public Law 103-198 Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act 107 Stat. 2304 
1994 Public Law 103-369 Satellite Home Viewer Act 108 Stat. 3477 
1994 Public Law 103-465 Uruguay Round Agreements Act 108 Stat. 4809, 
4973 
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Year Name of the Amending Law Common Name of the Law Reference 
1995 Public Law 104-39 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act 109 Stat. 336 
1996 Public Law 104-153 Anti-counterfeiting Consumer Protection Act 110 Stat. 1386, 
1388 
1996 Public Law 104-197 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act 110 Stat. 2394 
1997 Public Law 105-147 No Electronic Theft (NET) Act 111 Stat. 2678 
1997 Public Law 105-80  111 Stat. 1529 
1998 Public Law 105-298 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 112 Stat. 2827 
1998 Public Law 105-298 Fairness in Music Licensing Act 112 Stat. 2827, 
2830 
1998 Public Law 105-304 Computer Maintenance Competition Assurance Act 112 Stat. 2860, 
2886 
1998 Public Law 105-304 Digital Millennium Copyright Act 112 Stat. 2860, 
2887 
1998 Public Law 105-304 Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act 112 Stat. 2860, 
2877 
1998 Public Law 105-304 WIPO Copyright and Performances and 
Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act 
112 Stat. 2860, 
2861 
1998 Public Law 107-273 Technology, Education, and Copyright 
Harmonization Act 
116 Stat. 1758, 
1910 
1999 Public Law 106-113 Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act 113 Stat. 1501 
1999 Public Law 106-160 Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages 
Improvement Act 
113 Stat. 1774 
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Year Name of the Amending Law Common Name of the Law Reference 
2000 Public Law 106-379 Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act 114 Stat. 1444 
2002 Public Law 107-273 Intellectual Property and High Technology Technical 
Amendments Act 
116 Stat. 1758 
2002 Public Law 107-321 Small Webcaster Settlement Act 116 Stat. 2780 
2004 Public Law 108-419 Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act 118 Stat. 2341 
2004 Public Law 108-446 Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act 118 Stat. 2647, 
2807 
2004 Public Law 108-447 Satellite Home Viewer Extension and 
Reauthorization Act 
118 Stat. 2809, 
3393 
2004 Public Law 108-482 Anti- counterfeiting Amendments Act 118 Stat. 3912 
2004 Public Law 108-482 Fraudulent Online Identity Sanctions Act 118 Stat. 3912, 
3916 
2004 Public Law 108-482 Intellectual Property Protection and Courts Amendments 
Act 
 
2005 Public Law 109-9 Artists' Rights and Theft Prevention Act 119 Stat. 2128 
2005 Public Law 109-9 Family Movie Act 119 Stat. 218, 223 
2005 Public Law 109-9 Preservation of Orphan Works Act 119 Stat 218, 226 
2006 Public Law 109-303 Copyright Royalty Judges Program Technical Corrections 
Act 
120 Stat. 1478 
2008 Public Law 110-403 Prioritizing Resources and Organization for 
Intellectual Property Act 
122 Stat. 4526 
2008 Public Law 110-435 Webcaster Settlement Act 122 Stat. 4974 
2009 Public Law 111-36 Webcaster Settlement Act 123 Stat. 1926 
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Year Name of the Amending Law Common Name of the Law Reference 
2010 Public Law 111-118 Department of Defense Appropriations Act 123 Stat. 3409 
2010 Public Law 111-144 Temporary Extension Act 124 Stat. 42 
2010 Public Law 111-157 Satellite Extension Act 124 Stat. 1116 
2010 Public Law 111-175 Satellite Extension and Localism Act 124 Stat. 1218 
2010 Public Law 111-295 Copyright Cleanup, Clarification and Corrections Act 124 Stat. 3180 
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UK Copyright Law Amendment History 
Year Name of the Amending Law Reference 
1735 Engravers Act 8 Geo. II, c. 13 
1766 Engravers Amendment Act 7 Geo. III, c. 38 
1775 University Copyright Act 15 Geo. III, c. 53 
1798 Models and Busts Acts 38 Geo. III, c. 71 
1814 Sculptures Act 54 Geo.III, c.56 
1833 Dramatic Literature Act 3 & 4 Will.IV, c.15 
1835 Publication of Lectures Act 5 & 6 Will.IV, c.65 
1842 Copyright Act 5 & 6 Vict., c.45 
1844 International Copyright Act 7 & 8 Vict., c.12 
1852 International Copyright Act 15 & 16 Vict., c.12 
1862 Fine Arts Copyright Act 25 & 26 Vict., c.68 
1882 Copyright (Musical Compositions) Act 45 & 46 Vict., c. 40 
1886 International Copyright Act 49 & 50 Vict., c.33 
1888 Copyright (Musical Compositions) Act 51 & 52 Vict. c.17 
1902 Musical (Summary Proceedings) Copyright Act 2 Edw. VII, c. 15 
1906 Musical Copyright Act 6 Edw. VII, c. 36 
1911 Copyright Act 1 & 2 Geo. V, c. 46 
1925 Dramatic and Musical Performers Act 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 46 
1956 Copyright Act 1956 c.74 
1958 Performers Act 1958 c. 44 
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Year Name of the Amending Law Reference 
1963 Performers Act 1963 c.53 
1972 Performers' Protection Act 1972 c. 32 
1979 Public Lending Right 1979 c. 10 
1988 Competition Act 1998 1998 c. 41 
1988 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 c. 48 
1988 Criminal Justice Act 1988 1988 c. 33 
1989 Design Right (Semiconductor Topographies) Regulations 1989/1100 
1990 Broadcasting Act 1990 c. 42 
1995 Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performances Regulations 1995 No. 3297 
1996 Broadcasting Act 1996 1996 c. 55 
1996 Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 1996 No. 2967 
1996 Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 1996 No. 2967 
1996 Defamation Act 1996 c. 31 
1997 Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997 No. 3032 
2002 British Overseas Territories Act 2002 c. 8 
2002 Copyright, etc. and Trade Marks (Offences and Enforcement) Act 2002 c. 25 
2002 Copyright (Visually Impaired Persons) Act 2002 c. 33 
2002 Enterprise Act 2002 c. 40 
2003 Communications Act 2003 c. 21 
2003 Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) (Extension) (No. 2) Regulations 2003 No. 2500 
2003 Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003 c. 43 
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Year Name of the Amending Law Reference 
2003 Legal Deposit Libraries Act 2003 c. 28 
2003 The Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 No. 2498 
2004 The Goods Infringing Intellectual Property Rights (Customs) Regulations 2004 No. 1473 
2005 Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 c. 11 
2005 Constitutional Reform Act 2005 c. 4 
2005 Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 c. 5 
2005 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 c. 15 
2006 Government of Wales Act 2006 c. 32 
2006 National Health Service (Consequential Provisions) Act 2006 c. 43 
2006 The Intellectual Property (Enforcement, etc.) Regulations 2006 No. 1028 
2006 The Performances (Moral Rights, etc.) Regulations 2006 No. 18 
2006 Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 c. 38 
2006 Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 c. 36 
2007 Legal Services Act 2007 c. 29 
2007 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 c. 15 
2009 The Audiovisual Media Services Regulations 2009 No. 2979 
2010 Digital Economy Act 2010 c. 24 
2010 The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (Amendment) Regulations 2010 No. 2694 
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German Copyright Law Amendment History 
Year Name of the Amending Law Common Name of the Law Reference 
1870 Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Schriftwerken, 
Abbildungen, Kompositionen und dramatischen Werken 
 1870 R.B.G.l 339 
1876 Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Werken der 
bildenden Künste 
 1876 R.B.G.l 4 
1901 Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Werken der Literatur 
und der Tonkunst 
LUG 1901 R.B.G.l 227 
1907 Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an an Werken der 
bildenden Künste und der Photographie 
KUG 1907 R.B.G.l 7 
1910 Gesetz zur Ausführung der revidierten Berner Übereinkunft 
zum Schutze von Werken der Literatur und Kunst 
 1910 R.B.G.l 739 
1935 Gesetz zur Verlängerung der Schutzkritierien im 
Urheberrecht 
 1934 R.B.G.l II 359 
1940 Gesetz zur Verlängerung der Schutzfristen für das 
Urheberrecht an Lichtbildern 
 1940 R.B.G.l 758 
1965 Gesetz über das Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte UrhG 1965, B.G.B.l, no. 51, p. 
1273 
1970 Gesetz zur Änderung von Kostenermächtigungen, 
sozialversicherungsrechtlichen und anderen 
Vorschriften 
 1970, B.G.B.l, no. 58, p. 
805 
1972 Gesetz zur Änderung des Urheberrechts  1972, B.G.B.l, no. 120, 
p. 2081 
1973 Gesetz zu den am 24. Juli 1971 in Paris 
unterzeichneten Übereinkünften auf dem Gebiet des 
Urheberrechts 
 1973 B.G.B.l II, no. 44, 
p. 1069 
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Year Name of the Amending Law Common Name of the Law Reference 
1974 Bekanntmachung über das Inkrafttreten der Pariser Fassung 
der Berner Übereinkunft zum Schutz von Werken der 
Literatur und Kunst 
 1974, B.G.B.l II, no. 45, 
p. 1079 
1974 Einführungsgesetz zum Strafgesetzbuch  1974, B.G.B.l, no. 22, p. 
469 
1985 Gesetz zur Änderung von Vorschriften auf dem Gebiet des 
Urheberrechts 
 1985, B.G.B.l, no. 33, p. 
1137 
1986 1. Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Stellung des Verletzten im 
Strafverfahren 
Opferschutzgesetz 1986, B.G.B.l, no. 68, p. 
2496 
1990 Gesetz zur Stärkung des Schutzes des geistigen Eigentums 
und zur Bekämpfung der Produktpiraterie 
 1990, B.G.B.l, no. 10, p. 
422 
1993 2. Gesetz zur Änderung des Urheberrechts  1993, B.G.B.l, no. 29, p. 
910 
1993 Bekanntmachung über das Inkrafttreten des EWR- 
Ausführungsgesetzes sowie des Anpassungsgesetzes zum 
EWR- Ausführungsgesetz 
 1993, B.G.B.l, no. 73, p. 
2436 
1993 Gesetz zur Anpassung des EWR- Ausführungsgesetzes  1993, B.G.B.l, no. 52, 
1666 
1994 Gesetz zur Änderung des Patentgebührengesetzes und 
anderer Gesetze 
 1994, B.G.B.l, no. 48, p. 
1739 
1994 Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Berufsrechts der 
Rechtsanwälte und der Patentanwälte 
 1994, B.G.B.l, no. 59, p. 
2278 
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Year Name of the Amending Law Common Name of the Law Reference 
1994 Gesetz zur Reform des Markenrechts und zur Umsetzung 
der Ersten Richtlinie 89/104/EWG des Rates vom 21. 
Dezember 1988 zur Angleichung der Rechtsvorschriften der 
Mitgliedsstaaten über die Marken 
Markenrechtsreformgesetz 1994, B.G.B.l, no. 74, p. 
3082 
1995 3. Gesetz zur Änderung des Urheberrechtsgesetzes  1995, B.G.B.l, no. 32, p. 
842 
1996 Markenrechtsänderungsgesetz  1996, B.G.B.l, no. 52, p. 
1870 
1997 Gesetz zur Regelung der Rahmenbedingungen 
für Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste 
Informations- und 
Kommunikationsdienstegesetz 
1997, B.G.B.l, no. 52, p. 
1870 
1998 2. Gesetz zur Änderung des Patentgesetzes und 
anderer Gesetze 
 1998, B.G.B.l, no. 45, p. 
1827 
1998 4. Gesetz zur Änderung des Urheberrechts  1998, B.G.B.l, no. 27, p. 
902 
2000 Gesetz zur Vergleichenden Werbung und 
Änderung wettbewerbsrechtlicher Vorschriften 
 2000, B.G.B.l, no. 42, p. 
1374 
2001 Gesetz zur Bereinigung von Kostenregulungen auf dem 
Gebiet des geistigen Eigentums 
 2001, B.G.B.l, no. 69, p. 
3656 
2001 Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts  2001, B.G.B.l, no. 61, p. 
3138 
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2002 Gesetz zur Änderung des Rechts der Vertretung durch 
Rechtsanwälte vor den Oberlandesgerichten 
OLG 
Vertretungsänderungsgesetz 
2002, B.G.B.l, no. 53, p. 
2850 
2002 Gesetz zur Stärkung der vertraglichen Stellung von Urhebern 
und ausübenden Künstlern 
 2002, B.G.B.l, no. 21, p. 
1155 
2003 Gesetz zur Regelung des Urheberrechts in der 
Informationsgesellschaft 
 2003, B.G.B.l, no. 46, p. 
312 
2006 5. Gesetz zur Änderung des Urheberrechtsgesetzes  2006, B.G.B.l, no. 46, p. 
1774 
2007 2. Gesetz zur Änderung des Finanzverwaltungsgesetzes und 
anderer Gestze 
 2007, B.G.B.l, no. 65, p. 
2897 
2007 2. Gesetz zur Regelung des Urheberrechts in 
der Informationsgesellschaft 
 2007, B.G.B.l, no. 52, p. 
2513 
2008 6. Gesetz zur Änderung des Urheberrechtsgesetzes  2008 B.G.B.l , no. 56, p. 
2349 
2008 Gesetz zur Reform des Verfahrens in Familiensachen und in 
den Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit 
FGG- Reformgesetz- FGG- 
RG 
2008 B.G.B.l, no. 61, p. 
2586 
2008 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Durchsetzung von Rechten 
des geistigen Eigentums 
 2008, B.G.B.l, no. 48, p. 
2070 
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EU Copyright  Law  Amendment  History 
Year Name of the Amending Law Common Name of the Law Reference 
1991 Directive on the legal protection of computer programs Computer Programs 
Directive 
(91/250/EEC) 
1992 Directive on rental right and lending right and on certain 
rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual 
property 
Rental Rights Directive (92/100/EEC) 
1993 Directive on harmonizing the term of protection of copyright 
and certain related rights 
Term Harmonization 
Directive 
(93/98/EEC) 
1996 Directive on the legal protection of databases Database Directive (96/9/EC) 
2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union EU Fundamental Rights 
Charter 
(2000/C 364/01) 
2001 Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights in the information society 
Information 
Society (InfoSoc) 
Directive 
(2001/29/EC) 
2001 Directive on the resale right for the benefit of the author of 
an original work of art 
Resale Right Directive (2001/84/EC) 
2004 Directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights Enforcement Directive (2004/48/EC) 
2006 Directive on rental right and lending right and on certain 
rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property 
(codified version) 
Rental Rights Directive (2006/115/EC) 
2006 Directive on the term of protection of copyright and certain 
related rights (codified version) 
Term Harmonization 
Directive 
(2006/116/EC) 
2009 Directive on the legal protection of computer programs 
(codified version) 
Computer Programs 
Directive 
2009/24/EC) 
 362 
 
International Level Copyright Law  Amendment  History 
Year Name of the Amending Law Common Name of the Law 
1886 Convention Concerning the Creation of An International 
Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
Berne Convention 
1896 Additional Act Amending Articles 2, 3, 5, 7, 12, and 20, of 
the Convention of September 9, 1886, and Number 
1 and 4 of the Final Protocol Annexed Thereto 
Paris Additional Act and Interpretative Declaration 
1908 Revised Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works 
Berlin Act 
1914 Additional Protocol to the Revised Berne Convention of 
November 13, 1908 
Berne Additional Protocol 
1928 International Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works 
Rome Act 
1948 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works 
Brussels Act 
1952 Universal Copyright Convention UCC 
1961 International Convention for the Protection of 
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organisations 
Rome Convention 
1967 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works 
Stockholm Act 
1971 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works 
Paris Act 
1971 Convention for the Protection of Producers of 
Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their 
Phonograms 
Geneva Convention 
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Year Name of the Amending Law Common Name of the Law 
1971 Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris 24 
July 1971, with Appendix Declaration relating to 
Article XVII and Resolution concerning Article XI 1971 
UCC 
1979 Amendment to Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works 
Paris Act 
1994 Trade- related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights TRIPs 
1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty WCT 
1996 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty WPPT 
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Case Law 
Country Year Reference Case Name (if listed) 
EU 1981 cases C-55/80 and 57/80 Musik Vertrieb Membran v Gema 
EU 1982 case C- 262/81 Coditel 
EU 1988 case C- 158/86 Warner Brothers v Erik Viuff Christiansen 
EU 1989 case C- 341/87 EMI v Patricia 
EU 1989 case C- 341/87 Emi v Patricia and Others 
EU 1993 cases 92 C-92/92 and C-326/92 Phil Collins and Others 
EU 1998 case C- 200/96 Metronome Musik 
EU 2004 case C- 203/02 British Horse Racing Board 
EU 2004 case C- 444/02 Fixtures Marketing I 
Germany 1971 I BvR 765/66, Bundesgesetzblatt 
Teil I No. 112 (12/11/1971) 
 
 
Germany 1971 I BvR 766/66, Bundesgesetzblatt 
Teil I 1971 No. 124 (9/12/1971) 
 
 
Germany 1978 I BvR 352/71, Bundesgesetzblatt 
Teil I, No. 11 (6/3/1979) 
 
  
Germany 1884 1884 RGZ 12, 50  
Germany 1887 1887 RGZ 18, 150  
Germany 1895 1895 RGZ 34, 104  
Germany 1898 1898 RGZ 41, 43  
Germany 1908 1908 RGZ 69, 242  
Germany 1909 1909 RGZ 70, 266  
Germany 1912 1912 RGZ 79, 397  
Germany 1913 1913 RGZ 82, 333  
Germany 1922 1922 RGZ 105, 160  
Germany 1924 1924 RGZ 108, 62  
Germany 1926 1926 RGZ 113, 413  
Germany 1928 1928 RGZ 121, 357  
Germany 1929 1929 RGZ 123, 312  
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Country Year Reference Case Name (if listed) 
Germany 1932 1932 RGZ 136, 377  
Germany 1933 1933 RGZ 140, 137  
Germany 1933 1933 RGZ 141, 231  
Germany 1956 1956 BGHZ MDR 1956/42, 1553 Nichtöffentliche Musikdarbietung 
Germany 1956 1956 BGH MDR/42, 1552 Recht am eigenen Bilde 
Germany 1958 1958 BGH MDR 1959/4, 276- 7 Fahrscheinformular 
Germany 1958 1958 BGHZ MDR 1958/10, 749 Mecki Igel 
Germany 1959 1959 BGH MDR 1960/5, 375-6 Orientteppich 
Germany 1960 1960 BGH MDR 5/1960, 376 Werbung für Tonbandgeräte 
Germany 1971 case 78/70 Deutsche Grammophone Gesellschaft v Metro 
Germany 1971 1971 BGH NJW, 1971 # 48, 2169- 
2173 
Disney Parodie 
Germany 1972 1972 BGH MDR 1973/1, 33 Handbuch moderner Zitate 
Germany 1974 1974 BGH MDR 1974/7, 557- 8 Hummelrechte 
Germany 1980 1980 BGH MDR 1981/8, 641-2 Dirlada I 
Germany 1993 1993 BGH MDR 1994/2, 155  
Germany 1994 1994 BGH MDR 1994/11, 1103  
Germany 1995 1995 BGH MDR 1996/4, 365  
Germany 1998 1998 BGH MDR 1997/2, 157-8  
Germany 1998 1996 BGH, 10.12.1998 - I ZR 
100/96 
Elektronische Pressearchive 
Germany 1999 1999 BGH, 25.02.1999 - I ZR 
118/96 
Kopienversanddienst 
Germany 2006 2006 BGH 5.10.2006 - I ZR 277/03 Kinsky Klaus 
Germany 2008 2008 BGH, 17.07.2008 - I ZR 
219/05 
Clone CD 
Germany 2010 2010 BGH, 19.05.2010 - I ZR 
158/08 
Markenheftchen 
UK 1741 (1741) 2 Atk. 141 Gyles v Wilcox 
UK 1741 (1741) 2 Atk. 342 Pope v Curl 
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Country Year Reference Case Name (if listed) 
UK 1774 Hansard, 1st ser., 17 (1774): 953- 
1003 
Donaldson v Beckett 
UK 1854 4 HLC 815 Jeffreys v Boosey 
UK 1895 1985 2 Q.B 429 Fuller v Blackpool Winter Gardens 
UK 1900 [1900] AC 539 Walter v Lane 
US 1837 33 U.S. 591 Wheaton v Peters 
US 1841 (C.C.D.Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) Folsom v Marsh 
US 1880 101 U.S. 99 Baker v Selden 
US 1884 111 U.S. 53 Burrow- Giles Lithographic Co. v Sarony 
US 1903 188 U.S. 239 Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Company 
US 1908 210 U.S. 339 Bobbs- Merill v Straus 
US 1908 209 U.S. 1 White- Smith Music Publishing Cp. v Apollo Co. 
US 1948 80 N.Y.S.2d575 Shostakovich v 20 th Century Fox Film Corp. 
US 1954 347 U.S. 201, 219 Mazer v Stein 
US 1964 329 F.2d 541 Irving berlin v E.C. Publishing 
US 1973 487 F.2d 1345 Williams & Wilkins v US 
US 1984 464 U.S. 417 Sony Corp. of America v Universal Studios, Inc. 
US 1985 471 U.S. 539 Harper & Row v Nation Enterprises 
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